

# **A Multi-Generational Effort to Eliminate the Uyghurs: An Ongoing Genocide**



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The Global Accountability Network



The Pacific Rim Accountability Project of The Global Accountability Network Presents:

**A MULTI-GENERATIONAL EFFORT TO ELIMINATE THE UYGHURS: AN ONGOING GENOCIDE**

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The Global Accountability Network (GAN) is a collective of international criminal prosecutors and practitioners who supervise and work with law students on specific atrocity projects for Syria, Yemen, Venezuela, Ukraine, and Pacific Rim region. The students under the newly formed Pacific Rim Accountability Project (PRAP) of GAN are assigned to a section of the work such as investigations, research, and/or legal analysis regarding alleged war crimes and/or crimes against humanity. PRAP's goals are to gather evidence that can one day help to form the basis for criminal prosecution and to make a qualitative analysis on the current crises throughout the Pacific Rim region.

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## Executive Summary

This report<sup>1</sup> provides a detailed narrative of the crimes being perpetrated by the Chinese Government against the Uyghur Muslims and other Turkic Muslim minority groups in Xinjiang, China. The Chinese Government describes their actions as “counter-terrorism,” countering extremism, or providing skills-based “re-education,” with policies implemented by high-level Government officials. In reality, the Government has implemented a program of mass detention/re-education camps, with intense surveillance both within and beyond the camps, and a program of forced labor. Despite the original focus, or purported focus, on counter-terrorism—as a response to particular violent incidents—the large-scale crimes being perpetrated against the Uyghurs cannot possibly be explained as counter-terrorism.

Conditions in the Uyghur detention/re-education “camps” are horrific, with crimes being committed there including murder, mass rape (sometimes for profit), torture (including using electroshocks), other sexual abuse, and medical experimentation. In one of the grizzliest aspects, it is reported that Uyghurs between 25–35 years of age are selected for “organ harvesting,” with the organs sold to wealthy purchasers. While total fatality figures resulting from the organ harvesting are difficult to trace, by some estimates, approximately 25,000 people per year are victims, with the Government earning significant sums from the sales of organs. Additionally, there are reports of crematoria built near detention camps, family told they may not see bodies of the deceased, and reports of liquids designed to dissolve bodies. In total, some sources suggest there are *several million* Uyghurs missing—between the detention, forced labor, and the number killed outright.

In addition, there appears to be a concerted effort to eliminate a substantial number of the next generation through a campaign of mass forced abortion, mass forced sterilization, and mass forced marriages. The forced marriages require Uyghur women to marry Han Chinese men or risk facing detention. Also aimed at targeting the next generation is a large-scale campaign to remove Uyghur children from their parents and place them in orphanages and schools where they are taught Mandarin and isolated from their traditional language, culture and religion. The Uyghurs’ culture is also being eradicated through the destruction of mosques, gravestones, and other important cultural and religious objects; perversion of traditional festivals; and the disappearance of prominent religious and intellectual leaders.

All told, *each* of the underlying crimes of genocide appears to be occurring: (a) killing members of the group; (b) causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group; (c) deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about its physical destruction in whole or in part; (d) imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group; and (e) forcibly transferring children of the group to another group.<sup>2</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> The report was compiled solely through open-source information.

<sup>2</sup> Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (“Genocide Convention”), 78 U.N.T.S. 277, Dec. 9, 1948, Art. II.

Coupling this pattern of purposeful conduct with high-level Chinese Government officials' statements about "eradicating" the "viruses" and "tumors" (derogatory terms for the Uyghurs and/or their beliefs), the special mental state requirement (*dolus specialis*) of genocide can be shown. That is, there is clear "intent to destroy" a substantial part of the Uyghur population, which is a distinct ethnic and religious group, through the underlying crimes. Simply using open-source information, one can put together, as this report does, a *prima facie* case of genocide.

Because of the extensive use of cyber to conduct surveillance of the Uyghurs, the use of facial recognition technology to identify who is a Uyghur, as well as the use of malware against the Uyghurs, the crimes detailed herein additionally could be considered a cyber-enabled genocide.

The People's Republic of China (PRC) bears state responsibility for violating the Genocide Convention and Chinese Government officials bear individual criminal responsibility for committing the crime of genocide. Additionally, under Article I of the Genocide Convention, all States Parties to the Genocide Convention have the obligation to "prevent" genocide,<sup>3</sup> which they are failing to satisfy. States Parties are obligated to utilize all means reasonably available to them to prevent this ongoing genocide.<sup>4</sup> The report concludes with analysis of what additional steps states could take to meet their statutory obligations and pursue legal remedies for the perpetration of the crimes discussed in this report.

The crimes analyzed are both "widespread" and "systematic," and committed in the context of an "attack" against the civilian population pursuant to Governmental plans and policies. As such they would equally qualify as crimes against humanity—which states *also* have an obligation to prevent; this report, however, focuses on the crime of genocide. While the report primarily examines the treatment of the Uyghurs, some of the same crimes are being perpetrated against additional Muslim groups<sup>5</sup> as well as the peoples of Tibet.

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<sup>3</sup> *Id.* Art. I. The obligation is triggered once there is a "serious risk" of genocide occurring, as clearly exists. Case Concerning the Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Bosn & Herz. v. Serb. and Montenegro), Judgment of 26 February 2007, ICJ Rep. 43 (Feb. 26), paras. 430–31 ("*Bosnia v. Serbia* case") (serious risk).

<sup>4</sup> For the due diligence obligations states owe, see *id.*

<sup>5</sup> Other targeted groups include, but are not limited to, Kazakhs, Hui, Uzbeks, Kyrgyz, and Tajiks.

# A Multi-Generational Effort to Eliminate the Uyghurs: An Ongoing Genocide

This report provides an overview and analysis of crimes being committed against the Uyghurs and other Turkic Muslim minority groups in the Xinjiang Province of China. Part I provides background information. Part II then examines some of the Chinese officials who are in charge of implementing policies in Xinjiang. Part III provides a detailed narrative regarding the crimes being committed against the Uyghurs. Part IV explains how the special mental state requirement of genocide (*dolus specialis*) is met. Appendix A then provides a compilation of open-source materials related to the crimes. Appendix B contains a chart detailing the Government's structure and Government officials in positions to potentially set policy related to the Uyghurs. Appendix C contains a chart of detailed findings on: cultural erasure/assimilation, surveillance, detention/re-education, forced labor, torture, murder, rape, other sexual violence, medical experimentation, forced sterilization, forced abortion, forced marriage, and removal of Uyghur children. Finally, Appendix D compiles additional law on the crime of genocide and factual support illustrating how the elements of the crime are met.

Put together, these findings clearly indicate a genocide designed to erase a substantial part of the Uyghur population. While many crimes are occurring currently, the forced sterilization, forced abortion, and forced marriage campaigns and removal of Uyghur children appear designed to ensure destruction of the next generation of Uyghurs.

## I. Background

### *Overview: Who Are the Uyghurs?*

The Xinjiang Province, also known as the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region (XUAR), is a large territory located in Northwest China. Under Chinese control since 1949, the region makes up one sixth of China's territory.<sup>6</sup> With a population of over 25 million,<sup>7</sup> the region is home to several ethnic groups, the largest group being that of the Uyghur Muslims. The Uyghur Muslims are ethnically and culturally Turkic peoples. China's 2001 national census indicated that the Uyghurs comprised nearly 50% of the population in Xinjiang, making them the dominant nationality in the region.<sup>8</sup>

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<sup>6</sup> Lillian Craig Harris, "Xinjiang, Central Asia and the Implications for China's Policy in the Islamic World," *The China Quarterly*, vol. 133, Mar. 1993, pp. 111–129, at 111, <https://doi.org/10.1017/s030574100001821x>.

<sup>7</sup> Mihray Abdilim and Alim Seytoff, "China's Xinjiang Population Growth Report Raises Eyebrows," *Radio Free Asia*, Oct. 6 2021, <https://www.rfa.org/english/news/uyghur/population-white-paper-09302021162942.html>.

<sup>8</sup> Yu-Wen Chen, *The Uyghur Lobby: Global Networks, Coalitions and Strategies of the World Uyghur Congress*, Routledge, Taylor & Francis Group, 2014.

The Chinese Government has aggressively targeted the Uyghurs more than other Islamic groups because of conflicting Uyghur and Chinese claims to the Xinjiang region.<sup>9</sup> Prior to its acquisition by China, Xinjiang was known as East Turkestan.<sup>10</sup> Historical records prove the Uyghurs' 4,000 year long history in the region—forming the crossroads between the East and the West along the original Silk Road.<sup>11</sup> The Uyghurs long history, one that is intertwined with Islam and their distinct, established culture in the region are seen to pose a threat to China's monolithic Han-based culture.<sup>12</sup>

### **CCP Policy in Xinjiang**

As the Province is removed from China both culturally and geographically, Chinese policy in Xinjiang has been formulated to maintain the PRC's power in the region. Chinese authority in the region has long been disputed and opposed by ethnic minorities, with Government "policies of assimilation" dating back to the late 19<sup>th</sup> and early 20<sup>th</sup> centuries. There has been a history of unequal treatment in the region, claimed to "penaliz[e] Uyghurs for no reason other than preferential treatment [towards the majority Han population] based on ethnicity."<sup>13</sup> For decades, Uyghur militants, known as the East Turkestan Movement (ETIM) have sought to establish an independent East Turkestan. Founded by Hasan Mahsum, a Uyghur from Xinjiang's Kashgar region, the ETIM seeks to establish an independent state that includes the Uyghur region of China and parts of Turkey, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan, Pakistan, and Afghanistan.<sup>14</sup>

The tumultuous history of repression in Xinjiang reached a turning point in the 1990s with the PRC's reaction to the growth of separatist movements and demands for independence. In 1996, a Government document entitled "Document No. 7" declared the conflict in Xinjiang to be a serious threat to the PRC, with a "Strike Hard" campaign implemented against protests, enabling the violent suppression of riots the following year.<sup>15</sup> The "Strike Hard" campaign authorized the arrest and detention—without trial—of any persons suspected of separatism or "illegal religious activities."<sup>16</sup>

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<sup>9</sup> Nicholas Fuller, "Xinjiang: The History and Context of Modern Issues," *The Undergraduate Research Journal of History*, vol. 6, 2016, <https://scholarworks.iu.edu/journals/index.php/iusburjh/article/view/22855/>.

<sup>10</sup> *Id.* at 13–14.

<sup>11</sup> *Id.*

<sup>12</sup> *Id.* at 18.

<sup>13</sup> *Id.* at 13.

<sup>14</sup> Beina Xu, Holly Fletcher, and Jayshree Bajoria, (1) "The East Turkestan Islamic Movement (ETIM)," *Council on Foreign Relations*, Sept. 4, 2014, <https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/east-turkestan-islamic-movement-etim>.

<sup>15</sup> Michael Dillon, "A Uyghurs' History of China," *History Today*, vol. 70, no. 1, Jan. 1, 2020, <https://www.historytoday.com/archive/behind-times/uyghurs%E2%80%99-history-china>.

<sup>16</sup> *Id.*



Post-9/11, concern over separatist groups and movements within the region came to be couched as dealing with “Islamic terrorists,”<sup>17</sup> with resultant shifts in media rhetoric and Government policy.<sup>18</sup> At the request of the Chinese Government, the U.S. Treasury in 2002 listed the ETIM as a “terrorist organization.”<sup>19</sup> As a result, 22 Uyghurs were wrongfully detained at the U.S. military facilities in Guantánamo Bay, Cuba, until all were cleared in 2013, with many claiming to never have heard of the ETIM.<sup>20</sup> The Guantánamo Uyghurs were used as instruments of Chinese propaganda against the Uyghurs; notwithstanding the individuals’ release and relocation in 2013, the Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesman still addressed them as “terrorists.”<sup>21</sup> Using the Guantánamo Uyghurs as purported “evidence” of Uyghur extremism—coupled with the Bush Administration’s “War Against Terror”—the Chinese Government justified its own terror campaign against the Uyghurs.

In more recent years, growing tensions in the region came to a head with a year of unrest in 2008 following the arrest and subsequent death of prominent Uyghur businessman Mutallip Hajim.<sup>22</sup> The riots resulted in a large number of arrests, after which thousands of protestors took to the streets, prompted not only by Hajim’s death but by ongoing “restrictions on religious expression by the Chinese government....”<sup>23</sup> The unrest caused China to tighten its hold on the region, resulting in a continued crackdown, with increased executions and detentions. Imprisonment without charge or trial on fabricated claims of “extremism” had been on the upswing since the 2008 civil and political unrest.<sup>24</sup>

The 2008 violence escalated the inter-ethnic conflict between Turkic-speaking Muslim Uyghurs and Han Chinese, leading to the events on July 5, 2009.<sup>25</sup> The day began as a peaceful Uyghur demonstration in response to “government inaction,” but developed into a conflict that

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<sup>17</sup> Minglang Zhou and Hongkai Sun, “Minority Language Rights in China,” *Language Policy in the People’s Republic of China: Theory and Practice since 1949*, Kluwer Academic Publishers, Boston, 2004, at 55.

<sup>18</sup> *Id.* at 55.

<sup>19</sup> Xu et al. (1), *supra* note 14.

<sup>20</sup> James Griffiths, “These Uyghurs Were Locked up by the US in Guantanamo. Now They’re Being Used as an Excuse for China’s Crackdown in Xinjiang,” *CNN*, May 15, 2021, <https://www.cnn.com/2021/05/15/china/china-xinjiang-guantanamo-uyghurs-intl-hnk/index.html>.

<sup>21</sup> *Id.*

<sup>22</sup> Fuller, *supra* note 9, at 14. He was arrested for his affiliation with Muslim schools.

<sup>23</sup> *Id.* at 14.

<sup>24</sup> Human Rights Watch (1), “‘We Are Afraid to Even Look for Them’ Enforced Disappearances in the Wake of Xinjiang’s Protests,” *Human Rights Watch*, Oct. 20, 2009, <https://www.hrw.org/report/2009/10/20/we-are-afraid-even-look-them/enforced-disappearances-wake-xinjiangs-protests>.

<sup>25</sup> Due to the “party-state’s labor surplus export program” that was enacted in 2002, 96,000 workers from southern Xinjiang were transferred to other parts of China in 2009; 818 Uyghurs were transferred to the Xuri Toy Factory as part of this program. The purpose of this program, as stated by the CCP, was to give Uyghurs the opportunity to “access new ideas,” “become more open minded,” and “access modernization” by being in direct contact with populations with a Han majority. David Tobin, “Nation-Building and Ethnic Boundaries in China’s Northwest,” *The University of Manchester*, 2013, at 131, [https://www.research.manchester.ac.uk/portal/files/54540917/FULL\\_TEXT.PDF](https://www.research.manchester.ac.uk/portal/files/54540917/FULL_TEXT.PDF).

resulted in the deaths of nearly 200 people in Xinjiang's regional capital of Urumqi.<sup>26</sup> The CCP framed the violence "as the work of international and domestic 'separatists' and 'terrorists,'" categorizing the threat as transnational.<sup>27</sup> In China, the incident is referred to as "the 7/5 incident,"<sup>28</sup> and provided further ammunition for the CCP's 2014 launch of the still ongoing "Strike Hard against Violent Terrorism" campaign against the Uyghurs.<sup>29</sup>

By 2017, the Chinese Government embarked on a systematic mass detention of Uyghur Muslims. The number of people detained rose exponentially, with leaked secret Chinese Government documents revealing that individuals could be detained for supposed "crimes" such as "wearing a veil or growing a long beard."<sup>30</sup> Other reasons for detention have been: contradicting Government officials, travel to certain states, attending a mosque, having over three children, or reciting Quranic verses.<sup>31</sup> Along with the existence of detention centers, hundreds of thousands are also being sentenced to prison terms on similar grounds, without charge or trial.<sup>32</sup> As previously mentioned, by some estimates, there are several *million* Uyghurs missing—between the detention, forced labor, and number killed outright.<sup>33</sup>

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<sup>26</sup> In an attempt to prevent the violence, Uyghur Journalist Heyrat Niyaz claimed to have warned the Government, one day in advance, about the possibility of a violent conflict breaking out. *Id.* at 131. Sophie Beach, "Heyrat Niyaz on the July 5 Riots in Urumchi," *China Digital Times*, July 9, 2009, <https://chinadigitaltimes.net/2009/07/heytrat-niyaz-on-the-july-5-riots-in-urumchi/>. In an interview published in the Hong Kong newsweekly *Yazhou Zhoukan*, Niyaz was quoted as saying: "At the time, the official [whom he had notified] said he would make a phone call to seek instructions. In the end, not a single one of these recommendations [about how to prevent conflict from breaking out] was taken. In fact, I was not even the first person to warn the relevant Government agencies on July 4. Just after 6 p.m. on July 4 another person had provided a warning." Shortly after this interview, Niyaz was convicted under Article 111 of China's Criminal Code and sentenced to 15 years in prison for "endangering state security." *Id.*

<sup>27</sup> Sheena Chestnut Greitens, Myunghee Lee, and Emir Yazici (1), "Counterterrorism and Preventive Repression: China's Changing Strategy in Xinjiang," *International Security*, vol. 44, no. 3, Jan. 1, 2020, at 40, [https://doi.org/10.1162/isec\\_a\\_00368](https://doi.org/10.1162/isec_a_00368).

<sup>28</sup> Tobin, *supra* note 25. The trigger of the violence had been the murder of Uyghur laborers in the Xuri Toy Factory in Shaoguan, Guangdong, a few weeks earlier on June 26, 2009, by Han co-workers who believed that two Uyghur males had raped an unknown number of Chinese women. It is unclear whether the original rapes actually occurred. *Id.*

<sup>29</sup> Maya Wang, et al. (1), "'Break Their Lineage, Break Their Roots,'" *Human Rights Watch*, Apr. 19, 2021, <https://www.hrw.org/report/2021/04/19/break-their-lineage-break-their-roots/chinas-crimes-against-humanity-targeting>.

<sup>30</sup> Ivan Watson and Ben Wescott, "China's Xinjiang Records Revealed: Uyghurs Thrown into Detention for Growing Beards or Bearing Too Many Children, Leaked Chinese Document Shows," *CNN*, 2020, <https://www.cnn.com/interactive/2020/02/asia/xinjiang-china-karakax-document-intl-hnk/>.

<sup>31</sup> Lindsay Maizland, "China's Repression of Uyghurs in Xinjiang," *Council on Foreign Relations*, Mar. 1, 2021, <https://www.cfr.org/background/chinas-repression-uyghurs-xinjiang#chapter-title-0-2>.

<sup>32</sup> BBC News (1), "Who Are the Uyghurs and Why Is China Being Accused of Genocide?," *BBC News*, June 21, 2021, <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-china-22278037>.

<sup>33</sup> CJ Werleman, "'Death is Everywhere' Millions More Uyghurs Missing," *Byline Times*, Aug. 24, 2020, <https://bylinetimes.com/2020/08/24/death-is-everywhere-millions-more-uyghurs-missing/>. See also Appendix D at 197 (different calculations as to the number missing).

### *What Is Happening in Xinjiang?*

The Human Rights Council's 2018 *Compilation on China* highlighted "concern about reports that ethnic minorities continued to face severe restrictions in the realization of their right to take part in cultural life" and their right to "practice their religion freely."<sup>34</sup> Moreover, the World Uyghur Congress cites the use of forced confessions, torture, and arbitrary arrest, along with large-scale withholding of basic civil and political rights.<sup>35</sup> The extensive detail in the report highlights the violations committed by the PRC, specifically reports of torture, and numerous cases of maltreatment in the internment camps where individuals are "forced to undergo indoctrination classes, [forced to] march shouting Communist Party slogans, provided very little food throughout the day, and housed in small rooms with many other inmates."<sup>36</sup> Crackdowns in the region in the last decade have attracted increased international attention, with reports of mass surveillance, mass internment, forced sterilization, torture, forced organ "harvesting," medical experimentation, and other crimes in Xinjiang, documented by numerous international news sources and non-governmental organizations,<sup>37</sup> and detailed in the current report.

In November 2019, the International Consortium of Investigative Journalists (ICIJ) launched the *China Cables* investigation into the mass internment and surveillance of Uyghurs and other Muslim minorities in the region.<sup>38</sup> The investigation uncovered detailed, specific instructions on the maintenance and operation of the detention camps, including the prevention of escapes, the importance of total secrecy on the inner working of the camps, and methods of forced indoctrination, labeled by Government officials as "education."<sup>39</sup> The documents reveal

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<sup>34</sup> United Nations Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, "Compilation on China: Report of the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights," *United Nations Digital Library*, United Nations, Aug. 27, 2018, <https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/1645054?ln=en#record-files-collapse-header>.

<sup>35</sup> World Uyghur Congress, "Parallel Submission to the Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination (CERD) for the People's Republic of China (PRC)," *World Uyghur Congress*, 96th Session, 2018, <https://www.uyghurcongress.org/en/wp-content/uploads/2018/07/World-Uyghur-Congress-CERD-Submission-China-July-2018.pdf>. Uyghur Organizations such as the World Uyghur Congress (WUC) were formed as early as 2004, with the aim of promoting the right to global self-determination for Uyghur Muslims. The Uyghur Human Rights Project (UHRP) was formed in 2004 with the mission of promoting human rights and democracy for the Uyghur people, to raise awareness of human rights abuses occurring in Xinjiang, and demonstrate the longstanding history of cultural tensions in the region.

<sup>36</sup> *Id.*

<sup>37</sup> See, e.g., Yonah Diamond et al., "The Uyghur Genocide: An Examination of China's Breaches of the 1948 Genocide Convention," *New Lines Institute for Strategy and Policy*, Mar. 8, 2021, <https://newlinesinstitute.org/wp-content/uploads/Chinas-Breaches-of-the-GC3-2.pdf>.

<sup>38</sup> International Consortium of Investigative Journalists, "Read the China Cables Documents," *ICIJ*, Mar. 24, 2022, <https://www.icij.org/investigations/china-cables/read-the-china-cables-documents/>. Leaked official Government documents, sourced and published by the ICIJ, reveal that the "camps" function as high security prisons. *Id.*

<sup>39</sup> Bethany Allen-Ebrahimian, "Exposed: China's Operating Manuals for Mass Internment and Arrest by Algorithm," *ICIJ*, Mar. 24, 2022, <https://www.icij.org/investigations/china-cables/exposed-chinas-operating-manuals-for-mass-internment-and-arrest-by-algorithm/>.

the extent of ethnic and religious indoctrination Uyghurs undergo in the detention/re-education camps “aimed at transforming them into secular and loyal supporters of the party.”<sup>40</sup>

China’s response to international calls for fact-finding missions and access for the UN has been dismissive. The Government claims that the policy targeting Uyghurs within the region is part of a wider counter-terrorism initiative, and detention camps are merely “vocational training centers” aimed at integrating Uyghur Muslims into society.<sup>41</sup> (Appendix D openly raises the counter-narrative that China would likely present.)<sup>42</sup> However, the facts indicate that the mass detention of, and other crimes being committed against, the Uyghurs cannot be justified as counter-terrorism. Rather, they appear to be part of an ongoing system of repression and crimes that—between the crimes impacting currently as well as those aimed at eliminating the next generation of Uyghurs, or a substantial part thereof—amount to genocide.

## **II. Chinese Officials with Key Roles in Implementing Policy Related to the Uyghurs**

### ***Brief Overview of Policymakers Over Time***

The Chinese Government is pursuing a systematic erasure of Uyghur culture and the Uyghur people.<sup>43</sup> A chart detailing Government officials with potential responsibility related to the CCP’s campaigns against the Uyghurs is located in Appendix B, while a narrative of the same follows.

In Xinjiang, there are two branches of bureaucratic agencies “that have the most influence over policy and [its] implantation in Xinjiang”<sup>44</sup>—the United Front Work Department

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<sup>40</sup> Austin Ramzy and Chris Buckley, “‘Absolutely No Mercy’: Leaked Files Expose How China Organized Mass Detentions of Muslims,” *The New York Times*, Nov. 16, 2019, <https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2019/11/16/world/asia/china-xinjiang-documents.html>.

<sup>41</sup> Allen-Ebrahimian, *supra* note 39. *See also infra* at 10–11; text accompanying note 177.

<sup>42</sup> *See* Appendix D at 193 (counter-narrative).

<sup>43</sup> James Millward and Dahlia Peterson, “China’s System of Oppression in Xinjiang: How it Developed and How to Curb it,” *Brookings Institute*, Sept. 2020, [https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2020/09/FP\\_20200914\\_china\\_oppression\\_xinjiang\\_millward\\_peterson.pdf](https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2020/09/FP_20200914_china_oppression_xinjiang_millward_peterson.pdf).

<sup>44</sup> Jessica Batke, “Central and Regional Leadership for Xinjiang Policy in Xi’s Second Term,” *China Leadership Monitor*, 2021, <https://www.hoover.org/sites/default/files/research/docs/clm56jb.pdf>.



(UFWD)<sup>45</sup> and the Central Political and Legal Affairs Commission (PLC).<sup>46</sup> There is limited publicly available information about the individuals working in these agencies and the work they perform, as the CCP has made an active effort to keep this work hidden.<sup>47</sup>

Two dominant policies have shaped CCP policy regarding Xinjiang—Sinicization and counter-terrorism. Under **President Xi Jinping**, the CCP has attempted to “Sinicize” the Province.<sup>48</sup> Sinicization refers to the shaping of religion to conform to the CCP’s officially atheist doctrines and the majority Han-Chinese society’s customs.<sup>49</sup> Although “Sinicization of religion” was first introduced by President Xi in 2015 at a national conference hosted by

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<sup>45</sup> Alexander Bowe, “China’s Overseas United Front Work, Background and Implications for the United States,” *The U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission*, Aug. 24, 2018, [https://www.uscc.gov/sites/default/files/Research/China%27s%20Overseas%20United%20Front%20Work%20-%20Background%20and%20Implications%20for%20US\\_final\\_0.pdf](https://www.uscc.gov/sites/default/files/Research/China%27s%20Overseas%20United%20Front%20Work%20-%20Background%20and%20Implications%20for%20US_final_0.pdf). “The UFWD, which is the primary organization responsible for United Front work within China and United Front operations targeting Chinese communities abroad, is a high-level Party body that reports directly to the CCP’s Central Committee. The UFWD follows the direction of China’s broader United Front strategy set forth by the CPPCC, a coordinating body led by a member of the Party’s Politburo Standing Committee that brings together representatives of China’s other interest groups under the CCP’s overall leadership. The UFWD comprises four subordinate offices and nine specialized bureaus, each dealing with a particular targeted group such as China’s eight officially approved non-communist political parties, ethnic minorities, and Chinese communities overseas. President Xi recently expanded the UFWD by establishing two new bureaus. One, which targets representatives of the “New Social Classes,” is responsible for garnering support from China’s new middle class, and the other cultivates loyalty and suppresses separatism in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region of western China, home to the Uyghur ethnic group and other Muslim minorities.” *Id.*

<sup>46</sup> Charlotte Gao, “Xi Stresses the Party’s Absolute Leadership Over Political and Legal Work,” *The Diplomat*, Jan. 23, 2018, <https://thediplomat.com/2018/01/xi-stresses-the-partys-absolute-leadership-over-political-and-legal-work/>. “In China’s political dictionary, political and legal work involves all the work related to China’s legal enforcement system, including the police force, the procuratorates, the ministry of justice, the judicial branch, the state security agency, and other relevant departments. Under China’s political system, all these authorities should follow the leadership of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) and the Central Political and Legal Affairs Commission (CPLAC)—directly under the CCP’s Central Committee—oversees all these authorities in practice.” *Id.*

<sup>47</sup> *Id.* The need for secrecy was emphasized when PLC Secretary, Zhou Yongkang, was sentenced to prison for “intentional disclosure of state secrets” in 2012. Yuwen Wu, “Profile: China’s Fallen Security Chief Zhou Yongkang,” *BBC News*, Oct. 12, 2015, <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-china-26349305>.

<sup>48</sup> Connor W. Dooley, “Silencing Xinjiang, The Chinese Government’s Campaign Against the Uyghurs,” *The Georgia Journal of International and Comparative Law*, 2019, <https://digitalcommons.law.uga.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=2472&context=gjicl>.

<sup>49</sup> Michael Clarke (1), “‘No Cracks, No Blind Spots, No Gaps’: Technologically-Enabled ‘Preventative’ Counterterrorism and Mass Repression in Xinjiang, China,” *Counterterrorism Ethics and Technology*, Advanced Sciences and Technologies for Security Applications, at 121–137, 2022, <https://link.springer.com/content/pdf/10.1007/978-3-030-90221-6.pdf>.

UFWD,<sup>50</sup> since the 1980s onward, regulations were been implemented to curb the spread of religion, but had not been as effective as the CCP hoped.<sup>51</sup>

CCP policies also related to, or purport to relate to, counterterrorism. After the “7/5 incident” in 2009, discussed above, **Zhu Hailun**, Xinjiang Security Chief, was dispatched to coordinate the Government’s response.<sup>52</sup> He implemented the first-ever local recruitment of *Special Police Unit* (SPU) officers in Xinjiang, a “highly effective” strike force, designed to deal with large-scale security threats.<sup>53</sup> **Wang Lequan**, the former Xinjiang Party Secretary from 1994–2010, was replaced in April 2010 by **Zhang Chunxian**, who implemented “grid-style social management.”<sup>54</sup> Zhang Chunxian’s grid management harnessed new surveillance technologies and big data analytics to comprehensively monitor activities within Xinjiang.<sup>55</sup> As a result of the change in leadership, total security-related recruitment for the SPU doubled.<sup>56</sup> Additionally, in January 2012, the recruitment of 8,000 new police officers was announced by the region’s government in an attempt to reinforce security before the 18<sup>th</sup> CCP National Congress.<sup>57</sup> This allowed the implementation of the “*one village, one policeman*”<sup>58</sup> strategy, which created a multi-tiered police force consisting of a single substation police officer who oversaw a maximum of three assistant police officers in each rural village. Through these measures, security and surveillance in Xinjiang dramatically increased.

The CCP, through the Xinjiang Party Secretary at the time, Zhang Chunxian, couched the CCP’s treatment of the Uyghurs in May 2014 as part of the “Strike Hard Campaign against Violent Terrorism” campaign.<sup>59</sup> The CCP then inaugurated the “People’s War on Terror” in the

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<sup>50</sup> Naoko Eto, “Why Does the Xi Jinping Administration Advocate the “Sinicization” of Religion?,” *The Sasakawa Peace Foundation*, Aug. 11, 2018, <https://www.spf.org/spf-china-observer/en/document-detail008.html>.

<sup>51</sup> Richard Madsen, “The Party and Religion: Toward Sinicization?,” *China Focus*, Nov. 13, 2017, <https://chinafocus.ucsd.edu/2017/11/13/the-party-and-religion-toward-sinicization/>.

<sup>52</sup> “The CCP’s initial response to [the July 5<sup>th</sup> 2009 incident] was focused on replacement of senior party figures in Xinjiang—including Urumqi CCP secretary Li Zhi and long-serving Xinjiang CCP chairman Wang Lequan—and a renewed focus on ‘stability maintenance.’” Michael Clarke (2), “Urumqi 2009 and the Road to Xinjiang Re-education Centers,” *The Diplomat*, July 11, 2019, <https://thediplomat.com/2019/07/urumqi-2009-and-the-road-to-xinjiang-re-education-centers/>.

<sup>53</sup> Adrian Zenz and James Leibold, “Securitizing Xinjiang: Police Recruitment, Informal Policing and Ethnic Minority Co-Optation,” *The China Quarterly*, vol. 242, 2020, at 324–348.

<sup>54</sup> Tobin, *supra* note 25; Greitens et al. (1), *supra* note 27.

<sup>55</sup> Ramzy and Buckley, *supra* note 40.

<sup>56</sup> Zenz and Leibold, *supra* note 53. It went from 8,647 positions in 2006–2008 to 17,352 positions in 2009–2011. *Id.*

<sup>57</sup> *Id.*

<sup>58</sup> “‘One village one policeman’...assigned one trained policeman, assisted by several staff, to their home village, to take advantage of their familiarity with local social networks and issues.” Greitens et al. (1), *supra* note 27, at 23.

<sup>59</sup> Maya Wang et al. (2), “‘Eradicating Ideological Viruses’: China’s Campaign of Repression Against Xinjiang’s Muslims,” *Human Rights Watch*, Sept. 9, 2018, [https://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/report\\_pdf/china0918\\_web2.pdf](https://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/report_pdf/china0918_web2.pdf).

region, following Chunxian's announcement that revived the campaign.<sup>60</sup> In 2014 speeches, President Xi singled out the southern part of Xinjiang as the priority in his purported fight against religious extremism.<sup>61</sup> A few months later, there was an attack led by Uyghurs in Yarkand against a Government office, which triggered the appointment of Han official **Wang Yongzhi** to run the Xinjiang Province.<sup>62</sup> Yongzhi was a lifetime citizen of southern Xinjiang and was seen as a seasoned official who could deliver on Xi's plan.<sup>63</sup> Yongzhi, however, developed personal misgivings; he later quietly ordered the release of more than 7,000 detention camp inmates, resulting in his disappearance from public view.<sup>64</sup>

As tensions continued in Xinjiang, the CCP in 2016 appointed a new leader for Xinjiang: **Chen Quanguo**, who, as party secretary of Xinjiang, oversaw a significant number of security crackdowns.<sup>65</sup> Although the region was now led by Chen, Zhu Hailun still played a pivotal role after being appointed head of the region's security and legal apparatus.<sup>66</sup> CCP Policy in Xinjiang escalated drastically in the spring of 2017 after Chen returned from a large, publicly proclaimed Central National Security Commission symposium.<sup>67</sup> Chen led a campaign that mirrored campaigns of past Chinese leadership, such as those of Mao Zedong, which consisted of requiring local Xinjiang officials (police officers who are part of the "one village, one policeman" initiative) to consider any Uyghur expression indicating an individual is not conforming to the norms of Han society as a crime.<sup>68</sup> In February 2017, Chen gave a speech to thousands of police officers and troops in Urumqi to prepare for a "**smashing, obliterating offensive**."<sup>69</sup>

In the following weeks, leaked Government documents indicated that the CCP leadership agreed on **plans to detain large numbers of Uyghurs**. Internal documents reflect a repeated vague phrase issued on behalf of Chen to local unknown officials: "**Round up everyone who should be rounded up**."<sup>70</sup> Authorities released a dozen "signs" to look out for in anyone who

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<sup>60</sup> Millward and Peterson, *supra* note 43.

<sup>61</sup> Ramzy and Buckley, *supra* note 40.

<sup>62</sup> *Id.*

<sup>63</sup> *Id.*

<sup>64</sup> *Id.*

<sup>65</sup> Martin Quin Pollard, "Analysis: New Xinjiang Chief Expected to Maintain Policies, Boost Economic Focus," *Reuters*, Dec. 29, 2021, <https://www.reuters.com/world/china/new-xinjiang-chief-expected-maintain-policies-boost-economic-focus-2021-12-29/>.

<sup>66</sup> Sasha Chavkin, "Xinjiang's Architect of Mass Detention: Zhu Hailun," *The International Consortium of Investigative Journalists*, Mar. 24, 2022, <https://www.icij.org/investigations/china-cables/xinjiangs-architect-of-mass-detention-zhu-hailun/>.

<sup>67</sup> Sheena Chestnut Greitens, Myunghye Lee, and Emir Yazici (2), "Understanding China's 'Preventive Repression' in Xinjiang," *Brookings Institution*, Mar. 4, 2022, <https://www.brookings.edu/blog/order-from-chaos/2020/03/04/understanding-chinas-preventive-repression-in-xinjiang/>.

<sup>68</sup> Millward and Peterson, *supra* note 43.

<sup>69</sup> Ramzy and Buckley, *supra* note 40.

<sup>70</sup> During Chen's leadership in the region, the Chinese Government also attempted to build an international coalition in support of its policies in order to counter a letter sent to the U.N. Human Rights

displayed “symptoms” of “antigovernment views” or “religious radicalism.”<sup>71</sup> These “signs” included behavior that was relatively common among devout Uyghurs such as “wearing long beards, giving up smoking or drinking, studying Arabic and praying outside mosques.”<sup>72</sup> In a 2017 visit to the Xinjiang region, Chen Quanguo and **Guo Shengkun** demonstrated their devotion to the security buildup in Xinjiang.<sup>73</sup> Guo stated that officials should continue “to visit the homes of minority families and to raise their understanding of Chinese culture, the Chinese Communist Party, and the ‘great motherland’ so that ‘we are truly held tightly together like the pips in a pomegranate.’”<sup>74</sup> Party leaders reinforced this sentiment in a 10-page directive released in 2017, attempting to justify the extreme measures by warning about the potential of copycat attacks of attacks carried out elsewhere.<sup>75</sup>

In the aforementioned 2017 series of leaked Chinese secret documents, Chinese plans and policies towards the Uyghurs are explained in detail. Among the leaked documents was a **telegram approved by Zhu Hailun that outlined an operations manual on running internment camps.**<sup>76</sup> This could be a “smoking gun” document at least as to detention camps. The document details ways of “further strengthening and standardizing” what the document calls “vocational skills education and training centers.”<sup>77</sup>

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Council on behalf of 37 countries that asked China to “stop involuntary internments in Xinjiang.” Greitens et al. (2), *supra* note 67.

<sup>71</sup> Ramzy and Buckley, *supra* note 40.

<sup>72</sup> *Id.*

<sup>73</sup> Reuters (1), “Top China Official Urges ‘Reform Through Education’ for Xinjiang Prisoners.” *Reuters*, Sept. 21, 2018, <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-china-xinjiang/top-china-official-urges-reform-through-education%20for-xinjiang-prisoners-idUSKCN1M10ES>.

<sup>74</sup> Rights groups and activists say that visits by cadres are often used as a way to check up on households and ensure that they are not breaking any restrictions banning certain religious clothing, practices or books. *Id.*

<sup>75</sup> Ramzy and Buckley, *supra* note 40.

<sup>76</sup> Allen-Ebrahimian, *supra* note 39.

<sup>77</sup> These include:

- “[N]ever [allowing] escapes,” preventing noise, and “never [allowing] attacks on staff.”
- Preventing escapes through the use of video surveillance, “strictly managing door locks and keys,” double locking doors immediately after use, utilizing one button alarms, improving the “installation of police stations at front gates, security guard duty rooms, high guard posts, security guard posts and patrol routes” and other “protective defenses.”
- It was encouraged that guards extra strictly manage and control student activities in order to “prevent escapes during class, eating periods, toilet breaks, bath time, medical treatment, and medical visits.”
- It is forbidden for students to have cellphones, and staff cannot hand cellphones over to students. Students are “not allowed to contact the outside world apart from during prescribed activities.”
- Surveillance within the camps is intensive. There is a requirement for there to be “full video surveillance coverage of dormitories and classrooms free of blind spots, ensuring that guards on duty can monitor in real time, record things in detail, and report suspicious circumstances immediately.” Additionally, “secret forces [are rolled out in order to] bring information officers into play to prevent people from joining forces to cause trouble.”



In early 2019, **Wang Junzheng** was promoted to Xinjiang Deputy Security Chief, replacing Zhu Hailun, who became deputy head of Xinjiang's People's Congress.<sup>78</sup> In 2021, Chen Quanguo was succeeded by **Ma Xingrui** as Party Secretary of Xinjiang; Xingrui had been the Governor of Guangdong Province since 2017.<sup>79</sup> In a speech following his appointment, Xingrui pledged to “maintain public order” and “**never allow any lapses from stability**.”<sup>80</sup> Additionally, Xingrui lavishly praised President Xi's leadership and applauded Chen, his predecessor, for how he “ensured Xinjiang's social and economic progress.”<sup>81</sup>

Thus, we see that the policies related to the Uyghurs were implemented by key figures, largely in the name of “Sinicization” and purportedly as “counter-terrorism.” Yet, Chinese treatment of the Uyghurs, detailed below, cannot, as mentioned, possibly all be understood within the counter-terrorism framework.

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- Students constantly have their data collected from when they enter the “training center,” including “records in performance, rewards and punishments, grade improvements ... compliance and discipline.”
  - Students' behavior within the camps will be constantly managed “[their] study, life, and activity management system should be formulated in detail. And the students should have a fixed bed position, fixed queue position, fixed classroom seat, and fixed station during skills work.”
  - It is emphasized that behavioral norms should be implemented and discipline requirements put in place for “getting up, rollcall, washing, going to the toilet, organizing and housekeeping, eating, studying, sleeping, closing the door and so forth,” and that the punishment and discipline for behavioral violations should be increased.
  - All Prefectures are called to “increase investment in personnel, property and materials, and provide full guarantees for all necessary staffing, funding, and facilities for education and training,” including through allocating funds for these areas in the annual budget.

Strict secrecy is mentioned as vital. It is “strictly forbidden to bring video and video equipment such as mobile phones and cameras into the teaching and management areas and upload pictures to the internet. Data should not be disseminated and not be open to the outside.” *Id.*; Autonomous Region Party Political and Legal Affairs Commission, “Opinions on Further Strengthening and Standardizing Vocational Skills Education and Training Center Work,” 2017, <https://www.documentcloud.org/documents/6558510-China-Cables-Telegram-English.html>.

<sup>78</sup> Chavkin, *supra* note 66.

<sup>79</sup> Vincent Ni, “China Replaces Xinjiang Party Boss Associated with Uyghur Crackdown,” *The Guardian*, Dec. 26, 2021, <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2021/dec/26/china-replaces-xinjiang-party-boss-associated-uyghur-crackdown>.

<sup>80</sup> Lizzi C. Lee, “What Can We Expect from Xinjiang's New Party Boss Ma Xingrui?,” *SupChina*, Dec. 29, 2021, <https://supchina.com/2021/12/29/what-can-we-expect-from-xinjiangs-new-party-boss-ma-xingrui/>.

<sup>81</sup> CNBC, “China Replaces Xinjiang Communist Party Chief Chen Quanguo,” *CNBC*, Dec. 26, 2021, <https://www.cnbc.com/2021/12/26/china-replaces-xinjiang-communist-party-chief-chen-quanguo.html>.

### III. Crimes Against the Uyghurs

The Chinese Government has embarked on a systematic erasure of the Uyghur people and their culture through the use of mass surveillance,<sup>82</sup> use of forced labor camps disguised as “re-education” camps,<sup>83</sup> destruction of religious and culturally important sites,<sup>84</sup> criminalization of Islam,<sup>85</sup> torture, medical experimentation, rape, and other sexual violence, forced sterilization, forced abortions, forced marriage, transfer of children,<sup>86</sup> and forced organ transplants.<sup>87</sup> As mentioned, the goal is to reach an internal and external “Sinicization” of the Uyghur’s religion and culture by making it conform to Han culture, or simply eliminating it. Some of the crimes are impacting now (mass detention, forced labor transfer, torture, medical experimentation, murder, rape and organ “harvesting”) while, through the systematic use of sterilization, forced abortions, forced marriage, and transfer of children, the goal appears to be the elimination of the next generation.<sup>88</sup> The narrative below commences with examination of mass surveillance and cultural erasure—not alone indicators of genocide<sup>89</sup> and not by any means only being implemented against the Uyghurs<sup>90</sup>—but to provide an understanding of the general conditions faced by the Uyghurs.

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<sup>82</sup> Eva Dou (1), “Documents Link Huawei to China’s Surveillance Programs,” *The Washington Post*, Dec. 14, 2021, <https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2021/12/14/huawei-surveillance-china/>.

<sup>83</sup> Vicky Xiuzhong Xu, Danielle Cave, Dr James Leibold, Kelsey Munro, and Nathan Ruser (2), “Uyghurs for Sale,” *Australian Strategic Policy Institute*, Mar. 1, 2020, <https://www.aspi.org.au/report/uyghurs-sale>.

<sup>84</sup> Nathan Ruser, Dr James Leibold, Kelsey Munro, and Tilla Hoja, “Cultural Erasure,” *Australian Strategic Policy Institute*, Sept. 24, 2020, <https://www.aspi.org.au/report/cultural-erasure>.

<sup>85</sup> *Id.*

<sup>86</sup> Helen Davidson and Patrick Wintour, “US ‘Deeply Disturbed’ by Reports of Systematic Rape in China’s Xinjiang Camps,” *The Guardian*, Feb. 4, 2021, <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2021/feb/04/us-is-deeply-disturbed-by-reports-of-systematic-in-chinas-uyghurxinjiang-camps>.

<sup>87</sup> Sadie Brown, “UN Experts ‘Extremely Alarmed’ by Alleged Organ Harvesting in China,” *Organized Crime and Corruption Reporting Project*, June 18, 2021, <https://www.occrp.org/en/daily/14667-un-experts-extremely-alarmed-by-alleged-organ-harvesting-in-china>.

<sup>88</sup> Ruser et al., *supra* note 84.

<sup>89</sup> As will be explained below, surveillance and cultural erasure could result in causing serious mental harm to members of the group, one of the underlying crimes of genocide. *See infra* Part IV.

<sup>90</sup> Michael J. Walsh, “Religion, Nationalism, and State Violence in China,” *The Berkley Forum*, Mar. 30, 2022, <https://berkleycenter.georgetown.edu/responses/religion-nationalism-and-state-violence-in-china> (“Ever since Mao Zedong took control of China in 1949, the country’s leadership has long sought to control religious groups and to argue that religion will one day disappear from society.”); Dahlia Peterson, “How China Harnesses Data Fusion to Make Sense of Surveillance Data,” *Brookings Institute*, Sept. 23, 2021, <https://www.brookings.edu/techstream/how-china-harnesses-data-fusion-to-make-sense-of-surveillance-data/> (on surveillance).

## *Mass Surveillance*

**Through the use of mass surveillance, advanced artificial intelligence, and the “social credit” system, the Chinese Government is monitoring every aspect of the Uyghurs’ lives to prevent them from practicing their faith and culture.**<sup>91</sup>

Mass surveillance is already a prevalent practice in China. As part of the “Strike Hard against Violent Terrorism” campaign, the Chinese Government created the National Security Strategic Guidelines, National Security Law, and Counterterrorism Law, which resulted in increased surveillance.<sup>92</sup> Hundreds of millions of surveillance cameras cover the country with advanced facial recognition technology that can identify an individual within seconds.<sup>93</sup> Surveillance drones are also used to capture every moment of Chinese citizens’ lives. **Through mass surveillance, “Chinese authorities are collecting an oceanic amount of data** about people to develop a fine-grained understanding of human behavior, and then controlling that behavior.”<sup>94</sup> The intent of these efforts appears to be to re-engineer people’s behavior to conform to CCP standards.<sup>95</sup>

The main system used for storing the data from mass surveillance in Xinjiang is the Integrated Joint Operations Program app.<sup>96</sup> The Government stores data collected from police reports, camera surveillance, and court histories, then uses the data to determine the likelihood that a Uyghur will commit a “crime.”<sup>97</sup> The app sends notifications to local police of individuals whom the system has flagged.<sup>98</sup> The “suspicious activity” that can trigger a “flag” could be an action as simple as entering through the back door instead of the front or being late to work.<sup>99</sup> Moreover, police routinely seize the phones of Uyghurs during checkpoint stops throughout Xinjiang; given the large number of police officers, some Uyghurs are stopped numerous times each time they leave their house.<sup>100</sup> Each time, they risk the confiscation of their phones, which are never returned. Leaked reports published by The Intercept show “how Chinese authorities collect millions of text messages, phone contacts, call records, ecommerce and banking

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<sup>91</sup> Senate Foreign Relations Committee Subcommittee on East Asia, The Pacific, And International Cybersecurity Policy, “Testimony of Deputy Assistant Secretary Scott Busby,” Dec. 4, 2018 [https://www.foreign.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/120418\\_Busby\\_Testimony.pdf](https://www.foreign.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/120418_Busby_Testimony.pdf).

<sup>92</sup> Lookout, “Mobile APT Surveillance Campaigns Targeting Uyghurs,” *Lookout*, June 2020, at III <https://www.lookout.com/documents/threat-reports/us/lookout-uyghur-malware-tr-us.pdf>.

<sup>93</sup> Yael Grauer, “Revealed: Massive Chinese Police Database,” *The Intercept*, Jan. 29, 2021, <https://theintercept.com/2021/01/29/china-uyghur-muslim-surveillance-police/>.

<sup>94</sup> Nazish Dholakia and Maya Wang, “Interview: China’s ‘Big Brother’ App,” *Human Rights Watch*, May 1, 2019, <https://www.hrw.org/news/2019/05/01/interview-chinas-big-brother-app>.

<sup>95</sup> *Id.*

<sup>96</sup> *Id.*

<sup>97</sup> Roseanne Gerin and Alim Seytoff, “China’s Persecution of Uyghurs is Preview of Wider Surveillance Scheme, Lawmakers Say,” *Radio Free Asia*, Nov. 17, 2021, <https://www.rfa.org/english/news/uyghur/commission-hearing-11172021191538.html>.

<sup>98</sup> *Id.*

<sup>99</sup> *Id.*

<sup>100</sup> Vice News, “China’s Vanishing Muslims: Undercover in the Most Dystopian Place in the World,” June 29, 2019, on YouTube at <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=v7AYyUqrMuQ>.

records... biometric data... [and] use community informants...”; they even use applying for asylum abroad to classify individuals as “terrorists.”<sup>101</sup>

Along with mass surveillance, the internet is heavily censored, with the Government able to easily access the limited social media and chatting apps of individual private citizens. Major Chinese technology firms have facilitated the tracking, including Huawei, Hikvision, Dahua, Megvii Technology, IFLYTEK, Sense Time, Meiya Pico Information Co. Ltd., Yitu Technologies, Yixin Science, and Technology Co. Ltd.<sup>102</sup> **A leaked marketing presentation from the telecom firm Huawei shows “how its technologies can help government authorities identify individuals by voice, monitor political individuals of interest, manage ideological re-education and labor schedules for prisoners, and help retailers track shoppers using facial recognition.”**<sup>103</sup> The leaked documents reveal the close relationship between Chinese technology companies and the Government.

No business in China is truly private. Since the era of Mao Zedong, “Chinese state firms have always had a predominant role in the economy, and the Communist party has always maintained direct control over state firms.”<sup>104</sup> President Xi Jinping has further strengthened the Government’s role in business.<sup>105</sup> A document titled “Opinion on Strengthening the United Front Work of the Private Economy in the New Era” released by the Central Committee of the Communist Party explains the central role of the Government in the private sector and the “united front” between businesses and Government.<sup>106</sup> In 2017, China passed the National Intelligence Law, which states in Article 7: “Any organisation and citizen shall, in accordance with the law, support, provide assistance, and cooperate in national intelligence work, and guard the secrecy of any national intelligence work that they are aware of. The state shall protect individuals and organisations that support, cooperate with, and collaborate in national intelligence work.”<sup>107</sup> Because of the Chinese Government’s relationship with the private sector, there is nothing private companies can do to prevent Government intervention.<sup>108</sup> If the Government asks a technology firm to record private conversations between the Uyghurs, they must comply.

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<sup>101</sup> Grauer, *supra* note 93.

<sup>102</sup> Ana Swanson and Paul Mozur, “U.S. Blacklists 28 Chinese Entities Over Abuses in Xinjiang,” *The New York Times*, Oct. 7, 2019, <https://www.nytimes.com/2019/10/07/us/politics/us-to-blacklist-28-chinese-entities-over-abuses-in-xinjiang.html>.

<sup>103</sup> Dou (1), *supra* note 82.

<sup>104</sup> Richard McGregor, “How the State Runs Business in China,” *The Guardian*, July 25, 2019, <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2019/jul/25/china-business-xi-jinping-communist-party-state-private-enterprise-huawei>.

<sup>105</sup> *Id.*

<sup>106</sup> Stephen Olson, “Are Private Chinese Companies Really Private?,” *The Diplomat*, Sept. 30, 2020, <https://thediplomat.com/2020/09/are-private-chinese-companies-really-private/>.

<sup>107</sup> Samantha Hoffman and Elsa Kania, “Huawei and the Ambiguity of China’s Intelligence and Counter-Espionage Laws,” *Australian Strategic Policy Institute*, Sept. 13, 2018, <https://www.aspistrategist.org.au/huawei-and-the-ambiguity-of-chinas-intelligence-and-counter-espionage-laws/>.

<sup>108</sup> McGregor, *supra* note 104.



Leaked highly classified documents reveal how the Chinese Government uses an app utilized by Muslims worldwide called Zapyra to target the Uyghurs.<sup>109</sup> The app was created by Beijing start-up company DewMobile Inc. to download the Quran and share its religious teachings.<sup>110</sup> The app allows users to send messages and photos to other smartphones without being connected to the internet.<sup>111</sup> Since 2016, the Government has been closely monitoring and flagging the users of the app. One of the leaked documents ordered local Government leaders to “arrest people described as ‘violent terrorists and extremist elements who used the “Kuai Ya” [Chinese name for the app] software to spread audio and video with violent terroristic characteristics.”<sup>112</sup> If police find someone has downloaded religious content from the Quran or used words like “Allah,” the person will be detained.<sup>113</sup>

In an interview with Amnesty International, interviewees stated that the only method to communicate with family in China is through the Chinese app WeChat,<sup>114</sup> as Facebook and WhatsApp are both banned. Many reported that the app was used to track and intimidate individuals using the platform.<sup>115</sup> Uyghurs living abroad also report being harassed by police in China through the use of social messaging apps to track and intimidate them.<sup>116</sup>

Lookout’s “Threat Intelligence Team” discovered new Android surveillance tools being used: “SilkBean, DoubleAgent, CarbonSteal, and GoldenEagle. These four interconnected malware tools are elements of much larger MAPT (mobile advanced persistent threat) campaigns originating in China, and primarily targeting the Uyghur ethnic minority.”<sup>117</sup> Essentially, the malware gathers personal data and then sends it to command and control servers. This technology has also been used against Tibetans and wider Muslim communities in China and other countries.<sup>118</sup> In addition to Android phones being targeted for surveillance against Uyghurs, “Apple confirmed that Uighurs [sic] were the focus of a barrage of hacking against iPhones.”<sup>119</sup> Google’s Project Zero researchers found in 2019 that “attackers could use breached websites to

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<sup>109</sup> Scilla Alecci, “How China Targets Uighurs ‘One by One’ for Using a Mobile App,” *The International Consortium of Investigative Journalists*, Nov. 24, 2019, <https://www.icij.org/investigations/china-cables/how-china-targets-uighurs-one-by-one-for-using-a-mobile-app/>.

<sup>110</sup> *Id.*

<sup>111</sup> *Id.*

<sup>112</sup> *Id.*

<sup>113</sup> *Id.*

<sup>114</sup> Amnesty International, “Nowhere Feels Safe: Uyghurs Tell of China-Led Intimidation Campaign Abroad,” *Amnesty International*, <https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/research/2020/02/china-uyghurs-abroad-living-in-fear/>.

<sup>115</sup> *Id.*

<sup>116</sup> *Id.*

<sup>117</sup> Security Magazine, “Lookout Research: Mobile APT Surveillance Campaigns Targeting Uyghurs,” *Security Magazine*, July 2, 2020, <https://www.securitymagazine.com/articles/92746-lookout-research-mobile-apt-surveillance-campaigns-targeting-uyghurs>.

<sup>118</sup> *Id.*

<sup>119</sup> Sean Lyngaas, “Chinese Mobile Surveillance of Uighurs More Pervasive Than Previously Thought, Researchers Say,” *CyberScoop*, July 1, 2020, <https://www.cyberscoop.com/china-surveillance-uighur-xinjiang-lookout/>.

infect iOS devices, then access key aspects of the operating system to covertly install malicious apps, monitor a user's location or monitor communications sent via encrypted messaging apps like iMessage or WhatsApp, among others.”<sup>120</sup> As of 2020, there were “**eight malware families meant to stealthily spy on [the Uyghurs]** at the minimum with some of them expanding even more broadly in their targeting.”<sup>121</sup> **This software can turn phones into effective listening devices.**<sup>122</sup>

**Another mass surveillance tool used by the Chinese Government is the “social credit system,”** which involves a variety of schemes and apps used to monitor and rate the behavior of Chinese citizens.<sup>123</sup> This system mimics the American credit system, but in a way to incentivize “good behavior” by citizens. Points can be allotted to individuals who exhibit favorable behaviors in the eyes of the Chinese Government, such as taking an elderly person to the doctor, having a son who serves at the Tibetan border, or cleaning up one's city.<sup>124</sup>

At the same time, the social credit system is used to encourage the public to participate in the cultural and religious persecution of the Uyghurs and other Turkic minorities. **Individuals in Xinjiang are encouraged to spy on and report on each other for a multitude of reasons.** These include having matches, knives, books, chemical fertilizers, or prayer mats, violating family planning policy, teaching religion or participating in religious expressions without official approval, having more than one wife, being an influential individual, being a tax evader, not obeying local officials, being a “two-faced” individual, having families abroad, being deemed untrustworthy, being recommended by the “Integrated Joint Operations Platform” (IJOP) app, not participating in flag-raising ceremonies or other official activities, communicating with individuals in foreign countries, or submitting complaints about local officials.<sup>125</sup>

By having ordinary citizens leave tips on individuals practicing religious-specific offenses, the Chinese Government is incentivizing members of the public to conduct surveillance against each other. For the Uyghurs, this is used to build a case for their detention. For instance, there are monetary awards for individuals in Xinjiang to report on Uyghurs who are practicing Islam.<sup>126</sup> **Such religion-specific crimes include owning a Koran, discussing the Koran or Islam in online forums like WeChat, and/or wearing a headscarf; such “offenses” can subject Uyghurs to detention and punishment in detention/“re-education” camps.**<sup>127</sup>

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<sup>120</sup> Jeff Stone, “Indiscriminate’ iOS Hacking Was Relatively Limited, Apple Says. Try Telling That to the Uighur Population,” Sept. 6, 2019, <https://www.cyberscoop.com/apple-indiscriminate-hacking-ios-uighur/>.

<sup>121</sup> Lyngaas, *supra* note 119.

<sup>122</sup> *Id.*

<sup>123</sup> Wall Street Journal, “Life Inside China’s Total Surveillance State,” Dec. 20, 2017, available on YouTube, <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=OQ5LnY2IHgc>.

<sup>124</sup> *Id.*

<sup>125</sup> Wang et al. (2), *supra* note 59.

<sup>126</sup> Sarah Cook, “Analysis: How the Chinese Communist Party is Incentivizing Repression,” *Freedom House*, Feb. 2019, <https://freedomhouse.org/report/china-media-bulletin/china-media-bulletin-social-credit-incentives-elite-jailings>.

<sup>127</sup> *Id.*

Through the use of malware attacks,<sup>128</sup> facial recognition technology to identify who is a Uyghur,<sup>129</sup> as well as the use of other surveillance technology,<sup>130</sup> as will be discussed further below, **the crimes detailed in this report could be considered a cyber-enabled genocide.**<sup>131</sup>

### ***Cultural Erasure***

For decades, China has attempted to limit the practice of Islam. As described above, China's advanced mass surveillance has facilitated this goal. **The Chinese Government characterizes any practice of Islam in the Xinjiang Province as “extremist” and subjects the Uyghurs to arbitrary arrests and detentions.** While all Turkic Muslim groups living in China seem to be targeted, the Uyghurs are treated with greater hostility.

**The Uyghurs are being forced to incorporate “Hanness” into all aspects of their culture through Government-backed initiatives such as Xi Jinping’s theory of “cultural nourishment”—one of the many terms used as part of Sinicization.**<sup>132</sup> Restricting the practice of Islam is only part of the Chinese Government’s plan to erase Uyghur culture and destroy group identity. In 2018, the State Council Information Office (also called the Central Office of Foreign Propaganda) opined that “Chinese culture,” used interchangeably with “Hanness,” should be the basis of all ethnic minorities’ cultural identities in Xinjiang.<sup>133</sup> Other Government propaganda narratives seeking to remove the Turkic identity of the Uyghurs are disseminated in Government-backed websites such as The Global Times and backed by Government-sponsored “research institutions” such as The Institute of China’s Borderlands or the Chinese Academy of

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<sup>128</sup> See text accompanying notes 117–122 *supra* (malware).

<sup>129</sup> See Johana Bhuiyan, “‘There’s Cameras Everywhere’: Testimonies Detail Far-Reaching Surveillance of Uyghurs in China,” *The Guardian*, Sept. 30, 2020, at <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2021/sep/30/uyghur-tribunal-testimony-surveillance-china#:~:text=By%202018%2C%20camera%20surveillance%20had,experts%20at%20the%20tribunal%20detailed> (Huawei filed for a patent to detect whether someone is Han or Uyghur through facial recognition technology; Hikavision then developed similar technology and was awarded Chinese Government contracts to implement facial recognition surveillance in reeducation camps and at the entrances of at least 967 mosques).

<sup>130</sup> See Appendix C, Surveillance.

<sup>131</sup> For a report detailing how genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes, and the crime of aggression can be perpetrated through cyber-attacks, or be cyber-enabled, see The Council of Advisers’ Report on the Application of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court to Cyberwarfare, prepared by the Permanent Mission of Liechtenstein to the United Nations, Aug. 2021, at [The Council of Advisers’ Report on the Application of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court to Cyberwarfare.docx \(regierung.li\)](#).

<sup>132</sup> Amy Anderson and Darren Byler, “‘Eating Hanness’: Uyghur Musical Tradition in a Time of Re-education,” *China Perspectives*, 2019, <https://journals.openedition.org/chinaperspectives/9358>.

<sup>133</sup> *Id.* at 17–18.

Social Sciences.<sup>134</sup> Government officials have used prominent Uyghurs as mouthpieces of the Government to promote ideas of assimilation.<sup>135</sup>

Because music and dance are integral parts of Uyghur culture, both have been used as tools by the Government to Sinicize the Uyghurs.<sup>136</sup> In 2010, China urged UNESCO to add Meshrep, a traditional Uyghur male gathering involving poetry, dance, and music, to its list of “Intangible Cultural Heritage in Need of Urgent Safeguarding,” with the intent of commercializing and Sinicizing the practice.<sup>137</sup> Following the UNESCO recognition, the Chinese Government folklorized Meshreps. “Every month, every county and town began to organize official Meshreps that displayed happy, dancing traditions removed from the moral instruction and religious culture out of what the tradition emerged.”<sup>138</sup> The purpose of Meshrep is to pass down the traditions and history to the next generation, which this forced re-engineering of the traditional Meshrep is preventing.<sup>139</sup>

Since the start of the Uyghur crackdowns, mosques and other Uyghur cultural heritage sites have been targeted by the Government. Using satellite imagery, the Australian Strategic Policy Institute (ASPI) was able to track and map the continued destruction of important cultural sites before and after the start of the crackdowns.<sup>140</sup> It is estimated that since 2017, **around 8,500 mosques and half of all protected cultural sites in the Xinjiang region have been damaged or destroyed**, including the Imam Asim Shrine, **a sacred pilgrimage site for the Uyghurs.**<sup>141</sup> In addition, the state has also destroyed 60–100 Uyghur cemeteries and grave sites.<sup>142</sup>

**Uyghur cultural and language centers have been targeted as well.** On February 22, 2022, the Civil Affairs Bureau of the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region issued a notice **shutting down over 150 Uyghur cultural research and language centers.**<sup>143</sup> The list of closed

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<sup>134</sup> For example, a 2019 white paper published by the Government made seven (false) claims on the “origins” of the Uyghur people: “Xinjiang has long been an inseparable part of Chinese territory; Xinjiang has never been the so-called ‘East Turkistan’; different ethnic groups living in Xinjiang constitute an integral part of the Chinese nation; the Uyghur ethnic groups came into being in the long process of migration and ethnic integration; Xinjiang ethnic cultures are an inseparable part of Chinese civilization; Xinjiang has long been a multi-religious region; and Islam is neither an indigenous belief of the Uyghur people, nor the sole one of the Uyghur people.” Liu Xin, “Uyghurs not Turk Descendants: White Paper,” *Global Times*, July 21, 2019, <https://www.globaltimes.cn/page/201907/1158545.shtml>. *Global Times* is a daily tabloid newspaper operating under the auspices of the Chinese Communist Party’s flagship newspaper, the *People’s Daily*.

<sup>135</sup> Mihray Abdilim et al. (1), “Uyghurs Find China’s ‘Cultural Nourishment’ Campaign Hard to Stomach,” *Radio Free Asia*, Mar. 10, 2022, <https://www.rfa.org/english/news/uyghur/cultural-nourishment-03102022172734.html>.

<sup>136</sup> Anderson and Byler, *supra* note 132.

<sup>137</sup> *Id.*

<sup>138</sup> *Id.*

<sup>139</sup> Intangible Cultural Heritage, “Meshrep,” *UNESCO*, <https://ich.unesco.org/en/USL/meshrep-00304>.

<sup>140</sup> Map found at <https://xjdp.aspi.org.au/map/?marker=3865>.

<sup>141</sup> Ruser et al., *supra* note 84.

<sup>142</sup> The University of British Columbia (1), “Xinjiang Documentation Project: Cultural Destruction,” *The University of British Columbia*, <https://xinjiang.sppga.ubc.ca/timelines/cultural-destruction-timeline/>.

<sup>143</sup> Abdilim et al. (1), *supra* note 135.

institutions includes “the Uyghur Classical Literature and Muqam Research Association, Dolan Farmer Painters’ Association, Atlan Vocational Training School, [International] Language School and Miraj Vocational Training School.”<sup>144</sup> The Chinese Government has also pressured governments abroad to follow suit; authorities in Istanbul closed Hira Uyghur Elementary, a Uyghur elementary school, at the request of Chinese Government officials.<sup>145</sup> It is reported that the Chinese Government has even banned Uyghur parents from giving their children certain Islamic names, including Mohammed and Medina.<sup>146</sup>

In an official recording from the Communist Party distributed to the Uyghurs via WeChat, the Chinese Government described Muslims in the detention centers as “**infected by an ideological disease**.”<sup>147</sup> They argue that it is the Chinese Government’s “responsibility to cure the poison [religious extremism] and **stop this infection at its roots**.”<sup>148</sup> “If we do not **eradicate religious extremism at its roots**, the violent terrorist incidents will grow and spread all over like an incurable malignant tumor.”<sup>149</sup>

Since the start of the Uyghur crackdowns, **any action remotely related to the practice of Islam may trigger an arrest**. For example, Uyghur academic Ilham Tohti was arrested on charges of “separatism” for running a news website providing information on Turkic Muslims.<sup>150</sup> Not registering with the CCP, praying in a different manner, fasting, or downloading e-books in Uyghur are practices used to justify arbitrary arrests of imams.<sup>151</sup> Through a program known as “Becoming Family,” Government officials visit and stay in Uyghur homes to ensure that they are not practicing Islam.<sup>152</sup> Arbitrary arrests and detentions continue to take place in Xinjiang, including that of Hasiyet Ehmet, who was arrested four years ago for teaching Islam and hiding Qurans and sentenced in January 2022 to 14 years in prison.<sup>153</sup> The Xinjiang Police Files even

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<sup>144</sup> Mihray Abdilim et al. (2), “China Moves to Close Down Uyghur Cultural, Language Organizations,” *Radio Free Asia*, Mar. 1, 2022, <https://www.rfa.org/english/news/uyghur/deregistered-organizations-03012022193543.html>.

<sup>145</sup> Abdilim et al. (1), *supra* note 135.

<sup>146</sup> Maizland, *supra* note 31. There is a “List of Forbidden Names” which includes Islamic names for boys and girls that are purportedly “linked to extremism.” There are at least twenty-nine names on the list. *Id.*

<sup>147</sup> Sigal Samuel (1), “China is Treating Islam Like a Mental Illness,” *The Atlantic*, Aug. 28, 2018, <https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2018/08/china-pathologizing-uyghur-muslims-mental-illness/568525/>.

<sup>148</sup> *Id.*

<sup>149</sup> *Id.*

<sup>150</sup> Wang, et al. (2), *supra* note 59, at 16–17.

<sup>151</sup> *Id.* at 28; Ruser et al., *supra* note 84.

<sup>152</sup> Human Rights Watch (2), “China: Visiting Officials Occupy Homes in Muslim Region,” *Human Rights Watch*, May 13, 2018, <https://www.hrw.org/news/2018/05/13/china-visiting-officials-occupy-homes-muslim-region>.

<sup>153</sup> Shohret Hoshur et al. (1), “Uyghur Woman Sentenced to 14 Years for Teaching Islam, Hiding Qurans,” *Radio Free Asia*, Jan. 7, 2022, <https://www.rfa.org/english/news/uyghur/hasiyet-ehmet-01072022150935.html>.

provide evidence of the elderly held in detention—removing the generation who would pass on cultural and religious practices to the younger generation.<sup>154</sup>

**Re-education in the detention camps, discussed below, is designed to indoctrinate the Uyghurs through Han Chinese propaganda. Individuals are forced to praise the Communist party, sing propaganda songs, admit what Uyghurs “had done wrong,” thank the Communist Party for showing the right path, praise the Communist Party for everything, condemn themselves for not being loyal to the Communist Party, renounce their Uyghur identity, and study a distorted version of history.**<sup>155</sup>

### ***Detention and “Re-education Camps”***

The number of Uyghurs held in detention camps has increased drastically within the last five years. It was estimated, as of 2019, that **China has detained around 1.5 million Uyghurs and other Muslims in detention centers in Xinjiang.**<sup>156</sup> Other estimates place this number between eight hundred thousand and two million.<sup>157</sup> The former estimate is based on a combination of “satellite images, public spending on detention facilities and witness accounts of overcrowded facilities and missing family members.”<sup>158</sup> These figures are out of date, and the true number of those in detention is likely far higher.<sup>159</sup> By some estimates, there could be 11 million missing Uyghurs—between detention, forced labor, and outright murder.<sup>160</sup> Thus far, it is unclear what the age is of the youngest detainees,<sup>161</sup> but it has been reported that individuals as old as 80 years have been detained in detention camps.<sup>162</sup>

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<sup>154</sup> Dr. Adrian Zenz (1), *The Xinjiang Police Files* by the Victims of Communism Memorial Foundation, May 2022, <https://www.xinjiangpolicefiles.org/>.

<sup>155</sup> Uyghur Tribunal—Fact Witness Statement (1), “UTFW2-069—Abdusalam Muhammad,” at <https://uyghurtribunal.com/wp-content/uploads/2021/09/UTFW2-069-Abdusalam-Muhammad-FINAL-1.pdf>. One survivor recounts: “From 6 pm–10 pm, we were forced to study lessons about the types of illegal religious activities, types of extremism, and the quality of illegal elements were intertwined with those 70, 80, 50, 30 rules. If we could not learn fast enough, they threatened to take us to jail and we saw some people were sent to jail when they could not learn it. I stayed for 70 days (about 2 and a half months) studying there.” *Id.*

<sup>156</sup> Stephanie Nebehay, “1.5 Million Muslims Could be Detained in China’s Xinjiang: Academic,” *Reuters*, Mar. 13, 2019, <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-china-xinjiang-rights-idUSKCN1QU2MQ>. Most of those detained are Uyghurs, but Muslims from other ethnic groups have also been detained including Kazakhs, Kyrgys, Uzbeks, and other ethnic Turkic Muslims. *Id.* See also Ayjaz Wani, “China Didn’t Spare the Uyghurs Even in Times of Pandemic, Pushed Them to Covid Frontlines,” *The Print*, Apr. 10, 2020, at 19, <https://theprint.in/opinion/china-didnt-spare-the-uyghurs-even-in-times-of-pandemic-pushed-them-to-covid-frontlines/399255/> (estimating 1 million detained as of 2018).

<sup>157</sup> Nebehay, *supra* note 156.

<sup>158</sup> *Id.*

<sup>159</sup> Werleman, *supra* note 33.

<sup>160</sup> *Id.*

<sup>161</sup> There are reports of a 14-year-old being beaten during interrogations. Rebecca Wright, Ivan Watson, Zahid Mahmood, and Tom Booth, ““Some are Just Psychopaths”: Chinese Detective in Exile Reveals Extent of Torture Against Uyghurs,” *CNN*, Oct. 5, 2021, <https://www.cnn.com/2021/10/04/china/xinjiang-detective-torture-intl-hnk-dst/index.html>.

<sup>162</sup> *Id.*

Between 2001 and 2002, **around 16,000 imams and other religious figures “were compelled to attend formalised education courses that foreshadowed the mass ‘re-education’ programmes pursued today against the general population.”**<sup>163</sup> Because Imams are important figures in uniting the Uyghur community, they are particularly susceptible to detention. The Uyghur Human Rights Project reports that **“at least 630 imams and other Muslim religious figures” remained detained or imprisoned.**<sup>164</sup> **Of the 630, at least 304 of the clerics have been sent to prison, with the remainder to “re-education camps.”**<sup>165</sup> For those clerics imprisoned, “96% [were] sentenced to at least five years and 26% to 20 years or more, including 14 life sentences.”<sup>166</sup>

**Numerous reports indicated that individuals who have been detained were not charged with any crimes,** but were told they would not be allowed to leave the detention centers and families lack information on the location and wellbeing of detained family members.<sup>167</sup> **As detailed herein, those who are detained have been subject to intense surveillance, forced assimilation and a variety of religions restrictions, forced labor, torture, rape, forced sterilizations, as well as, allegedly, organ “harvesting.”**<sup>168</sup> During overnight routine mass detention operations, people “who did not listen” had guns put to their heads and were ordered not to move or be killed.<sup>169</sup>

**Schools, hospitals and police stations have been converted to detention centers to hold Muslims.**<sup>170</sup> **As of 2018, an estimated 1,200 detention centers existed—one for every county and township in Xinjiang.**<sup>171</sup> Official documents detail the lengths gone to keep the Uyghurs caged, such as “never [allowing] escapes,” preventing noise, and “never [allowing] attacks on staff.”<sup>172</sup> Food and water were regularly withheld for failing to memorize books about Xi Jinping,<sup>173</sup> or memorize and recite Communist Party dictums.<sup>174</sup> Means of preventing escapes include the use of video surveillance, “strictly managing door locks and keys,” double locking

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<sup>163</sup> Joel Gunter, “Uyghur Imams Targeted in China’s Xinjiang Crackdown,” *BBC News*, May 13, 2021, <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-china-56986057>.

<sup>164</sup> *Id.*

<sup>165</sup> *Id.*

<sup>166</sup> *Id.*

<sup>167</sup> Testimony of Deputy Assistant Secretary Scott Busby, *supra* note 91.

<sup>168</sup> Maizland, *supra* note 31; David Stavrou, “China’s ‘XXX Files’: ‘25 Thousand People Disappear Each Year, Their Organs Are Harvested,’” *Haaretz*, Dec. 4, 2020, <https://www.haaretz.com/world-news/MAGAZINE-china-s-xinjiang-xxx-files-thousands-ughur-disappear-organs-harvested-1.9340106>.

<sup>169</sup> Wright et al., *supra* note 161.

<sup>170</sup> Philip Wen and Olzhas Auyezov, “Tracking China’s Muslim Gulag,” *Reuters*, Nov. 29, 2018, <https://www.reuters.com/investigates/special-report/muslims-camps-china/>.

<sup>171</sup> Autonomous Region Party Political and Legal Affairs Commission, *supra* note 77.

<sup>172</sup> Testimony of Deputy Assistant Secretary Scott Busby, *supra* note 91; Autonomous Region Party Political and Legal Affairs Commission, *supra* note 77.

<sup>173</sup> Matthew Hill, David Campanale, and Joel Gunter, “‘Their Goal is to Destroy Everyone’: Uighur Camp Detainees Allege Systematic Rape,” *BBC News*, Feb. 2, 2021, <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-china-55794071>.

<sup>174</sup> Wen and Auyezov, *supra* note 170.



doors immediately after use, utilizing one button alarms, improving the “installation of police stations at front gates, security guard duty rooms, high guard posts, security guard posts and patrol routes” and other “protective defenses.”<sup>175</sup> Guards were encouraged to extra strictly manage and control student activities in order to “prevent escapes during class, eating periods, toilet breaks, bath time, medical treatment, and medical visits.”<sup>176</sup>

While China originally denied the existence of these camps, they now assert that these are not “detention camps” but are in fact “vocational training centers that emphasize rehabilitation and redemption,” all part of the larger national “war on terrorism.”<sup>177</sup> According to the Chinese Government, the purpose of the re-education camps is to eradicate religious extremism and terrorism.<sup>178</sup> However, research on the camps shows that, instead of combating extremism, the camps are being used to erase and Sinicize Uyghur culture.<sup>179</sup> Many of the techniques currently being utilized by China against the Uyghurs were not developed for the Uyghurs but were originally used in the Tibetan Autonomous Region against the Tibetans.<sup>180</sup>

### ***Forced Labor***

The mass detention and incarceration of Uyghurs in Xinjiang has resulted in a surplus of readily available workers, enabling a systematic program of forced labor and forced transfer.

While China has a long history of forced labor for prisoners,<sup>181</sup> labor transfer programs targeting Uyghurs can be traced back to 2003, with the creation of programs aimed at alleviating rural poverty and unemployment.<sup>182</sup> The programs initiated the transfer of rural Uyghurs for agricultural work throughout Xinjiang or for factory work in other parts of China.<sup>183</sup> One of the **forced transfer** policies starting in 2006 targeted young and unmarried **Uyghur women, as young as 15 years of age**, to be sent to work in provinces in Eastern China.<sup>184</sup> The transferred women reported harassment in the work situations such as salaries not being paid on time, being forced to work up to 12 hours per day, not being allowed to speak the Uyghur language at work

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<sup>175</sup> Testimony of Deputy Assistant Secretary Scott Busby, *supra* note 91; Autonomous Region Party Political and Legal Affairs Commission, *supra* note 77.

<sup>176</sup> *Id.*

<sup>177</sup> Wen and Auyezov, *supra* note 170.

<sup>178</sup> Wang et al. (2), *supra* note 59.

<sup>179</sup> Maizland, *supra* note 31.

<sup>180</sup> Tibetans have faced extreme surveillance, the shutdown of mosques, destruction of homes, forcible eviction of monks and nuns, and the creation of re-education centers where individuals were forced to attend patriotic re-education classes. Testimony of Deputy Assistant Secretary Scott Busby, *supra* note 91.

<sup>181</sup> Peter Humphrey, “Forced Prison Labor in China: Hiding in Plain Sight,” *The Diplomat*, Jan. 25, 2022, <https://thediplomat.com/2022/01/forced-prison-labor-in-china-hiding-in-plain-sight/>.

<sup>182</sup> The University of British Columbia (2), “Forced Labor and Detainment Transfer,” *The University of British Columbia*, <https://xinjiang.sppga.ubc.ca/timelines/forced-labour/>.

<sup>183</sup> *Id.*

<sup>184</sup> Uyghur Human Rights Project, “China: Transfer of 400,000 Young Uyghur Women into Eastern China,” *Uyghur Human Rights Project*, June 19, 2008, [http://www.david-kilgour.com/2008/Jun\\_20\\_2008\\_01.htm](http://www.david-kilgour.com/2008/Jun_20_2008_01.htm).

or during free time, and not being allowed to return to their hometowns.<sup>185</sup> According to the Uyghur Human Rights Project, this policy was, and still is, effective in separating Uyghur families<sup>186</sup> and disrupting Uyghur culture.<sup>187</sup>

Since 2017, policies and programs have been clearly indicative of a coercive mass labor transfer initiative, with the local government in Xinjiang announcing a **“Three Year Plan” to transfer some 100,000 workers** to jobs throughout Eastern China.<sup>188</sup> Between 2017 and 2019, **an estimate of more than 80,000 Uyghurs were transferred out of Xinjiang and forced to work at labor factories in China under prison-like conditions.**<sup>189</sup> In 2018, 210,000 workers were forced to pick cotton “via labor transfer” in Xinjiang; by 2020, the number of people forced to work as seasonal cotton pickers is believed to have been **close to 500,000 working “under conditions that appear to raise a high risk of coercion.”**<sup>190</sup> These are outdated figures, with the actual numbers likely far higher.<sup>191</sup>

China accounts for 26 percent of global manufacturing output, from which many Western companies are benefiting, in part through the exploitation of Uyghur labor.<sup>192</sup> Since 2017, ASPI has identified **27 factories across nine Chinese provinces that are currently using Uyghur labor transferred from Xinjiang.**<sup>193</sup> Those factories are part of the **supply chain of 82 major**

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<sup>185</sup> *Id.*

<sup>186</sup> The Uyghur Human Rights Project Congressional-Executive Commission on China, “Testimony of Nury Turkel: Chairman of the Board, Uyghur Human Rights Project,” Oct. 17, 2019, [https://www.cecc.gov/sites/chinacommission.house.gov/files/documents/Turkel%20CECC%20Oct%2017%20Testimony\\_%2010152019%20version.pdf](https://www.cecc.gov/sites/chinacommission.house.gov/files/documents/Turkel%20CECC%20Oct%2017%20Testimony_%2010152019%20version.pdf). The systematic nature of the forced labor programs has resulted in the transfer of populations away from rural counties such as Kashgar, which by 2010 had witnessed a population decline of approximately 21 percent. *Id.*

<sup>187</sup> Uyghur Human Rights Project, *supra* note 184. “Traditionally, the Uyghur people do not send their children, especially young females, to distant lands, except for sending them to get a higher education. The transfer of young Uyghur women has therefore become a major concern among Uyghurs, not only for those farmers whose daughters have been transferred to China’s eastern provinces but also among Uyghur intellectuals, both in East Turkestan and abroad. Many Uyghurs see such transfers as an attack on the honor of Uyghur women and the dignity of Uyghur men. Many also see this as one of the most humiliating and provocative policies to date on the part of PRC government authorities. In the Uyghur culture, it is a most humiliating and provocative act to take Uyghur women against their will from the Uyghur community without paying due respect for the way of life and values of the Uyghur people.” *Id.*

<sup>188</sup> The University of British Columbia (2), *supra* note 182. It is estimated that in preparation for the implementation of this policy and the forced transfer of Uyghurs for labor, over 1 million people underwent “vocational training” in 2017. *Id.*

<sup>189</sup> BBC News (2), “China Uighurs ‘Moved into Factory Forced Labour’ for Foreign Brands,” *BBC News*, Mar. 2, 2020, <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-china-51697800>.

<sup>190</sup> John Sudworth, “China’s ‘Tainted’ Cotton,” *BBC News*, Dec. 2020, <https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/extra/nz0g306v8c/china-tainted-cotton>. The Prefecture of Aksu identified a need for 142,700 workers for its fields, which was largely met through the principle of “transferring all those who should be transferred.” *Id.*

<sup>191</sup> Werleman, *supra* note 33.

<sup>192</sup> Felix Richter, “Infographic: China is the World’s Manufacturing Superpower,” *Statista Infographics*, May 4, 2021, <https://www.statista.com/chart/20858/top-10-countries-by-share-of-global-manufacturing-output/>.

<sup>193</sup> Xu, et al. (2), *supra* note 83.

**international brands**, including Abercrombie & Fitch, Zara, Gap, Apple, Coca Cola, Nike, and Samson.<sup>194</sup> In fact, companies such as Nike, Apple, and Coca-Cola lobbied to weaken the Uyghur Forced Labor Prevention Act that eventually passed in the U.S. Congress.<sup>195</sup> The scale of the CCP's forced labor regime is reflected in the number of industries that are now cited as using forced labor. The U.S. Bureau of International Labor Affairs (ILAB) has added a total of 20 goods produced through forced labor by Muslim minorities in China to its Trafficking Victims Protection Reauthorization Act List.<sup>196</sup>

Reports have highlighted the **links between Xinjiang's detention facilities and the Government's forced labor program**, with factories built proximate to existing camps to facilitate the forced transfer of Uyghurs.<sup>197</sup> Many workers are transferred from detention facilities to work in conditions similar to those faced in detention.<sup>198</sup> For example, in 2019, a factory was built next to an internment facility in the city of Kuqa, and satellite images subsequently revealed that "masses of people, all apparently wearing the same color uniforms, can be seen walking in close formation between the two sites."<sup>199</sup>

Following the onset of the pandemic, *The New York Times* revealed in July 2020 that some Chinese-made face masks being sold in the United States and other countries were produced in factories that relied on Uyghur labor.<sup>200</sup> After reviewing state media reports and public records, *The New York Times* found 17 companies producing face masks participating in the labor transfer program.<sup>201</sup>

The Uyghur Human Rights Project has additionally reported on Uyghurs forcibly transferred to work, often paid extremely low wages and facing threats of being returned to detention facilities for refusal to work.<sup>202</sup> Although the situation varies across different industries

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<sup>194</sup> *Id.* at 31–39. *See id.* at Appendix for further details on the forced labor transfers, the Chinese factories involved, and the international brands purchasing goods from those factories.

<sup>195</sup> Elisabeth Braw, "Why Western Companies Should Leave China," *Foreign Policy*, Feb. 17, 2021, <https://foreignpolicy.com/2021/02/17/why-western-companies-should-leave-china/>.

<sup>196</sup> Bureau of International Labor Affairs, "List of Goods Produced by Child Labor or Forced Labor," *United States Department of Labor*, <https://www.dol.gov/agencies/ilab/reports/child-labor/list-of-goods>. These goods include gloves, hair products, textiles, thread/yarn, and tomato products. *Id.*

<sup>197</sup> Sudworth, *supra* note 190.

<sup>198</sup> *Id.*

<sup>199</sup> *Id.*

<sup>200</sup> Jen Kirby (1), "Concentration Camps and Forced Labor: China's Repression of the Uyghurs, Explained," *Vox*, July 18, 2020, <https://www.vox.com/2020/7/28/21333345/uighurs-china-internment-camps-forced-labor-xinjiang>.

<sup>201</sup> Muyi Xiao, Haley Willis, Christoph Koettl, Natalie Reneau, and Drew Jordan, "China is Using Uighur Labor to Produce Face Masks," *The New York Times*, July 19, 2020, <https://www.nytimes.com/2020/07/19/world/asia/china-mask-forced-labor.html>. After tracing a shipment of face masks to a medical supply company in the state of Georgia from a Chinese factory in the Hubei Province, *The New York Times* discovered that more than 100 Uyghur workers had been transferred to work in the factory. *Id.*

<sup>202</sup> Ye Ling, "Released from Camps, Uyghurs Subjected to Forced Labor," *Bitter Winter*, July 29, 2020, <http://bitterwinter.org/uyghurs-subjected-to-forced-labor/>. In one factory in Quanzhou, Uyghur workers

and factories, there is generally little to no pay, horrific living and working conditions, extensive surveillance, periodic torture and physical violence, lack of freedom of movement (i.e., the inability to leave), limited ability to communicate, and punishment for practicing religious beliefs.<sup>203</sup> One Uyghur woman who had been sent to an internment facility and was later transferred to work in a technology factory in Urumqi described **“660 people are being brought in shackled and handcuffed.”**<sup>204</sup>

Forced labor is also combined with “re-education” efforts. In factories, workers “live in segregated dormitories, undergo organized Mandarin and ideological training outside working hours, are subject to constant surveillance, and [are] forbidden from participating in religious observances.”<sup>205</sup> In one internment camp in Kashgar, Xinjiang, Uyghur detainees work as forced laborers to produce textiles; when not working, the Uyghur workers must learn Mandarin and undergo ideological indoctrination.<sup>206</sup>

On June 21, 2022, the Uyghur Forced Labor Prevention Act (UFLPA) took effect in the United States to “prohibit imports made by forced labor into the United States of products made in Xinjiang.”<sup>207</sup> Twenty percent of the world’s cotton comes from China with 86% of that cotton produced in the Xinjiang region.<sup>208</sup> The act assumes all goods made in whole or in part in the Xinjiang region to be made from forced labor.<sup>209</sup> The burden of responsibility now falls on

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are made to work on average 13 hours per day, but their monthly salary ranges from 2,800 to 3,000 RMB (about \$ 400–430), while Han workers’ pay in the same factory is from 6,000 to 8,000 RMB (about \$858–1,145). *Id.* According to the US Department of Labor: “[W]hile previous research has focused on goods and products produced in Xinjiang, recent external reports indicate that Uyghurs also have been transported to work in other provinces in China, increasing the number of goods potentially made with forced labor and broadening the risk of forced labor in supply chains.... Moreover, the government gives subsidies to companies moving to Xinjiang or employing Muslim minority workers. These practices exacerbate a demand for members of Muslim ethnic minority groups that the government wants placed in work assignments where they can be controlled and watched, as well as receive Mandarin Chinese training and undergo political indoctrination. Once at a work placement, workers are usually subjected to constant surveillance and isolation. Given the vast surveillance state in Xinjiang and the threat of detention, individuals have little choice but to face the difficult situations present in these work assignments.” Bureau of International Labor Affairs, “Against Their Will: The Situation in Xinjiang,” *United States Department of Labor*, 2021, <https://www.dol.gov/agencies/ilab/against-their-will-the-situation-in-xinjiang>.

<sup>203</sup> Bureau of International Labor Affairs, *supra* note 202.

<sup>204</sup> Kirby (1), *supra* note 200.

<sup>205</sup> Xu, et al. (2), *supra* note 83, at 3.

<sup>206</sup> Bureau of International Labor Affairs, *supra* note 202. If family communication and visits are allowed, they are heavily monitored. *Id.*

<sup>207</sup> Press Statement, Antony J. Blinken, Secretary of State, “Implantation of the Uyghur Forced Labor Prevention Act,” June 21, 2021, <https://www.state.gov/implementation-of-the-uyghur-forced-labor-prevention-act/>.

<sup>208</sup> Eva Dou (2), “China’s Xinjiang Cotton is Banned in the U.S. but Still Making it to Store Shelves, Report Says,” *The Washington Post*, Nov. 17, 2001, [https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/asia\\_pacific/china-xinjiang-cotton/2021/11/17/fcfe320e-37a3-11ec-9662-399cfa75efee\\_story.html](https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/asia_pacific/china-xinjiang-cotton/2021/11/17/fcfe320e-37a3-11ec-9662-399cfa75efee_story.html).

<sup>209</sup> *Id.*

companies to prove that no part of their supply chain utilizes forced labor from Xinjiang.<sup>210</sup> Although the law is a positive step towards removing human rights violators from the global economy, effectively identifying forced labor products has been challenging due to the complexity of supply chains.<sup>211</sup>

## ***Murder, Disappearances, and Forced “Organ Harvesting”***

### **Murder and Disappearances**

**Throughout the years, many Uyghurs have been forcefully disappeared and/or murdered.** Victims have been taken from their homes, off the streets, or from detention centers following their arrests. **Activists, academics, and other prominent Uyghurs are especially vulnerable.** For instance, after a peaceful protest in Ürümqi in 2009, Xinjiang turned violent due to a police crackdown and more than 40 Uyghurs were disappeared.<sup>212</sup> Later, many were sentenced to death.<sup>213</sup> An ASIP investigative report found that well-known leaders in the Uyghur community—especially from Xinjiang University—were sentenced to either long-term imprisonment or death.<sup>214</sup>

**By silencing the most notable voices in the Uyghur community, the Chinese Government is destroying the community from within.** In 2017, the former Dean of Xinjiang University, Arslan Abdulla, went missing and is believed to be in detention.<sup>215</sup> In the same year, the President of Xinjiang Medical University, Halmurat Ghopur, was arrested and subsequently sentenced to death.<sup>216</sup> Similarly, Tashpolat Teyip, the President of Xinjiang University, was arrested and later sentenced to death.<sup>217</sup> Another prominent Uyghur activist, Ilham Toti, remains missing following his 2017 arrest.<sup>218</sup> Muhammad Salih Hajim, an academic translator, was

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<sup>210</sup> *Id.*

<sup>211</sup> Human Rights Watch (3), “China: US Law Against Uyghur Forced Labor Takes Effect,” *Human Rights Watch*, June 20, 2022, <https://www.hrw.org/news/2022/06/20/china-us-law-against-uyghur-forced-labor-takes-effect>.

<sup>212</sup> Raffi Khatchadourian, “Surviving the Crackdown in Xinjiang,” *The New Yorker*, Apr. 12, 2021, <https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2021/04/12/surviving-the-crackdown-in-xinjiang>.

<sup>213</sup> *Id.*

<sup>214</sup> Al Jazeera (1), “China Committing Genocide Against Uighurs, Says Report,” *Al Jazeera*, Mar. 10, 2021, <https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2021/3/10/china-committed-genocide-against-uighurs-in-xinjiang-says-report>.

<sup>215</sup> The University of British Columbia (3), “Xinjiang Documentation Project: Intellectual and Celebrity Arrests,” *The University of British Columbia*, <https://xinjiang.sppga.ubc.ca/timelines/arrests/>.

<sup>216</sup> *Id.*

<sup>217</sup> *Id.*

<sup>218</sup> Jen Kirby (2), “Concentration Camps and Forced Labor: China’s Repression of the Uighurs, Explained,” *Vox*, Sept. 25, 2020, <https://www.vox.com/2020/7/28/21333345/uighurs-china-internment-camps-forced-labor-xinjiang>.

arrested and later found dead in custody.<sup>219</sup> Halide Israyil, who wrote an award-winning novel depicting the Cultural Revolution in Xinjiang, was arrested and sent to an internment camp.<sup>220</sup>

**Detainees who question authority in the camps risk execution.** Omer Rozi, a former *qadi* (Islamic judge), witnessed the execution by firing squad and mutilation of a fellow inmate who tried to fight back against his tormentors.<sup>221</sup> Rozi was then “forced to collect the dead inmate’s flesh.”<sup>222</sup> While the exact number of fatalities is unknown, **it has been reported there were 200 dead inmates, over a 6-month period, in one township alone.**<sup>223</sup> An officer at the Kuchar County Police Department **confirmed 150 deaths at “No. 1 Camp,”** one of four camps in the Yengisher District.<sup>224</sup> There are more isolated accounts; for example, a female inmate dying in detention due to heavy bleeding, or another account by a female inmate who reported nine women from her cell dying over the duration of 3 months in detention.<sup>225</sup>

Dr. Erkin Sidick, a Uyghur-American and the President of the Uyghur Projects Foundation and senior advisor to the World Uyghur Congress, states that **international reports on the situation in Xinjiang are at least two years behind—that the situation is worse than initially thought to be.**<sup>226</sup> The Washington-based Campaign for Uyghurs expressed similar sentiment, accusing China of being “a primary perpetrator of forced disappearances.”<sup>227</sup>

Individuals with family abroad are subjected to extra scrutiny, especially those with relatives living in one of the following 26 “sensitive countries”: Afghanistan, Algeria, Azerbaijan, Egypt, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Kazakhstan, Kenya, Kyrgyzstan, Libya, Malaysia, Nigeria, Pakistan, Russia, Saudi Arabia, Somalia, South Sudan, Syria, Tajikistan, Thailand, Turkey, Turkmenistan, United Arab Emirates, Uzbekistan, and Yemen.<sup>228</sup> For example, a mother

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<sup>219</sup> The University of British Columbia (3), *supra* note 215.

<sup>220</sup> *Id.*

<sup>221</sup> Samuel Pitchford, “Uyghur Tribunal Day 3: Evidence Uyghurs Are Being Killed in Chinese Camps,” *Human Rights Pulse*, June 7, 2021, <https://www.humanrightspulse.com/mastercontentblog/uyghur-tribunal-day-3-evidence-uyghurs-are-being-killed-in-chinese-camps>.

<sup>222</sup> *Id.*

<sup>223</sup> Shohret Hoshur et al. (2), “At Least 150 Detainees Have Died in One Xinjiang Internment Camp: Police Officer,” *Radio Free Asia*, Oct. 29, 2019, <https://www.rfa.org/english/news/uyghur/deaths-10292019181322.html>.

<sup>224</sup> *Id.*

<sup>225</sup> Maria Danilova, “Woman Describes Torture, Beatings in Chinese Detention Camp,” *The Associated Press*, Nov. 26, 2018, <https://apnews.com/article/north-america-politics-china-race-and-ethnicity-dc-wire-61cdf7f5dfc34575aa643523b3c6b3fe>; Ivan Watson and Rebecca Wright, “Allegations of Shackled Students and Gang Rape Inside China’s Detention Camps,” *CNN*, Feb. 19, 2021, <https://www.cnn.com/2021/02/18/asia/china-xinjiang-teacher-abuse-allegations-intl-hnk-dst/index.html>.

<sup>226</sup> Werleman, *supra* note 33.

<sup>227</sup> Sangyal Kunchok, Tenzin Dickyi, and Richard Finney, “Tibetans, Uyghurs Remember Those Who ‘Disappeared’ at China’s Hands,” *Radio Free Asia*, Aug. 30, 2021, <https://www.rfa.org/english/news/tibet/vanish-08302021172350.html>.

<sup>228</sup> Reuters (2), “Muslim Minority in China’s Xinjiang Face ‘Political Indoctrination’: Human Rights Watch,” *Reuters*, Sept. 9, 2018, <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-china-xinjiang-rights/muslim-minority-in-chinas-xinjiang-face-political-indoctrination-human-rights-watch-idUSKCN1LQ01F>.

and two of her adult sons disappeared after talking to a third son living abroad.<sup>229</sup> The mother called without supervision and deviated from the script she had been given by the Government. She told her son to assume the worst if he lost contact with them and that it would not be suicide. She also encouraged her son to keep doing his activism.<sup>230</sup>

Uyghurs abroad are also not safe from such danger. Some disappear after returning to Xinjiang from abroad. A man was arrested in Istanbul and returned to China, three days before a planned holy pilgrimage to Saudi Arabia; his wife has not heard from him since, and his location is unknown.<sup>231</sup> There have been instances of forced disappearances to prevent Uyghurs from leaving China. For example, a wife was detained before her intended travels to Australia, and her whereabouts remain unknown.<sup>232</sup>

### Organ “Harvesting”

Many human rights activists and experts report that **prisoners are being murdered for their organs.**<sup>233</sup> Researcher, Ethan Gutmann, believes **around 25,000 people in Xinjiang are murdered every year for their organs.**<sup>234</sup> According to Gutmann: “The Chinese Communist Party first experimented with the live organ harvesting of death row criminals on the execution grounds of Xinjiang as early as 1994. By 1997, surgeons were extracting livers and kidneys from Uyghur political and religious prisoners for high-ranking CCP cadres—small-scale, but it set a precedent.”<sup>235</sup> In more recent years, the practice has expanded as the CCP “targets a number of ethnic, religious, or linguistic minorities such as Falun Gong practitioners, Uyghurs, Tibetans, Muslims and Christians held in detention at different locations.”<sup>236</sup>

Another researcher, Matthew Robinson, said there is a **direct link between Uyghur incarceration rates and the rise in organ transplants.**<sup>237</sup> According to Robinson, “reports have emerged of Uighurs [sic] being subjected to blood tests and other medical examinations

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<sup>229</sup> Emily Feng (1), “Family Disappears Amid China’s Detention of Mostly Ethnic Uyghurs,” *NPR*, Mar. 3, 2021, <https://www.npr.org/2021/03/03/973198171/family-disappears-amid-chinas-detention-of-mostly-ethnic-uyghurs>.

<sup>230</sup> *Id.*

<sup>231</sup> Tasnim Nazeer, “The Missing Uyghur Children,” *The Diplomat*, Apr. 21, 2021, <https://thediplomat.com/2021/04/the-missing-uyghur-children/>.

<sup>232</sup> Ali MC, “Australia Uighurs Despair Over ‘Disappeared’ Relatives in China,” *Al Jazeera*, June 4, 2021, <https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2021/6/4/uighurs-in-australia-struggle-to-contact-families-in-xinjiang>.

<sup>233</sup> *See, e.g.*, Stavrou, *supra* note 168.

<sup>234</sup> *Id.*

<sup>235</sup> *Id.*

<sup>236</sup> Siobhán Mullally, Miriam Estrada-Castillo, Tae-Ung Baik, Tlaleng Mofokeng, Fernand de Varennes, Ahmed Shaheed, Fionnuala Ni Aolain, Nils Melzer, and Dubravka Simonovic, “Letter to The Chinese Government Concerning Allegations of Organ Harvesting Targeting Ethnic, Religious or Linguistic Minorities,” *United Nations Human Rights Office of the High Commissioner*, June 10, 2021, at 1–2, <https://spcommreports.ohchr.org/TMResultsBase/DownloadPublicCommunicationFile?gId=26382>.

<sup>237</sup> Stavrou, *supra* note 168.



consistent with those required to assess organ health, which is a prerequisite for organ matching and transplantation.”<sup>238</sup>

A letter from a number of UN Special Rapporteurs and human rights Working Groups sent to the Chinese Government details the information received on forced organ harvesting:

It is alleged that lists of prisoners’ names are maintained for the purpose of forced organ harvesting at the detention centres. Further, it is alleged that if prisoners or detainees are hospitalized, they are at risk of forced organ harvesting. The most common organs removed from the prisoners are allegedly hearts, kidneys, livers, corneas and, less commonly, parts of livers. This form of trafficking reportedly involves health sector professionals, including surgeons, anesthetists, and other medical specialists.

It is further alleged that prisoners or detainees who belong to the aforementioned ethnic, religious or linguistic minorities [Falun Gong practitioners, Uyghurs, Tibetans, Muslims and Christians held in detention], are frequently arrested without being informed of the reasons for the arrest or provided with arrest warrants, and are subjected to blood tests and organ examinations, including ultrasounds and x-rays, without their informed consent. Such alleged practices are credible indicators of forced organ harvesting. The results of the examinations are reportedly registered in a database of living organ sources that facilitates organ allocation. It is also reported that some of these prisoners or detainees have been subject to enforced disappearances after their arrests.

The alleged practice of subjecting prisoners or detainees to frequent examinations without their prior informed consent was reportedly documented in at least the following facilities: female prison in Urumqi called “Sankan” (the No. 3 prison); No. 2 detention centre at Urumqi and Karmay prison.

It is also alleged that some prisoners receive death threats and threats of organ harvesting from the police, if they do not renounce their beliefs or refuse to cooperate with the police.<sup>239</sup>

Since 2000, the Chinese **organ transplant industry has generated profits worth an estimated US\$1 billion per year.**<sup>240</sup> In one hospital, organ transplants grew from 60–70 a year in 2006–2007 to 200 a year in 2009.<sup>241</sup> It has been reported that the Chinese Government is going through “deliberate and extreme measures to hide any trace of the disappeared, including

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<sup>238</sup> *Id.*

<sup>239</sup> Mullally et al., *supra* note 236.

<sup>240</sup> Brown, *supra* note 87.

<sup>241</sup> Stavrou, *supra* note 168.

**using chemicals to decompose bodies.”**<sup>242</sup> As fast pass “green lanes” for organ transportation opened in airports in East China in 2016, nine new crematoriums were built in Xinjiang.<sup>243</sup> Local Xinjiang **crematoria** reported burning bodies from detention centers.<sup>244</sup> When families asked why they were not allowed to see bodies of their deceased family members, burial administrators have used organ “harvesting” as an explanation.<sup>245</sup>

### ***Rape, Other Sexual Violence, and Medical Experimentation***

Both male and female Uyghurs are subjected to torture, rape, and other forms of sexual violence. Detention has left many Uyghurs vulnerable to such crimes.

#### **Rape and Other Sexual Violence**

Witnesses testify to **inhumane treatment** in “re-education” camps, including detainees being kept **semi-naked in overcrowded cells and being subject to freezing conditions** with little clothing.<sup>246</sup> Women inmates have reported being bitten all over their bodies, leaving marks, mainly in relation to **rape while in detention**—often by two or three men at a time.<sup>247</sup> Female inmates also reported being victims of sadistic violence, such as being handed a mixture of ground chili pepper and water from guards to rub on their genitals before showering.<sup>248</sup> Security cameras are allegedly set up in the bathrooms used to film female detainees.<sup>249</sup> A former male guard reported Chinese officers would **watch the female inmates in their cells on monitors to pick out the women they wanted to rape**. In the kitchen there were two tables, “one for snacks and liquor, and the other for *doing things*.”<sup>250</sup>

Inmate testimonies detail how they were the most at risk during nighttime. Former inmates reported **especially younger and unmarried women were taken from their cells at night to be raped; some never returned**.<sup>251</sup> Some inmates have reported becoming pregnant after multiple rapes. For example, Ruqiye Perhat became pregnant twice after she was repeatedly

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<sup>242</sup> Werleman, *supra* note 33.

<sup>243</sup> Ethan Gutmann, “The Killing of Innocents for Their Organs,” *The International Coalition to End Transplant Abuse in China*, 2012, at 17–21, [https://endtransplantabuse.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/08/TheKillingOfInnocentsForTheirOrgans\\_FOH\\_Xinjiang\\_EastTurkestan\\_byEthanGutmann.pdf](https://endtransplantabuse.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/08/TheKillingOfInnocentsForTheirOrgans_FOH_Xinjiang_EastTurkestan_byEthanGutmann.pdf).

<sup>244</sup> *Id.* at 16.

<sup>245</sup> Stavrou, *supra* note 168.

<sup>246</sup> Uyghur Tribunal—Fact Witness statement (1), *supra* note 155.

<sup>247</sup> Hill et al., *supra* note 173.

<sup>248</sup> Amie Ferris-Rotman, “Abortions, IUDs and Sexual Humiliation: Muslim Women Who Fled China for Kazakhstan Recount Ordeals,” *The Washington Post*, Oct. 5, 2019, [https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/asia\\_pacific/abortions-iuds-and-sexual-humiliation-muslim-women-who-fled-china-for-kazakhstan-recount-ordeals/2019/10/04/551c2658-cfd2-11e9-a620-0a91656d7db6\\_story.html](https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/asia_pacific/abortions-iuds-and-sexual-humiliation-muslim-women-who-fled-china-for-kazakhstan-recount-ordeals/2019/10/04/551c2658-cfd2-11e9-a620-0a91656d7db6_story.html).

<sup>249</sup> Danilova, *supra* note 225.

<sup>250</sup> Ferris-Rotman, *supra* note 248.

<sup>251</sup> *Id.*

raped by guards, with both pregnancies aborted inside the camps.<sup>252</sup> Another female inmate reported being forced to assist rape taking place outside the facilities, where local **Han men would “pay money to have their pick of the prettiest young inmates;”** the women would then have bags put over their heads before being led off.<sup>253</sup> Bob Fu, Founder and President of China Aid, said, “we rescued a woman who was eyewitness to a program that the Government organized for prostitution. She was handcuffed to the bed, the man did his thing and she cried. She said she heard the man shouting and complaining that he had paid good money for this.”<sup>254</sup>

Other Turkic minorities encounter similar acts of sexual violence. Gulzira Auelkhan, an ethnic Kazakh, was forced to assist rape by undressing women from the waist up and handcuffing their hands behind their heads.<sup>255</sup> A policeman or a man from outside the camp would enter the room, while Auelkhan would wait outside; after, she would take the raped woman for a shower and clean the room.<sup>256</sup>

Sexual humiliation and rape are part of the facilities’ torture methods during interrogations. A female guard confirmed rape was established as a regular practice in the camps.<sup>257</sup> A female inmate asserted that **“all women and men under age 35 were raped and sexually abused.”**<sup>258</sup> During his first night in detention in the city of Kashgar, a male inmate was **gang raped by more than 12 other inmates** who were forced by the guards to do so.<sup>259</sup> Another female inmate was publicly **gang raped in front of about 100 other detainees.**<sup>260</sup> Police and guards took turns raping her after she was forced to make a public confession; any detainees watching who resisted, clenched their fists, closed their eyes, or looked away, were taken away for punishment.<sup>261</sup>

## **Torture**

In addition to rape and other sexual violence (which are forms of torture), **detainees are subject to additional torture techniques.** Four different electroshock method have been reported by former inmates: **the chair, the glove, the helmet, and a stick.**<sup>262</sup> For example, during her first night in the camp, Tursunay Ziawudun, an ethnic Uyghur, was taken from a cell she shared with 14 other women at night and **tortured with an electroshock stick which was**

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<sup>252</sup> *Id.*

<sup>253</sup> Hill et al., *supra* note 173.

<sup>254</sup> Michael Kaplan, “Uyghur Women in China Labor Camps Recall Horror of Rape, Forced Sterilization,” *New York Post*, Dec. 18, 2021, <https://nypost.com/2021/12/18/uyghur-women-recall-horrors-of-chinas-labor-camps/>.

<sup>255</sup> Hill et al., *supra* note 173.

<sup>256</sup> *Id.*

<sup>257</sup> *Id.*

<sup>258</sup> Ferris-Rotman, *supra* note 248.

<sup>259</sup> Wright et al., *supra* note 161.

<sup>260</sup> Hill et al., *supra* note 173.

<sup>261</sup> *Id.*

<sup>262</sup> *Id.* The stick was used for anal and vaginal rape and on male genitals. *Id.*

**forced into her genital tract.**<sup>263</sup> She also described how women were taken from their cell at night to black rooms with no surveillance cameras to be raped by one or more men who wore suits not uniforms.<sup>264</sup> Another woman had her legs and arms strapped to a chair and an **electroshock helmet placed on her head.**<sup>265</sup> The treatment caused her mouth to foam and continued at least until she lost consciousness.<sup>266</sup> She was told her crime was being Uyghur.<sup>267</sup> Similarly, another male inmate was interrogated for 4-5 days, during which he was put in a **tiger chair**, which is **used to immobilize a person through handcuffing or restraining their arms and legs, hung up and beaten with wooden torches and iron whips on his thighs.**<sup>268</sup> Other inmates were **chained with heavy chains on their hands and feet**, and forced to sleep bent over.<sup>269</sup> A woman saw a man strapped in a tiger chair being beaten and electrocuted to the point that the screaming disrupted her own interrogation.<sup>270</sup>

Detainees have also been subjected to beatings during interrogations. **Inmates as young as 14 were beaten** and kicked until bruised, swollen, and crying.<sup>271</sup> One woman says she was kicked in the stomach during interrogations to the point of bleeding.<sup>272</sup> When she was seen by a medical doctor about the injuries, he neglected her bleeding by saying “it is normal for women to bleed.”<sup>273</sup> After she was released from the camp in Kunes County and fled China, she needed to have her womb removed as a consequence of the mistreatment.<sup>274</sup> A male inmate was reported beaten by the guards until he fainted.<sup>275</sup> Other reports detail stepping on faces of inmates during interrogations to obtain confessions.<sup>276</sup> Some suspects were **hung from the ceiling** during interrogations.<sup>277</sup>

Torture techniques also target the Uyghurs’ religion. Inmates exhibiting “bad behavior” were **forced to eat pork**; others accused of religious extremism were **forced to drink alcohol.**<sup>278</sup>

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<sup>263</sup> *Id.*

<sup>264</sup> *Id.*

<sup>265</sup> Wright et al., *supra* note 161.

<sup>266</sup> Danilova, *supra* note 225.

<sup>267</sup> *Id.*

<sup>268</sup> Wright et al., *supra* note 161.

<sup>269</sup> *Id.*

<sup>270</sup> Khatchadourian, *supra* note 210. The screams were so loud that her interrogators asked the other interrogators to stop. *Id.*

<sup>271</sup> Wright et al., *supra* note 161.

<sup>272</sup> Hill et al., *supra* note 173.

<sup>273</sup> *Id.*

<sup>274</sup> *Id.*

<sup>275</sup> Feng (1), *supra* note 229.

<sup>276</sup> Wright et al., *supra* note 161.

<sup>277</sup> *Id.*

<sup>278</sup> Simon Denyer, “Former Inmate of China’s Muslim ‘Reeducation’ Camps Tell of Brainwashing, Torture,” *The Washington Post*, May 17, 2018, [https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/asia\\_pacific/former-inmates-of-chinas-muslim-re-education-camps-tell-of-brainwashing-torture/2018/05/16/32b330e8-5850-11e8-8b92-45fdd7aacf3c\\_story.html](https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/asia_pacific/former-inmates-of-chinas-muslim-re-education-camps-tell-of-brainwashing-torture/2018/05/16/32b330e8-5850-11e8-8b92-45fdd7aacf3c_story.html).

If detainees moved their lips, police would assume they were reciting the Quran and torture them badly.<sup>279</sup>

### **Medical Experimentation**

According to Dr. Erkin Sidick's reports, the CCP has isolated about 165 Uyghurs between 18–20 years of age in a hospital for the purpose of medical experimentation.<sup>280</sup> Each individual was infected with COVID-19 before being given a COVID-19 vaccine.<sup>281</sup> Medical exams, such as having blood drawn twice a day and oral liquid tests, were done to monitor the effectiveness of the vaccines.<sup>282</sup> Additionally, Dr. Sidick reports another COVID-19 vaccine testing camp at Bainiao Lake Vocational Training Centre, similar medical experimentation sites in locked down schools, and facilities for medical experimentation being built near detention camps.<sup>283</sup> *The New York Times* has also found evidence of medical research being conducted and published based on blood samples collected from detained individuals without obtaining valid informed consent.<sup>284</sup>

### ***Forced Sterilizations, Forced Abortions, and Forced Marriages***

Reports of campaigns of forced sterilization, forced abortions, and forced marriage highlight the Chinese Government's deliberate attempts to ensure there is not a next generation of Uyghurs or their number is substantially reduced.

Treatment of the Uyghurs should be considered in the context of China's generally restrictive historical policies regarding childbirth. China implemented a "one child policy" in 1979, although ethnic minorities, including the Uyghurs, were allowed second-child permits.<sup>285</sup> The one-child policy was enforced on Chinese women through "economic, psychological, and at times physical coercion"; women who had had one child were fitted with IUDs, and women with two children were sterilized.<sup>286</sup> Abortions mainly occurred if contraceptives failed.<sup>287</sup> In 1987, when 77% of the married child-bearing women used contraceptives—mainly IUDs and

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<sup>279</sup> Uyghur Tribunal—Fact Witness statement (1), *supra* note 155.

<sup>280</sup> Werleman, *supra* note 33.

<sup>281</sup> *Id.*

<sup>282</sup> *Id.*

<sup>283</sup> *Id.*

<sup>284</sup> Beatrice Brown, "DNA Phenotyping Experiment on Uighurs Raises Ethical Questions About Informed Consent," *Bill of Health Harvard Law*, Dec. 9, 2019, <https://blog.petrieflom.law.harvard.edu/2019/12/09/dna-phenotyping-experiment-on-uighurs-raises-ethical-questions-about-informed-consent/>.

<sup>285</sup> Wang Feng, Baochang Gu, and Yong Cai, "The End of China's One-Child Policy," *The Brookings Institution*, Mar. 30, 2016, <https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2016/07/The-End-of-Chinas-OneChild-Policy.pdf>. Ethnic minorities consisting of fewer than 10 million people had specific guidelines allowing for second-child permits.

<sup>286</sup> Joan Kaufman, Zhang Zhirong, Qiao Zinjian, and Zhang Yang, "Family Planning Policy and Practice in China: A Study of Four Rural Counties," *Population and Development Review*, Dec. 1989, vol. 15, no. 4, 707, at 707, <https://www.jstor.org/stable/pdf/1972596.pdf>.

<sup>287</sup> *Id.*

sterilization—policies changed with the possibilities of obtaining a “one-child pledge” certificate for a financial reward, or be fined for “unplanned births.”<sup>288</sup> The one-child policy partly ended in 2013, and fully ended in 2016.<sup>289</sup> However, in spite of the implementation of the two-child policy starting in 2016, China did not experience the upsurge in births that was anticipated and a three-child policy was introduced in 2021.<sup>290</sup>

Despite China’s efforts to increase birth rates nationally,<sup>291</sup> and despite the stated policy regarding the Uyghurs as of 2017 allowing two children in urban areas and three in rural ones, in actually,<sup>292</sup> **efforts to decrease birth rates in Xinjiang appear to have intensified** starting in at least 2015.<sup>293</sup> Uyghur women have testified to birth control restrictions more severe than those faced in the early 1980s during the one child policy.

### Forced Sterilizations

While the campaign of mass forced sterilization of Uyghur women started in 2018, reports date back to 2014, when it is estimated that 200,000 IUDs were fitted and placed in women in Xinjiang.<sup>294</sup> In 2016, the CCP launched the “Free Technical Family Planning Services to Farmers and Pastoralists” campaign which provided what the Government called “free birth control surgeries,” which included IUD placements, sterilizations, and abortions.<sup>295</sup> In 2018, AP News estimated that **approximately 330,000 IUDs had been fitted in Xinjiang,<sup>296</sup> accounting for around 80% of newly placed IUDs in China.<sup>297</sup> It was also reported that sterilization**

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<sup>288</sup> *Id.* at 708.

<sup>289</sup> Feng et al., *supra* note 285.

<sup>290</sup> Stephen McDonnell and Kerry Allen, “China Allows Three Children in Major Policy Shift,” *BBC News*, May 31, 2021, <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-china-57303592>.

<sup>291</sup> BBC News (3), “China NPC: Three-Child Policy Formally Passed into Law,” *BBC News*, Aug. 20, 2021, <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-china-58277473>. In 2021, “several resolutions aimed at boosting the birth rate and ‘reducing the burden’ of raising a child, said Xinhua news agency. These include cancelling the ‘social maintenance fee’—a financial penalty couples pay for having children beyond the limit, encouraging local governments to offer parental leave, increasing women’s employment rights; and improving childcare infrastructure.” *Id.*

<sup>292</sup> Joseph Hincks, “China’s Restive Xinjiang Province Changes Family Planning Rules to ‘Promote Ethnic Equality,’” *Time*, Aug. 1, 2017, <https://time.com/4881898/china-xinjiang-uyghur-children/>.

<sup>293</sup> VOA, “China Forces Birth Control on Uighurs to Suppress Population,” *VOA*, June 29, 2020, [https://www.voanews.com/a/east-asia-pacific\\_china-forces-birth-control-uyghurs-suppress-population/6191919.html](https://www.voanews.com/a/east-asia-pacific_china-forces-birth-control-uyghurs-suppress-population/6191919.html). “Birth rates in the mostly Uighur [sic] regions of Hotan and Kashgar plunged by more than 60% from 2015 to 2018.... Across the Xinjiang region, birth rates continue to plummet, falling nearly 24% (in 2019) alone—compared to just 4.2% nationwide, statistics show.” *Id.*

<sup>294</sup> Adrian Zenz (1), “China’s Own Documents Show Potentially Genocidal Sterilization Plans in Xinjiang,” *Foreign Affairs*, July 1, 2020, <https://foreignpolicy.com/2020/07/01/china-documents-uyghur-genocidal-sterilization-xinjiang/>.

<sup>295</sup> *Id.*

<sup>296</sup> The Associated Press, “China Cuts Uighur Births With IUDs, Abortion, Sterilization,” *The Associated Press*, June 29, 2020, <https://apnews.com/article/ap-top-news-international-news-weekend-reads-china-health-269b3de1af34e17c1941a514f78d764c>.

<sup>297</sup> Zenz (1), *supra* note 294.

rates in Xinjiang were 243 per 100,000 people, compared to 33 per 100,000 people in the rest of China.<sup>298</sup>

In August 2017, officials in a teachers' compound were instructed to **implant IUDs in all women of child-bearing age.**<sup>299</sup> One woman, a 50 year-old teacher, claimed that she was **threatened with being strapped to an iron chair for interrogation at the police station unless she complied, despite having one only child** and stating she had no plans on having more children; along with hundreds of other women, she was forced onto a bus with armed guards and taken to a hospital where they were lined up to get fitted with IUDs.<sup>300</sup> According to the interviewee, the IUD was designed to be irremovable.<sup>301</sup>

Moreover, the detention centers in Xinjiang have been used as a tool to facilitate the implementation of the forced sterilization campaign; one woman was told by her doctor, **the fitting of IUDs upon arrival at the detention camps is “a must for all women going to the camp.”**<sup>302</sup> In addition to being forcibly fitted with IUDs, women describe being forced in the detention facilities to consume unknown pills and liquids, the effects of which led to excessive bleeding and loss of periods for many.<sup>303</sup>

The 2019 family planning budget revealed Government targets set for the placement of IUDs and for sterilization of Uyghurs within the counties of Hotan and Guma. **In Hotan County, the target was 524 IUD placements and 14,872 sterilizations, a total of 14% of the childbearing population;**<sup>304</sup> **in Guma County, the target was 5,970 IUD placements and 8,064 sterilizations, a total of 34% of the childbearing population.**<sup>305</sup>

By 2020, rates of newly fitted IUDs and sterilizations in China had fallen, while in Xinjiang the rates continued to rise.<sup>306</sup> A doctor from Xinjiang reported that of 300 Uyghur women she had examined, 80% of them had been sterilized, with many of them unaware of the fact.<sup>307</sup> This is consistent with reports of other women who received medical confirmation of sterilization following release from detention facilities.<sup>308</sup>

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<sup>298</sup> Ben Westcott, “China Needs to Boost its Population so Why Not Scrap Birth Caps Entirely? The Reason Might be Xinjiang,” *CNN*, June 1, 2021, <https://www.cnn.com/2021/06/01/china/xinjiang-china-three-child-policy-intl-hnk/index.html>.

<sup>299</sup> The Associated Press, *supra* note 296.

<sup>300</sup> *Id.*

<sup>301</sup> *Id.*

<sup>302</sup> Ferris-Rotman, *supra* note 248.

<sup>303</sup> Danilova, *supra* note 225.

<sup>304</sup> Zenz (1), *supra* note 294.

<sup>305</sup> *Id.*

<sup>306</sup> The Associated Press, *supra* note 296.

<sup>307</sup> Westcott, *supra* note 298.

<sup>308</sup> The Associated Press, *supra* note 296.



### Forced Abortions

**The Chinese Government has additionally used forced abortions in a further effort to decrease birth rates amongst Uyghurs and other ethnic minorities in Xinjiang.**<sup>309</sup> Thus far, it appears as though the CCP's campaign to reduce birth rates among the Uyghurs—a result of both forced sterilizations and forced abortions—has largely been successful. Data reveals that from 2017–2018, **the birth rate in Xinjiang decreased from 15.8 per 1,000 people to 10.7 per 1,000 people.**<sup>310</sup> **Figures on the number of women who have been subject to forced abortions are unknown, or not publicly available;** however, Uyghur women's testimonies reveal the utilization of the practice.

In 2019, *The Washington Post* reported on a Kazakh woman who was forced to undergo two abortions while living in Xinjiang, one in 2016 and one in 2017.<sup>311</sup> The detention facilities are similarly utilized to carry out forced abortions; one female inmate was told that **pregnant women in the camp would be forced to undergo abortions if pregnancy was discovered.**<sup>312</sup> AP News reported that some women even attempted to terminate their pregnancies on their own, out of fear of retribution.<sup>313</sup>

Some cases are particularly abhorrent, with one Uyghur woman describing how she was **forced to abort her fourth child at 10 weeks; in an interview, she said that the fetus was cut out of her without anesthesia.**<sup>314</sup> In another case, one woman was coerced into having an abortion with threats that if she refused, her brother would be detained; she complied and was forced to undergo an abortion, yet she herself was subsequently detained.<sup>315</sup> In perhaps one of the most disturbing testimonies, **one Uyghur woman revealed that she was subjected to a forced abortion at 6½ months pregnant** while in detention.<sup>316</sup> These testimonies are only a few of the many reported cases of women being forcibly subjected to abortions.<sup>317</sup>

### Forced Marriages

As part of the effort to Sinicize the Uyghur population in Xinjiang, **the CCP originally implemented a policy in the region to promote interethnic marriages, while the practice has now deteriorated into one of forced marriages.** Coerced weddings and the promotion of interracial marriages in Xinjiang have become part of the Chinese Government's program to

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<sup>309</sup> *Id.*

<sup>310</sup> Westcott, *supra* note 298.

<sup>311</sup> Ferris-Rotman, *supra* note 248.

<sup>312</sup> The Associated Press, *supra* note 296.

<sup>313</sup> *Id.*

<sup>314</sup> Kirby (1), *supra* note 200.

<sup>315</sup> The Associated Press, *supra* note 296.

<sup>316</sup> Al Jazeera (2), “‘Uyghur Tribunal’ Opens With Testimony of Alleged Rape, Torture,” *Al Jazeera*, June 4, 2021, <https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2021/6/4/uyghur-tribunal-hears-evidence-of-alleged-china-abuses>.

<sup>317</sup> For additional details, see Appendix C.

assimilate the ethnic minority population.<sup>318</sup> These strategies are similar to those used to promote inter-ethnic marriages in Tibet.<sup>319</sup>

Forced marriage policies in Xinjiang were rooted in the “Uyghur-Chinese One Relative” policy passed in 2016, which made Han Chinese men and women “relatives” of Uyghurs.<sup>320</sup> This policy was reportedly **implemented by Chen Quanguo** as Xinjiang Communist Party Secretary.<sup>321</sup> In the same year, as part of the “Becoming Family” campaign, the Chinese Government mandated extensive homestay in Uyghur households and neighborhoods.<sup>322</sup> The purpose of the program was supposedly to promote “inter-ethnic mingling” and “ethnic harmony.”<sup>323</sup> However, the program entailed forced stayovers, where male Han Chinese “relatives” were assigned to monitor Uyghur families in Xinjiang; it has been reported that the men regularly sleep in the same beds as the wives of Uyghur men held in detention camps.<sup>324</sup>

In 2017, the local government in Xinjiang’s Cherchen County announced the “Uyghur-Han Marriage and Family Incentive Strategy,” providing 10,000 yuan to interethnic Han-Uyghur

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<sup>318</sup> Keoni Everington, “Netizens Outraged by ‘Gene Washing’ Wedding Between Chinese Man and Uyghur Woman,” *Taiwan News*, May 28, 2018, <https://www.taiwannews.com.tw/en/news/3442256>.

<sup>319</sup> William Wan and Xu Yangjingjing, “China Promotes Mixed Marriages in Tibet as Way to Achieve ‘Unity,’” *The Washington Post*, Aug. 16, 2014, [https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/asia\\_pacific/china-promotes-mixed-marriages-in-tibet-as-way-to-achieve-unity/2014/08/16/94409ca6-238e-11e4-86ca-6f03cbd15c1a\\_story.html](https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/asia_pacific/china-promotes-mixed-marriages-in-tibet-as-way-to-achieve-unity/2014/08/16/94409ca6-238e-11e4-86ca-6f03cbd15c1a_story.html).

<sup>320</sup> Radio Free Asia, “Xinjiang Authorities Push Uyghurs to Marry Han Chinese,” *Radio Free Asia*, 2017, <https://www.rfa.org/english/news/special/uyghur-oppression/ChenPolicy2.html>. One source describes the “Uyghur-Chinese One Relative” policy as follows:

The Xinjiang United Front Work Department said in February [2018] that government workers should live with their assigned families every two months, for five days at a time. The . . . program is mandatory for cadres. Likewise [Uyghurs] said their families understood that they would be deemed extremists if they refused to take part. . . . Some families might be paired with two or three cadres at a time, . . . and the regularly mandated house calls could be supplanted with trips to the local party office. . . . Overseas Uighurs [sic] said the ‘visits’ to their relatives’ homes often lasted longer than five days, and they were closely monitored the whole time. The cadres would ask their family members where they were going and who they were meeting whenever they wanted to leave the house.

Dake Kang and Yanan Wang, “China’s Uighurs Told to Share Beds, Meals with Party Members,” *The Associated Press*, Nov. 30, 2018, <https://apnews.com/article/ap-top-news-international-news-prayer-weddings-occasions-9ca1c29fc9554c1697a8729bba4dd93b>.

<sup>321</sup> Radio Free Asia, *supra* note 320.

<sup>322</sup> Wang et al. (2), *supra* note 59, at 13. The program has continued to expand since December 2017, with more than a million Government cadres sent to spend at least five days every two months in the homes of Uyghurs in Xinjiang. *Id.*

<sup>323</sup> Diamond et al., *supra* note 37.

<sup>324</sup> Habib Saddiqui, “China’s Forced Assimilation of Uyghurs is Repugnant and Dehumanizing,” *Eurasia Review*, Nov. 4, 2019, <https://www.eurasiareview.com/04112019-chinas-forced-assimilation-of-uyghurs-is-repugnant-and-dehumanizing-oped/>.

couples who agreed to marry.<sup>325</sup> To provide further incentives, authorities circulated promotional videos and magazine articles to promote interracial marriages between Uyghurs and Hans.<sup>326</sup>

**From 2017-2019, the CCP sent more than 1.1 million Han Chinese officials to Xinjiang to live in Uyghur homes as “relatives.”**<sup>327</sup> With the detention of Uyghur men in internment facilities throughout Xinjiang, the policy has created a disproportionate number of Han men in the region. When cadres are sent to homes of the opposite sex, women and girls become particularly vulnerable to forced marriages and/or sexual violence.<sup>328</sup> Following the recent arrival of Han Chinese men in local villages and counties, many women have felt pressure to marry.<sup>329</sup> Campaign for Uyghurs, a non-governmental organization, has called the program “another form of torture,” highlighting the restrictions Uyghur women face in maintaining their culture or practicing their religion, noting that some are even forced to drink alcohol and eat pork.<sup>330</sup>

**Reports that Uyghur women are being sold into marriage to Han men have been emerging, with men promised “government gratification,” such as money, jobs, and housing.**<sup>331</sup> Fear of repercussions or persecution by the Government restricts the ability of Uyghur women and girls to marry freely. Accurate figures on the number of Uyghur women forced to enter into marriage with Han men are largely unknown; however, interviews with women and families from Xinjiang paint a picture of a large-scale program. As one example, a female Uyghur activist reported in an interview that her neighbors, out of fear of being sent to detention facilities, accepted the marriage of their 18-year-old daughter to a Han Chinese man.<sup>332</sup> She described that local government officials visited the mother demanding she give her consent to the marriage.<sup>333</sup>

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<sup>325</sup> Radio Free Asia, *supra* note 320.

<sup>326</sup> Leigh Hartman, “China Coerces Uyghur Women into Unwanted Marriages,” *ShareAmerica*, July 28, 2021, <https://share.america.gov/china-coerces-uyghur-women-into-unwanted-marriages/>.

<sup>327</sup> Watson and Wright, *supra* note 225. Officials are expected to monitor and report on party loyalty and religious activities in the counties they are sent to. *Id.*

<sup>328</sup> Wang et al. (2), *supra* note 59, at 82.

<sup>329</sup> Hartman, *supra* note 326. One Uyghur woman interviewed said that dance parties are organized by her employer for Han men and Uyghur women, and claimed that those who refuse to enter into these marriages are at risk of being sent to the detention centers. *Id.*

<sup>330</sup> Campaign for Uyghurs, “Another Form of Torture for the Uyghurs: Forced to Marry Han Chinese,” *Campaign For Uyghurs*, Apr. 4, 2020, <https://campaignforuyghurs.org/another-form-of-torture-for-the-uyghurs-forced-to-marry-han-chinese/>. Rushan Abbas, the Executive Director of Campaign for Uyghurs, noted that “if they say no, then they will be viewed as [an] Islamic extremist who didn’t want to marry a non-Muslim Chinese. So, they cannot reject a proposal.” *Id.*

<sup>331</sup> Ani, “China Advertises Marriages to Uyghur Women to Attract Han Men into Xinjiang,” *BW Businessworld*, Aug. 1, 2020, <https://www.businessworld.in/article/China-advertises-marriages-to-Uyghur-women-to-attract-Han-men-into-Xinjiang-/01-08-2020-304075/>.

<sup>332</sup> Asim Kashgarian, “China Video Ad Calls for 100 Uighur Women to ‘Urgently’ Marry Han Men,” *VOA*, Aug. 22, 2020, [https://www.voanews.com/a/east-asia-pacific\\_voa-news-china\\_china-video-ad-calls-100-uighur-women-urgently-marry-han-men/6194806.html](https://www.voanews.com/a/east-asia-pacific_voa-news-china_china-video-ad-calls-100-uighur-women-urgently-marry-han-men/6194806.html).

<sup>333</sup> *Id.*

The CCP's implementation of forced marriage policy within the region shows no sign of abating, with the continued release of propaganda videos promoting and encouraging interethnic marriages.<sup>334</sup> Government propaganda on interethnic marriages represents one of the newer methods in the CCP's attempt to Sinicize the Turkic-speaking ethnic groups in Xinjiang. Young women are pressured and forced to marry men with whom they do not share language, religion, culture, or roots, with some going as far as to say that "this is government-sponsored mass rape."<sup>335</sup>

### ***Forced Transfer of Children and Family Separations***

Although Uyghur children are impacted by many of the crimes listed above (e.g., detention, forced labor transfers, murder and disappearance of their parents, as well as surveillance of their communities and the elimination of cultural and religious practices), they are also directly harmed by the CCP's temporary and permanent family separations. Specifically, children are impacted by the Government withholding their passports, transferring children to state-run orphanages (both inside and outside of Xinjiang), and forcing children into boarding schools most of the year. As will be explained further below, although forcing children to attend boarding school or the withholding of passports are not specific underlying crimes of genocide, the consequences could result in inflicting serious mental harm on the children and their parents. The transfer of children to orphanages—even when they have family members who could otherwise take them in—could constitute the underlying crime of transfer of children to members of another group.

### **Family Separations**

The Chinese Government has been forcibly keeping families apart beyond the re-education camps by **confiscating passports and arresting family members who return from abroad**.<sup>336</sup> Many families traveled abroad in 2016 but could not obtain passports for their children; the parents left the children behind in China, thinking they would be able to arrange paperwork at a later date.<sup>337</sup> However, this has not been possible and now many parents do not know where their children are or who is taking care of them.<sup>338</sup> When parents have attempted to return to China to arrange passports for their children, they have been arrested and had their passports confiscated.<sup>339</sup> Relatives in Xinjiang warn family members abroad against returning to China, or else face arrest.<sup>340</sup> Requests made by family members to have children returned are ignored by the Chinese Government, and families do not receive information about the health or

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<sup>334</sup> *Id.*

<sup>335</sup> Ani, *supra* note 331.

<sup>336</sup> Nazeer, *supra* note 231.

<sup>337</sup> *Id.*

<sup>338</sup> *Id.*

<sup>339</sup> *Id.*

<sup>340</sup> *Id.*

whereabouts of their children.<sup>341</sup> Sometimes separated children are shown in videos posted on Chinese social media; these videos are often the only way family members abroad find out if their child is alive.<sup>342</sup>

## Orphanages

The Chinese Government has been moving quickly to build massive new facilities to accommodate the large number of children separated from their families due to detention of the parents (i.e., to house children who are *not* in fact orphans).<sup>343</sup> Since the start of 2017, the Government has budgeted more than \$30 million to **build or expand 45 orphanages with the capacity to house 5,000 children**.<sup>344</sup> Most orphanages have a minimum capacity of 100 beds, but other facilities are much larger.<sup>345</sup> One Government construction bid called for an orphanage with four four-story dormitories to be built in Moyu County.<sup>346</sup>

Despite the expansion, orphanages can barely keep up with the demand as Uyghur children are not allowed to go to school with other children due to Government claims that the parents have a “political problem.”<sup>347</sup> In these state-run facilities, **the Uyghur children are separated from their language and culture in an effort by the state to forcibly assimilate the children into mainstream Chinese culture**.<sup>348</sup> In fact, Uyghur children lacking proper records, **“undergo changes of identity in which they assume Chinese names.”**<sup>349</sup>

A worker from a Xinjiang orphanage described severe overcrowding and awful conditions at the facilities, with **young children from the age of 6 months to 12 years being**

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<sup>341</sup> *Id.*

<sup>342</sup> *Id.*

<sup>343</sup> Yanan Wang and Dake Kang, “China Treats Uighur Kids as ‘Orphans’ After Parents Seized,” *AP News*, Sept. 21, 2018, <https://apnews.com/article/international-news-crime-china-clamps-down-china-ap-top-news-903a97b7c62a47b98553b6f422827dd7>; Shohret Hoshur et al. (3), “Dozens of Uyghur Children of Xinjiang Village Camp Detainees Sent to Live in Orphanages,” *Radio Free Asia*, July 2, 2018, <https://www.rfa.org/english/news/uyghur/orphanages-07022018143057.html>.

<sup>344</sup> Wang and Kang, *supra* note 343; Hoshur et al. (3), *supra* note 343.

<sup>345</sup> *Id.*

<sup>346</sup> *Id.*

<sup>347</sup> Emily Feng (2), “Uighur Children Fall Victim to China Anti-Terror Drive,” *Financial Times*, July 9, 2018, <https://www.ft.com/content/f0d3223a-7f4d-11e8-bc55-50daf11b720d>.

<sup>348</sup> Sigal Samuel (2), “China’s Jaw-Dropping Family Separation Policy,” *The Atlantic*, Sept. 4, 2018, <https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2018/09/china-internment-camps-uyghur-muslim-children/569062/>.

<sup>349</sup> According to one source:

Children belonging to the ethnic Uyghur minority at an orphanage in northwestern China routinely undergo changes of identity in which they assume Chinese names, according to current and former employees.... “At least 10 [of 30] of their [Uyghur children] names and file details were all changed to Chinese”... An employee who answered the phone at the orphanage [Urumchi Welfare Institution for Abandoned Children] confirmed.... “We use only the Chinese language here, and we rename Uyghur children with Chinese names in the case of those who have no family records,” she said.

Mihray et al., “Uyghur Children’s ‘Identities Changed,’” *Radio Free Asia*, May 22, 2009, <https://www.rfa.org/english/news/uyghur/orphans-05222009142223.html>.

**“locked up like farm animals in a shed.”**<sup>350</sup> Despite the orphanages receiving cash donations from the public, the worker claims that very little of the money is spent on the children, with the children being allowed meat only once a week and subsisting for the rest of the time on “rice soup.”<sup>351</sup> Overcrowding is causing many of the children to be moved to other regions of China away from Xinjiang, **making it impossible for parents released from detention camps to find their children.**<sup>352</sup>

### **Boarding Schools**

According to Government planning documents, the Chinese Government set a goal of operating one to two boarding schools in each of the over 800 townships in Xinjiang.<sup>353</sup> In 2015, a massive boarding school complex was completed outside of Kashgar that could house 23,400 students and teachers.<sup>354</sup> More than 4,300 bilingual kindergartens were built in 2017 alone, with the kindergarteners given a “patriotic” education and taught “civilized living habits.”<sup>355</sup> Government documents from early 2017 claim that, at that time, **nearly 40 percent of all elementary-school and middle-school-aged children in Xinjiang were in boarding schools, approximately 497,800 children.**<sup>356</sup> **As of 2019, Government planning documents reveal that the number of children transferred into state-run boarding schools in the region increased by 76.9 percent to 880,500.**<sup>357</sup>

It has been reported by witnesses that **boarding schools in Xinjiang strongly resemble adult “re-education” camps. The schools often have “full-coverage surveillance systems, perimeter alarms, and 10,000-volt electric fences, with some school security spending surpassing that of the camps.”**<sup>358</sup> Children are transferred to state-run boarding schools designed to block the “thinking and ideas” children might encounter at home.<sup>359</sup> It appears increasingly that **children are taken even when grandparents or extended family are willing and able to care for them.**<sup>360</sup>

The children obliged to stay in these facilities are mistreated. Uyghur children previously held in these facilities report having their heads shaved and that teachers and class monitors would **frequently hit them, lock them in dark rooms and force them to hold stress positions**

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<sup>350</sup> Hoshur et al. (3), *supra* note 343.

<sup>351</sup> *Id.*

<sup>352</sup> *Id.*

<sup>353</sup> Amy Qin, “In China’s Crackdown on Muslims, Children Have Not Been Spared,” *The New York Times*, Oct. 15, 2020, <https://www.nytimes.com/2019/12/28/world/asia/china-xinjiang-children-boarding-schools.html?searchResultPosition=4>.

<sup>354</sup> Wang and Kang, *supra* note 343.

<sup>355</sup> *Id.*

<sup>356</sup> Qin, *supra* note 353.

<sup>357</sup> Dr. Adrian Zenz (2), “Parent-Child Separation in Yarkand County, Kashgar,” *Adrian Zenz Medium*, Oct. 15, 2020, [https://adrianzenz.medium.com/story-45d07b25bcad#\\_ftn7](https://adrianzenz.medium.com/story-45d07b25bcad#_ftn7).

<sup>358</sup> Uyghur Tribunal—Fact Witness statement (2), “Julie Millsap,” Sept. 11, 2021, <https://uyghurtribunal.com/wp-content/uploads/2022/01/UT-211217-Julie-Millsap.pdf>.

<sup>359</sup> Khatchadourian, *supra* note 212.

<sup>360</sup> Samuel (2), *supra* note 348; Feng (2), *supra* note 347.

as a punishment.<sup>361</sup> Once released, the children were traumatized and **malnourished** and could no longer speak Uyghur.<sup>362</sup> The children describe having their hair pulled out and being beaten by older class monitors assigned to each dorm room.<sup>363</sup> A former teacher at a “bilingual” kindergarten outside of Kashgar said that all Uyghur students were forbidden from speaking Uyghur at school, with all lessons given in Mandarin.<sup>364</sup> **When the children did not learn quickly enough or did not follow orders, they were forced to hold a stress position called “the motorcycle,”** in which the arms are stretched out front and the knees bent in a half-squat.<sup>365</sup> They would be forced to hold this position for several minutes.<sup>366</sup> The worst punishment described by the children was to be sent to the basement, where they were told ghosts lived, and locked there alone in the dark for hours.<sup>367</sup>

One father recalled that his son was automatically transferred to a boarding school when he was nine years old as all Uyghur children of a certain age were required to attend boarding school and were only allowed home on weekends and holidays.<sup>368</sup> The father recalled **seeing iron bars at the facility, which reminded him of a zoo.**<sup>369</sup> Parents were only allowed to visit their children on Wednesday nights through a fence.<sup>370</sup>

Although the children are returned to their families from the boarding schools, some are “worried that their own children will incriminate them, whether accidentally or because teachers urge kids to spy on their parents,” causing parents to be “scared to death of their children....tell[ing] their teachers in school something about their religious habits that will get them singled out for punishment or internment in the camps.”<sup>371</sup>

\* \* \*

As will be explained below, the above narrative suggests that each of the underlying crimes of genocide is being committed against the Uyghurs: “(a) [k]illing members of the group; (b) [c]ausing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group; (c) [d]eliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about its physical destruction in whole or in part; (d) [i]mposing measures intended to prevent births within the group; [and] (e) [f]orcibly

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<sup>361</sup> Emily Feng (3), “Uyghur Kids Recall Physical and Mental Torment at Chinese Boarding Schools in Xinjiang,” *NPR*, Feb. 3, 2022, <https://www.npr.org/2022/02/03/1073793823/china-uyghur-children-xinjiang-boarding-school>.

<sup>362</sup> *Id.*

<sup>363</sup> *Id.*

<sup>364</sup> Wang and Kang, *supra* note 343.

<sup>365</sup> Feng (3), *supra* note 361.

<sup>366</sup> *Id.*

<sup>367</sup> *Id.*

<sup>368</sup> Wang and Kang, *supra* note 343.

<sup>369</sup> *Id.*

<sup>370</sup> *Id.*

<sup>371</sup> Samuel (2), *supra* note 348.



transferring children of the group to another group.”<sup>372</sup> As will also be explained below, these underlying crimes together with the special mental state requirement of genocide (*dolus specialis*) illustrate a *prima facie* case of the crime of genocide.

#### IV. The Intent to Destroy—Evidence of Genocidal Intent

The crime of genocide contains two component parts: (1) the special mental state requirement (*dolus specialis*), consisting of “intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national ethnical, racial, or religious group, as such”; and (2) the underlying crimes (enumerated above).<sup>373</sup> In addition to committing genocide, perpetrators may be punished for conspiracy, incitement, attempt, and complicity to commit genocide.<sup>374</sup> While many individuals are involved in the commission of genocide, perpetrators at all levels may be punished, including leaders, public officials, and private individuals.<sup>375</sup> State responsibility for genocide also exists, running in parallel with individual criminal responsibility.<sup>376</sup>

As detailed below, it can be inferred that Chinese Government officials have acted against the Uyghurs with intent that satisfies the special mental state requirement of genocide (*dolus specialis*), and, as mentioned, each of the underlying crimes listed in the Genocide Convention is being committed.<sup>377</sup> Together, this demonstrates that genocide is being committed by the Chinese Government against the Uyghurs. (For additional case law on the crime of genocide and how it is satisfied in the present situation, see Appendix D.)

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<sup>372</sup> Genocide Convention, *supra* note 2, Art. II.

<sup>373</sup> *Id.*

<sup>374</sup> *Id.* Art. III.

<sup>375</sup> *See id.* Art. IV (“[p]ersons committing genocide . . . shall be punished, whether they are constitutionally responsible rulers, public officials or private individuals”).

<sup>376</sup> *See, e.g.*, André Nollkaemper, “Concurrence Between Individual Responsibility and State Responsibility in International Law,” *The Int’l and Comp. L. Q.* vol. 52, no. 3, 615 (July, 2003).

<sup>377</sup> *See* text accompanying note 372 *supra*.

## ***Dolus Specialis***

### **Intent to Destroy**

Genocidal intent may be inferred from (1) existing plans or policies,<sup>378</sup> (2) a pattern of purposeful conduct,<sup>379</sup> or (3) overt statements indicative of genocidal intent.<sup>380</sup> “[R]elevant facts and circumstances could include ‘the general context, the perpetration of other culpable acts systematically directed against the same group, the scale of atrocities committed, the systematic targeting of victims on account of their membership of a particular group, or the repetition of destructive and discriminatory acts.’”<sup>381</sup>

Each of these indicia is met. First, the facts in the report demonstrate: a clear **plan** for large scale-detentions (*see, e.g.*, document from Zhu Hailun on running detention camps);<sup>382</sup> plans to implement forced labor transfers;<sup>383</sup> plans to implement large-scale sterilizations (the Government setting quotas for IUD placements)<sup>384</sup> with Uyghur birthrates falling precipitously compared to the population in general; forced marriage policies;<sup>385</sup> Government planning documents to transfer children to “schools,” where they are held under conditions similar to detention camps;<sup>386</sup> as well as Government building of orphanages, with Uyghur children in schools and orphanages being taken away from their parents.<sup>387</sup>

Second, the facts also illustrate **a pattern of purposeful conduct**, of forced labor, forced abortions, forced marriages, organ “harvesting,” torture, and rape.<sup>388</sup> These constitute large-scale crimes; the crimes are systematically directed against the Uyghurs, with the Uyghurs targeted on account of their group membership, and this is done through repeated destructive and discriminatory acts. (This report is not suggesting that other non-Han Chinese groups are not also being targeted; this report focuses on treatment of the Uyghurs.)<sup>389</sup>

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<sup>378</sup> “The Appeals Chamber, in a recent decision, indicated that the *existence of a plan was not a legal ingredient* of the crime of genocide *but could be of evidential assistance* to prove the intent of the authors of the criminal act(s).” *Prosecutor v. Krstić*, Trial Judgment, para. 572, IT-98-33-T, ICTY, April 19, 2004 (emphasis added).

<sup>379</sup> Genocidal *dolus specialis* may be inferred “from the facts, the concrete circumstances, or ‘a pattern of purposeful action.’” *Prosecutor v. Stakić*, Trial Judgment, para. 526, IT-97-24-T, ICTR, July 31, 2003.

<sup>380</sup> “[T]he perpetrator’s specific intent may be inferred from his overt statements or other circumstantial evidence.” *Prosecutor v. Karera*, Trial Judgment, ICTR-01-74-T, ICTR, December 7, 2007.

<sup>381</sup> *Prosecutor v. Gacumbitsi*, Appeal Judgment, para. 41, ICTR-2001-64-A, July 7, 2006.

<sup>382</sup> *See* notes 76–77 *supra* and accompanying text.

<sup>383</sup> *See* text accompanying note 188 *supra* (“Three Year Plan” to transfer 100,000 workers).

<sup>384</sup> *See* notes 304–305 *supra* and accompanying text.

<sup>385</sup> *See* pp. 38–41 *supra*.

<sup>386</sup> *See* p. 43 *supra*.

<sup>387</sup> Since the start of 2017, the Government has budgeted more than \$30 million to build or expand 45 orphanages with the capacity to house 5,000 children. Wang and Kang, *supra* note 341. *See also* Qin, *supra* note 348 (the Chinese Government had “a goal of operating one-two [state-run orphanages/boarding] schools in each of Xinjiang’s 800+ townships by the end of [2020]”).

<sup>388</sup> *See* Part III, this report.

<sup>389</sup> Other Muslim ethnic groups being targeted include, but are not limited to, the Kazakhs, Hui, Kyrgyz, Uzbeks, and Tajiks. Amnesty International, “China: Draconian Repression of Muslims in Xinjiang

Third, various **statements** by Chinese Government officials suggest genocidal intent against the Uyghurs:

- “Break their lineage, break their roots, break their connections, and break their origins. Completely shovel up the roots of ‘two-faced people,’ dig them out, and vow to fight these two-faced people until the end”;<sup>390</sup>
- “Wipe them out completely .... Destroy them root and branch”;<sup>391</sup>
- “You can’t uproot all the weeds hidden among the crops in the field one-by-one; you need to spray chemicals to kill them all”;<sup>392</sup>
- “Freedom is only possible when this ‘virus’ in their thinking is eradicated”;<sup>393</sup>
- Describing Uyghur beliefs as “religious extremist thought” and referred to their behavior as a “malignant tumor” and a “communicable plague” which would require “more radical and invasive surgery.” Officials were told to “eradicate tumors”;<sup>394</sup>
- The Party must “penetrate like an intravenous needle” and “cure” or “reform through criticism” in order to wipe out the thoughts and ideals of the Uyghurs;<sup>395</sup> and
- Police officers were told to prepare for a “smashing, obliterating offensive.”<sup>396</sup>

The above is all indicative of “intent to destroy.”

“The notion ‘destruction of the group’ means ‘the material destruction of a group either by physical or by biological means . . . .’”<sup>397</sup> Therefore, while this report discusses the destruction of the Uyghurs’ culture and surveillance of the Uyghurs,<sup>398</sup> it is not claimed that these directly constitute genocide.<sup>399</sup> Yet, to the extent that surveillance is being conducted through cyber-operations against the Uyghurs—as it is, including through malware attacks and

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Amounts to Crimes against Humanity,” *Amnesty International*, June 10, 2021, <https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2021/06/china-draconian-repression-of-muslims-in-xinjiang-amounts-to-crimes-against-humanity/>.

<sup>390</sup> Wang et al., (1) *supra* note 29.

<sup>391</sup> Ramzy and Buckley, *supra* note 40.

<sup>392</sup> Shohret Hoshur et al. (4), “Chinese Authorities Jail Four Wealthiest Uyghurs in Xinjiang’s Kashgar in New Purge,” *Radio Free Asia*, Jan. 5, 2018, <https://www.rfa.org/english/news/uyghur/wealthiest-01052018144327.html>.

<sup>393</sup> Diamond et al., *supra* note 37, at 38.

<sup>394</sup> Timothy Grose, “‘Once Their Mental State Is Healthy, They Will Be Able to Live Happily in Society,’” *ChinaFile*, Aug. 2, 2019, <https://www.chinafile.com/reporting-opinion/viewpoint/once-their-mental-state-healthy-they-will-be-able-live-happily-society>.

<sup>395</sup> Diamond et al., *supra* note 37, at 38.

<sup>396</sup> Ramzy and Buckley, *supra* note 40.

<sup>397</sup> *Prosecutor v. Seromba*, Trial Judgment, para. 319, ICTR-2001-66-I, ICTR, December 13, 2006.

<sup>398</sup> See pp. 15–19 (mass surveillance); pp. 19–22 (cultural erasure). See also Appendix C, Surveillance; Forced Assimilation and Cultural Destruction.

<sup>399</sup> They are, however, part of the genocide, as both cause serious mental harm, so constitute the underlying crime of “causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group.” Genocide Convention, *supra* note 2, Art. II.

the use of facial recognition technology to identify who is a Uyghur<sup>400</sup>—one might consider the genocide to be a cyber-enabled genocide.<sup>401</sup>

### **In Whole or In Part**

The intent to destroy must target at least a “substantial part” of one of the protected groups under the Genocide Convention.<sup>402</sup> There is no requirement of complete annihilation of the group, nor is there a numeric threshold that qualifies a genocide.<sup>403</sup> The perpetrators’ reach does not have to be global; genocide can occur against a particular group in a specific country or region or even a community within a region.<sup>404</sup> Additionally, targeting specific group members who are integral to the group’s survival as a whole may support a finding that the part targeted qualifies as a “substantial” part of the group,<sup>405</sup> as can targeting prominent members of the group.<sup>406</sup>

The facts indicate that a substantial part of the Uyghur population is being targeted through detention in camps, forced labor programs, as well as large-scale sterilization, abortion and forced marriage programs. Those targeted constitute a “substantial” part of the Uyghur group. For example, by 2017, it is reported that officials were ordered to detain nearly 40 percent of the adult population in parts of southern Xinjiang.<sup>407</sup> While total fatality figures resulting from the organ “harvesting” are difficult to trace, some estimate around 25,000 people per year are victims.<sup>408</sup> In total, the CPP’s policies have targeted millions of Uyghurs in Xinjiang.<sup>409</sup> As

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<sup>400</sup> See Appendix C, Surveillance; see also report, notes 117–122 (malware), notes 129, 418 (facial recognition technology).

<sup>401</sup> See *Council of Advisers Report*, *supra* note 122. See also Jennifer Trahan “The Criminalization of Cyber-Attacks under the Rome Statute,” *J. of Int’l Criminal Justice*, vol. 19, p. 1133 (2021); Jennifer Trahan, “Contributing to Cyber Peace by Maximizing the Potential for Deterrence: Criminalization of Cyber-Attacks under the International Criminal Court’s Rome Statute,” in *Cyber Peace: Charting a Path Toward a Sustainable, Stable, and Secure CyberSpace*, ed. by Scott Shackleford, Frederick Douzet, and Christopher Ankersen (Cambridge University Press 2022).

<sup>402</sup> “To establish specific genocidal intent, it is not necessary to prove that the perpetrator intended to achieve the complete annihilation of a group throughout the world, but, at least, to destroy a substantial part thereof.” *Seromba*, Trial Judgment, *supra* note 397, para. 319.

<sup>403</sup> “There is no numeric threshold of victims necessary to establish genocide.” *Id.*

<sup>404</sup> *Prosecutor v. Krstić*, Appeal Judgment, para. 582, IT-98-33-A, ICTY, April 19, 2004.

<sup>405</sup> “If a specific part of the group is emblematic of the overall group, or is essential to its survival, that may support a finding that the part qualifies as substantial within the meaning of Article [II].” *Id.*, para. 12.

<sup>406</sup> “[T]argeting the leadership of a protected group can indicate genocidal intent, irrespective of the process of selection of the targeted leader.” *Prosecutor v. Tolimir*, Appeal Judgment, paras. 260, 263, IT-05-88/2-A, ICTY, April 8, 2015 (recognizing that genocide may be committed through the killings of only certain prominent members of the group).

<sup>407</sup> Diamond et al., *supra* note 37, at 45.

<sup>408</sup> Stavrou, *supra* note 168.

<sup>409</sup> Diamond et al., *supra* note 37, at 45.

mentioned, while total numbers are difficult to be precise on, by some estimates there are *millions* of Uyghurs missing—between detention, forced labor, and outright murder.<sup>410</sup>

In addition, one sees the targeting of group members who are integral to the survival of the group—namely, Uyghur women of child-bearing age, who are being targeted through forced sterilization,<sup>411</sup> forced abortions, and forced marriages to Han Chinese.<sup>412</sup> Because women’s procreative abilities are integral to the group’s survival, these measures appear designed to ensure there will not be a next generation of Uyghurs, or their numbers will be substantially reduced.<sup>413</sup>

Finally, one also sees the targeting of Uyghurs in leadership positions—intellectual leaders (college presidents and professors), religious figures (such as imams), as well as other prominent individuals.<sup>414</sup>

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<sup>410</sup> See Appendix D at 197 (alternative numbers calculations).

<sup>411</sup> Government documents from 2019 revealed orchestrated plans to conduct mass female sterilizations in rural Uyghur regions, “targeting between 14 and 34 percent of all married women of childbearing age in two Uyghur counties in that year alone, with funding for these [Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region] programs increasing.” *Id.* at 31. Uyghur women’s reproductive abilities are particularly targeted in the camps through aggressive birth control measures; beginning in 2017, infertility rates increased by 124%, women experiencing menopause increased by 106%, and the rates of women becoming widows increased by 116.5%. Adrian Zenz (2), “Sterilizations, IUDs, and Mandatory Birth Control,” *The Jamestown Foundation*, July 21, 2020.

<sup>412</sup> See this report, p. 38 (forced abortions); pp. 38–41 (forced marriages).

<sup>413</sup> Additionally, more than 60% of those detained are between the ages of 20–40 years old. Removing a significant portion of the child-bearing population will have serious negative effects on the ability of the population as a whole to grow or reproduce. Naomi Conrad et al., “China’s Systematic Tracking, Arrests of Uyghurs Exposed in New Xinjiang Leak,” *DW*, Feb. 17, 2020, <https://www.dw.com/en/exclusive-chinas-systematic-tracking-arrests-of-uyghurs-exposed-in-new-xinjiang-leak/a-52397824>. Also, as discussed below, children are being taken away from the group, which will also impact the Uyghur’s survival.

<sup>414</sup> See report, p. 23 (imams), p. 28–29 (prominent individuals). See also Bahram K. Sintash et al., “Demolishing Faith: The Destruction and Desecration of Uyghur Mosques and Shrines,” *Uyghur Human Rights Project*, Oct. 2019, [https://xinjiangdocumentation.sites.olt.ubc.ca/files/2021/01/UHRP\\_report\\_Demolishing\\_Faith.pdf](https://xinjiangdocumentation.sites.olt.ubc.ca/files/2021/01/UHRP_report_Demolishing_Faith.pdf) (“Imams have been given disproportionately long prison sentences, and numerous deaths of religious leaders have occurred since the large-scale crackdowns in 2017–2018.”).

### A National, Ethnical, Racial, or Religious Group

Protected groups under the Genocide Convention are those belonging to a distinct “national, ethnical, racial or religious group.”<sup>415</sup> “An ethnic group is generally defined as a group whose members share a common language or culture .... [A] religious group is one whose members share the same religion, denomination or mode of worship.”<sup>416</sup>

The Uyghurs are both a distinct ethnic group as well as a distinct religious group. The Uyghurs are part of the Turkic Muslim group in Xinjiang. They are a distinct ethnic group from Han Chinese as the Uyghurs share a common language, culture, and identity.<sup>417</sup> The Chinese Government also records the Uyghurs’ ethnic identity on household registration cards and ID cards, so itself considers the Uyghurs as a distinct ethnic group.<sup>418</sup> The Uyghurs also practice a different religion in that they largely practice Sunni Islam.<sup>419</sup>

### As Such

Finally, the group targeted for destruction must be targeted “as such,” meaning individuals are targeted *because of* their membership in the group.<sup>420</sup> While the Chinese Government periodically suggests it is targeting Uyghurs because they are “extremists” and “terrorists”—a narrative particularly endorsed after 9/11<sup>421</sup>—the facts reveal large-scale targeting of group members for no reason other than they are Uyghurs.<sup>422</sup>

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<sup>415</sup> Genocide Convention, *supra* note 2, Art. II.

<sup>416</sup> *Prosecutor v. Akayesu*, Trial Judgment, paras. 512–515, ICTR-96-4-T, ICTR, September 2, 1998.

<sup>417</sup> Uyghurs have their own unique identifiers, such as “cultural heritage, traditional clothing and diet, and language.” Uyghurs often have physical features that differ from that of the average Han. Global Legal Research Center, “Treatment of the Uyghur Ethnic Group in the People’s Republic of China,” *United States Department of Justice*, Mar. 2015, [https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/eoir/pages/attachments/2015/03/30/loc\\_03-2015\\_china.pdf](https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/eoir/pages/attachments/2015/03/30/loc_03-2015_china.pdf), at 3.

<sup>418</sup> Chinese Government policy calls for its citizens’ ethnic identities to be recorded on identifying documents such as household registration cards and ID cards, thus recognizing the Uyghurs as an ethnic group. U.S. Department of Justice, *Treatment of the Uyghur Ethnic Group in the People’s Republic of China*, p. 3, Mar. 2015. *See also* IPVM, “Uyghur Surveillance & Ethnicity Detection Analytics in China Expert Report Presented to the Uyghur Tribunal,” Aug. 20, 2021, <https://uyghurtribunal.com/wp-content/uploads/2022/01/UT-211217-Conor-Healy.pdf> (an unpublished draft of the Ministry of Public Security’s standard for face recognition was found stating that “face attribute recognition functionalities should include ethnicity recognition: (Uyghur/Non-Uyghur).”).

<sup>419</sup> The Uyghurs are ethnically Turkic, speak a south-eastern Turkic language, and largely practice Sunni Islam. Minority Rights Group International, “World Directory of Minorities and Indigenous Peoples - China: Uyghurs,” Nov. 2017, <https://www.refworld.org/docid/49749d3c4b.html>.

<sup>420</sup> “The group itself is the ultimate target or intended victim of this type of massive criminal conduct .... [T]he intention must be to destroy the group ‘as such,’ meaning as a separate and distinct entity.” *Krstić*, Appeal Judgment, *supra* note 404, para. 552.

<sup>421</sup> *See* pp. 4–6 (CCP’s counter-terrorism narrative); *see also* Appendix D, pp. 193–195 (counter-narrative).

<sup>422</sup> As one example, Nurlan Kokteubai, a Kazakh detainee, stated in an interview:

Accordingly, the facts indicate that each of the four requirements to demonstrate the special intent requirement of genocide can be established.

### ***Underlying Crimes***

Additionally, under Article II of the Genocide Convention, at least one of five underlying crimes must also be committed for the crime of genocide to exist.<sup>423</sup> The facts discussed in this report quite extraordinarily suggest that *each* of the underlying crimes of genocide is being committed. Proof of *only one* of these crimes would suffice to make out a case of genocide.

(a) ***Killing members of the group.***<sup>424</sup> This report documents numerous killings, disappearances, as well as a program of forced organ “harvesting.”<sup>425</sup> All of these potentially constitute the underlying crime of killing members of the group. To the extent medical experimentation<sup>426</sup> results in fatalities, that could also constitute killing members of the group.

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They said they would keep us there up to 50 years, until the whole nation, Kazakhs, Uyghurs, and other Muslim nationalities, would disappear. They said there was a document sent from above, from the administrative center, and that they were acting based on that document. They said no one can change the document since it was sent from the Central Committee. *They said that the current system would not change until all Muslim nationalities would be extinct.*

Darren Byler, “‘Only When You, Your Children, and Your Grandchildren Become Chinese’: Life After Xinjiang Detainment,” *SupChina*, Jan. 6, 2021, <https://supchina.com/2021/01/06/life-after-xinjiang-detainment/> (emphasis added). See also Danilova, *supra* note 225 (A woman’s legs and arms were strapped to a high chair and an electroshock helmet was placed on her head. The shocks caused her mouth to foam and continued at least until she lost consciousness. *She was told her crime was being Uyghur.* This was the woman’s third time in detention.). As mentioned, this report focuses on the destruction of the Uyghurs; yet, additional Muslim groups appear to face similar targeting. See Testimony of Deputy Assistant Secretary Scott Busby, *supra* note 91 (“There is mass detention of Uighurs [sic], ethnic Kazakhs, and members of other Muslim minority groups in the Xinjiang Uighur [sic] Autonomous Region (Xinjiang).”). This does not suggest that the Uyghurs are *not* being targeted based on group membership; rather it suggests that other groups are also potentially being targeted based on group membership.

<sup>423</sup> Genocide Convention, *supra* note 2, Art. II.

<sup>424</sup> “Killing members of the group requires a showing that the principal perpetrator intentionally killed one or more members of the group.” *Prosecutor v. Bagosora*, Trial Judgment, para. 2117, ICTR-98-41-T, ICTR, December 18, 2008.

<sup>425</sup> See report, pp. 30–32; Appendix C at 137–148 and 167–168.

<sup>426</sup> See report, p. 35.

(b) *Causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group.*<sup>427</sup> The report documents numerous forms of torture in detention camps, detention in deplorable conditions,<sup>428</sup> mass rape, other crimes of sexual violence, medical experimentation, mass sterilization, and forced abortions.<sup>429</sup> Each of these constitutes serious bodily harm. Each of these crimes additionally causes serious mental harm, as does mass surveillance, cultural destruction, mass detention, forced labor, forced marriage, and taking Uyghur children away from their parents.<sup>430</sup>

(c) *Deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about its physical destruction in whole or in part.*<sup>431</sup> All of the above-listed practices are designed either to bring about immediate physical destruction (e.g., killing, disappearances, forced organ “harvesting”),<sup>432</sup> or long-term physical destruction by ensuring that there is not a next generation of Uyghurs (forced sterilization, forced abortions, forced marriages, and taking away children from members of the group).<sup>433</sup> These are measures calculated to bring about the immediate or eventual physical destruction of the Uyghurs, in whole or in part.

(d) *Imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group.*<sup>434</sup> The facts reveal large-scale programs of forced sterilization, forced abortions, and forced marriages of Uyghur women to Han Chinese men.<sup>435</sup> Forced sterilization and forced abortions are measures intended

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<sup>427</sup> “[S]erious harm need not cause permanent and irremediable harm, but it must involve harm that goes beyond temporary unhappiness, embarrassment or humiliation. It must be harmful that results in a grave and long-term disadvantage to a person’s ability to lead a normal and constructive life. . . . [T]he Chamber holds that inhuman treatment, torture, rape, sexual abuse and deportation are among the acts which may cause serious bodily or mental injury.” *Krstić*, Appeal Judgment, *supra* note 404, para. 513. “[R]ape and sexual violence certainly constitute infliction of serious bodily and mental harm on the victims and are even, according to the Chamber, one of the worst ways of inflict harm on the victim as he or she suffers both bodily and mental harm.” *Akayesu*, Trial Judgment, *supra* note 416, para. 731.

<sup>428</sup> See Hill et al., *supra* note 173; Wen and Auyezov, *supra* note 170 (food and water withheld for failing to memorize books about Xi Jinping and Communist Party dictums); Danilova, *supra* note 225 (60 women sharing one cell, forcing them to take turns sleeping); Wright et al., *supra* note 161 (people held in chains and shackles); Uyghur Tribunal—Fact Witness statement (1), *supra* note 155 (women held semi-naked in overcrowded cells in freezing conditions).

<sup>429</sup> See pp. 32–38; Appendix C at 113–130 and 148–175.

<sup>430</sup> See pp. 15–28, pp. 38–41, pp. 41–44; Appendix C at 91–137 and 175–185.

<sup>431</sup> “[D]eliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about its physical destruction in whole or in part,” includes methods of destruction which do not immediately lead to the death of members of the group . . . .” *Prosecutor v. Kayishema and Ruzindana*, Trial Judgment, paras. 115–116, ICTR-95-1-T, ICTR.

<sup>432</sup> See report, pp. 28–32; Appendix C at 137–148 and 167–168.

<sup>433</sup> See report, pp. 35–44; Appendix C at 148–157 and 175–185.

<sup>434</sup> “[M]easures intended to prevent births within the group, should be construed as sexual mutilation, the practice of *sterilization, forced birth control*, separation of the sexes and prohibition of marriages.” *Akayesu*, Trial Judgment, *supra* note 416, para. 507 (emphasis added).

<sup>435</sup> See report, pp. 35–41; Appendix C at 148–157.



to prevent births.<sup>436</sup> Forced marriages are also measures intended to prevent births within the Uyghur group, as they result in children of mixed Han Chinese and Uyghur ethnicity.<sup>437</sup>

(e) ***Forcibly transferring children of the group to another group.***<sup>438</sup> By taking children away from Uyghur parents and putting them in orphanages run by Han Chinese<sup>439</sup>—where they are indoctrinated, given Han Chinese names, and often held in deplorable conditions<sup>440</sup>—Uyghur children are being transferred to members of another group. While removal of Uyghur children in large numbers for transfer to Government run schools where they are also indoctrinated and face deplorable conditions also inflicts harm on group members, as do family separations due to denial of passports, this report only claims that the transfer of children to orphanages—particularly where there are family who would otherwise take them in<sup>441</sup>—appears to fit within this underlying crime.

## Conclusion and Routes to Pursuing Accountability

The facts discussed in this report indicate that the crime of genocide is being perpetrated by the Chinese Government against the Uyghurs. The PRC bears state responsibility for the crime of genocide, and individuals playing a role in perpetrating the crime bear individual criminal and/or superior responsibility.

Pursuing accountability, however, will be difficult. Although China has ratified the Genocide Convention, it has a reservation that shields it from legal action by other states for state responsibility for the crime of genocide before the International Court of Justice (ICJ).<sup>442</sup> China is also not a party to the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (ICC),<sup>443</sup> so its nationals cannot be prosecuted before the ICC unless some aspect of the genocide (or crimes

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<sup>436</sup> See note 434.

<sup>437</sup> For example, “[i]n patriarchal societies, where membership of a group is determined by the identity of the father, an example of a measure intended to prevent births within a group is the case where, during rape, a woman of the said group is *deliberately impregnated by a man of another group, with the intent to have her give birth to a child who will consequently not belong to its mother's group.*” Akayesu, Trial Judgment, *supra* note 416, para. 507 (emphasis added).

<sup>438</sup> “[T]he objective [of the crime of forcibly transferring children of the group to another group] is not only to sanction a direct act of forcible physical transfer, but also to sanction acts of threats or trauma which would lead to the forcible transfer of children from one group to another.” *Id.*, para. 509.

<sup>439</sup> See pp. 42–43; Appendix C at 175–185.

<sup>440</sup> See Samuel (2), *supra* note 348 (a worker at an orphanage reported of overcrowding and children aged 6 months–12 years being “locked up like farm animals in a shed”).

<sup>441</sup> See note 360.

<sup>442</sup> United Nations Treaty Collection, Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, China, reservation: “The People’s Republic of China does not consider itself bound by article IX of the said Convention,” [https://treaties.un.org/pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=IND&mtdsg\\_no=IV-1&chapter=4&clang=en#EndDec](https://treaties.un.org/pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=IND&mtdsg_no=IV-1&chapter=4&clang=en#EndDec).

<sup>443</sup> Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, July 17, 1998 (adopted), 2187 U.N.T.S. 91 (entered into force July 1, 2002).

against humanity)<sup>444</sup> occur within the territory of an ICC State Party, which is not the case for most of the facts discussed in this report. Because China holds a permanent membership on the UN Security Council, it could veto<sup>445</sup> referral of the situation in Xinjiang to the ICC,<sup>446</sup> and could veto a proposal for the creation of an ad hoc criminal tribunal to investigate and prosecute the crimes.<sup>447</sup> China also will not consent to the creation of a tribunal through a bilateral agreement between China and the United Nations,<sup>448</sup> nor will there be accountability within the domestic courts in China. Thus, the direct avenues for pursuing accountability currently appear blocked, although the pursuit of universal jurisdiction cases remains a possibility.

Importantly, however, every state party to the Genocide Convention also bears the obligation to “prevent” genocide under Article 1 of the Genocide Convention.<sup>449</sup> This means that each state should be exercising due diligence to do its utmost, legally, to prevent the crime.<sup>450</sup> This obligation is already triggered when there is a “serious risk” of genocide occurring<sup>451</sup>—a point that has most certainly been reached. States could be doing far more. For example, a state serving on the UN Security Council could draft a resolution referring the crimes in Xinjiang to the ICC. If the draft receives nine votes (the required number for it to pass), China would undoubtedly veto the referral. This would trigger automatic discussion within the General Assembly of China’s use of the veto.<sup>452</sup> States in the General Assembly could then challenge the legality of the veto through a request by the General Assembly to the ICJ for an Advisory Opinion.<sup>453</sup> The question posed could be on the legality of the use of the veto to block measures designed to prevent or curtail the commission of genocide, with the pursuit of accountability being a measure designed to attempt to deter additional crimes.<sup>454</sup> By attacking China’s ability to use its veto power to protect its own genocidal behavior (and, potentially, any other state’s

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<sup>444</sup> This report focusses on the crime of genocide; however, the facts detailed herein also quite clearly constitute crimes against humanity.

<sup>445</sup> See UN Charter, Art. 27(3) (veto).

<sup>446</sup> See Rome Statute, *supra* note 443, Art. 13(b) (Security Council referrals).

<sup>447</sup> The International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia and the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda were created by the UN Security Council. See UN Doc. S/RES/827 (1993); UN Doc. S/RES/955 (1994).

<sup>448</sup> The Special Court for Sierra Leone and the Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia were created by agreement between the UN and Sierra Leone, and the UN and Cambodia, respectively.

<sup>449</sup> Genocide Convention, *supra* note 2, Art. I.

<sup>450</sup> For the obligations states bear to “prevent” genocide, see the *Bosnia v. Serbia* case, *supra* note 3.

<sup>451</sup> The duty to prevent genocide is triggered when “the State learns of, or should normally have learned of, the existence of a *serious risk* that genocide will be committed.” *Id.*, para. 431 (emphasis added).

<sup>452</sup> See GA res. A/RES/76/262.

<sup>453</sup> See UN Charter, *supra* note 445, Art. 96.1 (“The General Assembly or the Security Council may request the International Court of Justice to give an advisory opinion on any legal question.”); Concept Note, [www.vetoinitiative.com](http://www.vetoinitiative.com) (urging that such an advisory opinion be requested by the General Assembly on the legality of a veto cast blocking measures designed to prevent or stop the commission of genocide, crimes against humanity, or war crimes).

<sup>454</sup> On the question of the legality of vetoes that block the prevention of, or efforts to stop, genocide, crimes against humanity, or war crimes, see Jennifer Trahan, *Existing Legal Limits to Security Council Veto Power in the Face of Atrocity Crimes* (Cambridge University Press 2020).

ability to use the veto in such circumstances, should another state join China's veto), states could open the path for pursuing accountability. Another way to open the path to accountability would be to challenge the legality of China's reservation under the Genocide Convention declining to accept ICJ jurisdiction as to the adjudication of state responsibility for the crime of genocide.<sup>455</sup> Five judges on the ICJ have already suggested the importance of revisiting the legality of that reservation.<sup>456</sup> With the reservation struck, this would open the way for another State Party to the Genocide Convention to bring suit against China before the ICJ for committing genocide.<sup>457</sup>

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This report aims to create a repository of information to help ensure that the crimes being committed against the Uyghurs are not forgotten and that one day there is justice for the victims. UN Member States need to have the courage, in the face of the genocide discussed in this report and in light of their own legal obligations under the Genocide Convention, to doggedly pursue accountability until it can be accomplished and the horrific crimes being committed can be stopped.

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<sup>455</sup> See note 442

<sup>456</sup> See Joint Separate Opinion of Higgins, Kooijmans, Elaraby, Owada, and Simma, *Armed Activities in the Territory of the Congo (DRC v. Rwanda)* (judgment) [2006] ICJ Rep. 6, 71, para. 25 ("It is a matter for serious concern that at the beginning of the twenty-first century it is still for states to choose whether they consent to the Court adjudicating claims that they have committed genocide. It must be regarded as a very grave matter that a state should be in a position to shield from international judicial scrutiny any claim that might be made against it concerning genocide.").

<sup>457</sup> An example of such a case is the one brought by *The Gambia et al. against Myanmar* for state responsibility for the crime of genocide. See *Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (The Gambia v. Myanmar)* (order, request for the indication of provisional measures) [2020] ICJ Rep. 3 (Jan. 23).

## APPENDIX A

### Compilation of Sources

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#### Longer Reports

Newlines Institute Report—Independent Report  
“The Uyghur Genocide: An Examination of China’s Breaches of the 1948 Genocide Convention”  
March 2021

This report is the first independent expert application of the 1948 Genocide Convention to the ongoing treatment of the Uyghurs in China. The report relies on evidence collected and verified from public Chinese State communications, leaked Chinese State communications, eye-witness testimony, and open-source research methods such as public satellite-image analysis, analysis of information circulating on the Chinese internet, and other available sources.

<https://newlinesinstitute.org/wp-content/uploads/Chinas-Breaches-of-the-GC3-2.pdf>

Independent Fact-finding Tribunal-Uyghur Tribunal  
June 2020

This independent tribunal was formed in 2020 at the request of the President of the World Uyghur Congress to investigate the possible genocide and atrocities being committed by the People’s Republic of China (PRC) against the Uyghurs, Kazakhs, and other Turkic Muslim populations. The Tribunal acted independently but benefited from evidence provided by other organizations. The Tribunal found that the PRC has committed genocide on the basis of imposition of measures to prevent births intended to destroy a significant part of the Uyghurs in Xinjiang.

<https://uyghurtribunal.com/>

Judgment

<https://uyghurtribunal.com/wp-content/uploads/2021/12/Uyghur-Tribunal-Summary-Judgment-9th-Dec-21.pdf>

Tribunal Hearing Videos

[https://www.youtube.com/channel/UCt4uc8LsgxsTDK\\_0dChZm5A/videos](https://www.youtube.com/channel/UCt4uc8LsgxsTDK_0dChZm5A/videos)

The Australian Strategic Policy Institute  
Vicky Xiuzhong Xu, Danielle Cave, Dr. James Leibold, Kelsey Munro, Nathan Ruser  
“Uyghurs for Sale: ‘Re-education,’ Forced Labour and Surveillance Beyond Xinjiang”  
March 1, 2020

This report explores how Chinese factories outside of Xinjiang are utilizing the forced labor of Uyghur detainees sent from re-education camps. It examines three case studies in which Uyghur laborers appear to be employed in forced labor conditions in Chinese factories which supply multinational corporations. This report utilizes open-source Chinese-language documents, satellite imagery, academic research, and statements of Chinese Government policy.

<https://www.aspi.org.au/report/uyghurs-sale>

Journal of Political Risk, Vol. 7, No. 11  
Adrian Zenz, Ph.D.

“‘Wash Brains, Cleanse Hearts’: Evidence from Chinese Government Documents About the Nature and Extent of Xinjiang’s Extrajudicial Internment Campaign”

November 2019

This report details the nature and scale of the extrajudicial internment camp system set up by the Chinese Government in Xinjiang. The author examines evidence of the nature of the camps in an effort to gain support of the international community to take action against the atrocities being committed in Xinjiang.

<https://www.jpolrisk.com/wash-brains-cleanse-hearts/>

New York Times  
Austin Ramzy and Chris Buckley  
The Xinjiang Papers  
November 16, 2019

This report by the New York Times reviews 403 pages of leaked internal Chinese Government documents. These documents confirm the coercive nature of the suppression in the words of the Chinese Government officials who ordered it. The papers contain 96 pages of internal speeches given by Xi Jinping and 102 pages of internal speeches given by other officials. 161 pages are of directives and reports on the surveillance and control of the population. Additionally, there are 44 pages detailing the internal investigations into local officials. These documents also provide a guide to local officials on how to answer the questions of returning students on what has happened to their disappeared relatives.

<https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2019/11/16/world/asia/china-xinjiang-documents.html>  
<https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2019/11/16/world/asia/china-detention-directive.html>

The Victims of Communism Memorial Foundation  
Dr. Adrian Zenz  
The Xinjiang Police Files  
May 2022

This website contains an interactive compilation of research reports and material including images of detainees, official detainee records, personal records, camp police instructions, and speeches from Government officials. The material, known as the Xinjiang Police Files, are the most recent leak of official documents on the treatment of Uyghurs in Xinjiang. The files were obtained by persons who directly hacked into police computers and databases in Xinjiang, and provide a previously unknown look at police operations inside the camps.

<https://www.xinjiangpolicefiles.org/>

International Consortium of Investigative Journalists  
Bethany Allen-Ebrahimian

“Exposed: China’s Operating Manuals for Mass Internment and Arrest by Algorithm”  
November 24, 2019

This report by the International Consortium of Investigative Journalists overviews a leak of highly classified Chinese Government documents which include classified lists of guidelines that serve as a manual for operating the detention camps that hold the Uyghurs. The documents reveal the inner workings of the camps, the severity of the conditions and the dehumanizing instructions regulating the daily routines of the inmates. The China Cables consist of a 9-page operations manual detailing the management of the camps and four short briefings providing guidance on the daily use of the mass-surveillance and predictive policing program.

<https://www.icij.org/investigations/china-cables/exposed-chinas-operating-manuals-for-mass-internment-and-arrest-by-algorithm/>

Read the China Cables Documents

<https://www.icij.org/investigations/china-cables/read-the-china-cables-documents/>

Amnesty International

“‘Like We Were Enemies in a War’: China’s Mass Internment, Torture and Persecution of Muslims in Xinjiang”

2021

This report by Amnesty International details the finding of field and remote research conducted by Amnesty International based on interviews with 108 individuals who were either former detainees in the internment camps or others who were present in Xinjiang after 2017. The report details the violations of human rights outside of the camps since 2017 justified under the guise of counterterrorism, such as destruction of religious and cultural artifacts, the extent of the surveillance state, and restrictions of freedoms of movement and expression. The report also overviews the status of arbitrary detentions and the conditions within the camps including torture.

<https://xinjiang.amnesty.org/#report>

Congressional Research Service

“China Primer: Uyghurs”

January 11, 2022

This primer published by the Congressional Research Service outlines the situation of the Uyghur peoples in Xinjiang. The report provides a background on the group and covers the current situation of repression in the region such as forced assimilation, mass internments, and forced labor. The report then details the various ways the U.S. Government has responded to the situation.

<https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/IF/IF10281>

Human Rights Watch

“‘Break Their Lineage, Break Their Roots’: China’s Crimes Against Humanity Targeting Uyghurs and Other Turkic Muslims”

April 19, 2021

This report by Human Rights Watch makes the case that the Chinese Government has committed crimes against humanity against the Uyghur and Turkic Muslim population within China. In making the case that crimes against humanity have been committed, the report details the arbitrary mass detention, arrests, and torture occurring in the Xinjiang region. The report also overviews the severity of mass surveillance, enforced disappearances, cultural and religious erasure, and separation of families being committed. The report makes recommendations to governments to increase pressure on the Chinese Government to change its policies in Xinjiang.

<https://www.hrw.org/report/2021/04/19/break-their-lineage-break-their-roots/chinas-crimes-against-humanity-targeting>

Human Rights Watch

“‘Eradicating Ideological Viruses’: China’s Campaign of Repression Against Xinjiang’s Muslims”

September 2018

This report details the human rights violations being carried out in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region by the Chinese Government as a part of the Strike Hard Campaign. This report examines abuses during police interrogations, in detention centers, and in political education camps as well as everyday repression in Xinjiang and examines the impact of the Strike Hard Campaign abroad. It discusses applicability legal standards and offers recommendations.

[https://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/report\\_pdf/china0918\\_web.pdf](https://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/report_pdf/china0918_web.pdf)

The United States Holocaust Memorial Museum's  
Simon-Skjoldt Center for the Prevention of Genocide  
“‘To Make Us Slowly Disappear’: The Chinese Government’s Assault on the Uyghurs”  
November 2021

This report by The United States Holocaust Memorial Museum expresses concern that the Chinese Government has committed crimes against humanity against the Uyghur peoples. Through analysis of openly available English language information the report finds reasonable basis to conclude that crimes against humanity such as forced sterilization, sexual violence, enslavement, forcible transfer, and torture have been committed. The Museum acknowledges that due to the restrictions on information created by the Chinese Government there is little access to critical information on the situation of the Uyghurs. The report overviews the responses of the U.S. Government to the atrocities and makes suggestions on possible future actions.  
[https://www.ushmm.org/m/pdfs/November\\_2021\\_Uyghur\\_Report.pdf](https://www.ushmm.org/m/pdfs/November_2021_Uyghur_Report.pdf)

Canadian House of Commons  
“The Human Rights Situation of Uyghurs in Xinjiang, China”  
March 2021

This report by the Subcommittee on International Human Rights of the House of Commons Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs and International Development provides an overview of the human rights situation of the Uyghurs in Xinjiang and offers recommendations to the Government of Canada. The report is based on evidence collected from 12 hours of testimony from witnesses and individuals knowledgeable of the situation in Xinjiang. The report is divided into three sections: the History of Xinjian; the Mechanisms of Suppression; and the Obligations of the International Community as dictated by the Genocide Convention.  
<https://www.ourcommons.ca/Content/Committee/432/FAAE/Reports/RP11164859/sdirrp04/sdirrp04-e.pdf>

U.S. State Department  
Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor  
2020 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices: China (Includes Hong Kong, Macau, and Tibet)  
March 2021

This report by the U.S. State Department outlines the status of human rights practices in China and finds that genocide and crimes against humanity against the Muslim Uyghur population of Xinjiang occurred during the year 2020. The report details the nature of the human rights abuses in seven sections: Respect for the Integrity of the Person; Respect for Civil Liberties; Freedom to Participate in the Political Process; Corruption and Lack of Transparency in Government; Governmental Attitude Regarding International and Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Abuses of Human Rights, Discrimination; Societal Abuses; and Trafficking in Persons and Workers’ Rights.  
<https://www.state.gov/reports/2020-country-reports-on-human-rights-practices/china/>



This report analyzes the Chinese Government’s actions in Xinjiang in the context of international law as it applies to China. It first introduces the historical background of Xinjiang and the campaign against the Uyghurs; then it explores the cultural-political interests at play in the region and the processes the Government uses to suppress the Uyghur people. The third part discusses the Convention for the Elimination of all Forms of Racial Discrimination and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights that the campaign against the Uyghurs violates and examines key Chinese laws. The report concludes that the Government of China is in violation of its treaty obligations and that the Chinese legal system has enabled these violations.

<https://digitalcommons.law.uga.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=2472&context=gjicl>

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## Compilations of Links/Databases

The University of British Columbia

Institute of Asian Research, School of Public Policy and Global Affairs

“Xinjiang Documentation Project”

This database compiles academic research that has contributed to an understanding of the treatment of ethnic minorities in Xinjiang. It includes published books and peer-reviewed articles.

<https://xinjiang.sppga.ubc.ca/critical-scholarship/academic-publications/>

Uyghur Human Rights Project—Research

This compilation of research by the Uyghur Human Rights Project includes reports, photo essays, and briefings covering a wide variety of crimes and allegations committed against the Uyghurs by the Chinese Government.

<https://uhrp.org/research/>

Yale University

Genocide Studies Program

“Persecution of the Uyghur Population in Western China”

This compilation of links created by the Yale Genocide Studies Program contains links to news articles, think tank and NGO reports, and official and quasi-official sources on the persecution of Uyghurs in Xinjiang.

<https://gsp.yale.edu/persecution-uyghur-population-western-china>

## Xinjiang Victims Database

This database consists of documentation of individuals victimized by the Chinese Government in Xinjiang. The goal of the database is to protect the affected individuals and to hold the Chinese authorities accountable by creating a foundation for future legal action.

<https://shahit.biz/eng/>

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## General

New America

Patrik Meyer

“China’s De-extremization of Uyghurs in Xinjiang”

June 1, 2016

<http://www.jstor.org/stable/resrep10486>

Statement by Ambassador Christoph Heusgen on Behalf of 39 Countries in the Third Committee

General Debate

October 6, 2020

<https://new-york-un.diplo.de/un-en/news-corner/201006-heusgen-china/2402648>

Journal of International Affairs

Vol. 73, No. 2

Rushan Abbas

“International Action to Protect the Uyghur People”

Spring/Summer 2020

<https://www.jstor.org/stable/26939976>

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## Backgrounders

Council on Foreign Relations

Lindsay Maizland

“China’s Repression of Uyghurs in Xinjiang.”

March 1, 2021

<https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/chinas-repression-uyghurs-xinjiang>

Global Centre for the Responsibility To Protect

“China”

June 1, 2022

<https://www.globalr2p.org/countries/china/>

Council on Foreign Relations  
Andrew Chatzky and James McBride  
“China’s Massive Belt and Road Initiative”  
January 28, 2020

<https://www.cfr.org/background/chinas-massive-belt-and-road-initiative>

## SUBJECT LISTINGS:

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### Detention Camps

Reuters  
Philip Wen and Olzhas Auyezov  
“Tracking China’s Muslim Gulag”  
November 29, 2018

<https://www.reuters.com/investigates/special-report/muslims-camps-china/>

The New Yorker  
Ben Mauk  
“Inside Xinjiang’s Prison State”  
February 26, 2021

<https://www.newyorker.com/news/a-reporter-at-large/china-xinjiang-prison-state-uyghur-detention-camps-prisoner-testimony>

Deutsche Welle  
William Yang  
“Xinjiang Footage Sheds New Light on Uyghur Detention Camps”  
November 22, 2021

<https://www.dw.com/en/xinjiang-footage-sheds-new-light-on-uyghur-detention-camps/a-59880898>

Testimony of Deputy Assistant Secretary Scott Busby  
Senate Foreign Relations Committee  
Subcommittee on East Asia, the Pacific, and International Cybersecurity  
Policy  
December 4, 2018

[https://www.foreign.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/120418\\_Busby\\_Testimony.pdf](https://www.foreign.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/120418_Busby_Testimony.pdf)

CNN  
James Griffiths  
“These Uyghurs Were Locked Up by the US in Guantanamo. Now They’re Being Used as an  
Excuse for China’s Crackdown in Xinjiang”  
May 15, 2021  
<https://www.cnn.com/2021/05/15/china/china-xinjiang-guantanamo-uyghurs-intl-hnk/index.html>

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## **Ethnic Identity Erasure and Forced Assimilation**

New York Times  
Austin Ramzy  
“China Targets Prominent Uighur Intellectuals to Erase an Ethnic Identity”  
January 5, 2019  
<https://www.nytimes.com/2019/01/05/world/asia/china-xinjiang-uighur-intellectuals.html>

Australian Strategic Policy Institute  
Nathan Ruser, Dr. James Leibold, Kelsey Munro, Tilla Hoja  
“Cultural Erasure: Tracing the Destruction of Uyghur and Islamic Spaces in Xinjiang”  
September 24, 2020  
<https://www.aspi.org.au/report/cultural-erasure>

Human Rights Watch  
“‘Eradicating Ideological Viruses’: China’s Campaign Against Xinjiang’s Muslims”  
September 9, 2018  
<https://www.hrw.org/report/2018/09/09/eradicating-ideological-viruses/chinas-campaign-repression-against-xinjiangs>

Lausanne Movement  
Thomas Harvey  
“The Sinicization of Religion in China Will Enforcing Conformity Work?”  
May 2019  
<https://lausanne.org/content/lga/2019-09/sinicization-religion-china>

University of California San Diego  
School of Policy and Strategy  
Richard Madsen  
“The Party and Religion: Toward Sinicization?”  
November 13, 2017  
<https://chinafocus.ucsd.edu/2017/11/13/the-party-and-religion-toward-sinicization/>

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# Family Separation and Disappearances and Taking Away Children

Human Rights Watch

“China: Xinjiang Children Separated from Families:  
Return Minors Housed in State-Run Institutions to Relatives”

September 15, 2019

<https://www.hrw.org/news/2019/09/15/china-xinjiang-children-separated-families>

The Atlantic

Sigal Samuel

“China’s Jaw-Dropping Family Separation Policy”

September 4, 2018

<https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2018/09/china-internment-camps-uyghur-muslim-children/569062/>

Amnesty International

“China: Hearts and Lives Broken—The Nightmare of Uyghur Families Separated by  
Repression”

March 19, 2021

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## APPENDIX B

### Chinese Communist Party Governmental Structure<sup>458</sup>

#### **President of the People's Republic of China**

The President of the People's Republic of China, according to Article 80 of the Chinese Constitution, “in pursuance of decisions of the National People's Congress and its Standing Committee, promulgates statutes; appoints and removes the Premier, Vice-Premiers, State Councillors, Ministers in charge of Ministries or Commissions, and the Auditor-General and the Secretary-General of the State Council; confers state medals and titles of honour; issues orders of special pardons; proclaims martial law; proclaims a state of war; and issues mobilization orders.” The President is in charge of all Government departments, military forces, courts, and parliamentary meetings. The Government is structured like a pyramid, with the President and his party at the top, ultimately controlling over 4 million branches of Government.

#### **The members of the Standing Committee of the Political Bureau**

The members of the Standing Committee of the Political Bureau, also known as the Politburo Standing Committee, consists of seven members whose decisions affect all aspects of life in China. Consequently, these politicians are among the most powerful. The members of the Communist Party's Politburo Standing Committee constitute the inner circle of the Politburo.

#### **The Politburo**

The Politburo, which is one step below the Standing Committee, consists of 18 additional members in addition to the seven members the Standing Committee. It is not unusual for members of the Politburo to hold high offices or important roles in the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), other branches of Government, or the military. Many of the members also have close relations to President Xi Jinping and his allies.

#### **The National People's Congress**

The National People's Congress consist of approximately 3,000 delegates who are not exclusively members of the CCP. Although the National People's Congress according to Article 57 and Article 58 of the Chinese Constitution “is the highest organ of state power... [e]xercis[ing] the legislative power of the state,” Congress is rumored to have little to no control over policymaking, which is due to the CCP dominating Congress and President Xi Jinping's consolidating power within the Politburo Standing Committee.

#### **The State Council**

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<sup>458</sup> The information on pages 1–3 of this Appendix is compiled from the Constitution of The People's Republic Of China, adopted on December 4, 1982, and *Multimedia*, “A Simple Guide to the Chinese Government,” <https://multimedia.scmp.com/widgets/china/cpc-primer/?module=inline&pgtype=article>.



The State Council “is the executive body of the highest organ of state power; it is the highest organ of state administration” according to Article 85 of the Chinese Constitution. Pursuant to Article 86 of the Constitution, it consists of: “The Premier; The Vice-Premiers; The State Councillors; The Ministers in charge of Ministries; The Ministers in charge of Commissions; The Auditor-General; and The Secretary-General. The Premier has overall responsibility for the State Council. The Ministers have overall responsibility for the respective ministries or commissions under their charge. The organization of the State Council is prescribed by law.” The State Council is similar to the cabinet system in the USA.

### **The Military**

According to The Constitution, the Central Military Commission’s highest position is the Chairman of the Central Military Commission, who reports to the National People’s Congress through the Central Military Commission. The position of Chairman is currently held by the head of the CCP, resulting in a direct line of control over the military by President Xi Jinping.


### **The Judiciary**

According to *A Simple Guide to the Chinese Government*, the Central Political and Legal Affairs Commission is “headed by a Politburo member, [who] oversees the judiciary and prosecutors,” making “rule of law” equivalent to “rule of the CCP.”

### **The Central Commission for Disciplinary Inspection**

The Central Commission for Disciplinary Inspection enforces loyalty and internal discipline with the CCP.

## Simplified Guide to Chinese Government



CCP Leadership with Possible Responsibility for Policies Related to the Uyghurs				
Name	Position	Responsibilities/ Details of Listed Individual	Dates in Role	Source
<b>Xi Jinping</b>	<p><u>State Position:</u> President of the People's Republic of China (PRC)</p> <p><u>Party Position:</u> General Secretary of the Chinese Communist Party</p>	<p>1) Xi Jinping holds the office of General Secretary of the Chinese Communist Party and succeeded Hu Jintao as President of the People's Republic of China.</p> <p>2) Xi has, by comparison to his Presidential predecessor, Hu Jintao, centralized authority and developed a cult of personality that is comparable to Mao Zedong's. Xi has also removed the Constitutionally established two-term limit for presidency, and anointed no successor, leaving no ending date to his rule.</p>	2012–Present	<p>1) “A Simple Guide to the Chinese Government.” <i>Multimedia</i>, <a href="https://multimedia.scmp.com/widgets/china/cpc-primer/?module=inline&amp;pgtype=article">https://multimedia.scmp.com/widgets/china/cpc-primer/?module=inline&amp;pgtype=article</a>.</p> <p>2) Susan L. Shirk, “China in Xi's ‘New Era’: The Return to Personalistic Rule,” <i>Journal of Democracy</i>, Apr. 2018, <a href="https://www.journalofdemocracy.org/articles/china-in-xis-new-era-the-return-to-personalistic-rule/">https://www.journalofdemocracy.org/articles/china-in-xis-new-era-the-return-to-personalistic-rule/</a>.</p>
<b>Li Keqiang</b>	<p><u>State Position:</u> Premier of the PRC</p> <p><u>Party Position:</u> Party Secretary of the State Council of the PRC</p>	<p>Li Keqiang sits on the 19<sup>th</sup> Politburo Standing Committee.</p> <p>As the Premier, Li Keqiang is responsible for the State Council and its affairs.</p>	2007–Present *Has stated he will be stepping down March 2023*	<p>“Chinese Premier Li Keqiang Says Will Retire This Year After Serving 2 Terms,” <i>Business-Standard</i>, Mar. 11, 2022, <a href="https://www.business-standard.com/article/international/chinese-premier-li-keqiang-says-will-retire-this-year-after-serving-2-terms-">https://www.business-standard.com/article/international/chinese-premier-li-keqiang-says-will-retire-this-year-after-serving-2-terms-</a></p>

				<a href="#">122031100264_1.html</a> .
<b>Li Zhanshu</b>	<p><u>State Position:</u> Chairman of the State Committee of the National People's Congress</p> <p><u>Party Position:</u> Director of the General Office of the CCP Central Committee</p>	<p>Li Zhanshu sits on the 19<sup>th</sup> Politburo Standing Committee.</p> <p>Li Zhanshu is the 3rd ranking member of the 19th Politburo Standing Committee. He is the presiding officer of the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress, a member of the 18th Politburo, and is considered one of Xi Jinping's closest aides, having served as his Chief of Staff since 2012.</p>	2017–Present	<p>Cheng Li, “Li Zhanshu,” <i>Brookings</i>, 2017, <a href="https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2017/10/china_20171013_19thpartycongress_li_zhanshu.pdf">https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2017/10/china_20171013_19thpartycongress_li_zhanshu.pdf</a>.</p>
<b>Wang Yang</b>	<p><u>State Position:</u> Member of the Politburo Standing Committee; Vice Premier of the State Council</p> <p><u>Party Position:</u> Member of the Central Committee of the CCP</p>	<p>1) Wang Yang sits on the 19<sup>th</sup> Politburo Standing Committee.</p> <p>2) Wang Yang is Chairman of the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC), the most important forum of the United Front Work Department.</p>	<p>2017–present (Member of the Politburo Standing Committee)</p> <p>2013–present (Vice Premier of the State Council)</p> <p>2007–present (Member of the Politburo and full member of the Central Committee of the CCP)</p>	<p>1) Cheng Li, “Wang Yang,” <i>Brookings</i>, 2022, <a href="https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2017/10/china_20171013_19thpartycongress_wang_yang.pdf">https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2017/10/china_20171013_19thpartycongress_wang_yang.pdf</a>.</p> <p>2) Alex Joske, “Foreign Interference and the Chinese Communist Party's United Front System,” <i>The Australian Strategic Policy Institute</i>, 2020, <a href="https://www.aspi.org.au/report/party-speaks-you">https://www.aspi.org.au/report/party-speaks-you</a>.</p>
<b>Wang Huning</b>	<p><u>State Position:</u> N/A</p> <p><u>Party Position:</u> Top-ranked Secretary of the Central Secretariat of the CCP</p>	<p>Wang Huning sits on the 19<sup>th</sup> Politburo Standing Committee.</p> <p>Wang's role as member of the Politburo Standing Committee is chief of ideology and propaganda. Due to this he is believed to be the mastermind behind the ideological frameworks set out by all three recent</p>	2017–Present	<p>“Wang Huning's Career Reveals Much About Political Change In China,” <i>The Economist</i>, Feb. 12, 2022, <a href="https://www.economist.com/china/2022/02/12/wang-huning">https://www.economist.com/china/20</a></p>

		Chinese leaders—Jiang Zemin, Hu Jintao and now Xi Jinping.		<a href="https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2017/10/china_20171013_19thpartycongress_zhao_leji.pdf">22/02/12/wang-hunings-career-reveals-much-about-political-change-in-china.</a>
<b>Zhao Leji</b>	<p><u>State Position:</u> Member of the Politburo Standing Committee</p> <p><u>Party Position:</u> Secretary of the Central Commission for Discipline Inspection</p>	<p>Zhao Leji sits on the 19<sup>th</sup> Politburo Standing Committee.</p> <p>Zhao was first elected as a full member to the CCP Central Committee in 2002, at the 16<sup>th</sup> Party Congress. In addition to his 2017 offices, he has since 2012 served as: Director of the Central Organization Department of the CCP Central Committee; Deputy Head of the Central Leading Group for Party Building Work; and Deputy Head of the Central Leading Group for Inspection Work.</p>	2017–Present	Cheng Li, “Zhao Leji,” <i>Brookings</i> , 2021, <a href="https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2017/10/china_20171013_19thpartycongress_zhao_leji.pdf">https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2017/10/china_20171013_19thpartycongress_zhao_leji.pdf</a> .
<b>Han Zheng</b>	<p><u>State Position:</u> Executive Vice Premier of the PRC</p> <p><u>Party Position:</u> Deputy Party Secretary of the State Council of the PRC</p>	<p>Han Zheng sits on the 19<sup>th</sup> Politburo Standing Committee.</p> <p>Han Zheng is a member of the Politburo Standing Committee. Additionally, Han Zheng’s role as Executive Vice Premier of the State Council, gives him the overall responsibility for the country’s domestic economy. The position is also “likely to include oversight of the National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC).”</p>	2017–Present	“Vice Premier Han Zheng,” <i>State Council Executives</i> , 2022, <a href="https://www.uschina.org/state-council-executive-vice-premier-han-zheng">https://www.uschina.org/state-council-executive-vice-premier-han-zheng</a> .
<b>Meng Jianzhu</b>	<p><u>State Position:</u> Secretary of the Central Committee Politics and Law Commission</p> <p><u>Party Position:</u> Politburo Member</p>	<p>Meng Jianzhu was selected by Xi Jinping in 2013 to replace Zhou Yongkang.</p> <p>In 2015, Meng called for “increased border security to prevent terrorists from entering China from abroad, as well as proposing that the CCP intensify its management of religious affairs to prevent religious extremism from taking root,” encouraging the counterterrorism agenda.</p>	2012–2017	Sheena Chestnut Greitens et al., “Counterterrorism and Preventive Repression: China’s Changing Strategy in Xinjiang,” <i>International Security</i> , vol. 44, no. 3, 9–47, 2020 <a href="https://doi.org/10.1162/isec_a_00368">https://doi.org/10.1162/isec_a_00368</a> , at 40.
<b>Guo Shengkun</b>	<u>State Position:</u> Secretary of the Central Committee	1) Guo Shengkun was Secretary of the Central Committee Politics and Law Commission; State Councilor of the State Council; Politburo Member;	2017–2022	1) Cheng Li, “Guo Shengkun,” <i>Brookings</i> , <a href="https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2017/10/china_20171013_19thpartycongress_zhao_leji.pdf">https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2017/10/china_20171013_19thpartycongress_zhao_leji.pdf</a> .

	<p>Politics and Law Commission; State Councilor of the State Council</p> <p><u>Party Position:</u> Politburo Member; full member of the Central Committee</p>	<p>and full member of the Central Committee.</p> <p>2) According to <i>The People's Daily</i>, after Guo Shengkun visited Xinjiang, he is known to have said “that social stability in Xinjiang had been hard-won and ‘should be greatly cherished and continuously consolidated.’”</p> <p>According to a 2018 Reuters article, he further stated: “We should comprehensively adopt legal education, psychological counseling and vocational training, innovate and strengthen reform through education work for prisoners, and make efforts to make them turn over a new leaf.” Due to Guo Shengkun’s position at the time, he had “ultimate authority over law enforcement,” making his statements concerning.</p>		<p><a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-china-xinjiang/top-china-official-urges-reform-through-education%20for-xinjiang-prisoners-idUSKCN1M10ES">ings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2017/10/china_20171025_19thpartycongress_guo_shen_gkun.pdf</a>.</p> <p>2) “Top China Official Urges ‘Reform Through Education’ for Xinjiang Prisoners,” <i>Reuters</i>, Sept. 21, 2018, <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-china-xinjiang/top-china-official-urges-reform-through-education%20for-xinjiang-prisoners-idUSKCN1M10ES">https://www.reuters.com/article/us-china-xinjiang/top-china-official-urges-reform-through-education%20for-xinjiang-prisoners-idUSKCN1M10ES</a>.</p>
<b>Wang Lequan</b>	<p><u>State Position:</u> Politburo</p> <p><u>Party Position:</u> Xinjiang Party Secretary</p>	<p>Wang Lequan was Party Secretary in Xinjiang during the 2009 riots.</p> <p>Wang’s nickname reportedly was “‘the stability secretary’ a tribute to his ability to step into chaos and impose order.” According to <i>The New York Times</i>, while in power in Xinjiang he “suppressed Islam, welcomed industry, marginalized the Uyghur language, built roads and rail links to the outside world, and spied on, arrested, and jailed countless minority citizens in the name of stopping terrorism and subsuming Uyghurs... into a greater China.”</p>	1994–2010	<p>Michael Wines, “A Strongman Is China’s Rock in Ethnic Strife,” <i>The New York Times</i>, July 10, 2009, <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2009/07/11/world/asia/11xinjiang.html">https://www.nytimes.com/2009/07/11/world/asia/11xinjiang.html</a>.</p>

<p><b>Zhang Chunxian</b></p>	<p><u>State Position:</u> N/A</p> <p><u>Party Position:</u> Xinjiang Party Secretary</p>	<p>Zhang Chunxian replaced long-term Party Secretary Wang Lequan.</p> <p>1) After the unrest of July 2009, Zhang pointed a finger at “illegal” religious activities as the cause of the unrest and as the target for a crackdown.</p> <p>2) Zhang’s “[g]rid management harnesses[ed] new surveillance technologies and big data analytics to comprehensively monitor activities within a discrete geometric zone,” including within Xinjiang.</p>	<p>2010–2016</p>	<p>1) David O’Brien, <i>International Journal of China Studies</i>, vol. 2, no. 2, pp. 389–405, Aug./Sept. 2011.</p> <p>2) Adrian Zenz and James Leibold, “Securitizing Xinjiang: Police Recruitment, Informal Policing and Ethnic Minority Co-Optation,” <i>The China Quarterly</i>, vol. 242, 324–348, June 2020.</p>
<p><b>Chen Quanguo</b></p>	<p><u>State Position:</u> N/A</p> <p><u>Party Position:</u> Xinjiang Party Secretary</p>	<p>Chen Quanguo became Party Secretary of Xinjiang in 2016.</p> <p>1) According to <i>The New York Times</i>’ Leaked “Xinjiang Papers,” Chen announced President Xi’s speeches as setting the “direction for making a success of Xinjiang,” which justified his call for officials to “<b>round up everyone who should be rounded up</b>” despite local officials’ worries it would further increase ethnic tensions. Chen’s campaign in Xinjiang has been compared to Mao Zedong’s hardhanded approach to local officials “in which top-down pressure on local officials encouraged overreach and any expression of doubt was treated as a crime.” Additionally, Chen gave a speech to regional leadership stating: “The struggle against terror and to safeguard stability is a protracted war, and also a war of offense.”</p> <p>2) According to The Newline Institute, he also “told thousands of police officers and soldiers to</p>	<p>2016–2021</p>	<p>1) Austin Ramzy and Chris Buckley, “‘Absolutely No Mercy’: Leaked Files Expose How China Organized Mass Detentions of Muslims,” <i>The New York Times</i>, Nov. 16, 2019, <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2019/11/16/world/asia/china-xinjiang-documents.html">https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2019/11/16/world/asia/china-xinjiang-documents.html</a>.</p> <p>2) Yonah Diamond et al., “The Uyghur Genocide: An Examination of China’s Breaches of the 1948 Genocide Convention,” <i>New Lines Institute for Strategy and Policy</i>, Mar. 8, 2021,</p>

		<p><b>prepare for a “smashing, obliterating offensive.”</b></p> <p>3) According to <i>The Wall Street Journal</i>, Chen significantly impacted Xinjiang with techniques he had used in Tibet and “installed thousands of high-tech police stations throughout Xinjiang and tapped big data to enforce order and monitor citizens. Police use hand-held devices to scan photos, messages and other data in residents’ mobile phones, searching for sensitive material. [As a result, m]any ethnic Uighurs [sic] and other Muslims are forced into camps to undergo political indoctrination, aimed at assimilating them with the country’s Han Chinese majority.” During his time in the region, although short, he “doubled down on grid-style policing, installing more than 4,900 convenience police stations,” “expanded his security forces, advertising some 100,000 policing-related jobs his first year in charge,” and almost doubled the region’s annual security spending.</p> <p>4) According to Radio Free Asia, Chen began the implementation of the “Uyghur-Chinese One Relative” policy—the policy made Han Chinese “relatives” of Uyghurs—within a month of taking office. For discussion of the policy see report, note 320.</p>		<p><a href="https://newlinesintitute.org/wp-content/uploads/Chinas-Breaches-of-the-GC3-2.pdf">https://newlinesintitute.org/wp-content/uploads/Chinas-Breaches-of-the-GC3-2.pdf</a>.</p> <p>3) Chun Han Wong, “China’s Hard Edge: The Leader of Beijing’s Muslim Crackdown Gains Influence,” <i>The Wall Street Journal</i>, Apr. 7, 2019, <a href="https://www.wsj.com/articles/chinas-hard-edge-the-leader-of-beijings-muslim-crackdown-gains-influence-11554655886">https://www.wsj.com/articles/chinas-hard-edge-the-leader-of-beijings-muslim-crackdown-gains-influence-11554655886</a>.</p> <p>4) “Xinjiang Authorities Push Uyghurs to Marry Han Chinese,” <i>Radio Free Asia</i>, 2017, <a href="https://www.rfa.org/english/news/special/uyghur-oppression/ChenPolicy2.html">https://www.rfa.org/english/news/special/uyghur-oppression/ChenPolicy2.html</a>.</p>
<b>Ma Xingrui</b>	<p><u>State Position:</u> N/A</p> <p><u>Party Position:</u> Xinjiang Party Secretary</p>	<p>Ma Xingrui, former Governor of Guangdong, replaced Chen Quanguo as Xinjiang Party Secretary due to US sanctions.</p> <p>According to Agence France-Presse, Ma has committed to “unswervingly promote sustained and long-term social stability in Xinjiang, and never allow for reversal of the hard-won stability.”</p>	2021–Present	<p>Agence France-Presse, “China’s New Xinjiang Chief Calls for Modernisation of Region Amid Forced Labour Allegations,” <i>Firstpost</i>, Dec. 29, 2021, <a href="https://www.firstpost.com/world/chinas-new-xinjiang-chief-calls-for-">https://www.firstpost.com/world/chinas-new-xinjiang-chief-calls-for-</a></p>



				<a href="#">modernisation-of-region-amid-forced-labour-allegations-10245801.html.</a>
<b>Zhu Hailun</b>	<p><u>State Position:</u> N/A</p> <p><u>Party Position:</u> Xinjiang Deputy Security Chief</p>	<p>Zhu Hailun, replaced the Urumqi city chief after the “7/5 incident.” (See report, pp. 5–6 for discussion.)</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1) Zhu served as both Deputy Chief of the CCP and top security official in Xinjiang, making him the second-most-powerful official.</li> <li>2) According to The International Consortium of Investigative Journalists, as head of Xinjiang’s Politics and Law Commission, <b>Zhu signed all “[t]he confidential government documents that show China’s plans for sweeping extrajudicial detentions and internment camps in Xinjiang.” The documents include a telegram outlining an operational manual for the detention camps, stating:</b> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• “[N]ever [allowing] escapes,” preventing noise, and “never [allowing] attacks on staff.”</li> <li>• Preventing escapes through the use of video surveillance, “strictly managing door locks and keys,” double locking doors immediately after use, utilizing one button alarms, improving the “installation of police stations at front gates, security guard duty rooms, high guard posts, security guard posts and patrol routes” and other “protective defenses.”</li> <li>• It was encouraged that guards extra strictly manage and control student activities in order to “prevent escapes during class, eating periods, toilet breaks, bath time, medical treatment, and medical visits.”</li> <li>• It is forbidden for students to have cellphones, and staff cannot hand</li> </ul> </li> </ol>	2010–2019	<p>1) Sasha Chavkin, “Xinjiang’s Architect of Mass Detention: Zhu Hailun,” <i>International Consortium of Investigative Journalists</i>, Nov. 24, 2019, <a href="https://www.icij.org/investigations/china-cables/xinjiangs-architect-of-mass-detention-zhu-hailun/">https://www.icij.org/investigations/china-cables/xinjiangs-architect-of-mass-detention-zhu-hailun/</a>.</p> <p>2) Bethany Allen-Ebrahimian, “Exposed: China’s Operating Manuals for Mass Internment and Arrest by Algorithm,” <i>International Consortium of Investigative Journalists</i>, Nov. 24, 2019, <a href="https://www.icij.org/investigations/china-cables/exposed-chinas-operating-manuals-for-mass-internment-and-arrest-by-algorithm/">https://www.icij.org/investigations/china-cables/exposed-chinas-operating-manuals-for-mass-internment-and-arrest-by-algorithm/</a>.</p>

		<p>cellphones over to students. Students are “not allowed to contact the outside world apart from during prescribed activities.”</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Surveillance within the camps is intensive. There is a requirement for there to be “full video surveillance coverage of dormitories and classrooms free of blind spots, ensuring that guards on duty can monitor in real time, record things in detail, and report suspicious circumstances immediately.” Additionally, “secret forces [are rolled out in order to] bring information officers into play to prevent people from joining forces to cause trouble.”</li> <li>• Students constantly have their data collected from when they enter the “training center,” including “records in performance, rewards and punishments, grade improvements ... compliance and discipline.”</li> <li>• Students’ behavior within the camps will be constantly managed “[their] study, life, and activity management system should be formulated in detail. And the students should have a fixed bed position, fixed queue position, fixed classroom seat, and fixed station during skills work.”</li> <li>• It is emphasized that behavioral norms should be implemented and discipline requirements put in place for “getting up, rollcall, washing, going to the toilet, organizing and housekeeping, eating, studying, sleeping, closing the door and so forth,” and that the punishment and discipline for behavioral violations should be increased.</li> <li>• All Prefectures are called to “increase investment in personnel, property and materials, and provide full guarantees for all</li> </ul>		
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		<p>necessary staffing, funding, and facilities for education and training,” including through allocating funds for these areas in the annual budget.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Strict secrecy is mentioned as vital. It is “strictly forbidden to bring video and video equipment such as mobile phones and cameras into the teaching and management areas and upload pictures to the internet. Data should not be disseminated and not be open to the outside.”</li> </ul>		
Wang Junzheng	<p><u>State Position:</u> N/A</p> <p><u>Party Position:</u> Secretary of the Party Committee of the Xinjiang Production and Construction Corps (XPCC)</p>	<p>1) Wang Junzheng was Secretary of the Party Committee of Xinjiang Production and Construction Corps (XPCC), but due to sanctions from the U.S., Canada, and Europeans, he was moved to Tibet in 2021. In Tibet he serves as Party Secretary.</p> <p>2) According to The Uyghur Tribunal, his new position is likely made possible by his work as Secretary of the Party Committee of the XPCC, which the US has labeled a “paramilitary structure” of the CCP. The XPCC is independent from the Xinjiang authorities as it answers to the Politburo directly, despite having widespread economic control in the region, “including the cotton industry, and [being] <b>directly responsible for Uyghur forced labor</b>. In addition, the XPCC directly administers several Xinjiang cities.” Controlling these parts of the economy is likely how Junzheng earned his <b>nickname “butcher of Xinjiang.”</b></p>	2019–2021	<p>1) “Treasury Sanctions Chinese Government Officials in Connection with Serious Human Rights Abuse in Xinjiang,” <i>US Department of the Treasury</i>, Mar. 22, 2021, <a href="https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/jy0070">https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/jy0070</a></p> <p>2) Sofia Issabayeva, “Wang Junzheng, ‘Butcher of Xinjiang,’ Becomes Party Secretary of Tibet,” <i>Uyghur Tribunal</i>, Oct. 22, 2021, <a href="https://www.uyghurcongress.org/en/wang-junzheng-butcher-of-xinjiang-becomes-party-secretary-of-tibet/?utm_source=rss&amp;utm_medium=rss&amp;utm_campaign=wang-junzheng-butcher-">https://www.uyghurcongress.org/en/wang-junzheng-butcher-of-xinjiang-becomes-party-secretary-of-tibet/?utm_source=rss&amp;utm_medium=rss&amp;utm_campaign=wang-junzheng-butcher-</a></p>

				<a href="#">of-xinjiang-becomes-party-secretary-of-tibet.</a>
<b>Wang Mingshan</b>	<p><u>State Position:</u> N/A</p> <p><u>Party Position:</u> Former member of the Standing Committee of the CCP in Xinjiang</p>	Wang Mingshan, former member of the Standing Committee of the CCP in Xinjiang, was, along with other high ranking senior official, sanctioned by the US, Canada, UK, and the EU due to the human rights situation in Xinjiang.	Unknown	<p>“Xinjiang Officials Rebuke Sanctions Against Them ‘Nothing but a Piece of Wastepaper,’” <i>Global Times</i>, Mar. 26, 2021, <a href="https://www.globaltimes.cn/page/202103/1219517.shtml">https://www.globaltimes.cn/page/202103/1219517.shtml</a>.</p>
<b>Chen Mingguo</b>	<p><u>State Position:</u> Vice Chairman of the Government of Xinjiang</p> <p><u>Party Position:</u> Director of Xinjiang’s Public Security Bureau</p>	<p>Chen Mingguo is another high ranking official sanctioned by the US, Canada, UK, and the EU due to the human rights situation in Xinjiang.</p> <p>According to <i>Asia Times</i>, he is quoted as saying that he is “very proud of being sanctioned by these countries.”</p>	Unknown—Present	<p>Vijay Prashad and Jie Xiong, “Why Xinjiang Is Central to US Cold War on China,” <i>Asia Times</i>, Apr. 17, 2021, <a href="https://asiatimes.com/2021/04/why-xinjiang-is-central-to-us-cold-war-on-china/">https://asiatimes.com/2021/04/why-xinjiang-is-central-to-us-cold-war-on-china/</a>.</p>
<b>Peng Jirarui</b>	<p><u>State Position:</u> N/A</p> <p><u>Party Position:</u> Xinjiang Production and Construction Corps Commander and Deputy Party Secretary</p>	Peng Jirarui is another high ranking official sanctioned by the US, Canada, UK, and the EU due to the human rights situation in Xinjiang.	2017–2022	<p>“Treasury Sanctions Chinese Entity and Officials Pursuant to Global Magnitsky Human Rights Executive Order,” <i>US Department of the Treasury</i>, July 31, 2020, <a href="https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/sm1073">https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/sm1073</a>.</p>

<b>Sun Jinlong</b>	<u>State Position:</u> N/A  <u>Party Position:</u> Party Secretary of Xinjiang Production and Construction Corps	Sun Jinlong is another high-ranking official sanctioned by the US, Canada, UK, and the EU due to the human rights situation in Xinjiang.	2016–unknown  *His title was described as “former” in an article published in 2020.	“Treasury Sanctions Chinese Entity and Officials Pursuant to Global Magnitsky Human Rights Executive Order,” <i>US Department of the Treasury</i> , July 31, 2020, <a href="https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/sm1073">https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/sm1073</a> .
<b>Zhao Kezhi</b>	<u>State Position:</u> State Councilor  <u>Party Position:</u> Minister of Public Security	Zhao Kezhi is known as the top anti-terrorism official in China.  According to The Associated Press, state media reported him telling officials “more needed to be done to improve intelligence gathering and anti-infiltration measures,” in connection with anti-terrorism work and addressing its root causes.	2018–Present (State Position)  [Minister of Public Security dates unknown]	“Chinese Official: Destroy Terrorism ‘Breeding Ground,’” <i>The Associated Press</i> , May 26, 2018, <a href="https://apnews.com/article/feae2f336f044198a0eadffb0a96e3d">https://apnews.com/article/feae2f336f044198a0eadffb0a96e3d</a> .
<b>Chen Wenqing</b>	<u>State Position:</u> N/A  <u>Party Position:</u> Minister of State Security	According to Reuters, Chen Wenqing served as Minister of State Security before becoming “the country’s top prosecutor.”	[Dates in office not publicly available info]	Ben Blanchard et al., “Exclusive: Xi Confidant Set to Become China’s New Spy Master – Sources,” <i>Reuters</i> , Feb. 28, 2018, <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-china-politics-security-exclusive/exclusive-xi-confidant-set-to-become-chinas-new-spy-master-sources-idUSKCN1GC17K">https://www.reuters.com/article/us-china-politics-security-exclusive/exclusive-xi-confidant-set-to-become-chinas-new-spy-master-sources-idUSKCN1GC17K</a> .
<b>Wang Xiaohong</b>	<u>State Position:</u> N/A  <u>Party Position:</u>	Wang Xiaohong, previous Vice Minister of Public Security, replaced Chen Wenqing as Minister of State Security in 2018. As Minister of Public Security he is in charge of foreign	2018–Present	Ben Blanchard et al., “Exclusive: Xi Confidant Set to Become China’s New Spy Master -

	Minister of Public Security	intelligence, counter-intelligence, and national security.		Sources,” <i>Reuters</i> , Feb. 28, 2018, <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-china-politics-security-exclusive/exclusive/exclusive-xi-confidant-set-to-become-chinas-new-spy-master-sources-idUSKCN1GC17K">https://www.reuters.com/article/us-china-politics-security-exclusive/exclusive/exclusive-xi-confidant-set-to-become-chinas-new-spy-master-sources-idUSKCN1GC17K</a> .
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## APPENDIX C

Evidence of Crimes			
Forced Assimilation and Cultural Destruction			
<i>Crime Code</i>	<i>Date</i>	<i>Allegation</i>	<i>Source</i>
Religious erasure, destruction of religious site, destruction of mosques	1997	State concerns over Islamic fundamentalism resulted in the CCP banning the Ordam Padishah Mazar (the largest mazar festival in Xinjiang). The closure was further justified by citing illegal religious activities. Satellite imagery from 2017 shows that the entire site (a settlement of 50 structures) had been razed. The Australian Strategic Policy Institute (ASPI) reported that considerable effort was needed to do this, chiefly transportation of a large demolition team “across tens of kilometers of ungraded desert tracks and across sand dunes,” thus “representing deliberate severing and destruction of cultural heritage, history, landscape, and identity.”	<a href="https://xinjiangdocumentation.sites.olt.ubc.ca/files/2021/01/Mazar-festivals-of-the-Uyghurs-Music-Islam-and-the-Chinese-State1.pdf">https://xinjiangdocumentation.sites.olt.ubc.ca/files/2021/01/Mazar-festivals-of-the-Uyghurs-Music-Islam-and-the-Chinese-State1.pdf</a> ; <a href="http://ad-aspi.s3.amazonaws.com/2020-09/Cultural%20erasure_0.pdf?VersionId=N1JYOaEV6DF3IfupGsd b73xtX0wCNokg">http://ad-aspi.s3.amazonaws.com/2020-09/Cultural%20erasure_0.pdf?VersionId=N1JYOaEV6DF3IfupGsd b73xtX0wCNokg</a>
Religious erasure	2007	Mazar festivals become increasingly regulated and closed throughout the Xinjiang region.	<a href="https://xinjiang.sppga.ubc.ca/timelines/cultural-destruction-timeline/">https://xinjiang.sppga.ubc.ca/timelines/cultural-destruction-timeline/</a>
Arrest of intellectuals	2009	Gulmira Imin—a government employee and moderator of a Uyghur-language, culture, and news website—was arrested. She also participated in protests against the deaths of Uyghur migrant workers in Guangdong in July 2009. She was sentenced to life in prison for splittism, leaking state secrets, and organizing an illegal demonstration.	<a href="https://xinjiang.sppga.ubc.ca/timelines/arrests/">https://xinjiang.sppga.ubc.ca/timelines/arrests/</a>
Indoctrination, Forced Assimilation	2009–ongoing	Gushanuer Rouzi, a Uyghur teacher in Urumqi, stated that when she started teaching in 2009 that the entire teaching staff was required to go to mandatory political education, and that if you did not attend you were considered to be anti-CPP and would not receive any salary or annual bonus.	<a href="https://uyghurtribunal.com/wp-content/uploads/2022/02/UTFW2-001-Guzhanuer-Rouzi.pdf">https://uyghurtribunal.com/wp-content/uploads/2022/02/UTFW2-001-Guzhanuer-Rouzi.pdf</a>

Destruction of mosques	2009	A redevelopment campaign in Kashgar leveled mosques and the neighborhoods surrounding them.	<a href="https://xinjiangdocumentation.sites.olt.ubc.ca/files/2021/01/UHRP_report_Demolishing_Faith.pdf">https://xinjiangdocumentation.sites.olt.ubc.ca/files/2021/01/UHRP_report_Demolishing_Faith.pdf</a>
Arrest of intellectuals, erasure of language	August 2013	Abduweli Ayup—a poet, linguist, and Uyghur educator was arrested. He and his associates were fundraising in order to finance new schools which would teach the Uyghur language. He was arrested for illegal fundraising.	<a href="https://xinjiang.sppga.ubc.ca/timelines/arrests/">https://xinjiang.sppga.ubc.ca/timelines/arrests/</a>
Policy	2014	New regulations were passed, which included prohibiting the “creation, possession, consumption, and dissemination of a range of materials defined so broadly and vaguely that any expression can be construed as prohibited... including anything that undermines national unity, social stability, economic development, scientific or technological progress, or affects religious harmony.” It also banned religion from education and punished teachers for failing to stop or report any activities that have “hints of religious” in schools, banned children from participating in religious activities (including at home), and banned parents or teachers from introducing religion to children.	<a href="https://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/report_pdf/china0918_web.pdf">https://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/report_pdf/china0918_web.pdf</a>
Destruction of cemeteries	No date (earliest found was 2014, ongoing)	The state has destroyed 60–100 Uyghur cemeteries and grave sites. The state has cited developmental and environmental goals/projects as reasons for their destruction. One Uyghur academic noted the importance of cemeteries to public life and identity, saying cemeteries “are a material and symbolic representation of the collective claim to a place, a land, and a homeland” and they play “a significant role in bonding the past and present.”	<a href="https://xinjiang.sppga.ubc.ca/timelines/cultural-destruction-timeline/">https://xinjiang.sppga.ubc.ca/timelines/cultural-destruction-timeline/</a> ; <a href="http://ad-aspi.s3.amazonaws.com/2020-09/Cultural%20erasure_0.pdf?VersionId=NlJYOaEV6DF3IfupGsd b73xtX0wCNokg">http://ad-aspi.s3.amazonaws.com/2020-09/Cultural%20erasure_0.pdf?VersionId=NlJYOaEV6DF3IfupGsd b73xtX0wCNokg</a>



Destruction of mosques, campaign	2015	Yang Weiwei published the “Operational Research on Restraining the Infiltration of Religious Extremist Thought,” which argued for a state-regulated version of Islam in order to squash religious extremism. Part of the article called for the destruction of “excess” mosques.	<a href="https://xinjiang.sppga.ubc.ca/timelines/cultural-destruction-timeline/">https://xinjiang.sppga.ubc.ca/timelines/cultural-destruction-timeline/</a>
Destruction of mosques	Earliest date reported–2015 (ongoing)	Mosques are required to fly Chinese flags, and display images and banners which reflect CCP values “like Ethnic solidarity and the Chinese Dream,” “Love the party, love the country.”	<a href="https://xinjiang.sppga.ubc.ca/timelines/cultural-destruction-timeline/">https://xinjiang.sppga.ubc.ca/timelines/cultural-destruction-timeline/</a> ; <a href="http://ad-aspi.s3.amazonaws.com/2020-09/Cultural%20erasure_0.pdf?VersionId=NIJYOaEV6DF3IfupGsd b73xtX0wCNokg">http://ad-aspi.s3.amazonaws.com/2020-09/Cultural%20erasure_0.pdf?VersionId=NIJYOaEV6DF3IfupGsd b73xtX0wCNokg</a>
Policy	April 2016	President Xi made a speech at the National Religious Work Conference in which he called for the Sinicization of Chinese religion. He noted the importance of fusing religious doctrine with Chinese culture and prevention of foreign interference.	<a href="http://ad-aspi.s3.amazonaws.com/2020-09/Cultural%20erasure_0.pdf?VersionId=NIJYOaEV6DF3IfupGsd b73xtX0wCNokg">http://ad-aspi.s3.amazonaws.com/2020-09/Cultural%20erasure_0.pdf?VersionId=NIJYOaEV6DF3IfupGsd b73xtX0wCNokg</a>
Campaign	2016	The “Mosque Rectification Campaign” began (launched by the Chinese Central Ethnic-Religious Affairs Department). The campaign called for demolishing mosques for the safety of the worshipers. (The Government justified the campaign by saying that construction of the mosques was unsafe.)	<a href="https://www.rfa.org/english/news/uyghur/under-the-guise-of-public-safety-12192016140127.html">https://www.rfa.org/english/news/uyghur/under-the-guise-of-public-safety-12192016140127.html</a>
Policy/Campaign	2016	Deputy Secretary of Aksu Prefecture CPP Committee, Mardan Mugai, calls on Government departments to “waste no times in guiding the masses... to change their customs” and “abandon closed, backwards, conservative and ignorant customs.” (This was specifically in reference to traditional cemeteries and other burial grounds, shrines, and sacred sites.)	<a href="http://ad-aspi.s3.amazonaws.com/2020-09/Cultural%20erasure_0.pdf?VersionId=NIJYOaEV6DF3IfupGsd b73xtX0wCNokg">http://ad-aspi.s3.amazonaws.com/2020-09/Cultural%20erasure_0.pdf?VersionId=NIJYOaEV6DF3IfupGsd b73xtX0wCNokg</a>

Arrest of prominent individual	March 2017	Abdurehim Heyit, a Uyghur singer and dutar musician arrested.	<a href="https://xinjiang.sppga.ubc.ca/timelines/arrests/">https://xinjiang.sppga.ubc.ca/timelines/arrests/</a>
Policy/Campaign	October 2017	President Xi makes a 3 1/2 hour speech to the Nineteenth Party Congress where he “stressed the need to uphold the principle that religions in China must be Chinese in orientation, and provide active guidance to religions so that they can adapt themselves to a socialist society.”	Madsen, “The Sinicization of Chinese Religions Under Xi Jinping”
Arrested prominent individual	November 2017	Halmurat Ghopur, President of Xinjiang Medical University, was arrested and sentenced to death with reprieve.	<a href="https://xinjiang.sppga.ubc.ca/timelines/arrests/">https://xinjiang.sppga.ubc.ca/timelines/arrests/</a>
Missing educational, cultural erasure	December 2017	Rahile Dawut, a Xinjiang University anthropologist who specialized in Islamic shrines, traditional songs and folklore, disappeared in 2017 while traveling to Beijing. It was later confirmed in June 2021 by employees of Xinjiang University that she is currently imprisoned.	<a href="https://xinjiang.sppga.ubc.ca/timelines/arrests/">https://xinjiang.sppga.ubc.ca/timelines/arrests/</a>
Arrested prominent individual, cultural erasure	December 2017	Adil Tuniyaz, a Uyghur poet, was arrested for promoting terrorism and religious extremism.	<a href="https://xinjiang.sppga.ubc.ca/timelines/arrests/">https://xinjiang.sppga.ubc.ca/timelines/arrests/</a>
Policy/Campaign	2017	A new regulation identified irregular beards as an expression of extremist thinking.	<a href="https://www.lowyinstitute.org/the-interpreter/colonialism-and-cultural-erasure-xinjiang">https://www.lowyinstitute.org/the-interpreter/colonialism-and-cultural-erasure-xinjiang</a>
Forced education, brainwashing	2017	Under the heading “centralized transformation through education work,” the report states that re-education work must “wash brains, cleanse hearts, support the right, remove the wrong” ( <i>xinao jingxin fuzheng quxie</i> 洗脑净心扶正祛邪).	<a href="https://www.jpolarisk.com/brainwashing-police-guards-and-coercive-internment-evidence-from-chinese-government-documents-about-the-nature-and-extent-of-xinjiangs-vocational-training-internment-camps/">https://www.jpolarisk.com/brainwashing-police-guards-and-coercive-internment-evidence-from-chinese-government-documents-about-the-nature-and-extent-of-xinjiangs-vocational-training-internment-camps/</a>
Forced transformation	2017	CCP officials begin going door to door in Xinjiang to tell Uyghurs their lifestyle is “outdated” and that they “must fundamentally transform their vernacular dwellings interiors or move into Government-built housing in order to	<a href="https://xinjiangdocumentation.sites.olt.ubc.ca/files/2021/01/If-you-don-t-know-how-just-learn-Chinese-housing-and-the-">https://xinjiangdocumentation.sites.olt.ubc.ca/files/2021/01/If-you-don-t-know-how-just-learn-Chinese-housing-and-the-</a>

		propel themselves into modernity.” It is reported that the transformation is not only aimed to be aesthetic, but also to “alter Uyghur behavior.”	<a href="#">transformation-of-Uyghur-domestic-space3.pdf</a>
Arrested prominent individual, cultural erasure	January 2018	Abdulqadir, a Xinjiang Normal University scholar who specialized in Central Asian poetry and worked to preserve Uyghur culture and identity, was arrested following the raiding of his home and has been held in an internment camp ever since.	<a href="https://xinjiang.sppga.ubc.ca/timelines/arrests/">https://xinjiang.sppga.ubc.ca/timelines/arrests/</a>
Arrested prominent individual, cultural erasure	January 2018	Perhat Tursan, a poet, writer, and screenwriter who was called the Uyghur Salman Rushdie, disappeared in January 2018 and was reportedly given a 16-year prison sentence.	<a href="https://xinjiang.sppga.ubc.ca/timelines/arrests/">https://xinjiang.sppga.ubc.ca/timelines/arrests/</a>
Policy/Campaign	February 2018	The State Council issues new regulations on religion. The regulations included the state “actively [guiding] religion to fit in with socialist society,” condemning the “advocating, supporting, or funding of religious extremism, or using religion to harm national security or public safety, undermine ethnic unity, or conduct separatism or terrorist activities.” Additionally, policies specified “harsh fines for engaging in unapproved religious activities and for providing venues for such activities.”	Madsen, “The Sinicization of Chinese Religions Under Xi Jinping”
Policy/Campaign, Religious erasure	February 2018	New regulations place strict restrictions on the use of the internet to disseminate religious materials.	Madsen, “The Sinicization of Chinese Religions Under Xi Jinping”
Arrested prominent individual, cultural erasure	February 2018	Ablajan Awut Ayup, a pop singer known as the “Uyghur Justin Bieber” and who was known for songs which intended to bridge the gap between Han Chinese and Uyghurs, was arrested. He has been held in an internment camp ever since.	<a href="https://xinjiang.sppga.ubc.ca/timelines/arrests/">https://xinjiang.sppga.ubc.ca/timelines/arrests/</a>
Policy/Campaign, Religious Erasure	March 2018	The head of the Islamic Association of China declared “Chinese Islam must adhere to official Sinicization policy by conforming to cultural norms.”	Madsen, “The Sinicization of Chinese Religions Under Xi Jinping”

Policy/ Campaign	Spring 2018	The State Administration of Religious Affairs was absorbed into the Communist Party's United Front Work Department in order to ensure tighter CPP control over religious work.	Madsen, "The Sinicization of Chinese Religions Under Xi Jinping"
Arrested prominent individual, cultural erasure	July 2018	Chimengul Awut, a poet and editor in chief at the Kashgar Uyghur Publishing House, was arrested for allegedly editing a book that was problematic with authorities.	<a href="https://xinjiang.sppga.ubc.ca/timelines/arrests/">https://xinjiang.sppga.ubc.ca/timelines/arrests/</a>
Policy	October 2018	An amendment was made to Xinjiang's de-extremification ordinance which introduced the concept of "Vocational Skills Education Training Centers."	<a href="https://www.jpolrisk.com/brainwashing-police-guards-and-coercive-internment-evidence-from-chinese-government-documents-about-the-nature-and-extent-of-xinjiangs-vocational-training-internment-camps/">https://www.jpolrisk.com/brainwashing-police-guards-and-coercive-internment-evidence-from-chinese-government-documents-about-the-nature-and-extent-of-xinjiangs-vocational-training-internment-camps/</a>
Arrested prominent individual, cultural erasure	December 2018	Sanubar Tursan, an iconic singer and Uyghur national symbol, disappeared in 2018 and was presumed to have been interred. She resurfaced in Shanghai in November 2019.	<a href="https://xinjiang.sppga.ubc.ca/timelines/arrests/">https://xinjiang.sppga.ubc.ca/timelines/arrests/</a>
Detention camps	2018	Records show many elderly persons were detained to prevent cultural and religious practices from being passed on to younger generations.	<a href="https://www.xinjiangpolicefiles.org/">https://www.xinjiangpolicefiles.org/</a>
Arrested prominent individual, cultural erasure	2018	Halide Israyil, who wrote an award-winning novel depicting the Cultural Revolution in Xinjiang, was arrested and she is currently in an internment camp.	<a href="https://xinjiang.sppga.ubc.ca/timelines/arrests/">https://xinjiang.sppga.ubc.ca/timelines/arrests/</a>
Policy/ Campaign	2018	A CPP White Paper "stressed the need to 'modernise' and 'localise' the ethnic cultures while insisting that 'Chinese culture' is the 'bond that unites various ethnic groups.'"	<a href="http://ad-aspi.s3.amazonaws.com/2020-09/Cultural%20erasure_0.pdf?VersionId=NIJYOaEV6DF3IfupGsd b73xtX0wCNokg">http://ad-aspi.s3.amazonaws.com/2020-09/Cultural%20erasure_0.pdf?VersionId=NIJYOaEV6DF3IfupGsd b73xtX0wCNokg</a>
Religious Erasure, Policy	2018	Minors under the age of 18 are banned from entering mosques to study. Other religious activity for minors under 18 also banned; it was especially problematic for Catholics who practice infant baptism.	Madsen, "The Sinicization of Chinese Religions Under Xi Jinping"

Religious Erasure, Policy	2018	A ban was implemented on using loudspeakers for the call to prayer.	Madsen, “The Sinicization of Chinese Religions Under Xi Jinping”
Religious Erasure, Policy	2018	All forms of unauthorized travel abroad for religious education or pilgrimage (such as the haj) are forbidden.	Madsen, “The Sinicization of Chinese Religions Under Xi Jinping”
Policy/ Campaign	2018	Officials launch the “Three News” campaign which “advocates for a new lifestyle, establishing a new atmosphere, and constructing a new order.”	<a href="https://newlinesinstitute.org/wp-content/uploads/China-s-Breaches-of-the-GC3-2.pdf">https://newlinesinstitute.org/wp-content/uploads/China-s-Breaches-of-the-GC3-2.pdf</a>
Indoctrination	2018	Newly uncovered Government documents from 2018 make references to “guiding” the pickers to “consciously resist illegal religious activities,” showing that the policies are designed predominantly for Xinjiang’s Uyghurs and other traditionally Muslim groups.	<a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/extra/nz0g306v8c/china-tainted-cotton">https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/extra/nz0g306v8c/china-tainted-cotton</a>
Policy/ Campaign	2019	The CPP’s top religious policy advisor, Zhang Xunmou, states that “the ultimate goal of religious work is to achieve its complete internal and external sinicisation.”	<a href="http://ad-aspi.s3.amazonaws.com/2020-09/Cultural%20erasure_0.pdf?VersionId=NIJYOaEV6DF3IfupGsd b73xtX0wCNokg">http://ad-aspi.s3.amazonaws.com/2020-09/Cultural%20erasure_0.pdf?VersionId=NIJYOaEV6DF3IfupGsd b73xtX0wCNokg</a>
Arrest of prominent individuals	2019	Tashpolat Teyip, the President of Xinjiang University arrested and later sentenced to death.	<a href="https://xinjiang.sppga.ubc.ca/timelines/arrests/">https://xinjiang.sppga.ubc.ca/timelines/arrests/</a>
Cultural erasure	No date	Reported that Uyghur parents have been banned from giving their babies certain names, such as Mohammed and Medina.	<a href="https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/chinas-repression-uyghurs-xinjiang#chapter-title-0-7">https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/chinas-repression-uyghurs-xinjiang#chapter-title-0-7</a>
Cultural erasure	No date	The tomb of Lutpullat Mutellip, a prominent Uyghur poet, was destroyed and turned into a modern Chinese park.	<a href="https://culturalpropertynews.org/bulldozing-culture-chinas-systematic-destruction-of-uyghur-heritage-reveals-genocidal-intent/">https://culturalpropertynews.org/bulldozing-culture-chinas-systematic-destruction-of-uyghur-heritage-reveals-genocidal-intent/</a>

Cultural erasure, rewriting history	No date	Archeologists in Xinjiang have been expressly tasked with proving that the region “has always been part of China.”	<a href="https://culturalpropertynews.org/bulldozing-culture-chinas-systematic-destruction-of-uyghur-heritage-reveals-genocidal-intent/">https://culturalpropertynews.org/bulldozing-culture-chinas-systematic-destruction-of-uyghur-heritage-reveals-genocidal-intent/</a>
Religious erasure	Starting date unknown, possibly 2009	“Extremist” religious materials such as Qurans, prayer mats, and CDs were confiscated and burned in public.	<a href="http://ad-aspi.s3.amazonaws.com/2020-09/Cultural%20erasure_0.pdf?VersionId=NIJYOaEV6DF3IfupGsd b73xtX0wCNokg">http://ad-aspi.s3.amazonaws.com/2020-09/Cultural%20erasure_0.pdf?VersionId=NIJYOaEV6DF3IfupGsd b73xtX0wCNokg</a>
Religious erasure	No date	A female individual was reportedly arrested because she had worn a scarf and tied it under her chin which was not permitted.	<a href="https://uyghurtribunal.com/wp-content/uploads/2021/09/UTFW2-069-Abdusalam-Muhammad-FINAL-1.pdf">https://uyghurtribunal.com/wp-content/uploads/2021/09/UTFW2-069-Abdusalam-Muhammad-FINAL-1.pdf</a>
Religious erasure	No date	Females were reportedly arrested and beaten for wearing skirts that were too long, wearing scarves tied under the chin, and covering the face too much.	<a href="https://uyghurtribunal.com/wp-content/uploads/2021/09/UTFW2-069-Abdusalam-Muhammad-FINAL-1.pdf">https://uyghurtribunal.com/wp-content/uploads/2021/09/UTFW2-069-Abdusalam-Muhammad-FINAL-1.pdf</a>
Cultural erasure, Campaign	No date	Halal food is reportedly more and more difficult to find in Urumqi following the local Government launching a campaign against it.	<a href="https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/chinas-repression-uyghurs-xinjiang">https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/chinas-repression-uyghurs-xinjiang</a>
Brainwashing	No date	Within the camps, individuals are forced to praise the Communist party, admit what Uyghurs had done wrong, thank the Communist Party for showing them the right path, praise the Communist Party for everything, and condemn themselves for not being loyal to the Communist Party.	<a href="https://uyghurtribunal.com/wp-content/uploads/2021/09/UTFW2-069-Abdusalam-Muhammad-FINAL-1.pdf">https://uyghurtribunal.com/wp-content/uploads/2021/09/UTFW2-069-Abdusalam-Muhammad-FINAL-1.pdf</a>
Forced denouncement of identity	No date	Within the camps, individuals were forced to daily renounce their Uyghur identity and study a distorted version of history.	<a href="https://uyghurtribunal.com/wp-content/uploads/2021/09/UTFW2-069-Abdusalam-">https://uyghurtribunal.com/wp-content/uploads/2021/09/UTFW2-069-Abdusalam-</a>

			<a href="#">Muhammad-FINAL-1.pdf</a>
Forced education	No date	A former detainee is quoted as saying: “From 6 pm – 10 pm, we were forced to study lessons about the types of illegal religious activities, types of extremism, and the quality of illegal elements were intertwined with those 70, 80, 50, 30 rules. If we could not learn fast enough, they threatened to take us to jail and we saw some people were sent to jail when they could not learn it. I stayed for 70 days (about 2 and a half months) studying there.”	<a href="https://uyghurtribunal.com/wp-content/uploads/2021/09/UTFW2-069-Abdusalam-Muhammad-FINAL-1.pdf">https://uyghurtribunal.com/wp-content/uploads/2021/09/UTFW2-069-Abdusalam-Muhammad-FINAL-1.pdf</a>
Cultural Erasure	No date	Individuals are forbidden from using Islamic greetings.	<a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-china-xinjiang-rights/muslim-minority-in-chinas-xinjiang-face-political-indoctrination-human-rights-watch-idUSKCN1LQ01F">https://www.reuters.com/article/us-china-xinjiang-rights/muslim-minority-in-chinas-xinjiang-face-political-indoctrination-human-rights-watch-idUSKCN1LQ01F</a>
Targeting of individuals based on family living abroad	No date	Individuals in Xinjiang with relatives living in one of 26 “sensitive countries” have been targeted for arrest and internment. Sensitive countries include: Afghanistan, Algeria, Azerbaijan, Egypt, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Kazakhstan, Kenya, Kyrgyzstan, Libya, Malaysia, Nigeria, Pakistan, Russia, Saudi Arabia, Somalia, South Sudan, Syria, Tajikistan, Thailand, Turkey, Turkmenistan, United Arab Emirates, Uzbekistan, and Yemen.	<a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-china-xinjiang-rights/muslim-minority-in-chinas-xinjiang-face-political-indoctrination-human-rights-watch-idUSKCN1LQ01F">https://www.reuters.com/article/us-china-xinjiang-rights/muslim-minority-in-chinas-xinjiang-face-political-indoctrination-human-rights-watch-idUSKCN1LQ01F</a>
Memorization	No date	Individuals in detention camps are forced to memorize Chinese poetry or face severe punishment (poetry length was sometimes up to 3–4 double sided pages).	<a href="https://uyghurtribunal.com/wp-content/uploads/2021/09/UTFW2-069-Abdusalam-Muhammad-FINAL-1.pdf">https://uyghurtribunal.com/wp-content/uploads/2021/09/UTFW2-069-Abdusalam-Muhammad-FINAL-1.pdf</a>
Forced education, brainwashing	No date	Uyghurs held in camps forced to sing propaganda songs.	<a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-china-xinjiang-rights/muslim-minority-in-chinas-">https://www.reuters.com/article/us-china-xinjiang-rights/muslim-minority-in-chinas-</a>



			<a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-china-56986057">xinjiang-face-political-indoctrination-human-rights-watch-idUSKCN1LQ01F</a>
Chinese migration	No date	Chinese migration is encouraged to predominantly Uyghur areas/towns/villages.	<a href="https://xinjiangdocumentation.sites.olt.ubc.ca/files/2021/01/UHRP_report_Demolishing_Faith.pdf">https://xinjiangdocumentation.sites.olt.ubc.ca/files/2021/01/UHRP_report_Demolishing_Faith.pdf</a>
Religious erasure, targeting of imams, detention	No date	As of 2014, the BBC found evidence that at least 18 clerics had died in detention or shortly after being released.	<a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-china-56986057">https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-china-56986057</a>
Religious erasure, targeting of imams, detention	No date	Among 640 cases of detention cases of imams, almost half had been sent to prisons rather than to “re-education camps;” 96% were sentenced to at least five years and 26% were sentenced to 20 years or more, including 14 life sentences.	<a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-china-56986057">https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-china-56986057</a>
Religious erasure, targeting of imams, detention	No date, but possibly after 2017	An imam, Oken Mahmet, was arrested and charged with propagating extremism. However, according to his family’s testimony, he was arrested for leading Friday prayers and for officiating marriages at a mosque.	<a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-china-56986057">https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-china-56986057</a>
Religious erasure, targeting of imams, detention	No date, but possibly after 2017	An imam, Baqythan Myrzan, was arrested and charged with propagating extremism, when in reality he had simply been carrying out his duties as an imam. In addition to his arrest, it was reported that over 60 members of Myrzan’s extended family had been arrested, including his nephew and all eight of his children.	<a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-china-56986057">https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-china-56986057</a>
Religious erasure, targeting of imams, detention	No date	An imam named Tursan was repeatedly detained between 2001 and 2009. He was detained again in 2017, at which time his family was subsequently targeted en masse for detention as well. Tursan’s niece, who had fled to America prior to the family’s targeting, reported that any member of the family that was over 14 was taken away.	<a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-china-56986057">https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-china-56986057</a>



Destruction of Mosques, Religious erasure	No date—ongoing	The Australian Policy Institute reported that mosques which have remained physically intact or undamaged have “been secularized or converted into commercial or civic spaces, including café-bars and even public toilets.”	<a href="http://ad-aspi.s3.amazonaws.com/2020-09/Cultural%20erasure_0.pdf?VersionId=N1JYOaEV6DF3IfupGsd b73xtX0wCNokg">http://ad-aspi.s3.amazonaws.com/2020-09/Cultural%20erasure_0.pdf?VersionId=N1JYOaEV6DF3IfupGsd b73xtX0wCNokg</a>
Destruction of Islamic architecture	No date—ongoing	Native architecture and Islamic architecture, such as the moon motif, has been targeted, torn down, and demolished. Historic entryways were also demolished.	<a href="https://xinjiangdocumentation.sites.olt.ubc.ca/files/2021/01/UHRP_report_Demolishing_Faith.pdf">https://xinjiangdocumentation.sites.olt.ubc.ca/files/2021/01/UHRP_report_Demolishing_Faith.pdf</a>
Destruction of architecture, destruction of mosques, religious erasure	No date—ongoing	Mosaic artwork on mosques was painted over; Arabic writing on mosques and buildings was painted over or erased; Islamic style gatehouses were destroyed.	<a href="http://ad-aspi.s3.amazonaws.com/2020-09/Cultural%20erasure_0.pdf?VersionId=N1JYOaEV6DF3IfupGsd b73xtX0wCNokg">http://ad-aspi.s3.amazonaws.com/2020-09/Cultural%20erasure_0.pdf?VersionId=N1JYOaEV6DF3IfupGsd b73xtX0wCNokg</a>
Religious erasure	No date	It was reported that Government employees and students were prohibited from praying in the mosque, including during the Eid festival. Some mosque doors were padlocked.	<a href="http://ad-aspi.s3.amazonaws.com/2020-09/Cultural%20erasure_0.pdf?VersionId=N1JYOaEV6DF3IfupGsd b73xtX0wCNokg">http://ad-aspi.s3.amazonaws.com/2020-09/Cultural%20erasure_0.pdf?VersionId=N1JYOaEV6DF3IfupGsd b73xtX0wCNokg</a>
Destruction of Mosques	No date—ongoing	Destruction of mosques: the Australian Policy Institute estimates that “approximately 16,000 mosques have been destroyed or damaged as a result of government policies” (65% of the total mosques in Xinjiang). They estimate that 8,500 have been demolished outright. In addition to mosques, ASPI estimates that an additional 30% of Islamic sacred sites such as shrines and pilgrimage routes have been demolished since 2017.	<a href="https://www.aspi.org.au/report/cultural-erasure">https://www.aspi.org.au/report/cultural-erasure</a>
Targeting of Imams	No date	Imams whose mosques have been destroyed have been targeted. “The goal appears to be to permanently remove religious leaders from society, and not to ‘re-educate’ them as official propaganda suggests.” Imams have been given	<a href="https://xinjiangdocumentation.sites.olt.ubc.ca/files/2021/01/UHRP_report_Demolishing_Faith.pdf">https://xinjiangdocumentation.sites.olt.ubc.ca/files/2021/01/UHRP_report_Demolishing_Faith.pdf</a>

		disproportionately long prison sentences, and numerous deaths of religious leaders have occurred since the large-scale crackdowns in 2017–2018.	
Religious erasure	No date	There is reported targeting of secretaries of mosques due to their “religious knowledge.”	<a href="https://uyghurtribunal.com/wp-content/uploads/2021/09/UTFW2-069-Abdusalam-Muhammad-FINAL-1.pdf">https://uyghurtribunal.com/wp-content/uploads/2021/09/UTFW2-069-Abdusalam-Muhammad-FINAL-1.pdf</a>
Destruction of holy sites	No date	Destruction of holy pilgrimage sites called Mazars is occurring.	<a href="https://culturalpropertynews.org/bulldozing-culture-chinas-systematic-destruction-of-uyghur-heritage-reveals-genocidal-intent/">https://culturalpropertynews.org/bulldozing-culture-chinas-systematic-destruction-of-uyghur-heritage-reveals-genocidal-intent/</a>
Brainwashing, forced education	No date	“According to numerous Xinjiang government websites, Vocational Training Internment Camps (VTICs) ‘wash clean the brains’ of those interned in them.”	<a href="https://www.jpolrisk.com/brainwashing-police-guards-and-coercive-internment-evidence-from-chinese-government-documents-about-the-nature-and-extent-of-xinjiangs-vocational-training-internment-camps/">https://www.jpolrisk.com/brainwashing-police-guards-and-coercive-internment-evidence-from-chinese-government-documents-about-the-nature-and-extent-of-xinjiangs-vocational-training-internment-camps/</a>
Cultural erasure, forced education	No date	Textbooks for Uyghur primary schools show erasure of religion, history, culture, poetry, and language education.	<a href="https://newlinesinstitute.org/wp-content/uploads/Chinas-Breaches-of-the-GC3-2.pdf">https://newlinesinstitute.org/wp-content/uploads/Chinas-Breaches-of-the-GC3-2.pdf</a>
Cultural erasure	No date	Cultural books associated with Turkic Muslim culture have been banned. Members of ethnic groups who owned books (or art) were pressured to destroy them and replace them with Chinese books and art.	<a href="https://xinjiang.amnesty.org/#blanket-repression-and-erasure-of-ethnic-identity">https://xinjiang.amnesty.org/#blanket-repression-and-erasure-of-ethnic-identity</a>

Cultural erasure	No date	Restrictions on ethnic-related items reported to extend beyond religious-associated items. One individual reported: “the restrictions are not just about religious things.... I was in my cousin’s house and [they were made to take down] their traditional wood carvings, and even the carpets [were cut].”	<a href="https://xinjiang.amnesty.org/#blanket-repression-and-erasure-of-ethnic-identity">https://xinjiang.amnesty.org/#blanket-repression-and-erasure-of-ethnic-identity</a>
Cultural erasure	No date	Multiple reports were submitted that individuals would burn or destroy their books and cultural artifacts in anticipation of having their houses searched. Individuals stated that the Government announced they should bring their books to a Government office, but they didn’t because that would be supplying evidence against themselves. Instead, they destroyed them, hid them, or burned them. One family reported: “We were afraid. We tore [our Qur’an] into little pieces and then burned it.”	<a href="https://xinjiang.amnesty.org/#blanket-repression-and-erasure-of-ethnic-identity">https://xinjiang.amnesty.org/#blanket-repression-and-erasure-of-ethnic-identity</a>
Cultural erasure, Education	No date	Individuals reported that classrooms where the Uyghur language was the language of instruction received half the supplies as Mandarin speaking schools, and that textbooks are not published in “minority languages,” but published in Mandarin only in order to force that to be the language of instruction.	<a href="https://uyghurtribunal.com/wp-content/uploads/2022/01/UT-211217-Julie-Millsap.pdf">https://uyghurtribunal.com/wp-content/uploads/2022/01/UT-211217-Julie-Millsap.pdf</a>
Surveillance tools, regulation of movement	No date but at least 2014 or after	When an individual was released from a detention camp, he reported that whole communities had been locked with iron gates and cameras had been installed everywhere.	<a href="https://uyghurtribunal.com/wp-content/uploads/2021/09/UTFW2-069-Abdusalam-Muhammad-FINAL-1.pdf">https://uyghurtribunal.com/wp-content/uploads/2021/09/UTFW2-069-Abdusalam-Muhammad-FINAL-1.pdf</a>
Forced labor, cultural erasure, policy	No date	A Chinese policy document boasts how satellite factories liberate women and combat extremism at the same time, leading Uyghur women into an acceptance of modern culture.	<a href="https://www.jpolrisk.com/beyond-the-camps-beijings-long-term-scheme-of-coercive-labor-poverty-alleviation-and-social-control-in-xinjiang/#_ftn25">https://www.jpolrisk.com/beyond-the-camps-beijings-long-term-scheme-of-coercive-labor-poverty-alleviation-and-social-control-in-xinjiang/#_ftn25</a>

Cultural erasure, settler program	No date	The state forced more than 200,000 Uyghurs from poor counties in Xinjiang into labor transfer programs, and is now currently planning to resettle more than 300,000 Han Chinese into the region by 2022 in order to “optimize the population structure.”	<a href="https://jamestown.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/03/Coercive-Labor-and-Forced-Displacement-in-Xinjiangs-Cross-Regional-Labor-Transfers-A-Process-Oriented-Evaluation_Updated-December-2021_.pdf?x72099">https://jamestown.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/03/Coercive-Labor-and-Forced-Displacement-in-Xinjiangs-Cross-Regional-Labor-Transfers-A-Process-Oriented-Evaluation_Updated-December-2021_.pdf?x72099</a>
Forced Assimilation, indoctrination	No date	It was reported that teachers in Xinjiang were encouraged to insult Western countries, repeat whatever the Government said, and would be punished for talking about topics such as human rights or freedom.	<a href="https://uyghurtribunal.com/wp-content/uploads/2022/02/UTFW2-001-Guzhanuer-Rouzi.pdf">https://uyghurtribunal.com/wp-content/uploads/2022/02/UTFW2-001-Guzhanuer-Rouzi.pdf</a>
Forced Assimilation, Violence	No Date	It was reported that Han teachers would beat Uyghur students in the classroom.	<a href="https://uyghurtribunal.com/wp-content/uploads/2022/02/UTFW2-001-Guzhanuer-Rouzi.pdf">https://uyghurtribunal.com/wp-content/uploads/2022/02/UTFW2-001-Guzhanuer-Rouzi.pdf</a>
Forced Assimilation, Violence	No Date	A Uyghur teacher reported that teachers at her school would have two-hour meetings with their teachers where the teachers would ask them questions about their home and family life. If the students reported anything religious (such as prayer) “teachers would tell the students when certain activities were prohibited and that they, and their parents, could be punished for carrying them out.” Students were also told that their religion was anti-communist, and that religion is a disease.	<a href="https://uyghurtribunal.com/wp-content/uploads/2022/02/UTFW2-001-Guzhanuer-Rouzi.pdf">https://uyghurtribunal.com/wp-content/uploads/2022/02/UTFW2-001-Guzhanuer-Rouzi.pdf</a>
Forced assimilation, religious erasure	No date	Fasting during Ramadan has been prohibited due to “health issues.” It has been reported that authorities have visited families during Ramadan and offered them food or drink; when they refused to eat or drink, they were accused of illegal fasting.	<a href="https://www.vox.com/2020/7/28/21333345/uyghurs-china-internment-camps-forced-labor-xinjiang">https://www.vox.com/2020/7/28/21333345/uyghurs-china-internment-camps-forced-labor-xinjiang</a>

Surveillance			
<i>Crime Code</i>	<i>Date</i>	<i>Allegation</i>	<i>Source</i>
Policy/ Campaign	April 2014	President Xi makes a series of speeches on the “struggle against terrorism, infiltration, and separatism” where he singled out the XUAR (Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region), and called for “comprehensive digital surveillance and local informants.”	<a href="https://newlinesinstitute.org/wp-content/uploads/China-s-Breaches-of-the-GC3-2.pdf">https://newlinesinstitute.org/wp-content/uploads/China-s-Breaches-of-the-GC3-2.pdf</a>
Policy/ Campaign	Mid-2014	The Chinese Government launched the Strike Hard against Violent Terrorism (严正打击暴力恐怖活动专项行动) campaign, <sup>459</sup> which resulted in the creation of National Security Strategic Guidelines, a National Security Law, and a Counterterrorism Law. The Lookout Foundation reported an increase in surveillance following passage of the laws.	<a href="https://www.lookout.com/documents/threat-reports/us/lookout-uyghur-malware-tr-us.pdf">https://www.lookout.com/documents/threat-reports/us/lookout-uyghur-malware-tr-us.pdf</a>
Policy/ Campaign	2014– 2017 (ongoing)	Authorities dispatch “fanghuiju” teams. Over 200,000 cadres were sent out between 2014 and 2017 to surveil individuals and subject them to propaganda.	<a href="https://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/report_pdf/china0918_web.pdf">https://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/report_pdf/china0918_web.pdf</a>
Surveillance, Border Control	2015– 2016	As part of the Strike Hard Against Violent Terrorism campaign, the Government made it easier for Xinjiang residents to apply for and obtain passports. Then, in 2016 authorities started recalling passports for “reasons of collective management,” which has allowed for “the police to scrutinize and control each foreign visit.”	<a href="https://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/report_pdf/china0918_web.pdf">https://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/report_pdf/china0918_web.pdf</a>
Policy	2016	Chen Quanguo is appointed XUAR Party Secretary and outlines a new policy agenda of increasing more proactive security systems to combat terrorism, extremism, and splittism. He added 100,680 new security-related positions in the first year,	<a href="https://newlinesinstitute.org/wp-content/uploads/China-s-Breaches-of-the-GC3-2.pdf">https://newlinesinstitute.org/wp-content/uploads/China-s-Breaches-of-the-GC3-2.pdf</a>

<sup>459</sup> “The Strike Hard Campaign is unprecedented not just for its sheer scale, but also for its novel use and deployment of technology. Although authorities in Xinjiang have long used information technology to counter unrest—to quell the 2009 riots, for example, they shut down all internet and text-messaging in the region—they had never previously used it with such precision and ubiquity. In August 2016, after Chen Quanguo was appointed Party Secretary in Xinjiang, he brought with him many of the securitization measures and surveillance technologies he introduced in Tibet.” Alina Polyakova and Chris Meserole, “Exporting Digital Authoritarianism: The Russian and Chinese Models,” *Brookings*, Aug. 2019, <https://www.brookings.edu/research/exporting-digital-authoritarianism/>.

		divided the region into communities, established thousands of “convenience police stations” (which are located every 300 to 500 meters in urban centers), and increased surveillance and tracking of Uyghurs through mandatory medical examinations.	
Surveillance	2016	Since 2016 there have been cameras in front of every home that are connected to the police station. The cameras collect voice samples, and even individuals’ gaits.	<a href="https://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/report_pdf/china0918_web.pdf">https://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/report_pdf/china0918_web.pdf</a>
Financial Spending	2016–2018	Between 2016 and 2018, individual cities spent as much as \$46 million on surveillance systems.	<a href="https://newlinesinstitute.org/wp-content/uploads/Chinas-Breaches-of-the-GC3-2.pdf">https://newlinesinstitute.org/wp-content/uploads/Chinas-Breaches-of-the-GC3-2.pdf</a>
Surveillance	Spring 2017	China installed QR codes on Muslim residents’ homes. As quoted by a former resident: “Then every two days, or every day, the cadres come and scan the QR code, so they know how many people live here—and starting around then, they would ask [our] visitors, ‘Why are you here?’ In the evenings the cadres would check as well.”	<a href="https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/asia/china-uyghur-muslims-xinjiang-province-qr-codes-security-crackdown-hrw-a8532156.html">https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/asia/china-uyghur-muslims-xinjiang-province-qr-codes-security-crackdown-hrw-a8532156.html</a>
Integrated Platform (IJOP) Screening	June 2017	The Integrated Platform (IJOP) is the main data system that registers individuals’ personal information. A leaked CPP document covered the Integrated Platform Screening initiative locating thousands of individuals in Xinjiang who obtained foreign nationality and also applied for Chinese Visas. The document addresses the CPP organizing households into units (10 households per unit) and combining them with the IJOP in order to analyze the people there. It goes on to state that personal identification and verification should be inspected one by one, that suspected terrorism cannot be ruled out, and that individuals should be placed into concentrated education and training and examined.	<a href="https://www.documentcloud.org/documents/6558502-China-Cables-IJOP-Daily-Bulletin-2-Enligsh.html">https://www.documentcloud.org/documents/6558502-China-Cables-IJOP-Daily-Bulletin-2-Enligsh.html</a>
IJOP Screening, surveillance	June 2017	A leaked CPP document stated “the autonomous region should actively and quantitatively push data to the prefectures,	<a href="https://www.documentcloud.org/documents/6558506-China-Cables-">https://www.documentcloud.org/documents/6558506-China-Cables-</a>

tools, monitoring		and follow the whole process to track the effectiveness.” The document then goes into types of verification issues experienced and how to remedy them.	<a href="http://www.documentcloud.org/documents/6558508-China-Cables-IJOP-Daily-Bulletin-14-English.html">IJOP-Daily-Bulletin-14-English.html</a>
Surveillance, monitoring	June 2017	A leaked CPP document detailed finding “violent terrorist and extremist elements” by looking at individuals who have used the “Kuai Ya” software to spread audio and video. The CPP begins monitoring and screening Kuai Ya, of which there are 1,869,310 current users (as of June 2017) in Xinjiang.	<a href="https://www.documentcloud.org/documents/6558508-China-Cables-IJOP-Daily-Bulletin-20-English.html">https://www.documentcloud.org/documents/6558508-China-Cables-IJOP-Daily-Bulletin-20-English.html</a>
Surveillance, Policy	December 2017	An unpublished draft of the Ministry of Public Security’s standard for face recognition was found. The draft stated that “face attribute recognition functionalities should include ethnicity recognition: (Uyghur/Non-Uyghur).”	<a href="https://uyghurtribunal.com/wp-content/uploads/2022/01/UT-211217-Conor-Healy.pdf">https://uyghurtribunal.com/wp-content/uploads/2022/01/UT-211217-Conor-Healy.pdf</a>
Surveillance	2017–ongoing	Residents were required in some areas to put QR codes on certain knives, including kitchen knives and craft knives, and then link those QR codes to their personal ID numbers.	China installs QR codes on Muslim residents homes
Surveillance, overcrowded cells	Early 2018	At the Kuytun City Vocational Skills Re-education Training Center, female detainees were sleeping in cells with more people than beds, resulting in mattresses on the floor and being shuffled around to find space. Due to the crowded cells, the women were instructed to conduct surveillance on each other at night, in two-hour shifts. The women were forced to cut their hair, with long hair symbolizing good fortune in their ethnic culture.	<a href="https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2021/04/12/surviving-the-crackdown-in-xinjiang">https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2021/04/12/surviving-the-crackdown-in-xinjiang</a>
Policy/Campaign	February 2018	New regulations place strict restrictions on the use of the internet to disseminate religious materials.	Madsen, “The Sinicization of Chinese Religions Under Xi Jinping”
Surveillance, point system	February 2018	Female detainees at Kuytun City Vocational Skills Re-education Training Center received points for good behavior that they could exchange for rewards such as family visits. One way to get points was by reporting on other inmates. The inmates could also lose points, but were never	<a href="https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2021/04/12/surviving-the-crackdown-in-xinjiang">https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2021/04/12/surviving-the-crackdown-in-xinjiang</a>



		made aware of their score and doubted the reality of the system.	
Surveillance tools	June 2018	China begins using robotic birds to conduct surveillance on the country. Over 30 military and Government agencies have deployed the birds.	<a href="https://www.scmp.com/news/china/society/article/2152027/china-takes-surveillance-new-heights-flock-robotic-doves-do-they">https://www.scmp.com/news/china/society/article/2152027/china-takes-surveillance-new-heights-flock-robotic-doves-do-they</a>
Company involvement, patent	July 2018	Huawei files for a patent to detect whether someone is Han or Uyghur through facial recognition technology. Hikavision then developed similar technology, and was awarded Chinese Government contracts to implement facial recognition surveillance in reeducation camps and at the entrances of at least 967 mosques.	<a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2021/sep/30/uyghur-tribunal-testimony-surveillance-china#:~:text=By%202018%2C%20camera%20surveillance%20had,experts%20at%20the%20tribunal%20detained">https://www.theguardian.com/world/2021/sep/30/uyghur-tribunal-testimony-surveillance-china#:~:text=By%202018%2C%20camera%20surveillance%20had,experts%20at%20the%20tribunal%20detained</a>
Management System	2018–ongoing	Cities and villages have been split into squares of approximately 500 people. Each square has a police station which regularly scans individuals identification cards, takes individuals photographs, takes fingerprints, and searches their cellphones.	<a href="https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/chinas-repression-uyghurs-xinjiang#chapter-title-0-7">https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/chinas-repression-uyghurs-xinjiang#chapter-title-0-7</a>
Personal Data Collection	2018	Clerics are forced to register their residential addresses and other personal information.	Madsen, “The Sinicization of Chinese Religions Under Xi Jinping”
Surveillance tools	July 2020	The Lookout Threat Intelligence Team discovers new Android surveillance tools: “SilkBean, DoubleAgent, CarbonSteal, and GoldenEagle. These four interconnected malware tools are elements of much larger MAPT [mobile advanced persistent threat] campaigns originating in China, and primarily targeting the Uyghur ethnic minority.” Essentially, the malware gathers personal data and then sends it to command and control servers. This technology has also been used on Tibetans and wider Muslim communities both within China and in other countries.	<a href="https://www.lookout.com/documents/threat-reports/us/lookout-uyghur-malware-tr-us.pdf">https://www.lookout.com/documents/threat-reports/us/lookout-uyghur-malware-tr-us.pdf</a>
Use of software to	2020	A new set of software was revealed and added to the Chinese surveillance arsenal.	<a href="https://www.cyberscoop.com/china-">https://www.cyberscoop.com/china-</a>



steal sensitive data		As of the 2020 article, there were “8 malware families meant to stealthily spy on [the Uyghurs] at the minimum, with some of them expanding even more broadly in their targeting.” This software could turn phones into more effective listening devices. A lot of this software was originally used on Tibetans.	<a href="https://citizenlab.ca/2013/04/permission-to-spy-an-analysis-of-android-malware-targeting-tibetans/">surveillance-uyghur-xinjiang-lookout/; https://citizenlab.ca/2013/04/permission-to-spy-an-analysis-of-android-malware-targeting-tibetans/</a>
Policy/ Campaign	Starting date unknown	The CCP developed security units in Xinjiang called the “Ten Family Joint Defense System.” The system mobilizes ordinary people (usually Han) to do security work for the region/mobilize people against each other. Under this system, every ten families (or local shops that are family run) are assigned a security unit. The security unit is responsible for ten daily tasks per day, which include “organizing security patrols and information collection, ‘transforming’ targeted people, and launching patriotic education.” These security details are trained in, and practice, anti-terrorist combat every afternoon (with the training guided by local police). The security leaders visit their families and shops in order to “detect abnormal issues” and be a first line of defense to “fight terrorism.”	<a href="https://xinjiang.sppga.ubc.ca/critical-scholarship/project-reports/extending-grassroots-power-and-mobilizing-the-people/">https://xinjiang.sppga.ubc.ca/critical-scholarship/project-reports/extending-grassroots-power-and-mobilizing-the-people/</a>
Policy/ Campaign, Security	Starting date unknown	New security measures implemented in Urumqi, which bans all liquids (including water) from public transit systems. Lighters and powders are also banned.	<a href="https://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/report_pdf/china0918_web.pdf">https://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/report_pdf/china0918_web.pdf</a>
Surveillance	Starting date unknown	Journalists reported that individuals were required to download an app on their phones called Clean Net Guard. The app provides the Government with access to the users phones, and also informs the Government of when the user views “inappropriate content.”	<a href="https://xinjiang.amnesty.org/#blanket-repression-and-erasure-of-ethnic-identity">https://xinjiang.amnesty.org/#blanket-repression-and-erasure-of-ethnic-identity</a>
Biometric data collection	Starting date unknown	Residents of Xinjiang reported that when they applied for passports or other ID cards they would be forced to comply and give biometric data including DNA and voice samples. They were even forced to walk so that officials could record their gait.	<a href="https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/asia/china-uyghur-muslims-xinjiang-province-qr-codes-security-crackdown-hrw-a8532156.html">https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/asia/china-uyghur-muslims-xinjiang-province-qr-codes-security-crackdown-hrw-a8532156.html</a>

Surveillance, Security	Date unknown—ongoing	In some areas with checkpoints, authorities have created “green channels” where Han are able to go through with no checks, while all Muslims are forced to line up and go through the security controls. Per a Human Rights Watch report, “in a ‘stability maintenance’ meeting, [the authorities] told us that there are these ‘green channels’ in which those whose official license plates are let through a scanner reads the licenses but the Uyghurs have to line up and their trunks checked. The authorities told us that, ‘Han, they come to develop Xinjiang, so they should be allowed through the green channel; but the Uyghurs, there are terrorists among them, so they should be checked. You shouldn’t dispute this.’”	<a href="https://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/report_pdf/china0918_web.pdf">https://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/report_pdf/china0918_web.pdf</a>
Surveillance, Policy	No date	The “Pair Up and Become Family Program” was instituted in order to surveil families in homes. This program entailed forced stayovers, where male Han Chinese “relatives” were assigned to monitor Uyghur families in Xinjiang. It has been reported that the men regularly sleep in the same beds as the wives of Uyghur men who are detained in internment camps.	<a href="https://www.eurasiareview.com/04112019-chinas-forced-assimilation-of-uyghurs-is-repugnant-and-dehumanizing-oped/">https://www.eurasiareview.com/04112019-chinas-forced-assimilation-of-uyghurs-is-repugnant-and-dehumanizing-oped/</a>
Surveillance, detention	No date	Individuals in Xinjiang reported that having unsanctioned software on your phone (such as VPNs or encrypted messaging platforms like WhatsApp) was grounds for being sent to an internment camp.	<a href="https://xinjiang.amnesty.org/#blanket-repression-and-erasure-of-ethnic-identity">https://xinjiang.amnesty.org/#blanket-repression-and-erasure-of-ethnic-identity</a>
Urumqi Police Database	Starting date unknown	Leaked reports published by the Intercept discuss “how Chinese authorities collect millions of text messages, phone contacts, call records, ecommerce and banking records...biometric data...use community informants...”. They also use applying for asylum abroad to classify individuals as terrorists.	<a href="https://theintercept.com/2021/01/29/china-uyghur-muslim-surveillance-police/">https://theintercept.com/2021/01/29/china-uyghur-muslim-surveillance-police/</a>
Physicals for All program	Starting date unknown	While state officials have claimed that the “Physicals for All” program is solely a health program, it has been found to be part of the surveillance and policing initiative. Authorities have used it to carry out a	<a href="https://theintercept.com/2021/01/29/china-uyghur-muslim-surveillance-police/">https://theintercept.com/2021/01/29/china-uyghur-muslim-surveillance-police/</a>

		biometric collection program where authorities collect DNA and blood types, among other metrics.	
Police checkpoints	Starting date unknown—ongoing	“At police checkpoints, Uighurs [sic] frequently have their DNA collected and their eyes scanned, and they may be forced to install spyware on their phones that tracks all of their online activity. To cover Uighur [sic] movement between checkpoints, the CCP has also mandated all vehicles in Xinjiang to install a navigation system powered by Beidou, China’s version of the Global Position System, or GPS.”	<a href="https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2019/08/FP_20190827_digital_authoritarianism_polyakova_meserole.pdf">https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2019/08/FP_20190827_digital_authoritarianism_polyakova_meserole.pdf</a>
Cameras within detention camps	Starting date unknown—ongoing	It has been reported that there is no area of the camps that is not covered by a camera except for in bathrooms where the toilet is.	<a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2021/sep/30/uyghur-tribunal-testimony-surveillance-china#:~:text=By%202018%2C%20camera%20surveillance%20head,experts%20at%20the%20tribunal%20detained">https://www.theguardian.com/world/2021/sep/30/uyghur-tribunal-testimony-surveillance-china#:~:text=By%202018%2C%20camera%20surveillance%20head,experts%20at%20the%20tribunal%20detained</a>
Surveillance tools, regulation of movement	No date but at least 2014 or after	When an individual was released from a detention camp, he reported that whole communities had been locked with iron gates and cameras installed everywhere.	<a href="https://uyghurtribunal.com/wp-content/uploads/2021/09/UTFW2-069-Abdusalam-Muhammad-FINAL-1.pdf">https://uyghurtribunal.com/wp-content/uploads/2021/09/UTFW2-069-Abdusalam-Muhammad-FINAL-1.pdf</a>
Monitoring of religious practices	No date—ongoing	Authorities have increasingly monitored religious practices, asking people how often they pray and go to mosques. Authorities also make regular visits to rural parts of Xinjiang in order to monitor religious activities.	<a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-china-xinjiang-rights/muslim-minority-in-chinas-xinjiang-face-political-indoctrination-human-rights-watch-idUSKCN1LQ01F">https://www.reuters.com/article/us-china-xinjiang-rights/muslim-minority-in-chinas-xinjiang-face-political-indoctrination-human-rights-watch-idUSKCN1LQ01F</a>
Surveillance, Arrests	Exact date unknown, possibly 2018	A Hui Chinese individual was sentenced to two years in prison for “organizing a discussion group on Muslim worship on WeChat.”	Madsen, “The Sinicization of Chinese Religions Under Xi Jinping”

Surveillance, Arrests	No date	Some Uyghurs remain terrified of their children, who can be used by the state to incriminate their parents. For example, “they’re scared that their children will tell their teachers in school something about their religious habits that will get them singled out for punishment or internment in the camps.”	<a href="https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2018/09/china-internment-camps-uyghur-muslim-children/569062/">https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2018/09/china-internment-camps-uyghur-muslim-children/569062/</a>
Surveillance, automated racism	No date-ongoing	The Uyghur Face Detection (UFD) system has been found to be a major part of the Chinese surveillance apparatus. The technology is trained to detect whether someone is Uyghur based on their facial traits, and the system “looks exclusively for Uyghurs based on their appearance and keeps records of the comings and goings for search and review.”	<a href="https://uyghurtribunal.com/wp-content/uploads/2022/01/UT-211217-Conor-Healy.pdf">https://uyghurtribunal.com/wp-content/uploads/2022/01/UT-211217-Conor-Healy.pdf</a>
Surveillance	No date-ongoing	The “Heart of City” (HOC) software was developed by Dahua Technology and integrated into police systems. Its functionality was described as “real time Uyghur warnings.”	<a href="https://uyghurtribunal.com/wp-content/uploads/2022/01/UT-211217-Conor-Healy.pdf">https://uyghurtribunal.com/wp-content/uploads/2022/01/UT-211217-Conor-Healy.pdf</a>
Surveillance, Policy/Campaign	No Date	Extensive Government-mandated homestays in Uyghur households and neighborhoods as part of the “Becoming Family” campaign. Since 2017, more than a million cadres spend at least 5 days every two months in the homes of Uyghurs in Xinjiang. In some cases, cadres have been intentionally sent to homes of the opposite sex, making women and girls particularly vulnerable to sexual violence.	<a href="https://newlinesinstitute.org/wp-content/uploads/Chinas-Breaches-of-the-GC3-2.pdf">https://newlinesinstitute.org/wp-content/uploads/Chinas-Breaches-of-the-GC3-2.pdf</a> ; <a href="https://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/report_pdf/china0918_web.pdf">https://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/report_pdf/china0918_web.pdf</a>
Surveillance	No date-ongoing	Individuals in Xinjiang are encouraged to spy on and report on each other for a multitude of reasons, which include: having matches/knives/books/chemical fertilizers/prayer mats, violating family planning policy, teaching religion or participating in religious expression without official approval, having more than one wife, being influential individuals, being tax evaders, not obeying local officials, being a “two-faced” individual, having families abroad, being deemed untrustworthy, being recommended by the IJOP, not participating in flag-raising	<a href="https://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/report_pdf/china0918_web.pdf">https://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/report_pdf/china0918_web.pdf</a>

		ceremonies or other official activities, communicating with individuals in foreign countries, and submitting complaints about local officials.	
Surveillance, Technology	No date	Many corporations have been involved in creating surveillance technology now utilized against the Uyghurs, including: Huawei, Hikvision, Dahua, Megvii Technology, IFLYTEK, Sense Time, Meiya Pico Information Co. Ltd., Yitu Technologies, Yixin Schience and Technology Co. Ltd.	<a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2019/10/07/us/politics/us-to-blacklist-28-chinese-entities-over-abuses-in-xinjiang.html">https://www.nytimes.com/2019/10/07/us/politics/us-to-blacklist-28-chinese-entities-over-abuses-in-xinjiang.html</a>

Detention and Internment			
<i>Crime Code</i>	<i>Date</i>	<i>Allegation</i>	<i>Source</i>
Detention, illegal trial methods, torture, coercion	2013–2014	Abduweli Ayup, a linguistic rights activist, reported that while in multiple detention centers in Kashgar and Urumqi, he was subjected to “repeated beatings, torture, and threats intended to make him confess to his ‘crimes.’” His “crimes” involved separatism due to his initiative to open Uyghur-language kindergartens in Xinjiang.	<a href="https://livingotherwise.com/wp-content/uploads/2021/04/Elephant-in-the-XUAR-III.4.20.2021.pdf">https://livingotherwise.com/wp-content/uploads/2021/04/Elephant-in-the-XUAR-III.4.20.2021.pdf</a>
Death	2014	According to Dr. Erkin Sidick, Xi Jinping decided on Government policy aiming to “kill one-third of all Uyghurs, lock up one third, and convert one third [to Chinese Communist Party ideology].”	<a href="https://bylinetimes.com/2020/08/24/death-is-everywhere-millions-more-uyghurs-missing/">https://bylinetimes.com/2020/08/24/death-is-everywhere-millions-more-uyghurs-missing/</a>
Detention, arrest of prominent individual, mistreatment, torture	January 2014	Ilham Tohti, a well-known university professor, was arrested in Beijing and transferred to the Autonomous Region Pre-Trial Detention Center in Urumqi. He was denied food for more than a week on two occasions, was shackled, denied time outside of his cell, and was held in custody with individuals charged with murder and rape, despite the center he was in holding individuals detained on non-violent crimes.	<a href="https://livingotherwise.com/wp-content/uploads/2021/04/Elephant-in-the-XUAR-III.4.20.2021.pdf">https://livingotherwise.com/wp-content/uploads/2021/04/Elephant-in-the-XUAR-III.4.20.2021.pdf</a>
Detention	No date (starting in 2016)	List of Uyghur intellectuals known to be imprisoned in China in and after 2016. The list was list updated in December 2018.	<a href="https://www.facebook.com/100000777053688/posts/2314003391968873/">https://www.facebook.com/100000777053688/posts/2314003391968873/</a>

Missing prominent individual	April 2017	Arslan Abdulla, former Dean of Xinjiang University, has been missing since 2017 and is presumed to be in detention.	<a href="https://xinjiang.sppga.ubc.ca/timelines/arrests/">https://xinjiang.sppga.ubc.ca/timelines/arrests/</a>
Missing educational, cultural erasure	December 2017	Rahile Dawut, a Xinjiang University anthropologist who specialized in Islamic shrines, traditional songs and folklore, disappeared in 2017 while traveling to Beijing. It was later confirmed in June 2021 by employees of Xinjiang University that she is currently imprisoned.	<a href="https://xinjiang.sppga.ubc.ca/timelines/arrests/">https://xinjiang.sppga.ubc.ca/timelines/arrests/</a>
Arrested prominent individual, cultural erasure	December 2017	Adil Tuniyaz, a Uyghur poet, was arrested for promoting terrorism and religious extremism.	<a href="https://xinjiang.sppga.ubc.ca/timelines/arrests/">https://xinjiang.sppga.ubc.ca/timelines/arrests/</a>
Detention, kidnapping, erasure of documentation	December 2017	Asqar Azatbek, a Kazakhstani citizen, was kidnapped and then detained by Chinese public security after he went to the Korgas International Center for Boundary Cooperation. His kidnapping was officially confirmed by Kazakhstan's Ministry of Foreign Affairs. He received a sentence of 20 years in prison for "spying for Kazakhstan" and "fraud." His court verdict made no mention of the kidnapping, and said that that he was only detained in March 2018 on suspicions of fraud—3 months after he was actually detained.	<a href="https://livingotherwise.com/wp-content/uploads/2021/04/Elephant-in-the-XUAR-III.4.20.2021.pdf">https://livingotherwise.com/wp-content/uploads/2021/04/Elephant-in-the-XUAR-III.4.20.2021.pdf</a>
Detention, Illegal trial methods	Late 2017	A lawyer based out of Shanghai traveled to Xinjiang to defend a chicken farmer there because no local lawyer "would dare take the case." The lawyer was told they would not be allowed to pursue an innocence defense, and that he could "probably" have access to "most" of the case files. When the lawyer questioned the legality of these actions/statements, the response given was "this is Xinjiang."	<a href="https://livingotherwise.com/wp-content/uploads/2021/04/Elephant-in-the-XUAR-III.4.20.2021.pdf">https://livingotherwise.com/wp-content/uploads/2021/04/Elephant-in-the-XUAR-III.4.20.2021.pdf</a>
Detention, Torture, illegal trial methods	2017	Zhang Haitao, a Xinjiang resident, was detained in the Autonomous Region Pre-Trial Detention Center in Urumqi for writing critically about the local policies of the CCP. He claimed that the pre-trial detention center police used illegal evidence against him that was obtained through torture. He was sentenced to 19 years in prison.	<a href="https://livingotherwise.com/wp-content/uploads/2021/04/Elephant-in-the-XUAR-III.4.20.2021.pdf">https://livingotherwise.com/wp-content/uploads/2021/04/Elephant-in-the-XUAR-III.4.20.2021.pdf</a>



Policy/ Campaign	2017	A series of Chinese secret documents were leaked to news sources globally which detail various Chinese plans and policies towards the Uyghurs. Among the documents leaked was a telegram approved by Zhu Hailun (the then deputy secretary of the Communist Party) which outlined an operations manual on running internment camps. The document lays out several ways of “further strengthening and standardizing vocational skills education and training centers.”	<a href="https://www.documentcloud.org/documents/6558510-China-Cables-Telegram-English.html">https://www.documentcloud.org/documents/6558510-China-Cables-Telegram-English.html</a>
Policy/ Campaign, Surveillance	2017	Official documents detail “never [allowing] escapes,” preventing noise, “never [allowing] attacks on staff,” and “never [allowing] abnormal deaths.” Means of preventing escapes include the use of video surveillance, “strictly managing door locks and keys,” double locking doors immediately after use, utilizing one button alarms, improving the “installation of police stations at front gates, security guard duty rooms, high guard posts, security guard posts and patrol routes” and other “protective defenses.” It was encouraged that guards extra strictly manage and control student activities in order to “prevent escapes during class, eating periods, toilet breaks, bath time, medical treatment, and medical visits.”	<a href="https://www.documentcloud.org/documents/6558510-China-Cables-Telegram-English.html">https://www.documentcloud.org/documents/6558510-China-Cables-Telegram-English.html</a>
Policy/ Campaign	2017	Official documents state it is forbidden for students within the camps to have cellphones, and staff cannot hand cellphones over to students. Students are “not allowed to contact the outside world apart from during prescribed activities.”	<a href="https://www.documentcloud.org/documents/6558510-China-Cables-Telegram-English.html">https://www.documentcloud.org/documents/6558510-China-Cables-Telegram-English.html</a>
Policy/ Campaign	2017	Official documents detail that “students” behavior within the camps must be constantly managed; “[their] study, life, and activity management system should be formulated in detail. And the students should have a fixed bed position, fixed queue position, fixed classroom seat, and fixed station during skills work.” It was emphasized that behavioral norms should be implemented and discipline	<a href="https://www.documentcloud.org/documents/6558510-China-Cables-Telegram-English.html">https://www.documentcloud.org/documents/6558510-China-Cables-Telegram-English.html</a>

		requirements in place for “getting up, rollcall, washing, going to the toilet, organizing and housekeeping, eating, studying, sleeping, closing the door and so forth,” and that the punishment and discipline for behavioral violations should be increased.	
Policy/ Campaign	2017	All Prefectures are called to “increase investment in personnel, property and materials, and provide full guarantees for all necessary staffing, funding, and facilities for education and training,” including through allocating funds for these areas in the annual budget.	<a href="https://www.documentcloud.org/documents/6558510-China-Cables-Telegram-English.html">https://www.documentcloud.org/documents/6558510-China-Cables-Telegram-English.html</a>
Policy	2017	Official documents state it is “strictly forbidden to bring video and video equipment such as mobile phones and cameras into the teaching and management areas and upload pictures to the internet.... Data should not be disseminated and not be open to the outside.”	<a href="https://www.documentcloud.org/documents/6558510-China-Cables-Telegram-English.html">https://www.documentcloud.org/documents/6558510-China-Cables-Telegram-English.html</a>
Detention	2017	18 new orphanages were built in a single county in Kashgar for the purpose of detaining children.	<a href="https://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/report_pdf/china0918_web.pdf">https://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/report_pdf/china0918_web.pdf</a>
Detention, forced transfer, inhumane treatment	2017	An individual, Otabari, reports being detained with no knowledge or information of what was happening to him, being kept in crowded jail cells with other prisoners, being subject to beatings and being struck with metal batons, and being forcibly transferred from there to a “political learning center” with other detainees who were all handcuffed, shackled, and hooded.	<a href="https://www.newyorker.com/news/a-reporter-at-large/china-xinjiang-prison-state-uighur-detention-camps-prisoner-testimony">https://www.newyorker.com/news/a-reporter-at-large/china-xinjiang-prison-state-uighur-detention-camps-prisoner-testimony</a>
Detention, targeting of Imams	2017	Since 2017, the number of imams receiving formal prison sentences increased significantly.	<a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-china-56986057">https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-china-56986057</a>
Detention, illegal trial methods	2017	Rahima Senbai, who was detained for a year, reported: “Except for the day I arrived and the day I left, only one day in the camp was different. That was the day of the open trial. They brought in seven women from a nearby prison who had been charged with gathering in a private home to pray together. During Ramadan, in the evening, you celebrate auyzashar [‘mouth	<a href="https://livingotherwise.com/wp-content/uploads/2021/04/Elephant-in-the-XUAR-III.4.20.2021.pdf">https://livingotherwise.com/wp-content/uploads/2021/04/Elephant-in-the-XUAR-III.4.20.2021.pdf</a>



		opener’], and the seven women had organized a meal and a prayer. That was their crime. At the trial, they read these accusations and sentenced each of the women to seven years in prison. They called it ‘open court.’ None of the women spoke.”	
Detention, illegal trial methods, torture	2017	<p>Bagdat Akin, a student, was arrested in 2017 immediately after returning to Xinjiang. After being arrested by Koktaogai County police he was interrogated for 20 days, and tortured by police by being beaten with multiple objects and deprived of sleep. They threatened to beat his relatives, and tortured his wife in close vicinity so he could hear her screaming. After being unable to cope with the torture, he was forced to make up a story about joining alleged terrorist groups while in Egypt. After 20 days of torture, he was brought to the Koktogai County Pre-Trial Detention Center. He was detained for 3 months before any records were started for him. He reported that while there, he was given a medical examination and the doctors testified there were no signs of torture (his wounds had three months to heal at this point). Then, he was brought to an interrogation room in the center where his relatives were once again used as hostages; police told him that they would release his father and sister if he cooperated, but that they were keeping his wife as collateral. He was then forced to say on camera what police instructed him to say.</p>	<a href="https://livingotherwise.com/wp-content/uploads/2021/04/Elephant-in-the-XUAR-III.4.20.2021.pdf">https://livingotherwise.com/wp-content/uploads/2021/04/Elephant-in-the-XUAR-III.4.20.2021.pdf</a>
Detention, illegal trial methods, Policy/ Campaign	2017	<p>Bagdat Akin reported that while he was detained, he was told by police that “as this was the time of the ‘Strike Hard’ campaign, ‘no one would bother if they beat me to death then and there.’”</p>	<a href="https://livingotherwise.com/wp-content/uploads/2021/04/Elephant-in-the-XUAR-III.4.20.2021.pdf">https://livingotherwise.com/wp-content/uploads/2021/04/Elephant-in-the-XUAR-III.4.20.2021.pdf</a>

Detention, illegal trial methods	No date—documented as early as 2017	Trials have been held in locations other than courthouses, such as in pre-trial detention centers.	<a href="https://livingotherwise.com/wp-content/uploads/2021/04/Elephant-in-the-XUAR-III.4.20.2021.pdf">https://livingotherwise.com/wp-content/uploads/2021/04/Elephant-in-the-XUAR-III.4.20.2021.pdf</a>
Surveillance, overcrowded cells	Early 2018	At the Kuytun City Vocational Skills Re-education Training Center, female detainees were sleeping in cells with more people than beds, resulting in mattresses on the floor and being shuffled around to find space. Due to the crowded cells, the women were instructed to conduct surveillance on each other at night, in two-hour shifts. The women were forced to cut their hair, with long hair symbolizing good fortune in their ethnic culture.	<a href="https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2021/04/12/surviving-the-crackdown-in-xinjiang">https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2021/04/12/surviving-the-crackdown-in-xinjiang</a>
Health issues, detention	Early 2018	A female detainee at the Kuytun City Vocational Skills Re-education Training Center developed a health issue causing a portion of her large intestine to spill out of her whenever she uses the bathroom, forcing her to push the intestine back into herself each time. She was taken to a hospital but was denied surgery due to high blood pressure. She was returned to the camp.	<a href="https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2021/04/12/surviving-the-crackdown-in-xinjiang">https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2021/04/12/surviving-the-crackdown-in-xinjiang</a>
Health issues, detention	Early 2018	Many female detainees at the Kuytun City Vocational Skills Re-education Training Center developed gynecological infections due to infrequent washing and being forced to wear dirty underwear.	<a href="https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2021/04/12/surviving-the-crackdown-in-xinjiang">https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2021/04/12/surviving-the-crackdown-in-xinjiang</a>
Harassment, detention	Early 2018	Female detainees at the Kuytun City Vocational Skills Re-education Training Center were forbidden to cry. If they cried the guards yelled and frightened them until they stopped.	<a href="https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2021/04/12/surviving-the-crackdown-in-xinjiang">https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2021/04/12/surviving-the-crackdown-in-xinjiang</a>
Mental abuse, illness, detention	Early 2018	A female detainee at the Kuytun City Vocational Skills Re-education Training Center repeatedly suffered mental breakdowns which had her hospitalized, but she was returned to the camp afterwards.	<a href="https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2021/04/12/surviving-the-crackdown-in-xinjiang">https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2021/04/12/surviving-the-crackdown-in-xinjiang</a>

Malnutrition, detention	Early 2018	Several female detainees at the Kuytun City Vocational Skills Re-education Training Center were malnourished. Some started vomiting uncontrollably when trying to eat or drink. They were given pills to stop the vomiting.	<a href="https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2021/04/12/surviving-the-crackdown-in-xinjiang">https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2021/04/12/surviving-the-crackdown-in-xinjiang</a>
Arrested prominent individual, cultural erasure	February 2018	Ablajan Awut Ayup, a pop singer known as the “Uyghur Justin Bieber” and who was known for songs which intended to bridge the gap between Han Chinese and Uyghurs, was arrested. He has been held in an internment camp ever since.	<a href="https://xinjiang.sppga.ubc.ca/timelines/arrests/">https://xinjiang.sppga.ubc.ca/timelines/arrests/</a>
Detention, torture	May 2018	Kayrat Samarkand reported to <i>The Washington Post</i> that they were punished for arriving late to camp study sessions by being forced to wear ankle cuffs for 12 hours.	<a href="https://docs.uhrp.org/pdf/MassDetention_of_Uyghurs.pdf">https://docs.uhrp.org/pdf/MassDetention_of_Uyghurs.pdf</a>
Detention, death in police custody, murder	June 2018	Aytursun Eli, a Kashgar tour guide who had been previously praised for her work, was summoned by local police in June 2018. Five days later, her mother was called to a local hospital and shown her daughter’s body, and authorities reported that the daughter “had a medical condition” and “was unable to cope with being questioned.”	<a href="https://livingotherwise.com/wp-content/uploads/2021/04/Elephant-in-the-XUAR-III.4.20.2021.pdf">https://livingotherwise.com/wp-content/uploads/2021/04/Elephant-in-the-XUAR-III.4.20.2021.pdf</a>
Arrested prominent individual, cultural erasure	December 2018	Sanubar Tursan, an iconic singer and Uyghur national symbol, disappeared in 2018 and was presumed to have been interred before she resurfaced in Shanghai in November 2019.	<a href="https://xinjiang.sppga.ubc.ca/timelines/arrests/">https://xinjiang.sppga.ubc.ca/timelines/arrests/</a>
Detention, mistreatment	December 2018	Mayila Yakufu was released from 10 months of detention in a “vocational training center,” and immediately had to go to a hospital to receive treatment for liver damage from the camp. She did not receive any surgery or medical attention in the camp.	<a href="https://uyghurtribunal.com/wp-content/uploads/2022/01/UT-211116-Nyrola-Elima.pdf">https://uyghurtribunal.com/wp-content/uploads/2022/01/UT-211116-Nyrola-Elima.pdf</a>
Detention, illegal trial methods	No date, but mostly limited to late 2018	Sham “camp trials” were reported in official documentation and by ex-detainees. These trials were brief sessions “that took place while the individuals were still being detained in the region’s ‘vocational centers.’”	<a href="https://livingotherwise.com/wp-content/uploads/2021/04/Elephant-in-the-XUAR-III.4.20.2021.pdf">https://livingotherwise.com/wp-content/uploads/2021/04/Elephant-in-the-XUAR-III.4.20.2021.pdf</a>

Arrested prominent individual, cultural erasure	2018	Halide Israyil, who wrote an award-winning novel depicting the Cultural Revolution in Xinjiang, was arrested and is currently in an internment camp.	<a href="https://xinjiang.sppga.ubc.ca/timelines/arrests/">https://xinjiang.sppga.ubc.ca/timelines/arrests/</a>
Food/water deprivation, detention	2018	Food deprivation was reported in a camp in Kunes County.	<a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-china-55794071">https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-china-55794071</a> . The witness is a woman named, Tursunay Ziawudun (Uyghur)
Detention	2018	Baimurat Nauryzbek was detained in 2012 and received a 10-year prison sentence because of something religious he wrote on social media in 2012.	<a href="https://livingotherwise.com/wp-content/uploads/2021/04/Elephant-in-the-XUAR-III.4.20.2021.pdf">https://livingotherwise.com/wp-content/uploads/2021/04/Elephant-in-the-XUAR-III.4.20.2021.pdf</a>
Detention, religious erasure	2018	It was reported in a 2018 verdict that a 55-year-old Uyghur farmer was serving a 10-year prison sentence for “propagating extremism,” but the sentence was doubled after he “used a disguised and simplified method to perform the namaz prayer in the prison dormitory.” He was reported on by a cellmate.	<a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-china-56986057">https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-china-56986057</a>
Detention	2018	Despite the Xinjiang region reporting 74,348 criminal cases in 2018, only 7,714 criminal verdicts are available. This absence of verdicts, which is particularly prevalent regarding cases on “propagating extremism” and “inciting separatism” could indicate that China is intentionally scrubbing court records.	<a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-china-56986057">https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-china-56986057</a>
Detention, excessive force	2018	In 2018, government agencies overseeing camps reportedly purchased 2,768 police batons, 550 electric cattle prods, 1,367 pairs of handcuffs, and 2,792 cans of pepper spray.	<a href="https://www.vox.com/2020/7/28/21333345/ughurs-china-internment-camps-forced-labor-xinjiang">https://www.vox.com/2020/7/28/21333345/ughurs-china-internment-camps-forced-labor-xinjiang</a>
Detention	2018	Gene Bunin has reported on the ratios of missing criminal verdicts in 2018, found below. “Case counts are sourced from official work reports. Sometimes, only the first-instance case (一审案件) counts were reported, and the verdict count was consequently limited to first-instance only as well in order to allow comparison—these are marked with an asterisk (*).”	<a href="https://livingotherwise.com/wp-content/uploads/2021/04/Elephant-in-the-XUAR-III.4.20.2021.pdf">https://livingotherwise.com/wp-content/uploads/2021/04/Elephant-in-the-XUAR-III.4.20.2021.pdf</a>

		<p><b>Location / Verdicts / Cases / Ratio</b></p> <p>Xinjiang / 7,714 / 74,348 / 1: 9.64</p> <p>Tibet / 998 / 2,524 / 1: 2.53</p> <p>Hainan / 5,337 / 12,457 / 1: 2.33</p> <p>Liaoning / 31,171 / 66,421 / 1: 2.13</p> <p>Fujian / 43,115 / 77,600 / 1: 1.80</p> <p>Hubei / 38,504 / 61,595 / 1: 1.60</p> <p>Anhui / 38,806 / 58,910 / 1: 1.52</p> <p>Inner Mongolia* / (2019) 19,811 / 29,000 / 1: 1.46</p> <p>Guizhou / 23,561 / 32,445 / 1: 1.38</p> <p>Guangdong* / 87,345 / 120,000 / 1: 1.37</p> <p>Beijing / 16,084 / 21,928 / 1: 1.36</p> <p>Shanxi* / 19,822 / 25,328 / 1: 1.28</p> <p>Guangxi* / 29,789 / 37,220 / 1: 1.25</p> <p>Shaanxi* / 19,545 / 23,800 / 1: 1.22</p> <p>Jiangxi / 29,616 / 35,588 / 1: 1.20</p> <p>Heilongjiang* / 23,326 / 28,000 / 1: 1.20</p> <p>Ningxia* / 4,882 / 5,850 / 1: 1.20</p> <p>Zhejiang* / (2017) 62,621 / 75,000 / 1: 1.20</p> <p>Shandong* / (2019) 75,159 / 89,000 / 1: 1.18</p> <p>Jiangsu* / 67,950 / 78,833 / 1: 1.16</p> <p>Henan* / 80,694 / 91,566 / 1: 1.13</p> <p>Hebei* / 40,557 / 45,600 / 1: 1.12</p> <p>Shanghai* / 25,243 / 28,000 / 1: 1.11</p> <p>Qinghai* / 4,483 / 4,845 / 1: 1.08</p> <p>Chongqing* / 22,753 / 24,198 / 1: 1.06</p> <p>Hunan* / 52,713 / 55,000 / 1: 1.04</p> <p>Jilin* / 23,946 / 24,178 / 1: 1.01</p> <p>Yunnan* / 42,973 / 41,708 / 1: 0.97</p>	
Detention, removing documentation	Ongoing —these figures as of 2019	<p>Criminal verdicts typically assigned to Uyghurs have been disappearing. The numbers below represent the cases as seen in early 2019 vs those available in late 2019.</p> <p><b>Crime; 2019 Cases Listed in Late 2019; 2019 Cases Listed in Early 2021</b></p> <p>“Assisting in terrorist activities;”10;3</p> <p>“Preparing to carry out terrorist activities;” 22;0 “Propagating terrorism and</p>	<p><a href="https://livingotherwise.com/wp-content/uploads/2021/04/Elephant-in-the-XUAR-III.4.20.2021.pdf">https://livingotherwise.com/wp-content/uploads/2021/04/Elephant-in-the-XUAR-III.4.20.2021.pdf</a></p>

		<p>extremism, and inciting terrorist activities;" 72;3</p> <p>"Using extremism to undermine law enforcement;" 3;0 "Illegal possession of items propagating terrorism and extremism;" 9;1</p> <p>"Inciting ethnic hatred and discrimination;" 224;6 "Gathering a crowd to disturb social order;" 417;37.</p>	
Detention, Internment	Ongoing (latest numbers as of 2019)	It has been estimated, as of 2019, that China has detained around 1.5 million Uyghurs and other Muslims in detention centers in Xinjiang. Other estimations place this number to be anywhere between eight hundred thousand and two million. Most of those detained are Uyghurs, but Muslims from other ethnic groups have also been detained including Kazakhs, Kyrgys, Uzbeks, and other ethnic Turkic Muslims. Individuals as old as 80 years old have been reported to be detained.	<a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-china-xinjiang-rights-idUSKCN1QU2MQ">https://www.reuters.com/article/us-china-xinjiang-rights-idUSKCN1QU2MQ</a>
Detention, Internment	2019 (exact date unknown) –ongoing	New satellite images show internment camps like those used for the Uyghurs are now being built in Tibet. At least three were under construction in 2019.	<a href="https://unpo.org/article/21403">https://unpo.org/article/21403</a>
Arrest of prominent individuals	2019	Tashpolat Teyip, the President of Xinjiang University, was arrested and later sentenced to death.	<a href="https://xinjiang.sppga.ubc.ca/timelines/arrests/">https://xinjiang.sppga.ubc.ca/timelines/arrests/</a>
Policy	No date –ongoing	Individuals were told they would not be allowed to leave detention centers, and families lack information on the location and wellbeing of detained family members.	"Testimony of Deputy Assistant Secretary Scott Busby," § Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Subcommittee on East Asia, The Pacific, and International Cybersecurity Policy (2018)
Detention, arbitrary detention	No date	Several individuals reported that people were often detained without warning in the middle of the night. Some were taken with their hands cuffed behind them, with black hoods over their heads.	<a href="https://xinjiang.amnesty.org/#blanket-repression-and-erasure-of-ethnic-identity">https://xinjiang.amnesty.org/#blanket-repression-and-erasure-of-ethnic-identity</a>

Detention, coercion	No date	Individuals shared that some people were requested to come to police stations in order to hand in their passports, but then were detained when they arrived.	<a href="https://xinjiang.amnesty.org/#blanket-repression-and-erasure-of-ethnic-identity">https://xinjiang.amnesty.org/#blanket-repression-and-erasure-of-ethnic-identity</a>
Policy, Surveillance	No date—ongoing	Within the detention centers there are “full video surveillance coverage of dormitories and classrooms free of blind spots, ensuring that guards on duty can monitor in real time, record things in detail, and report suspicious circumstances immediately.”	<a href="https://www.documentcloud.org/documents/6558510-China-Cables-Telegram-English.html">https://www.documentcloud.org/documents/6558510-China-Cables-Telegram-English.html</a>
Detention	No date	Individuals held within camps/detention centers were not given adequate time outside and had insufficient exercise. Many said they were rarely allowed any time outside their cells or classrooms. A small minority of individuals said they were given a couple minutes outside per day; some said they were given a few minutes outside once every few weeks or months. Many reported that there was no sunlight, no fresh air, and no windows.	<a href="https://xinjiang.amnesty.org/#blanket-repression-and-erasure-of-ethnic-identity">https://xinjiang.amnesty.org/#blanket-repression-and-erasure-of-ethnic-identity</a>
Detention	No date	Within camps, the position that individuals slept in was regulated; they were forced to sleep from head to toe so that they would be unable to communicate with each other at night.	<a href="https://xinjiang.amnesty.org/#blanket-repression-and-erasure-of-ethnic-identity">https://xinjiang.amnesty.org/#blanket-repression-and-erasure-of-ethnic-identity</a>
Detention, excessive force	No date	Guards within camps patrol with spiked clubs, tear gas, and stun guns.	<a href="https://www.vox.com/2020/7/28/21333345/ughurs-china-internment-camps-forced-labor-xinjiang">https://www.vox.com/2020/7/28/21333345/ughurs-china-internment-camps-forced-labor-xinjiang</a>
Detention, Surveillance	No date	All interviewees interviewed by Amnesty International stated that they were required to “work” one or two hour shifts every single night where they monitored their cellmates. They had to ensure that the faces of all individuals were visible to the cameras in the cells at all times. A few of them claimed that this policy was put in place in order to ensure nobody killed themselves.	<a href="https://xinjiang.amnesty.org/#blanket-repression-and-erasure-of-ethnic-identity">https://xinjiang.amnesty.org/#blanket-repression-and-erasure-of-ethnic-identity</a>



Detention, forced healthcare	No date	Detainees were subjected to healthcare procedures without their consent within camps and within pre-trial detention centers. These includes receiving injections and having their blood drawn.	<a href="https://xinjiang.amnesty.org/#blanket-repression-and-erasure-of-ethnic-identity">https://xinjiang.amnesty.org/#blanket-repression-and-erasure-of-ethnic-identity</a>
Detention, forced healthcare	No date	Some detainees reported that they were forced to take pills every couple of weeks. Many believed the pills and injections were for the purposes of sterilization.	<a href="https://xinjiang.amnesty.org/#blanket-repression-and-erasure-of-ethnic-identity">https://xinjiang.amnesty.org/#blanket-repression-and-erasure-of-ethnic-identity</a>
Detention, lack of healthcare	No date	Detainees did not receive the healthcare they genuinely needed while in camps. Individuals have reported becoming sick without treatment, being unable to sit or stand without being in pain, having issues with memory, issues with eyesight, and difficulty sleeping.	<a href="https://xinjiang.amnesty.org/#blanket-repression-and-erasure-of-ethnic-identity">https://xinjiang.amnesty.org/#blanket-repression-and-erasure-of-ethnic-identity</a>
Detention, boarding schools, cultural erasure	No date—ongoing	Uyghurs who are in exile report that Uyghur children are being detained in boarding schools and/or orphanages in horrible and overcrowded conditions, especially if their parents are in re-education camps.	<a href="https://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/report_pdf/china0918_web.pdf">https://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/report_pdf/china0918_web.pdf</a>
Detention, boarding schools, cultural erasure, transfer of children	No date—ongoing	Boarding schools have been reported to be the “ideal context for a sustained cultural re-engineering of minority societies.” These schools are also used for the long-term separation of families.	<a href="https://uyghurtribunal.com/wp-content/uploads/2022/01/UT-211217-Julie-Millsap.pdf">https://uyghurtribunal.com/wp-content/uploads/2022/01/UT-211217-Julie-Millsap.pdf</a>
Detention, boarding schools, disappearance	No date—ongoing	In more than 60 interviews, parents testified to the disappearance of more than 100 children in Xinjiang from boarding schools.	<a href="https://uyghurtribunal.com/wp-content/uploads/2022/01/UT-211217-Julie-Millsap.pdf">https://uyghurtribunal.com/wp-content/uploads/2022/01/UT-211217-Julie-Millsap.pdf</a>
Detention, boarding schools, disappearance	No date—ongoing	It has been reported by witnesses that boarding schools in Xinjiang are of strong resemblance to adult “re-education” camps. The schools often have “full-coverage surveillance systems, perimeter alarms, and 10,000-volt electric fences, with some school security spending surpassing that of the camps.”	<a href="https://uyghurtribunal.com/wp-content/uploads/2022/01/UT-211217-Julie-Millsap.pdf">https://uyghurtribunal.com/wp-content/uploads/2022/01/UT-211217-Julie-Millsap.pdf</a>
Detention, Internment, inhumane	No date—ongoing	Witnesses testify of inhumane treatment within re-education centers/camps, including being kept semi-naked in	<a href="https://uyghurtribunal.com/wp-content/uploads/2021/">https://uyghurtribunal.com/wp-content/uploads/2021/</a>



treatment, torture		overcrowded cells, being subject to freezing conditions with little clothing.	<a href="#">09/UTFW2-069-Abdusalam-Muhammad-FINAL-1.pdf</a>
Religious erasure, targeting of imams, detention	No date	As of 2014, the BBC found evidence that at least 18 clerics had died in detention or shortly after being released.	<a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-china-56986057">https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-china-56986057</a>
Targeting of imams, detention, lack of documentation	No date	The family of the imam, Tursan (mentioned directly above), attempted to hire a lawyer in order to have Tursan freed. However, the lawyer stated that they could not receive court documents, and that “documents could not be sent outside.”	<a href="https://livingotherwise.com/wp-content/uploads/2021/04/Elephant-in-the-XUAR-III.4.20.2021.pdf">https://livingotherwise.com/wp-content/uploads/2021/04/Elephant-in-the-XUAR-III.4.20.2021.pdf</a>
Detention, lack of documentation, lack of lawyers	No date	Eyewitnesses have reported that individuals who are detained and taken to prison or “re-education camps” are not provided a lawyer or due process, and written documentation was either “scarce, absurd, or non-existent.”	<a href="https://livingotherwise.com/wp-content/uploads/2021/04/Elephant-in-the-XUAR-III.4.20.2021.pdf">https://livingotherwise.com/wp-content/uploads/2021/04/Elephant-in-the-XUAR-III.4.20.2021.pdf</a>
Detention, illegal trial methods	No date	<p>Gulbahar Haitiwaji reported on her year and a half in detention, and she detailed the process of her “trial,” saying:</p> <p>“None of this resembled a trial. In a trial, you’d have a court room that looked like a court room, rather than an interrogation room at a police station. You’d have a judge who looked like a judge—not dressed in a military uniform.... The benches would be filled with an audience of people, distantly or closely linked to the defendant: relatives, friends, acquaintances. They would be called to the witness stand to testify. Here, the black, plastic benches were empty, and there was no stand intended for allowing some third party to take part. My sister was somewhere to the side, wiping her nose, and apart from her irritating sniffing would make no sound, save for just after my sentence had been pronounced, when she thanked the judge and the Chinese Communist Party for having ‘given me the chance to repent’. Someone had dictated</p>	<a href="https://livingotherwise.com/wp-content/uploads/2021/04/Elephant-in-the-XUAR-III.4.20.2021.pdf">https://livingotherwise.com/wp-content/uploads/2021/04/Elephant-in-the-XUAR-III.4.20.2021.pdf</a>

		<p>the words to her, of course. Lodged behind a video camera, some guy was filming the room. In a normal trial, you'd also have a lawyer at your side. Someone to act as an intermediary between the judge and the client, someone to defend you. The shield to protect you against the judicial machinery that was unleashed on you. Next to me, I only had my instructor, her face expressionless and her mouth zipped shut. For the nine minutes that my trial lasted, she did not say a word. Lastly, in a real trial, you'd have a defendant who actually had something to defend—that's to say, a person who had committed acts capable of being judged and condemned. I, however, was innocent."</p>	
Detention	No date	<p>Some, mostly older, individuals reported that rather than being detained in camps they were detained in hospitals. A few were held in hospital rooms for more than a year, where they were not allowed to go outside and were told to learn Mandarin.</p>	<a href="https://xinjiang.amnesty.org/#blanket-repression-and-erasure-of-ethnic-identity">https://xinjiang.amnesty.org/#blanket-repression-and-erasure-of-ethnic-identity</a>
Detention, coercion	No date	<p>Chinese authorities threatened to harm the families of Uyghurs living overseas in order to coerce them to come home, where they were later detained in camps.</p>	<a href="https://docs.uhrp.org/pdf/MassDetention_of_Uyghurs.pdf">https://docs.uhrp.org/pdf/MassDetention_of_Uyghurs.pdf</a>
Detention, prevention of burial	No date	<p>Families of those who died within camps reported that there were strict limitations on who was allowed to attend the funeral, and others reported not being able to see the body at all.</p>	<a href="https://docs.uhrp.org/pdf/MassDetention_of_Uyghurs.pdf">https://docs.uhrp.org/pdf/MassDetention_of_Uyghurs.pdf</a>
Detention, prevention of burial, possible murder	No date	<p>Those in attendance for the funeral of businessman Abdulreshit Seley Hajim, described seeing what appeared to be impact from a blunt-force instrument to his head.</p>	<a href="https://docs.uhrp.org/pdf/MassDetention_of_Uyghurs.pdf">https://docs.uhrp.org/pdf/MassDetention_of_Uyghurs.pdf</a>
Detention, internment, inhumane conditions	No date	<p>Individuals were forced to use a bucket for a toilet which there was no cover for. Thus, they were forced to smell the bucket at all times and had runny noses or nasal infections.</p>	<a href="https://uyghurtribunal.com/wp-content/uploads/2021/09/UTFW2-069-Abdusalam-Muhammad-FINAL-1.pdf">https://uyghurtribunal.com/wp-content/uploads/2021/09/UTFW2-069-Abdusalam-Muhammad-FINAL-1.pdf</a>

Detention, religious erasure	No date	One detainee expressed: “we can’t even touch our face, or they would suspect us of praying.”	<a href="https://xinjiang.amnesty.org/#blanket-repression-and-erasure-of-ethnic-identity">https://xinjiang.amnesty.org/#blanket-repression-and-erasure-of-ethnic-identity</a>
Detention, cultural erasure	No date	Detainees shared they were not allowed to speak any language except Mandarin Chinese in the camps; if they spoke another language they were punished. This included individuals from rural areas in Xinjiang, who did not speak or understand Mandarin at all.	<a href="https://xinjiang.amnesty.org/#blanket-repression-and-erasure-of-ethnic-identity">https://xinjiang.amnesty.org/#blanket-repression-and-erasure-of-ethnic-identity</a>
Overcrowded cell, detention	No date	A female inmate reported her cell was overcrowded and the inmates had to take turns sitting down.	<a href="https://www.reuters.com/investigates/special-report/muslims-camps-china/">https://www.reuters.com/investigates/special-report/muslims-camps-china/</a>
Food/water deprivation, detention	No date	Food and water were withheld for failing to memorize books about Xi Jinping.	<a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-china-55794071">https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-china-55794071</a> . The witness is a former camp guard who is not named.
Food/water deprivation, detention	No date	Food and water were withheld for failing to memorize and recite the lines of the Communist Party dictums.	<a href="https://www.reuters.com/investigates/special-report/muslims-camps-china/">https://www.reuters.com/investigates/special-report/muslims-camps-china/</a> The witness is a former detainee who is not named, but is either Uyghur or Kazaks.
Detention, targeting of Imams	No date	It was reported that families were notified of the deaths of relatives in detention (who were imams), but the family never received the bodies.	<a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-china-56986057">https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-china-56986057</a>
Held without charges	No date	Inmates reported being kept in camps without knowing their charges, and not being questioned.	<a href="https://www.newyorker.com/news/a-reporter-at-large/china-xinjiang-prison-state-uyghur-detention-camps-prisoner-testimony">https://www.newyorker.com/news/a-reporter-at-large/china-xinjiang-prison-state-uyghur-detention-camps-prisoner-testimony</a>
Detention	No date	A Hui man named Huang Shike received a prison sentence of two years because he explained the Quran and taught individuals how to pray in WeChat groups.	<a href="https://livingotherwise.com/wp-content/uploads/2021/04/Elephant-in-the-">https://livingotherwise.com/wp-content/uploads/2021/04/Elephant-in-the-</a>

			<a href="#">XUAR-III.4.20.2021.pdf</a>
Detention	No date	A Hui man named Jin Dehuai was sentenced to life in prison due to his religious missionary work with the group Tablighi Jamaat. He received this life sentence while already in prison, where he was serving a 7-year sentence, also for his involvement in Muslim missionary work.	<a href="https://livingotherwise.com/wp-content/uploads/2021/04/Elephant-in-the-XUAR-III.4.20.2021.pdf">https://livingotherwise.com/wp-content/uploads/2021/04/Elephant-in-the-XUAR-III.4.20.2021.pdf</a>
Detention, torture	No date	Omer Bekri, a Kazakhstani citizen, was detained for 7 months in the Karamay City Pre-Trial Detention Center, where he lost 40 kg and claimed to have spent the entire time he was there in shackles and chains. The only time he said he was allowed out of the chains, was for the period of a couple hours when diplomats from Kazakhstan visited him.	<a href="https://livingotherwise.com/wp-content/uploads/2021/04/Elephant-in-the-XUAR-III.4.20.2021.pdf">https://livingotherwise.com/wp-content/uploads/2021/04/Elephant-in-the-XUAR-III.4.20.2021.pdf</a>
Detention, torture	No date	Gulbahar Jelilova, a women detained in multiple detention centers in Urumqi, stated that the centers were overcrowded and unsanitary, and while there she was forced to have a starvation diet. She further stated that the environment in the detention centers led to some people losing their minds.	<a href="https://livingotherwise.com/wp-content/uploads/2021/04/Elephant-in-the-XUAR-III.4.20.2021.pdf">https://livingotherwise.com/wp-content/uploads/2021/04/Elephant-in-the-XUAR-III.4.20.2021.pdf</a>
Detention, torture	No date	One man, who was detained only one week, was kept in an underground detention center where he experienced a burst eardrum after being hit on the head for drinking the tap water that he was using to wash himself.	<a href="https://livingotherwise.com/wp-content/uploads/2021/04/Elephant-in-the-XUAR-III.4.20.2021.pdf">https://livingotherwise.com/wp-content/uploads/2021/04/Elephant-in-the-XUAR-III.4.20.2021.pdf</a>
Detention	No date	In Kashgar, some villages have reported having over 15% of their village detained.	<a href="https://livingotherwise.com/wp-content/uploads/2021/04/Elephant-in-the-XUAR-III.4.20.2021.pdf">https://livingotherwise.com/wp-content/uploads/2021/04/Elephant-in-the-XUAR-III.4.20.2021.pdf</a>

Detention, Arbitrary Detention, Coercion	No date	Individuals reported that during “investigations,” police organs that were responsible for detaining the individual were also in charge of finding evidence for their detention. This process was reportedly streamlined by police resulting in “threats, mistreatment, and torture when evidence could not be found or did not exist.”	<a href="https://livingotherwise.com/wp-content/uploads/2021/04/Elephant-in-the-XUAR-III.4.20.2021.pdf">https://livingotherwise.com/wp-content/uploads/2021/04/Elephant-in-the-XUAR-III.4.20.2021.pdf</a>
Detention	No date	Satellite imagery has confirmed that pre-trial detention centers in Xinjiang have been expanded significantly in recent years.	<a href="https://livingotherwise.com/wp-content/uploads/2021/04/Elephant-in-the-XUAR-III.4.20.2021.pdf">https://livingotherwise.com/wp-content/uploads/2021/04/Elephant-in-the-XUAR-III.4.20.2021.pdf</a>
Detention, targeting of imams, torture	No date	The sister-in-law of Nurlan Pioneer, a state-sanctioned imam, reported that when he appeared for trial after being detained he had “aged dramatically, was gaunt and could no longer walk, had his pants stained with urine, and [had] no recognition on his face when she called out his name.”	<a href="https://livingotherwise.com/wp-content/uploads/2021/04/Elephant-in-the-XUAR-III.4.20.2021.pdf">https://livingotherwise.com/wp-content/uploads/2021/04/Elephant-in-the-XUAR-III.4.20.2021.pdf</a>
Detention	No date	Description of the cells have been given by ex-detainees: “Cells in internment camps were basic rooms, usually holding about eight to 20 people. Men and women were detained in separate cells. The cells normally contained two-level or three-level bunkbeds and small stools or chairs. Most detainees had their own bed, but some shared a bed. A few former detainees stated that all people in their cell shared one large bed, known as a <i>kang</i> , which was on the ground, and that people were packed ‘shoulder to shoulder’; a few former detainees stated that when there were more people than beds, some people slept on the floor. There is usually a TV in the cell and often a Chinese flag on the wall. Windows, if they existed, were barred and usually blacked out. There was a loudspeaker in the room through which camp staff spoke to detainees. There were several closed-circuit television cameras—usually four—in each cell. Cells often had lists of camp rules and ‘crimes’ hanging on the wall.	<a href="https://xinjiang.amnesty.org/#blanket-repression-and-erasure-of-ethnic-identity">https://xinjiang.amnesty.org/#blanket-repression-and-erasure-of-ethnic-identity</a>

		Most detainees reported that the lights in the cell remained on at all times, including during the night. Cell doors often had two holes, one for the guards stationed in the hallway to look in and another to pass food through. Cell doors were often positioned so that detainees could not see any other rooms from their door.”	
Detention, Torture	No date	Former detainees reported that upon arriving in camps, for days, weeks, or sometimes months, they were forced to sit still for the entire day, with only breaks allowed for meals. They were punished if they were unable to sit straight.	<a href="https://xinjiang.amnesty.org/#blanket-repression-and-erasure-of-ethnic-identity">https://xinjiang.amnesty.org/#blanket-repression-and-erasure-of-ethnic-identity</a>
Detention	No date	The Karakash List, linked here, is a 137 page Government document that outlines the situation for hundreds of Uyghur individuals who were taken to detention camps in Karakash County.	<a href="https://uhrp.org/report/ideological-transformation-records-mass-detention-qaraqash-hotan-html/">https://uhrp.org/report/ideological-transformation-records-mass-detention-qaraqash-hotan-html/</a>
Detention, Internment	Ongoing	Lists and projects that have documented all known detention/internment camps.	<p>The Xinjiang Data Project: maps 385 known detention facilities  <a href="https://xjdp.aspi.org.au/map/">https://xjdp.aspi.org.au/map/</a></p> <p>East Turkistan National Awakening Movement: another mapping project. So far they have identified 182 suspected concentration camps, 209 suspected prisons, and 74 suspected labor camps.  <a href="https://nationalawakening.org/coordinates/">https://nationalawakening.org/coordinates/</a></p>

<b>Forced Labor</b>			
<i>Crime code</i>	<i>Date</i>	<i>Allegation</i>	<i>Source</i>
Forced transfer	2003	Local CCP officials in Xinjiang create programs for the alleviation of rural poverty and unemployment. These programs transfer rural Uyghurs to perform agricultural work throughout Xinjiang Province or to factories throughout Eastern China.	<a href="https://xinjiang.sppga.ubc.ca/timelines/forced-labour/">https://xinjiang.sppga.ubc.ca/timelines/forced-labour/</a>
Forced transfer	June 2006	CCP authorities launch a policy that targets young and unmarried Uyghur women for labor transfer. The policy aims to relocate approximately 400,000 women to positions in Eastern China. Those transferred to these jobs report inconsistent wages, cultural discrimination, and restriction of movement, and some attempt to return home, but are prevented from doing so.	<a href="https://xinjiang.sppga.ubc.ca/timelines/forced-labour/">https://xinjiang.sppga.ubc.ca/timelines/forced-labour/</a>
Forced transfer/ labor	2008	The Uyghur Human Rights project reported on “the systematic program of coercive labor transfer that particularly targeted young women to be sent to factories in coastal Chinese provinces. Government cadres used a combination of deception, pressure, and threats to round up thousands of young Uyghurs against their will.”	The Uyghur Human Rights Project; <a href="https://www.cecc.gov/sites/chinacommission.house.gov/files/documents/Turkel%20CEC%20Oct%2017%20Testimony%2010152019%20version.pdf">https://www.cecc.gov/sites/chinacommission.house.gov/files/documents/Turkel%20CEC%20Oct%2017%20Testimony%2010152019%20version.pdf</a>
Forced transfer	2010	By 2010, one county in Kashgar Prefecture has witnessed approximately 21 percent of its population transferred to positions away from their villages.	<a href="https://xinjiang.sppga.ubc.ca/timelines/forced-labour/">https://xinjiang.sppga.ubc.ca/timelines/forced-labour/</a>
Death	2014	According to Dr. Erkin Sidick, Xi Jinping decided on Government policy aiming to “kill one-third of all Uyghurs, lock up one third, and convert one third [to Chinese Communist Party ideology].”	<a href="https://bylinetimes.com/2020/08/24/death-is-everywhere-millions-more-uyghurs-missing/">https://bylinetimes.com/2020/08/24/death-is-everywhere-millions-more-uyghurs-missing/</a>
Forced transfer	January 2017	The Human Resources and Social Security Department of Xinjiang announced a “Three Year Plan” for the transfer of 100,000 workers to jobs throughout Eastern China. In the same year, 1,259,000 people received vocational training in preparation for the policy.	<a href="https://xinjiang.sppga.ubc.ca/timelines/forced-labour/">https://xinjiang.sppga.ubc.ca/timelines/forced-labour/</a>
Forced transfer/ Labor	2017– 2019	At least 80,000 Uyghurs were taken from Xinjiang and transferred to various factories around China under a central	<a href="https://www.aspi.org.au/report/uyghurs-sale">https://www.aspi.org.au/report/uyghurs-sale</a>



		government policy knows as Xinjiang Aid. Some Uyghurs were taken directly from detention camps to the factories, though the conditions mirrored those they faced in detention.	
Forced labor	June 20, 2018	An unnamed garment making company set up a textile vocational training camp work base at Xinhe County (Aksu Prefecture) Industrial Park, which is a “Vocational Training Internment Camp” (VTIC). All workers are listed as provided by the Xinhe County Education and Training Center, with the Government providing the factory with “police force and teachers to assist in semi-military management.”	“Equity Financing of Xinjiang Clothing Education and Training Base Project 2 Million Yuan.” (webpage translated from Chinese by Google)
Forced labor	December 2018	Clothing had been exported to the U.S. by a Chinese manufacturer Hetian Taida, in a factory in the Hotan Vocational Education and Training Center, one of the many detention camps that have been established across East Turkistan.	The Uyghur Human Rights Project; <a href="https://www.cecc.gov/sites/chinacommission.house.gov/files/documents/Turkel%20CEC%20Oct%2017%20Testimony_%2010152019%20version.pdf">https://www.cecc.gov/sites/chinacommission.house.gov/files/documents/Turkel%20CEC%20Oct%2017%20Testimony_%2010152019%20version.pdf</a>
Forced transfer	2018	210,000 workers were sent to the Prefectures of Aksu and Hotan “via labor transfer” to pick cotton for a Chinese paramilitary organization, the Xinjiang Production and Construction Corps.	<a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/extra/nz0g306v8c/china-tainted-cotton">https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/extra/nz0g306v8c/china-tainted-cotton</a>
Forced labor	2018	A former Uyghur detainee was informed that his mother and sister had been transferred to work from the camps, with his sister forcibly transferred to work in a textile factory, claiming “she stayed in the factory for three months and didn’t get any money.”	<a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/extra/nz0g306v8c/china-tainted-cotton">https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/extra/nz0g306v8c/china-tainted-cotton</a>
Policy, forced labor	June 2019	At the opening ceremony of the Taekwang night school, a Government official called on Uyghur workers to “strengthen their identification with the state and the nation.” The school is referred to as the Pomegranate Seed Night School, referencing a speech by Xi Jinping where he said “every ethnic group must tightly bind together like the seeds of a pomegranate.”	<a href="https://www.aspi.org.au/report/uyghurs-sale">https://www.aspi.org.au/report/uyghurs-sale</a>



Forced transfer	July 2019	A Uyghur woman who had been sent to an internment facility was later transferred to work in a technology factory in Urumqi. The interviewee stated that “660 people are being brought in shackled and handcuffed.”	<a href="https://www.vox.com/2020/7/28/21333345/uyghurs-china-internment-camps-forced-labor-xinjiang">https://www.vox.com/2020/7/28/21333345/uyghurs-china-internment-camps-forced-labor-xinjiang</a>
Forced labor	October 2019	The Uyghur Human Rights Project report on forced labor highlights that “a regime of forced labor has become the fulcrum of the CCP’s campaign of forced assimilation in East Turkistan.”	The Uyghur Human Rights Project, <a href="https://www.cecc.gov/sites/chinacommission.house.gov/files/documents/Turkel%20CEC%20Oct%2017%20Testimony_%2010152019%20version.pdf">https://www.cecc.gov/sites/chinacommission.house.gov/files/documents/Turkel%20CEC%20Oct%2017%20Testimony_%2010152019%20version.pdf</a>
Forced labor	2019	After a factory was built next to an internment facility in the city of Kuqa, satellite images revealed that “that masses of people, all apparently wearing the same color uniforms, can be seen walking in close formation between the two sites.”	<a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/extra/nz0g306v8c/china-tainted-cotton">https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/extra/nz0g306v8c/china-tainted-cotton</a>
Forced transfer/labor	2019	A Uyghur woman told her sister in Australia that she had been transferred to a factory from the camps and was forced to work.	The Uyghur Human Rights Project; <a href="https://www.cecc.gov/sites/chinacommission.house.gov/files/documents/Turkel%20CEC%20Oct%2017%20Testimony_%2010152019%20version.pdf">https://www.cecc.gov/sites/chinacommission.house.gov/files/documents/Turkel%20CEC%20Oct%2017%20Testimony_%2010152019%20version.pdf</a>
Forced labor	2019	A Uyghur woman reported being paid less than half the minimum wage and was coerced to perform labor tasks, having been threatened with returning to the camp if she did not sign a contract to work.	The Uyghur Human Rights Project; <a href="https://www.cecc.gov/sites/chinacommission.house.gov/files/documents/Turkel%20CEC%20Oct%2017%20Testimony_%2010152019%20version.pdf">https://www.cecc.gov/sites/chinacommission.house.gov/files/documents/Turkel%20CEC%20Oct%2017%20Testimony_%2010152019%20version.pdf</a>
Forced transfer	2019	A local government work report stated: “For every batch [of workers] that is trained, a batch of employment will be arranged and a batch will be transferred. Those employed need to receive thorough ideological education and remain in their jobs.”	Australian Strategic Policy Institute; <a href="https://www.aspi.org.au/report/uyghurs-sale">https://www.aspi.org.au/report/uyghurs-sale</a>

Forced labor, detention	January 2020	“600 ethnic minority workers from Xinjiang were employed at Qingdao Taekwang Shoes Co. Ltd. The Xinjiang workers are mostly Uyghur women from Hotan and Kashgar Prefectures, which are remote parts of southern Xinjiang that the Chinese government has described as ‘backward’ and ‘disturbed by religious extremism.’ At the factory, the Uyghur labourers make Nike shoes during the day. In the evening, they attend a night school where they study Mandarin, sing the Chinese national anthem and receive ‘vocational training’ and ‘patriotic education.’”	<a href="https://www.aspi.org.au/report/uyghurs-sale">https://www.aspi.org.au/report/uyghurs-sale</a>
Forced labor	February 2020	<i>The Washington Post</i> visited a factory which produces trainers for sports giant Nike. The factory resembled a prison, with barbed wire, watchtowers, cameras, and a police station.	<a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/asia-pacific/china-compels-uyghurs-to-work-in-shoe-factory-that-supplies-nike/2020/02/28/ebddf5f4-57b2-11ea-8efd-0f904bdd8057_story.html">https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/asia-pacific/china-compels-uyghurs-to-work-in-shoe-factory-that-supplies-nike/2020/02/28/ebddf5f4-57b2-11ea-8efd-0f904bdd8057_story.html</a>
Forced transfer/labor	February 2020	Interviewed street vendors from stalls by factory gates have said “everyone knows they didn’t come here of their own free will. They were brought here.” “The Uighurs [sic] had to come because they didn’t have an option. The government sent them here,” another vendor told <i>The Washington Post</i> .	<a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/asia-pacific/china-compels-uyghurs-to-work-in-shoe-factory-that-supplies-nike/2020/02/28/ebddf5f4-57b2-11ea-8efd-0f904bdd8057_story.html">https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/asia-pacific/china-compels-uyghurs-to-work-in-shoe-factory-that-supplies-nike/2020/02/28/ebddf5f4-57b2-11ea-8efd-0f904bdd8057_story.html</a>
Forced labor	July 2020	<i>The New York Times</i> revealed in July that some Chinese-made face masks being sold in the United States and other countries were produced in factories that relied on Uyghur labor.	<a href="https://www.vox.com/2020/7/28/21333345/uyghurs-china-internment-camps-forced-labor-xinjiang">https://www.vox.com/2020/7/28/21333345/uyghurs-china-internment-camps-forced-labor-xinjiang</a>
Forced transfer/labor	July 2020	According to China’s National Medical Products Administration, only four companies in Xinjiang produced medical grade protective equipment before the pandemic. As of June 30, 2020, that number was 51. After reviewing state	<a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2020/07/19/world/asia/china-mask-forced-labor.html">https://www.nytimes.com/2020/07/19/world/asia/china-mask-forced-labor.html</a>

		media reports and public records, <i>The Times</i> found that at least 17 of those companies participate in the labor transfer program.	
Forced transfer/labor, indoctrination	July 2020	<i>The New York Times</i> traced a shipment of face masks to a medical supply company in the U.S. state of Georgia from a factory in China's Hubei Province, where more than 100 Uyghur workers had been sent. <i>The New York Times</i> also found that workers are required to learn Mandarin and pledge their loyalty to China at weekly flag-raising ceremonies.	<a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2020/07/19/world/asia/china-mask-forced-labor.html">https://www.nytimes.com/2020/07/19/world/asia/china-mask-forced-labor.html</a>
Forced labor	July 2020	A Kazakh woman formerly detained in an internment facility and then transferred for factory work said: "The clothes factory was no different from the [internment] camp. There were police, cameras, you couldn't go anywhere."	<a href="https://enduyghurforcedlabour.org/news/402-2/">https://enduyghurforcedlabour.org/news/402-2/</a>
Forced transfer/labor	December 2020	New evidence from the BBC suggests that upwards of half a million minority workers a year are being marshalled into seasonal cotton picking under "conditions that again appear to raise a high risk of coercion."	<a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/extra/nz0g306v8c/china-tainted-cotton">https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/extra/nz0g306v8c/china-tainted-cotton</a>
Forced transfer	December 2020	The Prefecture of Aksu identified a need for 142,700 workers for its own fields, which was largely met through the principle of "transferring all those who should be transferred."	<a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/extra/nz0g306v8c/china-tainted-cotton">https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/extra/nz0g306v8c/china-tainted-cotton</a>
Forced labor	2020	The Bureau of International Labor Affairs (ILAB) added five goods produced by forced labor by Muslim minorities in China to the 2020 edition of the Trafficking Victims Protection Reauthorization Act List. These goods include gloves, hair products, textiles, thread/yarn, and tomato products. In 2021, ILAB added an additional good, Polysilicon, produced by forced labor by Muslim minorities in China.	<a href="https://www.dol.gov/agencies/ilab/against-their-will-the-situation-in-xinjiang">https://www.dol.gov/agencies/ilab/against-their-will-the-situation-in-xinjiang</a>
Forced labor, detention	2020	Independent analysts examine a prison camp complex outside the city of Korla, citing the presence of "multiple factory buildings visible inside."	<a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/extra/nz0g306v8c/china-tainted-cotton">https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/extra/nz0g306v8c/china-tainted-cotton</a>

Forced labor, indoctrination	No date	In one internment camp in Kashgar, Xinjiang, Uyghur detainees work as forced laborers to produce textiles. They receive little pay, are not allowed to leave, and have limited or no communication with family members. If family communication and visits are allowed, they are heavily monitored or cut short. When not working, the Uyghur workers must learn Mandarin and undergo ideological indoctrination.	US Department of Labor; <a href="https://www.dol.gov/agencies/ilab/against-their-will-the-situation-in-xinjiang">https://www.dol.gov/agencies/ilab/against-their-will-the-situation-in-xinjiang</a>
Forced labor	No date	Uyghur workers in a factory in Quanzhou, a port city in Fujian, are made to work on average 13 hours per day, but their monthly salary ranges from 2,800 to 3,000 RMB (about \$400–430), while Han workers’ pay in the same factory is from 6,000 to 8,000 RMB (about \$858–1,145).	Bitter Winter (Human Rights NGO); <a href="http://bitterwinter.org/uyghurs-subjected-to-forced-labor/">http://bitterwinter.org/uyghurs-subjected-to-forced-labor/</a>
Business, campaign, forced labor	No date	Eastern Chinese cities and provinces are incentivizing their local corporations to participate in Xinjiang’s low-skilled, labor-intensive manufacturing drive, and in doing so to further their patriotic duty.	<a href="https://www.jpolrisk.com/beyond-the-camps-beijings-long-term-scheme-of-coercive-labor-poverty-alleviation-and-social-control-in-xinjiang/#_ftn25">https://www.jpolrisk.com/beyond-the-camps-beijings-long-term-scheme-of-coercive-labor-poverty-alleviation-and-social-control-in-xinjiang/#_ftn25</a>
Forced labor, cultural erasure, policy	No date	A Chinese policy document boasts how satellite factories liberate women and combat extremism at the same time, leading Uyghur women into an acceptance of modern culture.	<a href="https://www.jpolrisk.com/beyond-the-camps-beijings-long-term-scheme-of-coercive-labor-poverty-alleviation-and-social-control-in-xinjiang/#_ftn25">https://www.jpolrisk.com/beyond-the-camps-beijings-long-term-scheme-of-coercive-labor-poverty-alleviation-and-social-control-in-xinjiang/#_ftn25</a>
Forced labor, policy	No date (starting date unclear)	The “Industrial Xinjiang Aid” campaign seeks to “assign work to idle Uyghurs” in the name of poverty alleviation. Companies across China are encouraged to participate in Industrial Xinjiang aid in two ways: by opening up satellite factories, or hiring Uyghur workers for their factories elsewhere in China through a range of labor transfer schemes.	<a href="https://www.aspi.org.au/report/uyghurs-sale">https://www.aspi.org.au/report/uyghurs-sale</a>
Forced labor	No date	Allegations have been made that there is indentured servitude and forced labor of Uyghur farmers in the south.	<a href="https://www.csis.org/analysis/addressing-forced-labor-xinjiang-uyghur-autonomous-">https://www.csis.org/analysis/addressing-forced-labor-xinjiang-uyghur-autonomous-</a>

			<a href="#">region-toward-shared-agenda</a>
Forced labor	No date	After being detained in camps, Abduweil Arish (formally a computer programmer) was not allowed to return to his chosen profession. While he was a skilled professional and not in need of poverty alleviation, the Government dictated that he would work and determined where he would work.	<a href="https://uyghurtribunal.com/wp-content/uploads/2022/01/UT-220118-David-Tobin-et.al_.pdf">https://uyghurtribunal.com/wp-content/uploads/2022/01/UT-220118-David-Tobin-et.al_.pdf</a>
Forced labor	No date	The Nankai Report (now deleted from the Chinese internet) noted that labor transfers of Uyghurs were meant to reduce labor costs for companies.	<a href="https://www.rfa.org/english/news/uyghur/labor-03042021181945.html">https://www.rfa.org/english/news/uyghur/labor-03042021181945.html</a>
Forced labor	No date	The Nankai Report (now deleted from the Chinese internet) noted that labor transfers of Uyghurs were a means of effective thinning out ethnic minority populations in Xinjiang. It further stated that this policy “could be downplayed in order to avoid international scrutiny.”	<a href="https://www.rfa.org/english/news/uyghur/labor-03042021181945.html">https://www.rfa.org/english/news/uyghur/labor-03042021181945.html</a>
Forced labor	No date	83 foreign brands were identified as benefitting from the use of Uyghur forced labor.	<a href="https://www.business-humanrights.org/en/latest-news/china-83-major-brands-implicated-in-report-on-forced-labour-of-ethnic-minorities-from-xinjiang-assigned-to-factories-across-provinces-includes-company-responses/">https://www.business-humanrights.org/en/latest-news/china-83-major-brands-implicated-in-report-on-forced-labour-of-ethnic-minorities-from-xinjiang-assigned-to-factories-across-provinces-includes-company-responses/</a>

<b>Murder</b>			
<i>Crime code</i>	<i>Date</i>	<i>Allegation</i>	<i>Source</i>
Death	2009	After a peaceful protest in Ürümqi, Xinjiang turned violent due to a police crackdown, hundreds of Uyghurs were killed. Several more Uyghurs were later sentenced to death.	<a href="https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2021/04/12/surviving-the-crackdown-in-xinjiang">https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2021/04/12/surviving-the-crackdown-in-xinjiang</a>
Organ harvesting	2009	In one hospital, organ transplants grew from 60–70 a year in 2006–2007, to 200 a year in 2009.	<a href="https://www.haaretz.com/world-news/MAGAZINE-china-s-xinjiang-xxx-files-thousands-">https://www.haaretz.com/world-news/MAGAZINE-china-s-xinjiang-xxx-files-thousands-</a>

			<a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/jun/16/uyghur-disappear-organs-harvested-1.9340106">uighur-disappear-organs-harvested-1.9340106</a>
Death	2014	A 13-year-old drowned, and his mother was unable to claim his body due to the Chinese Government's punishment for her having too many children.	<a href="https://thediplomat.com/2021/04/the-missing-uyghur-children/">https://thediplomat.com/2021/04/the-missing-uyghur-children/</a> . The mother is named in the article, Kalbinur Turson (Uyghur)
Death	2014	According to Dr. Erkin Sidick, Xi Jinping decided on Government policy aiming to “kill one-third of all Uyghurs, lock up one third, and convert one third [to Chinese Communist Party ideology].”	<a href="https://bylinetimes.com/2020/08/24/death-is-everywhere-millions-more-uyghurs-missing/">https://bylinetimes.com/2020/08/24/death-is-everywhere-millions-more-uyghurs-missing/</a>
Death	2015	An infant child died while the mother was detained.	<a href="https://apnews.com/article/north-america-politics-china-race-and-ethnicity-dc-wire-61cdf7f5dfc34575aa643523b3c6b3fe">https://apnews.com/article/north-america-politics-china-race-and-ethnicity-dc-wire-61cdf7f5dfc34575aa643523b3c6b3fe</a> . Mother is named in the article, Mihrigul Tursun (Uyghur)
Organ harvesting and crematoria	2016	As fast pass “green lanes” for organ transportation opened in airports in East China, nine new crematoria were built in Xinjiang. Some requesting 50 well-paid full-time guards.	<a href="https://endtransplantabuse.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/08/TheKillingOfInnocentsForTheirOrgans_FOH_Xinjiang_EastTurkestan_byEthanGutmann.pdf">https://endtransplantabuse.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/08/TheKillingOfInnocentsForTheirOrgans_FOH_Xinjiang_EastTurkestan_byEthanGutmann.pdf</a>
Organ harvesting	2016	A new department at the university hospital in Ürümqi allowed for only 24 hours from when wealthy individuals from Shanghai, Beijing, and South Korea arrived to them being matched with a donor. The doctor reporting on the phenomenon saw transplant files where the donor was labeled XXX, or where the consent form and the donor information did not match. Transplant files were kept secret from non-transplant doctors in the hospital.	<a href="https://www.haaretz.com/world-news/MAGAZINE-china-s-xinjiang-xxx-files-thousands-uyghur-disappear-organs-harvested-1.9340106">https://www.haaretz.com/world-news/MAGAZINE-china-s-xinjiang-xxx-files-thousands-uyghur-disappear-organs-harvested-1.9340106</a>

Death	March 26, 2017 for 8 months	A male inmate reported two people he knew died while in the camp in the city of Karamay, with him. In addition there were other inmates who committed suicide.	<a href="https://www.cnn.com/2021/10/04/china/xinjiang-detective-torture-intl-hnk-dst/index.html">https://www.cnn.com/2021/10/04/china/xinjiang-detective-torture-intl-hnk-dst/index.html</a> . <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/asia_pacific/former-inmates-of-chinas-muslim-re-education-camps-tell-of-brainwashing-torture/2018/05/16/32b330e8-5850-11e8-8b92-45fdd7aaef3c_story.html">https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/asia_pacific/former-inmates-of-chinas-muslim-re-education-camps-tell-of-brainwashing-torture/2018/05/16/32b330e8-5850-11e8-8b92-45fdd7aaef3c_story.html</a> . The man is named in the articles, Omir Bekali (Uyghur mother and Kazakh father)
Death	December 2017	Muhammad Salih Hajm, an academic translator, was arrested and later found dead in custody.	<a href="https://xinjiang.sppga.ubc.ca/timelines/arrests/">https://xinjiang.sppga.ubc.ca/timelines/arrests/</a>
Death	2017	A female inmate died in detention. The cause of death was heavy bleeding.	<a href="https://www.cnn.com/2021/02/18/asia/china-xinjiang-teacher-abuse-allegations-intl-hnk-dst/index.html">https://www.cnn.com/2021/02/18/asia/china-xinjiang-teacher-abuse-allegations-intl-hnk-dst/index.html</a>
Death	2017–2018 3-month detention	A female inmate reported nine women from her cell dying over the duration of 3 months in detention.	<a href="https://apnews.com/article/north-america-politics-china-race-and-ethnicity-dc-wire-61cdf7f5dfc34575aa643523b3c6b3fe">https://apnews.com/article/north-america-politics-china-race-and-ethnicity-dc-wire-61cdf7f5dfc34575aa643523b3c6b3fe</a> . The woman is named in the article, Mihrigul Tursun (Uyghur).



Death	June 2018	A Kashgar tour guide who had been previously praised for her work, was summoned by local police. Five days later, her mother was called to a local hospital and shown her daughter's body, and authorities reported that the daughter "had a medical condition" and "was unable to cope with being questioned."	<a href="https://livingotherwise.com/wp-content/uploads/2021/04/Elephant-in-the-XUAR-III.4.20.2021.pdf">https://livingotherwise.com/wp-content/uploads/2021/04/Elephant-in-the-XUAR-III.4.20.2021.pdf</a> . The woman is named in the article, Aytursun Eli.
Death	June–December 2018	Reports of more than 200 dead inmates, over a 6-month period. An officer at the Kuchar County Police Department, confirmed 150 deaths at "No. 1 Camp," one of four camps in the Yengisher District.	<a href="https://www.rfa.org/english/news/uyghur/deaths-10292019181322.html">https://www.rfa.org/english/news/uyghur/deaths-10292019181322.html</a>
Death	September 18, 2018	A man died while being detained.	<a href="https://www.cnn.com/2021/10/04/china/xinjiang-detective-torture-intl-hnk-dst/index.html">https://www.cnn.com/2021/10/04/china/xinjiang-detective-torture-intl-hnk-dst/index.html</a> . The man who died is named in the article, Bakri Ibrayim (Kazakh)
Death	November 3, 2018	A man who was disappeared for two years was confirmed dead by the Chinese Government. They said the cause of death was severe pneumonia and tuberculosis. The man's daughter did not believe them and said if anything diabetes would have been the cause of death.	<a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2020/oct/02/china-confirms-death-of-uyghur-man-whose-family-says-was-held-in-xinjiang-camps">https://www.theguardian.com/world/2020/oct/02/china-confirms-death-of-uyghur-man-whose-family-says-was-held-in-xinjiang-camps</a> . The man is named in the article, Abdulghafur Hapiz (Kazakh), so is his daughter, Fatimah Abdulghafur
Death	November 2018	The Government confirmed a man's death while in detention, but no body was available for the family.	<a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-china-56986057">https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-china-56986057</a> . The man is named in the article, Nurgazy Malik



Death	2018	A man died of “severe pneumonia and tuberculosis” according to the Government. His daughter believed torture from his 2016 detention was a contributing factor.	<a href="https://www.voanews.com/a/east-asia-pacific_voa-news-china_relatives-missing-uyghurs-learn-their-fate-years-later/6197486.html">https://www.voanews.com/a/east-asia-pacific_voa-news-china_relatives-missing-uyghurs-learn-their-fate-years-later/6197486.html</a> . The man’s daughter is named in the article, Fatima Abdulghafur (Uyghur)
Death	2018	A male inmate was detained; about three years later he was reported dead at 73 years old.	<a href="https://www.npr.org/2021/03/03/973198171/family-disappears-amid-chinas-detention-of-mostly-ethnic-uyghurs">https://www.npr.org/2021/03/03/973198171/family-disappears-amid-chinas-detention-of-mostly-ethnic-uyghurs</a> . The man’s son is named in the article, Akikat Kaliolla
Death	2019	A 15-year-old boy died from an untreated tumor while at boarding school. His parents were not allowed to take him to the hospital while he was there.	<a href="https://www.npr.org/2022/02/03/1073793823/china-uyghur-children-xinjiang-boarding-school">https://www.npr.org/2022/02/03/1073793823/china-uyghur-children-xinjiang-boarding-school</a> . His sister is named in the article, Mukerrem Mahmud
Organ harvesting	2021	<p>A letter from a number of UN Special Rapporteurs and Working Groups sent to the Government if China details the information received on forced organ harvesting—a practice that is not only impacting the Uyghurs:</p> <p>Forced organ harvesting in China target a number of ethnic, religious or linguistic minorities such as Falun Gong practitioners, Uyghurs, Tibetans, Muslims and Christians held in detention at different locations. It is alleged that lists of prisoners’ names are maintained for the purpose of forced organ harvesting at the detention centres. Further, it is alleged that if prisoners or detainees are hospitalized, they are at risk of forced</p>	<a href="https://spcommreports.ohchr.org/TMResultsBase/DownloadPublicationFile?gId=26382">https://spcommreports.ohchr.org/TMResultsBase/DownloadPublicationFile?gId=26382</a> . <a href="https://www.forbes.com/sites/ewelinaochab/2021/10/09/united-nations-china-denies-allegations-of-organ-harvesting/?sh=7369fa0039f4">https://www.forbes.com/sites/ewelinaochab/2021/10/09/united-nations-china-denies-allegations-of-organ-harvesting/?sh=7369fa0039f4</a> . <a href="https://www.ohchr.org/en/press-releases/2021/06/china-un-human-rights-experts-alarmed-organ-harvesting-">https://www.ohchr.org/en/press-releases/2021/06/china-un-human-rights-experts-alarmed-organ-harvesting-</a>

		<p>organ harvesting. The most common organs removed from the prisoners are allegedly hearts, kidneys, livers, corneas and, less commonly, parts of lives. This form of trafficking reportedly involves health sector professionals, including surgeons, anesthetists, and other medical specialists.</p> <p>It is further alleged that prisoners or detainees who belong to the aforementioned ethnic, religious or linguistic minorities, are frequently arrested without being informed of the reasons for the arrest or provided with arrest warrants, and are subjected to blood tests and organ examinations, including ultrasounds and x-rays, without their informed consent. Such alleged practices are credible indicators of forced organ harvesting. The results of the examinations are reportedly registered in a database of living organ sources that facilitates organ allocation. It is also reported that some of these prisoners or detainees have been subject to enforced disappearances after their arrests.</p> <p>The alleged practice of subjecting prisoners or detainees to frequent examinations without their prior informed consent was reportedly documented in at least the following facilities: female prison in Urumqi called “Sankan” (the No 3 prison); No.2 detention centre at Urumqi and Karmay prison.</p> <p>It is also alleged that some prisoners receive death threats and threats of organ harvesting from the police, if they do not renounce their beliefs or refuse to cooperate with the police.</p>	<a href="#">allegations?LangID=E&amp;NewsID=27167.</a>
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Death	N/A	Those in attendance for the funeral of businessman Abdulreshit Seley Hajim, described seeing what appeared to be impact from a blunt-force instrument to his head.	<a href="https://docs.uhrp.org/pdf/MassDetention_of_Uyghurs.pdf">https://docs.uhrp.org/pdf/MassDetention_of_Uyghurs.pdf</a>
Death	N/A	As of 2014, the BBC found evidence that at least 18 clerics have died while in detention or shortly after.	<a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-china-56986057">https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-china-56986057</a>
Death, missing body	N/A	It was reported that families were notified of the deaths of relatives in detention (who were imams), but the families never received the bodies.	<a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-china-56986057">https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-china-56986057</a>
Death, burial	N/A	Families of those who died within camps reported that there were strict limitations on who was allowed to attend the funeral, and others reported not being able to see the body at all.	<a href="https://docs.uhrp.org/pdf/MassDetention_of_Uyghurs.pdf">https://docs.uhrp.org/pdf/MassDetention_of_Uyghurs.pdf</a>
Decomposing of bodies	N/A	Dr. Erkin Sidick, a Uyghur-American, and the President of the Uyghur Projects Foundation and senior advisor to the World Uyghur Congress has reported the Chinese Government going through “deliberate and extreme measures to hide any trace of the disappeared, including using chemicals to decompose bodies.”	<a href="https://bylinetimes.com/2020/08/24/death-is-everywhere-millions-more-uyghurs-missing/">https://bylinetimes.com/2020/08/24/death-is-everywhere-millions-more-uyghurs-missing/</a>
Organ harvesting	N/A	A woman forced to teach English in a camp reported lists with names of detainees with small pink exclamation points next to them. Over the next few days these people would be taken away for organ harvesting. The disappeared individuals were approximately 25–35 years in age.	<a href="https://endtransplantabuse.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/08/TheKillingOfInnocentsForTheirOrgans_FOH_Xinjiang_EastTurkestan_byEthanGutmann.pdf">https://endtransplantabuse.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/08/TheKillingOfInnocentsForTheirOrgans_FOH_Xinjiang_EastTurkestan_byEthanGutmann.pdf</a> . The woman is named in the article, Sayragul Sauytbay.
Organ harvesting	N/A	Researcher, Ethan Gutmann, believes 25,000 people every year were murdered for organ harvesting in Xinjiang.	<a href="https://www.haaretz.com/world-news/MAGAZINE-china-s-xinjiang-xxx-files-thousands-uyghur-disappear-organs-harvested-1.9340106">https://www.haaretz.com/world-news/MAGAZINE-china-s-xinjiang-xxx-files-thousands-uyghur-disappear-organs-harvested-1.9340106</a> .
Crematoria	N/A	Local Xinjiang crematoria reported occasionally burning bodies from the detention centers.	<a href="https://endtransplantabuse.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/">https://endtransplantabuse.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/</a>

			<a href="#">08/TheKillingOfInnocentsForTheirOrgans_FOH_Xinjiang_EastTurkestan_byEthanGutmann.pdf</a>
Organ harvesting	N/A	Organ harvesting was used as an explanation by burial administrators as to why families were not allowed to see bodies of their deceased family members.	<a href="https://www.haaretz.com/world-news/MAGAZINE-china-s-xinjiang-xxx-files-thousands-uyghur-disappear-organs-harvested-1.9340106">https://www.haaretz.com/world-news/MAGAZINE-china-s-xinjiang-xxx-files-thousands-uyghur-disappear-organs-harvested-1.9340106</a>
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>For further details on organ harvesting, see “Torture” in this Index, and also <a href="https://spcommreports.ohchr.org/TMResultsBase/DownloadPublicCommunicationFile?gId=26382">https://spcommreports.ohchr.org/TMResultsBase/DownloadPublicCommunicationFile?gId=26382</a>.</li> </ul>			

Disappearances			
<i>Crime code</i>	<i>Date</i>	<i>Allegation</i>	<i>Source</i>
Disappeared	2009	After a peaceful protest in Ürümqi, Xinjiang turned violent due to a police crackdown, more than 40 Uyghurs were disappeared. Later many were sentenced to death.	<a href="https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2021/04/12/surviving-the-crackdown-in-xinjiang">https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2021/04/12/surviving-the-crackdown-in-xinjiang</a>
Lost contact	2016	A woman living abroad has been unable to contact any family members in China since her husband was detained upon his return to China with the intent to bring their three children abroad.	<a href="https://thediplomat.com/2021/04/the-missing-uyghur-children/">https://thediplomat.com/2021/04/the-missing-uyghur-children/</a> . The woman is named in the article, Maimatimin Buweiamina (Uyghur)
Disappeared	2016–2020	A Government official reported to Dr. Erkin Sidick that a county in Xinjiang had a Uyghur population of 92,000 in 2016, which had been reduced to 20,000 in 2020.	<a href="https://bylinetimes.com/2020/08/24/death-is-everywhere-millions-more-uyghurs-missing/">https://bylinetimes.com/2020/08/24/death-is-everywhere-millions-more-uyghurs-missing/</a>
Unknown whereabouts	July 2017	A man has lost all contact with his two brothers who lived in China since his wife was detained.	<a href="https://www.hrw.org/news/2019/09/15/china-xinjiang-children-separated-families#">https://www.hrw.org/news/2019/09/15/china-xinjiang-children-separated-families#</a> . The man is named in the article, Abdul Aziz (Uyghur)

Unknown whereabouts	September 2017	Wang Yongzhi, a Government official appointed to run Yarkand, was removed from his position and his whereabouts are unknown after he refused to follow orders from his superiors and guidelines from the Government on mass detention. He is said to have released 7,000 inmates.	<a href="https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2019/11/16/world/asia/china-xinjiang-documents.html">https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2019/11/16/world/asia/china-xinjiang-documents.html</a> ; <a href="https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2021/04/12/surviving-the-crackdown-in-xinjiang">https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2021/04/12/surviving-the-crackdown-in-xinjiang</a>
Lost contact	2017	An Australian citizen lost contact with his parents and siblings who lived in Xinjiang. The man suspects they have all been taken to camps.	<a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2021/6/4/ui-ghurs-in-australia-struggle-to-contact-families-in-xinjiang">https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2021/6/4/ui-ghurs-in-australia-struggle-to-contact-families-in-xinjiang</a> . The man is named in the article, Yusuf Hussein (Uyghur)
Disappeared	2017	Kazakh traders were disappeared at the border to China.	<a href="https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2021/04/12/surviving-the-crackdown-in-xinjiang">https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2021/04/12/surviving-the-crackdown-in-xinjiang</a>
Lost contact	2017	A daughter has not heard from her father, who was an economics professor and prominent Uyghur intellectual who ran UighurOnline.	<a href="https://www.vox.com/2020/7/28/21333345/ui-ghurs-china-internment-camps-forced-labor-xinjiang">https://www.vox.com/2020/7/28/21333345/ui-ghurs-china-internment-camps-forced-labor-xinjiang</a> . The daughter is named in the article, Jewher Ilham (Uyghur), so is her father, Ilham Tohti (Uyghur)
Disappeared	2017	A wife was detained before her intended migration to Australia. Her husband was unaware of her whereabouts.	<a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2021/6/4/ui-ghurs-in-australia-struggle-to-contact-families-in-xinjiang">https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2021/6/4/ui-ghurs-in-australia-struggle-to-contact-families-in-xinjiang</a> . The wife is named in the article, Buzainafu Abudourexiti, and so is her husband, Almas Nizanidin (Uyghur)

Disappeared	Late 2017	A female detainee at Kuytun City Vocational Skills Re-education Training Center who instead of writing a confession of her crimes wrote “I did nothing wrong,” was taken away and never returned to the camp.	<a href="https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2021/04/12/surviving-the-crackdown-in-xinjiang">https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2021/04/12/surviving-the-crackdown-in-xinjiang</a>
Disappeared	May 2018	A man was arrested in Istanbul and returned to China, three days before a planned holy pilgrimage to Saudi Arabia. His wife has not heard from him since, and his location is unknown.	<a href="https://thediplomat.com/2021/04/the-missing-uyghur-children/">https://thediplomat.com/2021/04/the-missing-uyghur-children/</a> . The man’s wife is mentioned in the article, Sudanisa Abdulhamit (Uyghur)
Disappeared	June 2018–late 2018	A woman was reported to have died during interrogations in June–August 2018; later it was reported to her brother that she had been detained in late 2018.	<a href="https://www.amnesty.org/en/wp-content/uploads/2021/05/ASA1737982021ENGLISH.pdf">https://www.amnesty.org/en/wp-content/uploads/2021/05/ASA1737982021ENGLISH.pdf</a> . Brother is named in the article, Turghun Memet, woman is named in article by first name only, Amina
Disappeared	2018	A woman was abducted and still missing a year later.	<a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/asia-pacific/abortions-iuds-and-sexual-humiliation-muslim-women-who-fled-china-for-kazakhstan-recount-ordeals/2019/10/04/551c2658-cfd2-11e9-a620-0a91656d7db6_story.html">https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/asia-pacific/abortions-iuds-and-sexual-humiliation-muslim-women-who-fled-china-for-kazakhstan-recount-ordeals/2019/10/04/551c2658-cfd2-11e9-a620-0a91656d7db6_story.html</a> . The woman’s sister is named in the article, Rushan Abbas

Disappeared	2018–2019	A woman was abducted; her whereabouts were still unknown to her brother a year later in 2019.	<a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/asia-pacific/abortions-jews-and-sexual-humiliation-muslim-women-who-fled-china-for-kazakhstan-recount-ordeals/2019/10/04/551c2658-cfd2-11e9-a620-0a91656d7db6_story.html">https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/asia-pacific/abortions-jews-and-sexual-humiliation-muslim-women-who-fled-china-for-kazakhstan-recount-ordeals/2019/10/04/551c2658-cfd2-11e9-a620-0a91656d7db6_story.html</a> . The brother is named in the article, Rushan Abbas
Disappeared	2019	A mother and two of her adult sons disappeared after talking to a third son living abroad. The mother called without supervision and deviated from the script she had been given by the Government. She told her son to assume the worst if he lost contact with them and that it would not be suicide. She also encouraged her son to keep doing his activism.	<a href="https://www.npr.org/2021/03/03/973198171/family-disappears-amid-chinas-detention-of-mostly-ethnic-uyghurs">https://www.npr.org/2021/03/03/973198171/family-disappears-amid-chinas-detention-of-mostly-ethnic-uyghurs</a> . The man's son is named in the article, Akikat Kaliolla
Disappeared	10 months	During detention, a female inmate told of a pregnant woman who disappeared from the camps.	<a href="https://apnews.com/article/ap-top-news-international-news-weekend-reads-china-health-269b3de1af34e17c1941a514f78d764c">https://apnews.com/article/ap-top-news-international-news-weekend-reads-china-health-269b3de1af34e17c1941a514f78d764c</a> . One woman is named in the article in relation to mysterious shots, Tursunay Ziyawudun (Uyghur)
Unknown whereabouts	N/A	A woman had three adult daughters in detention camps; for two of the daughters, the location was unknown. All her 16 grandchildren were unaccounted for.	<a href="https://www.hrw.org/news/2019/09/15/china-xinjiang-children-separated-families#">https://www.hrw.org/news/2019/09/15/china-xinjiang-children-separated-families#</a> . The woman is named in the article, Khalimakhan Akunjankyzy

Disappeared	N/A	A daughter living abroad has been unable to contact her mother and two siblings.	<a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2020/oct/02/china-confirms-death-of-uyghur-man-whose-family-says-was-held-in-xinjiang-camps">https://www.theguardian.com/world/2020/oct/02/china-confirms-death-of-uyghur-man-whose-family-says-was-held-in-xinjiang-camps</a> . The daughter is named in the article, Fatimah Abdulghafur
Disappeared	N/A	A woman who had recently given birth was detained and knew nothing about her child's whereabouts.	<a href="https://apnews.com/article/ap-top-news-international-news-weekend-reads-china-health-269b3de1af34e17c1941a514f78d764c">https://apnews.com/article/ap-top-news-international-news-weekend-reads-china-health-269b3de1af34e17c1941a514f78d764c</a> . The witness is another woman who was detained named Gulbahar Jelilova
Disappeared	N/A	Young men between 16 and 40 years of age would frequently disappear from the camps.	<a href="https://www.rfa.org/english/news/uyghur/uyghur-tribunal-06042021174406.html">https://www.rfa.org/english/news/uyghur/uyghur-tribunal-06042021174406.html</a>

### Forced Sterilization, Birth Control and Abortion

<i>Crime code</i>	<i>Date</i>	<i>Allegation</i>	<i>Source</i>
Forced IUD	2014	200,000 IUD were fitted and placed in Xinjiang. (This might be unrelated to the treatment of the Muslim ethnic minorities, but it is a number for reference.)	<a href="https://apnews.com/article/ap-top-news-international-news-weekend-reads-china-health-269b3de1af34e17c1941a514f78d764c">https://apnews.com/article/ap-top-news-international-news-weekend-reads-china-health-269b3de1af34e17c1941a514f78d764c</a>
Forced IUD	2016	A woman was forced to get fitted with an IUD after she had her third child.	<a href="https://apnews.com/article/ap-top-news-international-news-weekend-reads-china-health-269b3de1af34e17c1941a514f78d764c">https://apnews.com/article/ap-top-news-international-news-weekend-reads-china-health-269b3de1af34e17c1941a514f78d764c</a> . The woman is named in the article, Gulnar Omirzakh (Kazakh)



Child policy	2016	The Government changed the one child policy, but ethnic minorities in Xinjiang were still exempt from the strict rules, and legally allowed to have more than two children.	<a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-34665539">https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-34665539</a> <a href="https://www.sbs.com.au/guide/article/2016/05/04/9-things-you-didnt-know-about-chinas-one-child-policy#:~:text=Broadly%20speaking%2C%20the%20One%20Child,allowed%20to%20have%20two%20children.">https://www.sbs.com.au/guide/article/2016/05/04/9-things-you-didnt-know-about-chinas-one-child-policy#:~:text=Broadly%20speaking%2C%20the%20One%20Child,allowed%20to%20have%20two%20children.</a>
Forced abortion	2016, 2017	A Kazakh woman was forced to have two abortions while living in Xinjiang, one in 2016 and one in 2017.	<a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/asia-pacific/abortions-iuds-and-sexual-humiliation-muslim-women-who-fled-china-for-kazakhstan-recount-ordeals/2019/10/04/551c2658-cfd2-11e9-a620-0a91656d7db6_story.html">https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/asia-pacific/abortions-iuds-and-sexual-humiliation-muslim-women-who-fled-china-for-kazakhstan-recount-ordeals/2019/10/04/551c2658-cfd2-11e9-a620-0a91656d7db6_story.html</a>
Forced sterilization	2016–ongoing	The “Free Technical Family Planning Services to Farmers and Pastoralists” campaign provided what the government called “free birth control surgeries,” which included IUD placements, abortions, and sterilizations.	<a href="https://foreignpolicy.com/2020/07/01/china-documents-uighur-genocidal-sterilization-xinjiang/">https://foreignpolicy.com/2020/07/01/china-documents-uighur-genocidal-sterilization-xinjiang/</a>
Ultrasound	Late July 2017	A woman was subject to an ultrasound as part of a medical exam during the interrogation process.	<a href="https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2021/04/12/surviving-the-crackdown-in-xinjiang">https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2021/04/12/surviving-the-crackdown-in-xinjiang</a> . The woman is named in the article, Anar Sabit (Kazakh)
Forced IUD	August 2017	Officials in a teachers’ compound were instructed to implant IUDs in all women of childbearing age. A 50-year-old woman (coerced teacher) with only one child and no plans of having more children was threatened with being strapped to an iron	<a href="https://apnews.com/article/ap-top-news-international-news-weekend-reads-china-health-">https://apnews.com/article/ap-top-news-international-news-weekend-reads-china-health-</a>

		chair for interrogation at the police station unless she complied. She, and hundreds of other women, were forced on a bus with armed guards and taken to a hospital where they were lined up to get fitted. Her IUD was design to be irremovable.	<a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/asia-pacific/abortions-iuds-and-sexual-humiliation-muslim-women-who-fled-china-for-kazakhstan-recount-ordeals/2019/10/04/551c2658-cfd2-11e9-a620-0a91656d7db6_story.html">269b3de1af34e17c1941a514f78d764c</a> .
Forced IUD	Late 2017	A female inmate was fitted with an IUD upon arrival at a camp. She was told by her doctor “it’s a must for all women going to the camp.”	<a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/asia-pacific/abortions-iuds-and-sexual-humiliation-muslim-women-who-fled-china-for-kazakhstan-recount-ordeals/2019/10/04/551c2658-cfd2-11e9-a620-0a91656d7db6_story.html">https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/asia-pacific/abortions-iuds-and-sexual-humiliation-muslim-women-who-fled-china-for-kazakhstan-recount-ordeals/2019/10/04/551c2658-cfd2-11e9-a620-0a91656d7db6_story.html</a> . The woman is named in the article, Rakhima Senbay
Forced abortion	December 2017	A woman was forced to undergo an abortion via vacuum suction, or have her brother detained. She had the abortion and was detained herself.	<a href="https://apnews.com/article/ap-top-news-international-news-weekend-reads-china-health-269b3de1af34e17c1941a514f78d764c">https://apnews.com/article/ap-top-news-international-news-weekend-reads-china-health-269b3de1af34e17c1941a514f78d764c</a> . The woman is named in the article, Gulzia Mogdin
Forced abortion	2017	Two husbands living abroad were certain their wives were forced to have abortions while in detention.	<a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/asia-pacific/abortions-iuds-and-sexual-humiliation-muslim-women-who-fled-china-for-kazakhstan-recount-ordeals/2019/10/04/551c2658-cfd2-11e9-a620-0a91656d7db6_story.html">https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/asia-pacific/abortions-iuds-and-sexual-humiliation-muslim-women-who-fled-china-for-kazakhstan-recount-ordeals/2019/10/04/551c2658-cfd2-11e9-a620-0a91656d7db6_story.html</a> . One of the husbands is named, Almas Nizamidin

Child policy	2017	Family planning policies were altered to be equal for ethnic minorities and Han Chinese. Prior to this, ethnic minorities were allowed 1 more child than Han Chinese since the lift of the 1 child policy.	<a href="https://time.com/4881898/china-xinjiang-uyghur-children/">https://time.com/4881898/china-xinjiang-uyghur-children/</a>
Birth rate	2017–2018	The birth rate in Xinjiang went from 15.8 per 1,000 people to 10.7 per 1,000 people.	<a href="https://www.cnn.com/2021/06/01/china/xinjiang-china-three-child-policy-intl-hnk/index.html">https://www.cnn.com/2021/06/01/china/xinjiang-china-three-child-policy-intl-hnk/index.html</a>
Forced pills and liquid	2017–2018 3-month detention	During her third time in detention, a female inmate reported she and other female inmates were forced to take pills which made them faint. Inmates were also given a white liquid which caused bleeding for some and loss of period for others.	<a href="https://apnews.com/article/north-america-politics-china-race-and-ethnicity-dc-wire-61cdf7f5dfc34575aa643523b3c6b3fe">https://apnews.com/article/north-america-politics-china-race-and-ethnicity-dc-wire-61cdf7f5dfc34575aa643523b3c6b3fe</a> . The woman is named in the article, Mihrigul Tursun (Uyghur)
Forced abortion	January 2018	A woman was forced to abort her fourth child at 10 weeks. She said the fetus was cut out of her without anesthesia.	<a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/asia-pacific/abortions-jews-and-sexual-humiliation-muslim-women-who-fled-china-for-kazakhstan-recount-ordeals/2019/10/04/551c2658-cfd2-11e9-a620-0a91656d7db6_story.html">https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/asia-pacific/abortions-jews-and-sexual-humiliation-muslim-women-who-fled-china-for-kazakhstan-recount-ordeals/2019/10/04/551c2658-cfd2-11e9-a620-0a91656d7db6_story.html</a> . <a href="https://www.vox.com/2020/7/28/21333345/uyghurs-china-internment-camps-forced-labor-xinjiang">https://www.vox.com/2020/7/28/21333345/uyghurs-china-internment-camps-forced-labor-xinjiang</a> . The woman is named in the articles, Gulzira Mogdyn (Kazakh)

Threat of detention	January 2018	A woman who was forcefully fitted with an IUD after her third child, two year earlier, was forced to pay a fine for having too many children, or she would join her husband in detention.	<a href="https://apnews.com/article/ap-top-news-international-news-weekend-reads-china-health-269b3de1af34e17c1941a514f78d764c">https://apnews.com/article/ap-top-news-international-news-weekend-reads-china-health-269b3de1af34e17c1941a514f78d764c</a> . The woman is named in the article, Gulnar Omirzakh (Kazakh)
Segregation of married-unmarried, forced IUD, medical tests	2018, February was one of the months she was in detention	A female inmate reported that married and unmarried women were separated in the camps. Married women were given pregnancy tests and IUDs if they had children.	<a href="https://apnews.com/article/ap-top-news-international-news-weekend-reads-china-health-269b3de1af34e17c1941a514f78d764c">https://apnews.com/article/ap-top-news-international-news-weekend-reads-china-health-269b3de1af34e17c1941a514f78d764c</a> . The woman is named in the article, Rakhima Senbay (Kazakh)
Loss of period, forced injection	Early 2018	Several female detainees at the Kuytun City Vocational Skills Re-education Training Center stopped menstruating. They were routinely injected with mysterious shots, but the loss of period could also have been caused by the conditions under which they were living.	<a href="https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2021/04/12/surviving-the-crackdown-in-xinjiang">https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2021/04/12/surviving-the-crackdown-in-xinjiang</a>
Forced injections	2018	Women in a camp in Kunes County were every 15 days forcibly injected with a vaccine which caused numbness and nausea. They reported eventually losing their periods.	<a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-china-55794071">https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-china-55794071</a> . The witness is a woman named, Tursunay Ziauwudun (Uyghur)
Forced sterilization, medical test	2018	After release from the camps, a woman was told to undergo monthly gynecologic exams, along with other minority women, or be taken to the camps. One day, she and 200 other women were forced to be sterilized for having more than two children. Her fallopian tubes were tied.	<a href="https://apnews.com/article/ap-top-news-international-news-weekend-reads-china-health-269b3de1af34e17c1941a514f78d764c">https://apnews.com/article/ap-top-news-international-news-weekend-reads-china-health-269b3de1af34e17c1941a514f78d764c</a> . The woman is named in the article, Zumret Dawut

Forced IUD	2018	Women in a camp in Kunes County were forcibly fitted with IUDs.	<a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-china-55794071">https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-china-55794071</a> . The witness is a woman named, Tursunay Ziawudun (Uyghur)
Forced IUD	2018	80% of newly placed IUDs in China were fitted in Xinjiang. AP reported the number of IUDs fitted in Xinjiang being approximately 330,000.	<a href="https://foreignpolicy.com/2020/07/01/china-documents-uyghur-genocidal-sterilization-xinjiang/">https://foreignpolicy.com/2020/07/01/china-documents-uyghur-genocidal-sterilization-xinjiang/</a> . <a href="https://apnews.com/article/ap-top-news-international-news-weekend-reads-china-health-269b3de1af34e17c1941a514f78d764c">https://apnews.com/article/ap-top-news-international-news-weekend-reads-china-health-269b3de1af34e17c1941a514f78d764c</a>
Forced sterilization	2018	Sterilization rates in Xinjiang were 243 per 100,000 people, compared to 33 per 100,000 people in the rest of the China	<a href="https://www.cnn.com/2021/06/01/china/xinjiang-china-three-child-policy-intl-hnk/index.html">https://www.cnn.com/2021/06/01/china/xinjiang-china-three-child-policy-intl-hnk/index.html</a>
Forced sterilization	2018	Women in a camp in Kunes County were forcibly sterilized.	<a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-china-55794071">https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-china-55794071</a> . The witness is a woman named, Tursunay Ziawudun (Uyghur)
Forced pills	2018	Women in a camp in Kunes County were forced to take mysterious pills. They reported eventually losing their periods.	<a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-china-55794071">https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-china-55794071</a> . The witness is a woman named, Tursunay Ziawudun (Uyghur)
Medical tests	2018	Women in a camp in Kunes County were forced to undergo unexplained medical tests.	<a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-china-55794071">https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-china-55794071</a> . The witness is a woman named, Tursunay Ziawudun (Uyghur)
Forced sterilization	2018–2019	Mass forced sterilization started in 2018 and increased in 2019. (Prior to then, Islamic religious practices were respected to a degree which prevented forced sterilizations.) From 2019 onward, the goal	<a href="https://foreignpolicy.com/2020/07/01/china-documents-uyghur-genocidal-sterilization-xinjiang/">https://foreignpolicy.com/2020/07/01/china-documents-uyghur-genocidal-sterilization-xinjiang/</a>

		was to “sterilize some women with one or two children, and many or all women with three or more children.”	
Forced IUD, forced sterilization	2019	Hotan County in Xinjiang had a performance target for the year of 524 forcefully placed IUDs, and 14,872 forced sterilizations that year, which would have covered 14% of the female population between 18 and 49 years old.	<a href="https://foreignpolicy.com/2020/07/01/china-documents-ughur-genocidal-sterilization-xinjiang/">https://foreignpolicy.com/2020/07/01/china-documents-ughur-genocidal-sterilization-xinjiang/</a>
Forced IUD, forced sterilization	2019	Guma County in Xinjiang had a performance target for the year of 5,970 forcefully placed IUDs, and 8,064 forced sterilizations that year, which would have covered 34% of the female population between 18 and 49 years old.	<a href="https://foreignpolicy.com/2020/07/01/china-documents-ughur-genocidal-sterilization-xinjiang/">https://foreignpolicy.com/2020/07/01/china-documents-ughur-genocidal-sterilization-xinjiang/</a>
Forced sterilization	By end of 2019	Hotan County had a goal of sterilizing more than 1/3 of childbearing women by the end of 2019.	<a href="https://www.newyorker.com/news/a-reporter-at-large/china-xinjiang-prison-state-ughur-detention-camps-prisoner-testimony">https://www.newyorker.com/news/a-reporter-at-large/china-xinjiang-prison-state-ughur-detention-camps-prisoner-testimony</a>
Negative population growth	2019–2020	One county in Xinjiang reported negative population growth.	<a href="https://foreignpolicy.com/2020/07/01/china-documents-ughur-genocidal-sterilization-xinjiang/">https://foreignpolicy.com/2020/07/01/china-documents-ughur-genocidal-sterilization-xinjiang/</a>
Forced IUD, forced sterilization	2019–2020	About \$200 million was budgeted for financial rewards to women who volunteered to have IUDs or sterilizations, despite being legally allowed to have a third child.	<a href="https://foreignpolicy.com/2020/07/01/china-documents-ughur-genocidal-sterilization-xinjiang/">https://foreignpolicy.com/2020/07/01/china-documents-ughur-genocidal-sterilization-xinjiang/</a>
Forced IUD, forced sterilization, medical tests	2020	Minority women were subject to regular pregnancy checks, abortions, forced intrauterine devices, and sterilization.	<a href="https://apnews.com/article/ap-top-news-international-news-weekend-reads-china-health-269b3de1af34e17c1941a514f78d764c">https://apnews.com/article/ap-top-news-international-news-weekend-reads-china-health-269b3de1af34e17c1941a514f78d764c</a>
Forced IUD, forced sterilization	2020	As newly fitted IUDs and sterilizations fell in China overall, rates kept rising in Xinjiang.	<a href="https://apnews.com/article/ap-top-news-international-news-weekend-reads-china-health-269b3de1af34e17c1941a514f78d764c">https://apnews.com/article/ap-top-news-international-news-weekend-reads-china-health-269b3de1af34e17c1941a514f78d764c</a>

Forced sterilization	2020	A doctor reported 80% of 300 examined Uyghur women were sterilized. Many did not know.	<a href="https://www.cnn.com/2021/06/01/china/xinjiang-china-three-child-policy-intl-hnk/index.html">https://www.cnn.com/2021/06/01/china/xinjiang-china-three-child-policy-intl-hnk/index.html</a>
Forced IUD, forced sterilization	Person held for 10 months in detention	A woman who spent 10 months in a camp in Kunes reported that women, regardless of marital status, were fitted with IUDs and underwent sterilizations. She herself was repeatedly kicked in the lower stomach during interrogations and is today sterile.	<a href="https://www.newyorker.com/news/a-reporter-at-large/china-xinjiang-prison-state-uyghur-detention-camps-prisoner-testimony">https://www.newyorker.com/news/a-reporter-at-large/china-xinjiang-prison-state-uyghur-detention-camps-prisoner-testimony</a> . The woman is named in the article, Tursunay Ziyawudun (Uyghur)
Removal of ethnic men	N/A	Adrian Zenz reported “detentions have primarily targeted male heads of households. In some regions, government lists show that up to 50 percent of them had been sent to detention camps or prisons. With community leaders, religious authority figures, and husbands removed, nothing prevented the state from seizing complete control over female minority reproductive systems.”	<a href="https://foreignpolicy.com/2020/07/01/china-documents-uyghur-genocidal-sterilization-xinjiang/">https://foreignpolicy.com/2020/07/01/china-documents-uyghur-genocidal-sterilization-xinjiang/</a>
Forced pills	N/A	Married women who were rewarded with conjugal visits for good behavior were forced to take mysterious pills first.	<a href="https://apnews.com/article/ap-top-news-international-news-weekend-reads-china-health-269b3de1af34e17c1941a514f78d764c">https://apnews.com/article/ap-top-news-international-news-weekend-reads-china-health-269b3de1af34e17c1941a514f78d764c</a>
Forced pills	N/A	Female inmates were forced to swallow unknown pills after conjugal visits.	<a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/asia_pacific/abortions-iuds-and-sexual-humiliation-muslim-women-who-fled-china-for-kazakhstan-recount-ordeals/2019/10/04/551c2658-cfd2-11e9-a620-0a91656d7db6_story.html">https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/asia_pacific/abortions-iuds-and-sexual-humiliation-muslim-women-who-fled-china-for-kazakhstan-recount-ordeals/2019/10/04/551c2658-cfd2-11e9-a620-0a91656d7db6_story.html</a>

Forced abortions	N/A	A female inmate was told pregnant women in the camp would have abortions if discovered. In fear some women terminated their pregnancies on their own.	<a href="https://apnews.com/article/ap-top-news-international-news-weekend-reads-china-health-269b3de1af34e17c1941a514f78d764c">https://apnews.com/article/ap-top-news-international-news-weekend-reads-china-health-269b3de1af34e17c1941a514f78d764c</a>
Forced sterilization	N/A	Several women reported getting medical confirmation of sterilization after being released from the camps and escaping China.	<a href="https://apnews.com/article/ap-top-news-international-news-weekend-reads-china-health-269b3de1af34e17c1941a514f78d764c">https://apnews.com/article/ap-top-news-international-news-weekend-reads-china-health-269b3de1af34e17c1941a514f78d764c</a>
Forced IUD, forced sterilization, forced pills	N/A	In the camps, women were subjected to forced IUDs and what appeared to be pregnancy prevention shots, mysterious pills, and liquids. Many lost their periods.	<a href="https://apnews.com/article/ap-top-news-international-news-weekend-reads-china-health-269b3de1af34e17c1941a514f78d764c">https://apnews.com/article/ap-top-news-international-news-weekend-reads-china-health-269b3de1af34e17c1941a514f78d764c</a> . One woman is named in the article in relation to mysterious shots, Tursunay Ziyawudun (Uyghur)
Medical tests	N/A	Flag-raising ceremonies were utilized in some areas to order women to undergo gynecology exams or ultrasounds. Some places had specially outfitted rooms for these purposes. In 2018 the policy was “test all who need to be tested.”	<a href="https://apnews.com/article/ap-top-news-international-news-weekend-reads-china-health-269b3de1af34e17c1941a514f78d764c">https://apnews.com/article/ap-top-news-international-news-weekend-reads-china-health-269b3de1af34e17c1941a514f78d764c</a> .
Forced IUD	N/A	Flag-raising ceremonies were utilized to round up women for forced IUDs.	<a href="https://foreignpolicy.com/2020/07/01/china-documents-uyghur-genocidal-sterilization-xinjiang/">https://foreignpolicy.com/2020/07/01/china-documents-uyghur-genocidal-sterilization-xinjiang/</a>
Forced birth control, forced sterilization	N/A	Uyghur women who left China have reported being subject to forced contraceptives and forced sterilizations	<a href="https://www.cnn.com/2021/06/01/china/xinjiang-china-three-child-policy-intl-hnk/index.html">https://www.cnn.com/2021/06/01/china/xinjiang-china-three-child-policy-intl-hnk/index.html</a>
Forced abortion	N/A	A woman was subject to a forced abortion at 6½ months pregnant while in detention.	<a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2021/6/4/ui-ghur-tribunal-hears-">https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2021/6/4/ui-ghur-tribunal-hears-</a>



			<a href="#">evidence-of-alleged-china-abuses</a>
Removal of ethnic men	N/A	It is reported that men of childbearing age were one of the main populations in detention, making it impossible for women to have men of their ethnicity.	<a href="https://newlinesinstitute.org/wp-content/uploads/China-s-Breaches-of-the-GC3-2.pdf">https://newlinesinstitute.org/wp-content/uploads/China-s-Breaches-of-the-GC3-2.pdf</a> Pages 48–49.
For further details on forced sterilization, IUDs, and other birth control, see <a href="https://jamestown.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/06/Zenz-Sterilizations-IUDs-and-Mandatory-Birth-Control-FINAL-27June.pdf">https://jamestown.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/06/Zenz-Sterilizations-IUDs-and-Mandatory-Birth-Control-FINAL-27June.pdf</a>			

<b>Torture (excluding rape and sexual abuse)</b>			
<i>Crime code</i>	<i>Date</i>	<i>Allegation</i>	<i>Source</i>
Beaten	August 19–20, 2013 to November 20, 2014	A linguistic rights activist, reported that while in multiple detention centers in Kashgar and Urumqi, he was subjected to “repeated beatings, torture, and threats intended to make him confess to his ‘crimes.’” His “crimes” involved separatism due to his initiative to open Uyghur-language kindergartens in Xinjiang.	<a href="https://livingotherwise.com/wp-content/uploads/2021/04/Elephant-in-the-XUAR-III.4.20.2021.pdf">https://livingotherwise.com/wp-content/uploads/2021/04/Elephant-in-the-XUAR-III.4.20.2021.pdf</a> . The man is named in the article, Abduweli Ayup (Uyghur).
Food deprivation, shackled, forced to stay in cell	January 2014	A well-known university professor was arrested in Beijing and transferred to the Autonomous Region Pre-Trial Detention Center in Urumqi. He was denied food for more than a week on two occasions, was shackled, denied time outside of his cell, and was held in custody with individuals charged with murder and rape, despite the center he was in holding individuals detained on non-violent crimes.	<a href="https://livingotherwise.com/wp-content/uploads/2021/04/Elephant-in-the-XUAR-III.4.20.2021.pdf">https://livingotherwise.com/wp-content/uploads/2021/04/Elephant-in-the-XUAR-III.4.20.2021.pdf</a> . The man is named in the article, Ilham Tohti.
Interrogation, tiger chair, beaten	March 26, 2017 for 8 months	A male inmate was interrogated for 4–5 days, during which he was put in a tiger chair (used to immobilize a person through handcuffing or restraining their arms and legs), hung up and beaten with wooden torches and iron whips on his thighs.	<a href="https://www.cnn.com/2021/10/04/china/xinjiang-detective-torture-intl-hnk-dst/index.html">https://www.cnn.com/2021/10/04/china/xinjiang-detective-torture-intl-hnk-dst/index.html</a> . The man is named in the article, Omir Bekali (Uyghur mother and Kazakh father)

Chained	March 26, 2017 for 8 months	A male inmate reported that inmates were chained with heavy chains on their hands and feet, and forced to sleep bent over.	<a href="https://www.cnn.com/2021/10/04/china/xinjiang-detective-torture-intl-hnk-dst/index.html">https://www.cnn.com/2021/10/04/china/xinjiang-detective-torture-intl-hnk-dst/index.html</a> . The man is named in the article, Omir Bekali (Uyghur mother and Kazakh father)
Food poisoning, punishment	March 26, 2017 for 8 months	Reports of frequent food poisoning due to the food quality in the camp. Forcing inmates to eat pork was utilized as punishment for bad behavior, and those accused of religious extremism were forced to drink alcohol.	<a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/asia-pacific/former-inmates-of-chinas-muslim-re-education-camps-tell-of-brainwashing-torture/2018/05/16/32b330e8-5850-11e8-8b92-45fdd7aaef3c_story.html">https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/asia-pacific/former-inmates-of-chinas-muslim-re-education-camps-tell-of-brainwashing-torture/2018/05/16/32b330e8-5850-11e8-8b92-45fdd7aaef3c_story.html</a> . The man is named in the article, Omir Bekali (Uyghur mother and Kazakh father)
Malnutrition	March 26, 2017 for 8 months	A male inmate lost half his body weight during 8 months in the camps.	<a href="https://www.cnn.com/2021/10/04/china/xinjiang-detective-torture-intl-hnk-dst/index.html">https://www.cnn.com/2021/10/04/china/xinjiang-detective-torture-intl-hnk-dst/index.html</a> . The man is named in the article, Omir Bekali (Uyghur mother and Kazakh father)
Surveillance, tiger chair	Late July 2017–July 2018	A woman held for interrogation was in a solitary confinement cell overnight while waiting for her interview. When led into the room she would be questioned in, only a tiger chair was there, and another chair was fetched at the guards' request. When she asked to use the bathroom, she specifically asked for one without surveillance cameras, and had to be taken to a different floor to find one. The woman was Kazakh and did not speak Uyghur or Arabic, only Mandarin, which probably got	<a href="https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2021/04/12/surviving-the-crackdown-in-xinjiang">https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2021/04/12/surviving-the-crackdown-in-xinjiang</a> . The woman is named in the article, Anar Sabit (Kazakh)

		<p>her the special treatment. The woman learned she was flagged due to her travels to countries such as the United States, Thailand, Malaysia, Kyrgyzstan, Kazakhstan, and Russia. When she arrived at a police station in Kuytun city, she was instructed to share a military mattress with a Uyghur woman overnight, as the sleeping cell, shared by men and women, was full. The next night she slept locked in an interrogation cell with two other women. The woman spent 20 days in the police station before being released. Three months later, still unable to leave China, she was called back to the Kuytun city police station to be sent to detention at Kuytun City Vocational Skills Re-education Training Center Administrative Bureau. The cell she was in had three cameras and a microphone hanging from the ceiling.</p>	
Electroshock, tiger chair, beaten	Late July 2017	<p>A woman being interrogated reported seeing a man in a tiger chair in the interrogation room across from hers. During her interrogation she heard the man being beaten and electrocuted to the point of the screaming disrupting her own interrogation and her interrogators had to request the screams to stop.</p>	<p><a href="https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2021/04/12/surviving-the-crackdown-in-xinjiang">https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2021/04/12/surviving-the-crackdown-in-xinjiang</a>. The woman is named in the article, Anar Sabit (Kazakh)</p>
Restrained	Late July 2017	<p>Two young male detainees held in the city of Kuytun, sharing an interrogation cell with an older man, were handcuffed at all times to the bars which made up the walls of the cell, including at night, except for when eating/drinking and using the bathroom.</p>	<p><a href="https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2021/04/12/surviving-the-crackdown-in-xinjiang">https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2021/04/12/surviving-the-crackdown-in-xinjiang</a></p>
Sexual abuse, interrogation, beaten	August 17, 2017–December 2018	<p>A male inmate, during interrogations in the camps reported being forced to strip naked, drenched in water, and beaten.</p>	<p><a href="https://www.newyorker.com/news/a-reporter-at-large/china-xinjiang-prison-state-uyghur-detention-camps-prisoner-testimony">https://www.newyorker.com/news/a-reporter-at-large/china-xinjiang-prison-state-uyghur-detention-camps-prisoner-testimony</a>. The man is named in the article, Erbaqyt Otarbai (Kazakh)</p>

Electroshock	August 17, 2017–December 2018	A male inmate was electroshocked with an electric prod while in detention.	<a href="https://www.newyorker.com/news/a-reporter-at-large/china-xinjiang-prison-state-ughur-detention-camps-prisoner-testimony">https://www.newyorker.com/news/a-reporter-at-large/china-xinjiang-prison-state-ughur-detention-camps-prisoner-testimony</a> . The man is named in the article, Erbaqt Otarbai (Kazakh)
Overcrowded cell	August 17, 2017–December 2018	A male inmate reported being detained in an overcrowded cell that was shared by 22 men.	<a href="https://www.newyorker.com/news/a-reporter-at-large/china-xinjiang-prison-state-ughur-detention-camps-prisoner-testimony">https://www.newyorker.com/news/a-reporter-at-large/china-xinjiang-prison-state-ughur-detention-camps-prisoner-testimony</a> . The man is named in the article, Erbaqt Otarbai (Kazakh)
Solitary confinement	August 17, 2017–December 2018	A male inmate was put in a solitary confinement cell too small to lay down in.	<a href="https://www.newyorker.com/news/a-reporter-at-large/china-xinjiang-prison-state-ughur-detention-camps-prisoner-testimony">https://www.newyorker.com/news/a-reporter-at-large/china-xinjiang-prison-state-ughur-detention-camps-prisoner-testimony</a> . The man is named in the article, Erbaqt Otarbai (Kazakh)
Beaten	August 17, 2017–December 2018	A male inmate reported being beaten in the head with a metal baton, causing bleeding, as punishment for yelling at a guard for his release.	<a href="https://www.newyorker.com/news/a-reporter-at-large/china-xinjiang-prison-state-ughur-detention-camps-prisoner-testimony">https://www.newyorker.com/news/a-reporter-at-large/china-xinjiang-prison-state-ughur-detention-camps-prisoner-testimony</a> . The man is named in the article, Erbaqt Otarbai (Kazakh)

Kept awake	August 17, 2017–December 2018	Light was always on in the cells, even at night.	<a href="https://www.newyorker.com/news/a-reporter-at-large/china-xinjiang-prison-state-uyghur-detention-camps-prisoner-testimony">https://www.newyorker.com/news/a-reporter-at-large/china-xinjiang-prison-state-uyghur-detention-camps-prisoner-testimony</a> . The man is named in the article, Erbaqyt Otarbai (Kazakh)
Sleep deprivation, interrogation	2017	A woman was kept awake for four days straight during an interrogation.	<a href="https://apnews.com/article/north-america-politics-china-race-and-ethnicity-dc-wire-61cdf7f5dfc34575aa643523b3c6b3fe">https://apnews.com/article/north-america-politics-china-race-and-ethnicity-dc-wire-61cdf7f5dfc34575aa643523b3c6b3fe</a> . The woman is named in the article, Mihrigul Tursun (Uyghur)
Beaten, psychological torture	2017	A student was arrested in 2017 immediately after returning to Xinjiang. After being arrested by Koktaogai County police he was interrogated for 20 days, and tortured by police by being beaten with multiple objects and deprived of sleep. They threatened to beat his relatives, and tortured his wife in close vicinity so he could hear her screaming. After being unable to cope with the torture, he was forced to make up a story about joining alleged terrorist groups while in Egypt. After 20 days of torture, he was brought to the Koktogai County Pre-Trial Detention Center. He was detained for 3 months before any records were started for him. He reported that while there, he was given a medical examination and the doctors testified there were no signs of torture (his wounds had three months to heal at this point). Then, he was brought to an interrogation room in the center where his relatives were once again used as hostages; police told him that they would release his father and sister if he cooperated, but that they were keeping his wife as collateral. He was then forced to say on camera what	<a href="https://livingotherwise.com/wp-content/uploads/2021/04/Elephant-in-the-XUAR-III.4.20.2021.pdf">https://livingotherwise.com/wp-content/uploads/2021/04/Elephant-in-the-XUAR-III.4.20.2021.pdf</a> . The man is named in the article, Bagdat Akin.

		police instructed him to say. While he was detained, he was told by police that “as this was the time of the ‘Strike Hard’ campaign, ‘no one would bother if they beat me to death then and there.’”	
Surveillance, tiger chair, light always on in cell, no outside time, forced to stay awake	Late 2017–2018	Female detainees at Kuytun City Vocational Skills Re-education Training Center experienced surveillance cameras in their cells and showers. Their cells were also equipped with speakers which were used to remind inmates of the rules, if any were broken. The light was always on in the cell. Female guards constantly followed detainees around. Women who did not behave were punished by a female officer, by being restrained in a tiger chair overnight. The detainees were not allowed to spend time outside, and were only in their cells or in classes, with the exception of daily 3 minutes to brush their teeth and wash their faces, one minute to use the bathroom, and 5 minutes to shower. The female detainees were on one occasion forced to stay up all night repeatedly writing out confessions of their crimes.	<a href="https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2021/04/12/surviving-the-crackdown-in-xinjiang">https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2021/04/12/surviving-the-crackdown-in-xinjiang</a>
Electroshock	2017–2018 3-month detention	A woman’s legs and arms were strapped to a chair and an electroshock helmet was placed on her head. The shocks caused her mouth to foam and continued at least until she lost consciousness. She was told her crime was being Uyghur. This was the woman’s third time in detention.	<a href="https://apnews.com/article/north-america-politics-china-race-and-ethnicity-dc-wire-61cdf7f5dfc34575aa643523b3c6b3fe">https://apnews.com/article/north-america-politics-china-race-and-ethnicity-dc-wire-61cdf7f5dfc34575aa643523b3c6b3fe</a> . The woman is named in the article, Mihrigul Tursun (Uyghur)
Overcrowded cells	2017–2018 3-month detention	During her third time in detention, a former inmate reported 60 women sharing one cell, forcing them to take turns sleeping.	<a href="https://apnews.com/article/north-america-politics-china-race-and-ethnicity-dc-wire-61cdf7f5dfc34575aa643523b3c6b3fe">https://apnews.com/article/north-america-politics-china-race-and-ethnicity-dc-wire-61cdf7f5dfc34575aa643523b3c6b3fe</a> . The woman is named in the article, Mihrigul Tursun (Uyghur)
Kicked	2018, 9 months detention,	A woman was kicked in the stomach during interrogations to the point of bleeding. When seen by a medical doctor	<a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-china-55794071">https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-china-55794071</a> . The

	released December 2018.	about the injuries, he neglected her bleeding by saying “it is normal for women to bleed.” After release from the camp in Kunes County and fleeing China, she needed to have her womb removed as a consequence.	woman in named in the article, Tursunay Ziawudun (Uyghur)
Beaten, stained beds, restrains	Early 2018	Newly arrived female detainees at the Kuytun City Vocational Skills Re-education Training Center spoke of previous detentions in which they were restrained and shackled to the point of bruising, as well as being forced to sleep in beds stained with urine, feces, and blood. The women had also been repeatedly beaten.	<a href="https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2021/04/12/surviving-the-crackdown-in-xinjiang">https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2021/04/12/surviving-the-crackdown-in-xinjiang</a>
Medical neglect	December 2018	When a woman was released from 10 months of detention in a “vocational training center,” she immediately had to go to a hospital to receive treatment for liver damage from the camp. She did not receive any surgery or medical attention in the camp.	<a href="https://uyghurtribunal.com/wp-content/uploads/2022/01/UT-211116-Nyrola-Elima.pdf">https://uyghurtribunal.com/wp-content/uploads/2022/01/UT-211116-Nyrola-Elima.pdf</a> . The woman is named in the article, Mayila Yakufu.
Beaten	2018	A male inmate was reported beaten by the guards until he fainted.	<a href="https://www.npr.org/2021/03/03/973198171/family-disappears-amid-chinas-detention-of-mostly-ethnic-uyghurs">https://www.npr.org/2021/03/03/973198171/family-disappears-amid-chinas-detention-of-mostly-ethnic-uyghurs</a> . The man son is named in the article, Akikat Kaliolla
Malnutrition	2019	A husband reported of visiting his wife who was too weak to stand up, had lost most of her weight, and had scars from handcuffs on both her wrists.	<a href="https://www.npr.org/2022/02/03/1073793823/china-uyghur-children-xinjiang-boarding-school">https://www.npr.org/2022/02/03/1073793823/china-uyghur-children-xinjiang-boarding-school</a> . The couple are named in the article, Meryem Aimati and Abdüllatif Kuçar

Restrained	Person held for 3 months in detention	A male detainee reported of handcuffed ankles and handcuffs being used as punishment for up to 12 hours at a time. He shared a cell with 14 other men.	<a href="https://www.vox.com/2020/7/28/21333345/uyghurs-china-internment-camps-forced-labor-xinjiang">https://www.vox.com/2020/7/28/21333345/uyghurs-china-internment-camps-forced-labor-xinjiang</a> . The man is named in the article, Kayrat Samarkand
Malnutrition, shackled	Person held in detention for 7 months	A male inmate in the Karamay City Pre-Trial Detention Center lost 40 kg in weight and claimed to have spent the entire time he was there in shackles and chains. The only time he said he was allowed out of the chains, was for the period of a couple hours when diplomats from Kazakhstan visited him.	<a href="https://livingotherwise.com/wp-content/uploads/2021/04/Elephant-in-the-XUAR-III.4.20.2021.pdf">https://livingotherwise.com/wp-content/uploads/2021/04/Elephant-in-the-XUAR-III.4.20.2021.pdf</a> . The man is named in the article, Omer Bekri (Kazakhstani citizen)
Torture	N/A	Individuals reported that during “investigations,” police organs that were responsible for detaining the individual were also in charge of finding evidence for their detention. This process was reportedly streamlined by police resulting in “threats, mistreatment, and torture when evidence could not be found or did not exist.”	<a href="https://livingotherwise.com/wp-content/uploads/2021/04/Elephant-in-the-XUAR-III.4.20.2021.pdf">https://livingotherwise.com/wp-content/uploads/2021/04/Elephant-in-the-XUAR-III.4.20.2021.pdf</a>
Torture	N/A	If individuals in detention moved their lips inside the camps police thought they were reciting the Qur’an and would torture them very badly.	<a href="https://uyghurtribunal.com/wp-content/uploads/2021/09/UTFW2-069-Abdusalam-Muhammad-FINAL-1.pdf">https://uyghurtribunal.com/wp-content/uploads/2021/09/UTFW2-069-Abdusalam-Muhammad-FINAL-1.pdf</a>
Detention, Internment, inhumane treatment, torture	N/A	Witnesses testify of inhumane treatment within re-education centers/camps, including being kept semi-naked in overcrowded cells, being subject to freezing conditions with little clothing.	<a href="https://uyghurtribunal.com/wp-content/uploads/2021/09/UTFW2-069-Abdusalam-Muhammad-FINAL-1.pdf">https://uyghurtribunal.com/wp-content/uploads/2021/09/UTFW2-069-Abdusalam-Muhammad-FINAL-1.pdf</a>
Beaten	N/A	It was reported that Han teachers would beat Uyghur students in the classroom.	<a href="https://uyghurtribunal.com/wp-content/uploads/2022/">https://uyghurtribunal.com/wp-content/uploads/2022/</a>



			<a href="#">02/UTFW2-001-Guzhanuer-Rouzi.pdf</a>
Overcrowded, food deprivation, unsanitary living conditions, mental health	N/A	A woman detained in multiple detention centers in Urumqi, stated that the centers were overcrowded and unsanitary, and while there she was forced to have a starvation diet. She further stated that the environment in the detention centers led to some people losing their minds.	<a href="https://livingotherwise.com/wp-content/uploads/2021/04/Elephant-in-the-XUAR-III.4.20.2021.pdf">https://livingotherwise.com/wp-content/uploads/2021/04/Elephant-in-the-XUAR-III.4.20.2021.pdf</a> . The woman is named in the article, Gulbahar Jelilova.
Beaten, water deprivation	N/A	One man, who was detained only one week, was kept in an underground detention center where he experienced a burst eardrum after being hit on the head for drinking the tap water that he was using to wash himself.	<a href="https://livingotherwise.com/wp-content/uploads/2021/04/Elephant-in-the-XUAR-III.4.20.2021.pdf">https://livingotherwise.com/wp-content/uploads/2021/04/Elephant-in-the-XUAR-III.4.20.2021.pdf</a>
Forced health checks	N/A	Detainees were subjected to healthcare procedures without their consent within camps and within pre-trial detention centers. These includes receiving injections and having blood drawn.	<a href="https://xinjiang.amnesty.org/#blanket-repression-and-erasure-of-ethnic-identity">https://xinjiang.amnesty.org/#blanket-repression-and-erasure-of-ethnic-identity</a>
Medical neglect	N/A	Detainees did not receive the healthcare they genuinely needed while in camps. Individuals have reported becoming sick without treatment, being unable to sit or stand without being in pain, having issues with memory, issues with eyesight, and difficulty sleeping.	<a href="https://xinjiang.amnesty.org/#blanket-repression-and-erasure-of-ethnic-identity">https://xinjiang.amnesty.org/#blanket-repression-and-erasure-of-ethnic-identity</a>
Restrained, interrogation	N/A	Inmates reported being shackled to chairs for days during interrogations.	<a href="https://www.reuters.com/investigates/special-report/muslims-camps-china/">https://www.reuters.com/investigates/special-report/muslims-camps-china/</a> .
Waterboard, sleep deprivation, sexual abuse, interrogation	N/A	During interrogations, waterboarding, sleep deprivation, and sexual abuse are reported as torture techniques utilized during interrogations.	<a href="https://www.cnn.com/2021/10/04/china/xinjiang-detective-torture-intl-hnk-dst/index.html">https://www.cnn.com/2021/10/04/china/xinjiang-detective-torture-intl-hnk-dst/index.html</a> . The witness is a former policeman referred to as Jiang in the article.
Restrained, cold temperatures	N/A	There are reports of inmates being hung from walls while in detention.	<a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-china-57386625">https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-china-57386625</a>

Threats of death, mass detention	N/A	During overnight routine mass detention operations, people who did not listen, had guns put to their heads and were ordered to not move or be killed.	<a href="https://www.cnn.com/2021/10/04/china/xinjiang-detective-torture-intl-hnk-dst/index.html">https://www.cnn.com/2021/10/04/china/xinjiang-detective-torture-intl-hnk-dst/index.html</a> . The witness is a former policeman referred to as Jiang in the article.
Cold temperatures	N/A	There are reports of inmates being subjected to extremely cold temperatures.	<a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-china-57386625">https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-china-57386625</a>
Forced to sit still	N/A	Former detainees reported that upon arriving in camps, for days, weeks, or sometimes months, they were forced to sit still for the entire day, with only breaks allowed for meals. They were punished if they were unable to sit straight.	<a href="https://xinjiang.amnesty.org/#blanket-repression-and-erasure-of-ethnic-identity">https://xinjiang.amnesty.org/#blanket-repression-and-erasure-of-ethnic-identity</a>
Hooded/ blindfolded	N/A	Inmates were hooded during transportation.	<a href="https://www.newyorker.com/news/a-reporter-at-large/china-xinjiang-prison-state-ughur-detention-camps-prisoner-testimony">https://www.newyorker.com/news/a-reporter-at-large/china-xinjiang-prison-state-ughur-detention-camps-prisoner-testimony</a>
Electroshock	N/A	Reports of the use of four different electroshock methods: the chair, the glove, the helmet, and a stick. (The stick was used for anal and vaginal rape and on male genitals).	<a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-china-55794071">https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-china-55794071</a> . The source is a woman forced to teach in the camps named Qelbinur Sedik (Uzbek). A former camp guard (anonymous) confirms electroshock in general in the same article. This information is mentioned in another article as well, <a href="https://bylinetimes.com/2020/08/24/death-is-everywhere-millions-more-uyghurs-missing/">https://bylinetimes.com/2020/08/24/death-is-everywhere-millions-more-uyghurs-missing/</a> .

Stepping on faces, interrogation	N/A	Reports of stepping on the faces of inmates during interrogations to obtain confessions.	<a href="https://www.cnn.com/2021/10/04/china/xinjiang-detective-torture-intl-hnk-dst/index.html">https://www.cnn.com/2021/10/04/china/xinjiang-detective-torture-intl-hnk-dst/index.html</a> . The witness is a former policeman referred to as Jiang in the article.
Hanging from the ceiling, interrogation	N/A	Suspects were hung from the ceiling during interrogations to obtain confessions.	<a href="https://www.cnn.com/2021/10/04/china/xinjiang-detective-torture-intl-hnk-dst/index.html">https://www.cnn.com/2021/10/04/china/xinjiang-detective-torture-intl-hnk-dst/index.html</a> . The witness is a former policeman referred to as Jiang in the article.
Tiger chair, interrogation	N/A	Suspects would be shackled to a wooden or metal chair made to immobilize the victims during interrogations.	<a href="https://www.cnn.com/2021/10/04/china/xinjiang-detective-torture-intl-hnk-dst/index.html">https://www.cnn.com/2021/10/04/china/xinjiang-detective-torture-intl-hnk-dst/index.html</a> . The witness is a former policeman referred to as Jiang in the article.
Interrogation, kicked, beaten	N/A	During interrogations, inmates as young as 14 were beaten and kicked until bruised, swollen and crying.	<a href="https://www.cnn.com/2021/10/04/china/xinjiang-detective-torture-intl-hnk-dst/index.html">https://www.cnn.com/2021/10/04/china/xinjiang-detective-torture-intl-hnk-dst/index.html</a> . The witness is a former policeman referred to as Jiang in the article.
Organ harvesting	N/A	The “China Tribunal” testified to the United Nations Human Rights Council that “forced organ harvesting from prisoners of conscience has been committed for years throughout China on a significant scale.” According to an outspoken activist named Kuzzat Altay, “organ harvesting is normal in the Chinese Communist Party. They are known for this. There are some rich Middle Eastern clients who want Muslim kidneys (—which are free of alcohol and pork.) So Uyghur people were having their kidneys taken.”	<a href="https://nypost.com/2021/12/18/uyghur-women-recall-horrors-of-chinas-labor-camps/">https://nypost.com/2021/12/18/uyghur-women-recall-horrors-of-chinas-labor-camps/</a>

Organ harvesting	N/A	Sir Geoffrey Nice, Chairman of the “China Tribunal” said, “many were cut open while still alive for their kidneys, livers, hearts, lungs, cornea and skin to be removed and turned into commodities for sale.”	<a href="https://bylinetimes.com/2020/08/24/death-is-everywhere-millions-more-uyghurs-missing/">https://bylinetimes.com/2020/08/24/death-is-everywhere-millions-more-uyghurs-missing/</a>
For further details on organ harvesting, see also ‘Murder’ in this Index.			

Medical Experimentation			
<i>Crime code</i>	<i>Date</i>	<i>Allegation</i>	<i>Source</i>
Forced medical experimentation	2020	Dr. Erkin Sidick reported the Chinese Government experimented with COVID-19 vaccines on Uyghurs. “There’s a big residential complex in Urumqi. Many hundreds of people live there in tall buildings, and the Government took one person from each family—altogether about 165 people—and quarantined them in a remote hospital, with one person in each room, and examined them every day.... Authorities are taking blood twice per day for testing.... The Chinese authorities injected these people with the Coronavirus first, before they are given the vaccine.” After the injections the effectiveness of the vaccines was tested. Sidick obtained this information from several people with family members in such experiments. All subjects are between 18–20 years of age. Sidick also reported similar locations, such as locked down schools and COVID-19 vaccine testing camps at Bainiao Lake Vocational Training Centre, and the “new super hospital” built next to it, located at N 43° 48’ 25/ E 87 °17’ 50, and N 43° 49’ 19/ E 87 °18’ 0. Sidick was told by a Government official that there were more medical experimental facilities being built next to the concentration camps. (To the extent there are fatalities this practice constitutes murder.)	<a href="https://bylinetimes.com/2020/08/24/death-is-everywhere-millions-more-uyghurs-missing/">https://bylinetimes.com/2020/08/24/death-is-everywhere-millions-more-uyghurs-missing/</a>

Rape			
<i>Crime code</i>	<i>Date</i>	<i>Allegation</i>	<i>Source</i>
Gang rape	August 19–20, 2013–November 20, 2014	During his first night in detention in the city of Kashgar, a male inmate was gang raped by more than 12 other inmates who were forced to do so by the guards.	<a href="https://www.cnn.com/2021/10/04/china/xinjiang-detective-torture-intl-hnk-dst/index.html">https://www.cnn.com/2021/10/04/china/xinjiang-detective-torture-intl-hnk-dst/index.html</a> . The man is named in the article, Abduweli Ayup (Uyghyr). The same article includes confirmation, from a former police officer in exile, that occasionally they would force inmates to rape other inmates for humiliation and torture.
Systemic rape	2017	Despite a female guard claiming to be assigned to a detention center to investigate reports of rape, China claims “there is no so-called ‘systematic sexual assault and abuse against women’ in Xinjiang.” The female guard told a woman forced to teach at the detention center that “when (male guards) were drinking at night, the policemen would tell each other how they raped and tortured girls.”	<a href="https://www.cnn.com/2021/02/18/asia/china-xinjiang-teacher-abuse-allegations-intl-hnk-dst/index.html">https://www.cnn.com/2021/02/18/asia/china-xinjiang-teacher-abuse-allegations-intl-hnk-dst/index.html</a>
Gang rape	2018, 9 months detention, released December 2018.	A female inmate was gang raped by two or three men on three separate occasions after first being tortured. The woman reported seeing five to six men enter another room and gang rape another woman.	<a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-china-55794071">https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-china-55794071</a> . <a href="https://www.cnn.com/2021/02/18/asia/china-xinjiang-teacher-abuse-allegations-intl-hnk-dst/index.html">https://www.cnn.com/2021/02/18/asia/china-xinjiang-teacher-abuse-allegations-intl-hnk-dst/index.html</a> . The woman is named in the articles, Tursunay Ziawudun (Uyghur)

Pimping, rape	2018, 9 months detention, released December 2018.	A female inmate reported women were taken from their cell at night to black rooms with no surveillance cameras to be raped by one or more men. These men wore suits, not uniforms, and wore masks.	<a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-china-55794071">https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-china-55794071</a> . The woman is named in the article, Tursunay Ziawudun (Uyghur)
Electroshock and sexual abuse	2018, 9 months detention, released December 2018.	During her first night in the camp, a female inmate was taken from a cell she shared with 14 other women at night and tortured with an electroshock stick which was forced into her genital tract.	<a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-china-55794071">https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-china-55794071</a> . The woman is named in the article, Tursunay Ziawudun (Uyghur)
Coercion, rape	Person held for 18 months in detention	A female inmate was forced to assist rape by undressing women from the waist up and handcuffing their hands behind their heads. A policeman or a man from outside the camp would enter the room. She would wait outside, and after, she would take the raped woman for a shower and clean the room.	<a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-china-55794071">https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-china-55794071</a> . The woman is named in the article, Gulzira Auelkhan (Kazakh)
Pimping, rape	Person held for 18 months in detention	A female inmate forced to assist rape reported outside men would “pay money to have their pick of the prettiest young inmates.” The women would then have bags put on their heads before being led off.	<a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-china-55794071">https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-china-55794071</a> . <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/asia-pacific/abortions-iuds-and-sexual-humiliation-muslim-women-who-fled-china-for-kazakhstan-recount-ordeals/2019/10/04/551c2658-cfd2-11e9-a620-0a91656d7db6_story.html">https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/asia-pacific/abortions-iuds-and-sexual-humiliation-muslim-women-who-fled-china-for-kazakhstan-recount-ordeals/2019/10/04/551c2658-cfd2-11e9-a620-0a91656d7db6_story.html</a> . The woman is named in the articles, Gulzira Auelkhan (Kazakh)

Rape, forced abortion	Person held for 4 years in detention	A female inmate was repeatedly raped by guards resulting in pregnancies. Both pregnancies were aborted inside the camps.	<a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/asia-pacific/abortions-iuds-and-sexual-humiliation-muslim-women-who-fled-china-for-kazakhstan-recount-ordeals/2019/10/04/551c2658-cfd2-11e9-a620-0a91656d7db6_story.html">https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/asia-pacific/abortions-iuds-and-sexual-humiliation-muslim-women-who-fled-china-for-kazakhstan-recount-ordeals/2019/10/04/551c2658-cfd2-11e9-a620-0a91656d7db6_story.html</a> . The woman is named in the article, Ruqiye Perhat (Uyghur)
Sexual abuse, rape	Person held for 4 years in detention	A female inmate reported all women and men under age 35 were raped and sexually abused.	<a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/asia-pacific/abortions-iuds-and-sexual-humiliation-muslim-women-who-fled-china-for-kazakhstan-recount-ordeals/2019/10/04/551c2658-cfd2-11e9-a620-0a91656d7db6_story.html">https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/asia-pacific/abortions-iuds-and-sexual-humiliation-muslim-women-who-fled-china-for-kazakhstan-recount-ordeals/2019/10/04/551c2658-cfd2-11e9-a620-0a91656d7db6_story.html</a> . The woman is named in the article, Ruqiye Perhat (Uyghur)
Gang rape	N/A	Public gang rape of a woman in her early 20s in front of about 100 other detainees. Police/guards took turns raping her after she was forced to make a public confession. Any detainees watching who resisted, clenched their fists, closed their eyes, or looked away were taken away for punishment.	<a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-china-55794071">https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-china-55794071</a> . Witness is a woman named Sayragul Sauytbay
Rape, disappeared	N/A	Former inmates reported especially younger and unmarried women were taken from their cells at night to be raped. Some never returned.	<a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/asia-pacific/abortions-iuds-and-sexual-humiliation-muslim-">https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/asia-pacific/abortions-iuds-and-sexual-humiliation-muslim-</a>

			<a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-china-55794071">women-who-fled-china-for-kazakhstan-recount-ordeals/2019/10/04/551c2658-cfd2-11e9-a620-0a91656d7db6_story.html</a>
Rape	N/A	A female guard confirmed rape was established as a way of culture and torture in the camps.	<a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-china-55794071">https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-china-55794071</a> . The woman is named in the article, Qelbinur Sedik (Uzbek)
Rape	N/A	A former male guard reported Chinese officers would watch the female inmates in their cells on monitors to pick out the women they wanted to rape. In the kitchen there were two tables, “one for snacks and liquor, and the other for <i>doing things</i> .”	<a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/asia-pacific/abortions-iuds-and-sexual-humiliation-muslim-women-who-fled-china-for-kazakhstan-recount-ordeals/2019/10/04/551c2658-cfd2-11e9-a620-0a91656d7db6_story.html">https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/asia-pacific/abortions-iuds-and-sexual-humiliation-muslim-women-who-fled-china-for-kazakhstan-recount-ordeals/2019/10/04/551c2658-cfd2-11e9-a620-0a91656d7db6_story.html</a> . The man is only named by Berik (Kazakh)
Electroshock	N/A	Reports of the use of four different electroshock methods: the chair, the glove, the helmet, and a stick. (The stick was used for anal and vaginal rape and on male genitals).	<a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-china-55794071">https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-china-55794071</a> . The source is a woman forced to teach in the camps named Qelbinur Sedik (Uzbek). A former camp guard (anonymous) confirms electroshock in general in the same article. This information was mentioned in another article as well, <a href="https://bylinetimes.co">https://bylinetimes.co</a>



			<a href="https://www.voanews.com/a/south-central-asia_china-uses-rape-torture-tactic-against-uyghur-detainees-victims-say/6201842.html">m/2020/08/24/death-is-everywhere-millions-more-uyghurs-missing/.</a>
Systemic sexual abuse	N/A	Zubayra Shamseden, Chinese Outreach Coordinator at the Washington-based Uyghur Human Rights Project, who has interviewed Uyghur women who were sexually abused during detention said “due to the restrictive environment, fear of retaliation by the Chinese Government against other family members and social connections and due to cultural sensitivity, many victims of sexual violence, torture and abuse by Chinese authorities were unable to speak out.”	<a href="https://www.voanews.com/a/south-central-asia_china-uses-rape-torture-tactic-against-uyghur-detainees-victims-say/6201842.html">https://www.voanews.com/a/south-central-asia_china-uses-rape-torture-tactic-against-uyghur-detainees-victims-say/6201842.html</a>
Systemic rape	N/A	CNN reported the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs told them, the training centers “protect the basic rights of trainees including women from being violated, and it is strictly forbidden to insult and abuse trainees in any way.”	<a href="https://www.cnn.com/2021/02/18/asia/china-xinjiang-teacher-abuse-allegations-intl-hnk-dst/index.html">https://www.cnn.com/2021/02/18/asia/china-xinjiang-teacher-abuse-allegations-intl-hnk-dst/index.html</a>
Pimping	N/A	Bob Fu, Founder and President of China Aid said, “we rescued a woman who was eyewitness to a program that the government organized for prostitution. She was handcuffed to the bed, the man did his thing and she cried. She said she heard the man shouting and complaining that he had paid good money for this and she was crying.”	<a href="https://nypost.com/2021/12/18/uyghur-women-recall-horrors-of-chinas-labor-camps/">https://nypost.com/2021/12/18/uyghur-women-recall-horrors-of-chinas-labor-camps/</a>
Systemic rape	N/A	The Newline Institute reported that Han cadres who are assigned to Uyghur homes created situation in which “rape, sexual abuse, exploitation,” became common, similar to the situations in the camps.	<a href="https://newlinesinstitute.org/wp-content/uploads/Chinas-Breaches-of-the-GC3-2.pdf">https://newlinesinstitute.org/wp-content/uploads/Chinas-Breaches-of-the-GC3-2.pdf</a>

Other Sexual Violence			
<i>Crime code</i>	<i>Date</i>	<i>Allegation</i>	<i>Source</i>
Surveillance, sexual abuse	2017–2018 3-month detention	A former female detainee reported there being security cameras in the bathrooms.	<a href="https://apnews.com/article/north-america-politics-china-race-and-ethnicity-dc-wire-61cdf7f5dfc34575aa643523b3c6b3fe">https://apnews.com/article/north-america-politics-china-race-and-ethnicity-dc-wire-61cdf7f5dfc34575aa643523b3c6b3fe</a> . The woman is named in the article, Mihrigul Tursun (Uyghur) <a href="https://www.reuters.com/investigates/special-report/muslims-camps-china/">https://www.reuters.com/investigates/special-report/muslims-camps-china/</a> (mentions that other inmates have reported the same)
Bitten	2018, 9 months detention, released December 2018.	Women inmates reported being bitten all over their bodies, leaving marks, mainly in relation to rape while in detention. Often this was done by two or three men.	<a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-china-55794071">https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-china-55794071</a> . The woman is named in the article, Tursunay Ziawudun (Uyghur)
Sexual violence	N/A	Female inmates were handed a mixture of ground chili pepper and water from guards to rub on their genitals before showering.	<a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/asia_pacific/abortions-iuds-and-sexual-humiliation-muslim-women-who-fled-china-for-kazakhstan-recount-ordeals/2019/10/04/551c2658-cfd2-11e9-a620-0a91656d7db6_story.html">https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/asia_pacific/abortions-iuds-and-sexual-humiliation-muslim-women-who-fled-china-for-kazakhstan-recount-ordeals/2019/10/04/551c2658-cfd2-11e9-a620-0a91656d7db6_story.html</a>
Sexual abuse	N/A	Inmates reported being filmed while in the shower.	<a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/asia_pacific/abortions-iuds-and-sexual-humiliation-muslim-women-who-fled-china-for-kazakhstan-recount-ordeals/2019/10/04/551c2658-cfd2-11e9-a620-0a91656d7db6_story.html">https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/asia_pacific/abortions-iuds-and-sexual-humiliation-muslim-women-who-fled-china-for-kazakhstan-recount-ordeals/2019/10/04/551c2658-cfd2-11e9-a620-0a91656d7db6_story.html</a>

			<a href="https://www.cnn.com/2021/10/04/china/xinjiang-detective-torture-intl-hnk-dst/index.html">1c2658-cfd2-11e9-a620-0a91656d7db6_story.html</a>
Interrogation, electroshock, sexual violence	N/A	Different types of electroshock were used during interrogations. One technique was an electric baton with two sharp tips on top and wrapped with wires; this was used on the genitals of restrained suspects.	<a href="https://www.cnn.com/2021/10/04/china/xinjiang-detective-torture-intl-hnk-dst/index.html">https://www.cnn.com/2021/10/04/china/xinjiang-detective-torture-intl-hnk-dst/index.html</a> . The witness is a former policeman referred to as Jiang in the article.
Sexual abuse	N/A	Female inmates were forced to shower and use the bathroom in large groups.	<a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/asia-pacific/abortions-juds-and-sexual-humiliation-muslim-women-who-fled-china-for-kazakhstan-recount-ordeals/2019/10/04/551c2658-cfd2-11e9-a620-0a91656d7db6_story.html">https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/asia-pacific/abortions-juds-and-sexual-humiliation-muslim-women-who-fled-china-for-kazakhstan-recount-ordeals/2019/10/04/551c2658-cfd2-11e9-a620-0a91656d7db6_story.html</a>

<b>Forced Transfer of Children</b>			
<i>Crime code</i>	<i>Date</i>	<i>Allegation</i>	<i>Source</i>
Orphanage/boarding school	2015	A boarding school outside of Kashgar opened, with capacity to host 23,400 students and teachers.	<a href="https://apnews.com/article/international-news-crime-china-clamps-down-china-ap-top-news-903a97b7c62a47b98553b6f422827dd7">https://apnews.com/article/international-news-crime-china-clamps-down-china-ap-top-news-903a97b7c62a47b98553b6f422827dd7</a>
Orphanage/boarding school	2015	A 14-year-old girl was sent to a bilingual boarding school after her mother was arrested. The school was called “Peyzawat County No. 4 High School.”	<a href="https://apnews.com/article/international-news-crime-china-clamps-down-china-ap-top-news-903a97b7c62a47b98553b6f422827dd7">https://apnews.com/article/international-news-crime-china-clamps-down-china-ap-top-news-903a97b7c62a47b98553b6f422827dd7</a>
Orphanage/boarding school	Mid 2016–mid 2018	It is estimated that over a two-year period, about 400,000 children were forcefully displaced.	<a href="https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2021/04/12/surviving-the-crackdown-in-xinjiang">https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2021/04/12/surviving-the-crackdown-in-xinjiang</a>

Orphanage/ boarding school, detention of guardian	August 2016	A father lost contact with his two children after his wife was detained. Later, he saw his son in an online video answering questions in Chinese.	<a href="https://www.hrw.org/news/2019/09/15/china-xinjiang-children-separated-families#">https://www.hrw.org/news/2019/09/15/china-xinjiang-children-separated-families#</a> . Father is named in the article, Abdurahman Tohti (Uyghur)
Lost contact, disappeared	2016	A mother has not been able to contact three of her children since their father went back to China from exile with the intent of bringing them abroad. He was detained for fleeing.	<a href="https://thediplomat.com/2021/04/the-missing-uyghur-children/">https://thediplomat.com/2021/04/the-missing-uyghur-children/</a> . The mother is named in the article, Maimatimin Buweiamina (Uyghur)
Lost contact, orphanage/ boarding school	2016	A woman who went to Turkey in 2015 to give birth had not been in contact with her husband and five of her children since. In 2016, she talked to her sister who told her not to return to China. In 2020, the mother saw one of her 6 years old daughters in a Government video on social media. The video was from an orphanage/boarding school in Hotan.	<a href="https://thediplomat.com/2021/04/the-missing-uyghur-children/">https://thediplomat.com/2021/04/the-missing-uyghur-children/</a> . The mother and one daughter are named in the article, the mother is Kalbinur Turson (Uyghur), and the daughter's first name is Ayeshe
Detention of guardian	2016– November 2019	Children whose parents were in exile in Italy were living with their grandparents until the grandparents were detained. When the grandparents were detained in camps and the hospital, other family members were too scared to take the children in.	<a href="https://www.amnesty.org/en/wp-content/uploads/2021/05/ASA1737982021ENGLISH.pdf">https://www.amnesty.org/en/wp-content/uploads/2021/05/ASA1737982021ENGLISH.pdf</a> . The parents are named in the article, Mihriban Kader and her husband Ablikim Memtinin (Kazakh)
Lost contact	February 2017	A daughter asked her father to stop calling her after he moved to the US without her and the mother, who divorced him to be less of a target herself. The daughter said he was a “bad person” and that the Chinese Government are “good people.”	<a href="https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2018/09/china-internment-camps-uyghur-muslim-children/569062/">https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2018/09/china-internment-camps-uyghur-muslim-children/569062/</a> . Father is mentioned in the article, Tahir Imin (Uyghur)

Lost contact	March 2017	A father lost contact with twin sons after his wife was detained. All relatives were detained; there was no way to contact anyone. The Chinese Government has not answered letters about the man's sons.	<a href="https://www.hrw.org/news/2019/09/15/china-xinjiang-children-separated-families#">https://www.hrw.org/news/2019/09/15/china-xinjiang-children-separated-families#</a> . Father is named in the article, Memetrasul Khasan (Kyrgyz)
Lost contact	April 2017	A father lost contact with his children in April 2017 after his wife was detained. The grandparents of the children cut off contact with him in 2017, and again after one last phone call in August 2019.	<a href="https://www.amnesty.org/en/wp-content/uploads/2021/05/ASA1737982021ENGLISH.pdf">https://www.amnesty.org/en/wp-content/uploads/2021/05/ASA1737982021ENGLISH.pdf</a> . The father is named in the article by first name only, Mamutjan
Lost contact	June 2017	A Uyghur father has not heard from his three youngest children since his wife was detained.	<a href="https://apnews.com/article/international-news-crime-china-clamps-down-china-ap-top-news-903a97b7c62a47b98553b6f422827dd7">https://apnews.com/article/international-news-crime-china-clamps-down-china-ap-top-news-903a97b7c62a47b98553b6f422827dd7</a>
Lost contact, detention of guardian	July 2017	Since his wife was detained, a father lost all contact with his three children.	<a href="https://www.hrw.org/news/2019/09/15/china-xinjiang-children-separated-families#">https://www.hrw.org/news/2019/09/15/china-xinjiang-children-separated-families#</a> . The father is named in the article, Abdul Aziz (Uyghur)
Orphanages/boarding schools	July–August 2017	At least 9 new orphanages/boarding schools were initiated in the city of Hotan and multiple counties in Kashgar.	<a href="https://apnews.com/article/international-news-crime-china-clamps-down-china-ap-top-news-903a97b7c62a47b98553b6f422827dd7">https://apnews.com/article/international-news-crime-china-clamps-down-china-ap-top-news-903a97b7c62a47b98553b6f422827dd7</a>
Lost contact	September 2017	A mother working in Dubai was forced to leave her son with relatives and was asked to never contact them again.	<a href="https://www.amnesty.org/en/wp-content/uploads/2021/05/ASA1737982021ENGLISH.pdf">https://www.amnesty.org/en/wp-content/uploads/2021/05/ASA1737982021ENGLISH.pdf</a> . The mother is named by first name only in the article, Rizwangul

Orphanage/ boarding school	Late 2017	3 children were taken to Aixin Kindergarten, after their grandmother was detained in a camp. The aunt was able to visit the children for a few weeks, then she was denied access.	<a href="https://www.amnesty.org/en/wp-content/uploads/2021/05/ASA1737982021ENGLISH.pdf">https://www.amnesty.org/en/wp-content/uploads/2021/05/ASA1737982021ENGLISH.pdf</a> . Parents of the children are named in the article, Meripet Metniyaz and her husband Turghun Memet
Orphanage/ boarding school	2017	By the beginning of the year, Government papers reported an estimate of over 500,000 children in state-run orphanages/boarding schools.	<a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2019/12/28/world/asia/china-xinjiang-children-boarding-schools.html">https://www.nytimes.com/2019/12/28/world/asia/china-xinjiang-children-boarding-schools.html</a> . <a href="https://www.npr.org/2022/02/03/1073793823/china-uyghur-children-xinjiang-boarding-school">https://www.npr.org/2022/02/03/1073793823/china-uyghur-children-xinjiang-boarding-school</a> .
Lost contact	2017	A 12-year-old daughter who was left behind with her father in 2016, told her mother during their last point of contact in 2017 that she was alone and asked where her father was. The mother later received confirmation from relatives that the father had been detained and the daughter had been left to herself due to the strict surveillance of her relatives.	<a href="https://thediplomat.com/2021/04/the-missing-uyghur-children/">https://thediplomat.com/2021/04/the-missing-uyghur-children/</a> . The mother is named in the article, Maryem Abdulhamid (Uyghur), the daughter is also named by her first name, Rizwangul
Lost contact, detention of guardian	2017	A father lost contact with his children when their guardians, his in-laws, were detained. Despite his children having obtained Turkish citizenship, the Chinese Government would not allow family reunification.	<a href="https://thediplomat.com/2021/04/the-missing-uyghur-children/">https://thediplomat.com/2021/04/the-missing-uyghur-children/</a> . The father is named in the article, Omer Faruh (Uyghur)
Orphanage/ boarding school	2017	18 massive orphanages were built in the city of Kashgar.	<a href="https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2018/09/china-internment-camps-uyghur-muslim-children/569062/">https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2018/09/china-internment-camps-uyghur-muslim-children/569062/</a> .
Orphanage/ boarding school	2017	In a year, about 90,000 teachers were brought to Xinjiang to work in schools.	<a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2019/12/28/world/asia/china-xinjiang-children-boarding-schools.html">https://www.nytimes.com/2019/12/28/world/asia/china-xinjiang-children-boarding-schools.html</a>

Lost contact, detention of guardian	2017	A mother has been unable to contact three of her children since she left on holy pilgrimage in 2015 when she left her adult daughter in charge of the younger siblings. The parents were unable to return, and the last contact was a letter in 2017 from her oldest daughter which told the mother not to return.	<a href="https://thediplomat.com/2021/04/the-missing-uyghur-children/">https://thediplomat.com/2021/04/the-missing-uyghur-children/</a> . The mother is mentioned in the article, Sudanisa Abdulhami (Uyghur)
Orphanage/boarding school	2017	A policy document from the Chinese Government stated that the purpose of having children living at school was to “reduce the shock of going back and forth between learning science in the classroom and listening to scripture at home.” One way to expand boarding schools was to add dorms to existing schools.	<a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2019/12/28/world/asia/china-xinjiang-children-boarding-schools.html">https://www.nytimes.com/2019/12/28/world/asia/china-xinjiang-children-boarding-schools.html</a>
Orphanage/boarding school, social media	2017	A mother saw her 5-year-old daughter in a social media video posted by a teacher in Hotan, over 300 miles from their original home.	<a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2019/12/28/world/asia/china-xinjiang-children-boarding-schools.html">https://www.nytimes.com/2019/12/28/world/asia/china-xinjiang-children-boarding-schools.html</a> . The mother is named in the article, Kalbinur Tursun, so is the daughter, Ayshe
Orphanage/boarding school	2017	A policy document from the Chinese Government stated that about 40% (497,800) of elementary and middle school children were boarding at school.	<a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2019/12/28/world/asia/china-xinjiang-children-boarding-schools.html">https://www.nytimes.com/2019/12/28/world/asia/china-xinjiang-children-boarding-schools.html</a>
Orphanages/boarding schools	2017	More than \$30 million USD was budgeted for building and expanding a minimum of 45 orphanages, with capacity to house about 5,000 children.	<a href="https://apnews.com/article/international-news-crime-china-clamps-down-china-ap-top-news-903a97b7c62a47b98553b6f422827dd7">https://apnews.com/article/international-news-crime-china-clamps-down-china-ap-top-news-903a97b7c62a47b98553b6f422827dd7</a>
Orphanages/boarding schools	2017	According to the Chinese Government, about 4,300 bilingual kindergartens were renovated or built that year.	<a href="https://apnews.com/article/international-news-crime-china-clamps-down-china-ap-top-news-903a97b7c62a47b98553b6f422827dd7">https://apnews.com/article/international-news-crime-china-clamps-down-china-ap-top-news-903a97b7c62a47b98553b6f422827dd7</a>



Orphanages/ boarding school	2017– 2019	The number of children separated from their families increased by 76.9% in a two year period.	<a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2021/3/10/china-committed-genocide-against-uyghurs-in-xinjiang-says-report">https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2021/3/10/china-committed-genocide-against-uyghurs-in-xinjiang-says-report</a>
Orphanage/ boarding school	April 2018	Children were taken to orphanages/boarding schools despite extended family wanting to take them in.	<a href="https://www.ft.com/content/f0d3223a-7f4d-11e8-bc55-50daf11b720d">https://www.ft.com/content/f0d3223a-7f4d-11e8-bc55-50daf11b720d</a>
Orphanage/ boarding school, malnutrition	September 2018 to June 2019, whereabouts post-July 2019 are unknown	A 7-year-old girl was taken into child welfare without parental consent. When the girl got an infected toe, she was temporarily returned to her guardian (her uncle) until she got better. She had lost a significant amount of weight during her time away.	<a href="https://www.hrw.org/news/2019/09/15/china-xinjiang-children-separated-families#">https://www.hrw.org/news/2019/09/15/china-xinjiang-children-separated-families#</a> . Father is named by first name in the article, Mahmutjan (Uyghur)
Orphanages/ boarding school	2018	Reported talk of mandatory boarding schools for children starting at age 5.	<a href="https://apnews.com/article/international-news-crime-china-clamps-down-china-ap-top-news-903a97b7c62a47b98553b6f422827dd7">https://apnews.com/article/international-news-crime-china-clamps-down-china-ap-top-news-903a97b7c62a47b98553b6f422827dd7</a>
Orphanages/ boarding school	2018	A father received a picture of one of his 7-year-old twin children with her head shaved. The picture came two years after her first enrollment at a different school. Her twin brother was not pictured.	<a href="https://www.npr.org/2022/02/03/1073793823/china-uyghur-children-xinjiang-boarding-school">https://www.npr.org/2022/02/03/1073793823/china-uyghur-children-xinjiang-boarding-school</a>
Orphanage/ boarding school	2018 20 months	Two children who were in orphanages/boarding schools reported their heads being shaved, being beaten, and being locked in dark rooms. Even though the siblings were in separate institutions, they describe similar experiences: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• The kids shared dorms where they bunked with multiple other Uyghur children of various ages.</li> <li>• Every morning teachers did a mandatory bed inspection before the children lined up for breakfast, usually corn or rice porridge.</li> <li>• Then there was a Chinese flag-raising ceremony where the children were</li> </ul>	<a href="https://www.npr.org/2022/02/03/1073793823/china-uyghur-children-xinjiang-boarding-school">https://www.npr.org/2022/02/03/1073793823/china-uyghur-children-xinjiang-boarding-school</a> . The two children are named in the article, Aysu Kuçar (Uyghur) (she was 6 at the time of detention and was sent to what was previously called Urumqi Folk Art School) and Lütfullah Kuçar (Uyghur) (he was 4 at the time of



		<p>taught to chant Chinese political slogans and sing patriotic songs.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• The children were subject to physical and emotional torture, such as having an older student be the bully of the dorm, who would hit and pull the hair of the other students in the dorm.</li> <li>• Another form of punishment for not following orders or learn quickly enough, was a stress position called ‘the motorcycle’ where the children had to hold “two arms stretched out front, knees bent in a half-squat, which they held for several minutes.”</li> <li>• Children were also locked alone in the basements for hours at a time. The guards had told them ghosts lived there.</li> <li>• The children learned Chinese six days a week.</li> </ul>	detention), as if their father, Abdüllatif Kuçar
Lost contact, social media	January 2019 or 2020	A father saw his 4-year-old son in a video on a Chinese Government video on social media. The son was speaking Chinese and appeared to be in a state-run orphanage.	<a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2019/12/28/world/asia/china-xinjiang-children-boarding-schools.html">https://www.nytimes.com/2019/12/28/world/asia/china-xinjiang-children-boarding-schools.html</a> . The father is named in the article, Abdurahman Tohti (Uyghur)
Orphanage/boarding school	June 24, 2020	Four children were seized by police in Shanghai when looking for visas to leave China and join their parents abroad. The children were placed in an orphanage and boarding school in Kashgar.	<a href="https://www.amnesty.org/en/wp-content/uploads/2021/05/ASA1737982021ENGLISH.pdf">https://www.amnesty.org/en/wp-content/uploads/2021/05/ASA1737982021ENGLISH.pdf</a> . The parents are named in the article, Mihriban Kader and her husband Ablikim Memtinin (Kazakh)
Orphanages/boarding schools	N/A	Uyghurs who are in exile report that Uyghur children are being detained in boarding schools and/or orphanages in horrible and overcrowded conditions, especially if their parents are in re-education camps.	<a href="https://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/report_pdf/china0918_web.pdf">https://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/report_pdf/china0918_web.pdf</a>

Orphanage/ boarding school	N/A	A 5-year-old boy was forced to live at school Monday–Friday instead of at home with his guardians.	<a href="https://apnews.com/article/international-news-crime-china-clamps-down-china-ap-top-news-903a97b7c62a47b98553b6f422827dd7">https://apnews.com/article/international-news-crime-china-clamps-down-china-ap-top-news-903a97b7c62a47b98553b6f422827dd7</a> . The father is named in the article, Adil Dalelkhan (Kazakh)
Orphanage/ boarding school	N/A	A 9-year-old boy was forced to stay in boarding school and was only allowed to return home during vacations and holidays. His father reported that all children of a certain age in their Uyghur district were forced to do the same. Some parents were allowed to see their children once a week, but their children were behind fences and metal bars.	<a href="https://apnews.com/article/international-news-crime-china-clamps-down-china-ap-top-news-903a97b7c62a47b98553b6f422827dd7">https://apnews.com/article/international-news-crime-china-clamps-down-china-ap-top-news-903a97b7c62a47b98553b6f422827dd7</a>
Orphanage/ boarding school	N/A	Over a three-year period more than \$1 million USD was budgeted to surveillance and security equipment for schools.	<a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2019/12/28/world/asia/china-xinjiang-children-boarding-schools.html">https://www.nytimes.com/2019/12/28/world/asia/china-xinjiang-children-boarding-schools.html</a>
Orphanage/ boarding school	N/A	Boarding schools have been reported to be the “ideal context for a sustained cultural re-engineering of minority societies” by prominent scholar on the Uyghur Genocide, Adrian Zenz. These schools are also used for the long-term separation of families.	<a href="https://uyghurtribunal.com/wp-content/uploads/2022/01/UT-211217-Julie-Millsap.pdf">https://uyghurtribunal.com/wp-content/uploads/2022/01/UT-211217-Julie-Millsap.pdf</a>
Detention of guardians, orphanage/bo arding school	N/A	A 5-year-old girl was moved to an orphanage after her guardians (her aunt and uncle) were detained. The father who lives abroad has seen pictures of her looking very sad.	<a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2019/12/28/world/asia/china-xinjiang-children-boarding-schools.html">https://www.nytimes.com/2019/12/28/world/asia/china-xinjiang-children-boarding-schools.html</a> . The father is named in the article, Mahmutjan Niyaz
Orphanage/ boarding school, disappearance	N/A	In more than 60 interviews, parents testified of the disappearance of more than 100 children in Xinjiang from boarding schools.	<a href="https://uyghurtribunal.com/wp-content/uploads/2022/01/UT-211217-Julie-Millsap.pdf">https://uyghurtribunal.com/wp-content/uploads/2022/01/UT-211217-Julie-Millsap.pdf</a>

Orphanage/ boarding school	N/A	The Chinese Government had a goal of having 1–2 state-run orphanages/boarding schools in all of 800+ townships in Xinjiang.	<a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2019/12/28/world/asia/china-xinjiang-children-boarding-schools.html">https://www.nytimes.com/2019/12/28/world/asia/china-xinjiang-children-boarding-schools.html</a>
Orphanage/ boarding school, detention of guardians	N/A	4 children aged 3 to 8 years-old were taken to a state-run orphanage called Hotan City Kindness Kindergarten, when the guardians (their grandparents) were detained.	<a href="https://apnews.com/article/international-news-crime-china-clamps-down-china-ap-top-news-903a97b7c62a47b98553b6f422827dd7">https://apnews.com/article/international-news-crime-china-clamps-down-china-ap-top-news-903a97b7c62a47b98553b6f422827dd7</a>
Orphanage/ boarding school	N/A	Hotan City Kindness Kindergarten has been explained by Chinese Government officials as a kindergarten for children 6 and under whose “parents cannot care for them for a variety of reasons.” About \$1.24 million USD has been invested in the kindergarten.	<a href="https://apnews.com/article/international-news-crime-china-clamps-down-china-ap-top-news-903a97b7c62a47b98553b6f422827dd7">https://apnews.com/article/international-news-crime-china-clamps-down-china-ap-top-news-903a97b7c62a47b98553b6f422827dd7</a>
Orphanage/ boarding school	N/A	Chinese teacher Kang Jide wrote the following about the elementary school he worked at in Kasipi village: “In just a few days, all the day students were transferred. Classrooms were rearranged. Bunk beds were set up. Then, 270 new children arrived, leaving the school with 430 boarders, each in the sixth grade or below.”	<a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2019/12/28/world/asia/china-xinjiang-children-boarding-schools.html">https://www.nytimes.com/2019/12/28/world/asia/china-xinjiang-children-boarding-schools.html</a>
Orphanage/ boarding school	N/A	At some institutions, children were only allowed family visits once a week or every other week.	<a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2019/12/28/world/asia/china-xinjiang-children-boarding-schools.html">https://www.nytimes.com/2019/12/28/world/asia/china-xinjiang-children-boarding-schools.html</a>
Detention	N/A	After the detention of imam and scholar Abidin Ayup in 2017, his 8 children have been detained.	<a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-china-56986057">https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-china-56986057</a> . The imams niece is mentioned in the article, Maryam Muhammad
Social media, orphanage/ boarding school	N/A	Mothers abroad reported having seen their children on Chinese social media posts crying and looking sad.	<a href="https://thediplomat.com/2021/04/the-missing-uyghur-children/">https://thediplomat.com/2021/04/the-missing-uyghur-children/</a>

Detention of guardian	N/A	When a family (other than parents) taking care of children were in camps, it became impossible for parents to keep track of their children's whereabouts and stay in touch with them. Children were not allowed to join parents abroad when guardians in China were detained.	<a href="https://www.amnesty.org/en/wp-content/uploads/2021/05/ASA1737982021ENGLISH.pdf">https://www.amnesty.org/en/wp-content/uploads/2021/05/ASA1737982021ENGLISH.pdf</a> <a href="https://www.hrw.org/news/2019/09/15/china-xinjiang-children-separated-families#">https://www.hrw.org/news/2019/09/15/china-xinjiang-children-separated-families#</a>
Lost contact	N/A	A mother lost contact with her 5 children after travelling to Istanbul to give birth.	<a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2019/12/28/world/asia/china-xinjiang-children-boarding-schools.html">https://www.nytimes.com/2019/12/28/world/asia/china-xinjiang-children-boarding-schools.html</a> . The mother is named in the article, Kalbinur Tursun
Orphanage/boarding school	N/A	4 siblings were taken to orphanages/boarding schools when their parents were detained.	<a href="https://www.npr.org/2022/02/03/1073793823/china-uyghur-children-xinjiang-boarding-school">https://www.npr.org/2022/02/03/1073793823/china-uyghur-children-xinjiang-boarding-school</a> . Their sister is named in the article, Mukerrem Mahmud (Uyghur)
Lost contact	N/A	A father lost contact with two of his children after fleeing China.	<a href="https://thediplomat.com/2021/04/the-missing-uyghur-children/">https://thediplomat.com/2021/04/the-missing-uyghur-children/</a> . The father had his name changed in the article, but is confirmed Uyghur
Orphanage/boarding school	N/A	Children who were taken away from their Muslim families are held in "child welfare" institutions away from their relatives. These were "state-run child welfare institutions and boarding schools," which held children without parental consent when parents were in camps or in exile. In the camps, children were forced to learn Chinese, and the facilities had barbed wire fencing, and surveillance cameras.	<a href="https://www.hrw.org/news/2019/09/15/china-xinjiang-children-separated-families#">https://www.hrw.org/news/2019/09/15/china-xinjiang-children-separated-families#</a> .
Orphanage/boarding school, overcrowding	N/A	A worker at an orphanage reported of overcrowding and children aged 6 months to 2 years being "locked up like farm animals in a shed."	<a href="https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2018/09/china-internment-camps-">https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2018/09/china-internment-camps-</a>

			<a href="https://www.amnesty.org/en/wp-content/uploads/2021/05/ASA1737982021ENGLISH.pdf">uighur-muslim-children/569062/</a> .
Lost contact	N/A	A mother has been unable to contact two of her children since her husband was detained when he went back to Xinjiang to take them abroad.	<a href="https://thediplomat.com/2021/04/the-missing-uyghur-children/">https://thediplomat.com/2021/04/the-missing-uyghur-children/</a> . The parents are named in the article, the mother is Buzuhra Mamatkurban, and the father is Muhammad Kurban

Other			
<i>Crime code</i>	<i>Date</i>	<i>Allegation</i>	<i>Source</i>
Withheld passports	2015–May 2016	A woman applied for passports for her three children in 2015. In 2016 two passports were granted, while her youngest son was denied a passport because the local police believed she would never return to China if she was able to take all her children with her. Her youngest daughter was also left behind, and soon after her passport was confiscated.	<a href="https://www.amnesty.org/en/wp-content/uploads/2021/05/ASA1737982021ENGLISH.pdf">https://www.amnesty.org/en/wp-content/uploads/2021/05/ASA1737982021ENGLISH.pdf</a> . The woman is named by first named in the article, Dilnur (Uyghur)
Withheld passports, lost contact	November 2016	When asked to hand over their passports, a family fled to live with their father abroad, but were forced to leave behind two daughters with grandparents. In October 2017, contact was cut off when the grandparents were detained.	<a href="https://www.amnesty.org/en/wp-content/uploads/2021/05/ASA1737982021ENGLISH.pdf">https://www.amnesty.org/en/wp-content/uploads/2021/05/ASA1737982021ENGLISH.pdf</a> . The parents are named in the article, Meryem Faruh and husband Omer Faruh (Uyghur)
Withheld passports	2016	Parents fled to Italy after being told to hand over their passports, leaving children behind with grandparents.	<a href="https://www.amnesty.org/en/wp-content/uploads/2021/05/ASA1737982021ENGLISH.pdf">https://www.amnesty.org/en/wp-content/uploads/2021/05/ASA1737982021ENGLISH.pdf</a> . The parents are named in the article, Mihriban Kader and her husband Ablikim Memtinin (Kazakh)

Withheld passports	2016–2017	During 2016–2017, it became increasingly more difficult to obtain passports for all family members, forcing people to leave family members, including children behind.	<a href="https://www.amnesty.org/en/wp-content/uploads/2021/05/ASA1737982021ENGLISH.pdf">https://www.amnesty.org/en/wp-content/uploads/2021/05/ASA1737982021ENGLISH.pdf</a>
Harassment	Early 2017	A woman living in Turkey was asked by her family to return to China in order for the harassment of her family to stop and to prevent them from being detained.	<a href="https://www.amnesty.org/en/wp-content/uploads/2021/05/ASA1737982021ENGLISH.pdf">https://www.amnesty.org/en/wp-content/uploads/2021/05/ASA1737982021ENGLISH.pdf</a> . The woman is named by first named in the article, Dilnur (Uyghur)
Forced to move	Late 2017	A grandmother who was a guardian to three children was forced to move from Urumqi to Hotan based on official residency registration.	<a href="https://www.amnesty.org/en/wp-content/uploads/2021/05/ASA1737982021ENGLISH.pdf">https://www.amnesty.org/en/wp-content/uploads/2021/05/ASA1737982021ENGLISH.pdf</a> . Son of grandmother and father of children is named in the article, Turghun Memet, so is his wife (mother of children) Meripet Metniyaz
Coercion	2017	A woman was coerced into teaching in the camps.	<a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-china-55794071">https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-china-55794071</a> . <a href="https://bylinetimes.com/2020/08/24/death-is-everywhere-millions-more-uyghurs-missing/">https://bylinetimes.com/2020/08/24/death-is-everywhere-millions-more-uyghurs-missing/</a> . The woman is named in the articles, Qelbinur Sedik (Uzbek)
Separation of ethnic minorities	July 2018	Female detainees in a camp were separated within their ethnic groups. Uyghurs were treated the worst, and Kazakhs were slowly released.	<a href="https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2021/04/12/surviving-the-crackdown-in-xinjiang">https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2021/04/12/surviving-the-crackdown-in-xinjiang</a>

Coercion	2018	Guards who were ethnic Kazakh were forced to work at Kuytun City Vocational Skills Re-education Training Center. They were unable to resign, and feared detention for themselves if they made any mistakes.	<a href="https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2021/04/12/surviving-the-crackdown-in-xinjiang">https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2021/04/12/surviving-the-crackdown-in-xinjiang</a>
Incrimination by children	N/A	An adult student in the US lied at school growing up when asked about religious practices at home, in fear of incriminating his family.	<a href="https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2018/09/china-internment-camps-uyghur-muslim-children/569062/">https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2018/09/china-internment-camps-uyghur-muslim-children/569062/</a> . Student is anonymous, but confirmed Uyghur
Banning of named	N/A	It is reported that the Chinese Government banned Uyghur parents from giving their children certain names, including Mohammed and Medina.	<a href="https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/chinas-repression-uyghurs-xinjiang">https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/chinas-repression-uyghurs-xinjiang</a>
Coercion	N/A	Ethnic minority teachers were threatened with detention themselves, if they did not teach at detention camps and orphanages/boarding schools.	<a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2019/12/28/world/asia/china-xinjiang-children-boarding-schools.html">https://www.nytimes.com/2019/12/28/world/asia/china-xinjiang-children-boarding-schools.html</a>
Coercion	N/A	A woman was coerced into teaching in the camps.	<a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-china-55794071">https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-china-55794071</a> . The woman is named in the article, <u>Sayragul Sauytbay</u>

## APPENDIX D

### The “Chapeau” of Genocide & Underlying Crimes

INTENT TO DESTROY		
LEGAL STANDARD	INDICATIVE STATEMENTS	SOURCE
<p>“The [specific] victims must be targeted because of their membership in the protected group, and the perpetrator must intend to destroy at least a substantial part of that group. In the absence of direct evidence, <b>the perpetrator’s specific intent may be inferred from his overt statements or other circumstantial evidence.</b>”<sup>460</sup></p> <p>For example: “The Chamber concludes that Muvunyi’s words were spoken in public, were directed to a group of assembled Hutu civilians, and were intended to provoke the said civilians to kill Tutsis. Indeed, when considered in the context of the language and culture of Rwanda, equating Tutsis to snakes was, in the words of socio-linguistic expert Ntakirutimana, synonymous with condemning members of this ethnic group to death. The Chamber is satisfied that Muvunyi knew that his audience immediately understood the genocidal implication of his words and therefore that he had the requisite intent to destroy members of the Tutsi ethnic group in whole or in part as such.”<sup>461</sup></p> <p>“[T]he Chamber is of the opinion that the direct element of incitement should</p>	<p>1) “Break their <b>lineage</b>, break their <b>roots</b>, break their <b>connections</b>, and <b>break their origins</b>. Completely shovel up the roots of ‘two-faced people,’ <b>dig them out, and vow to fight these two-faced people until the end,</b>” as quoted by Chinese religious affairs official Maisumujiang Maimuer. This message was posted on the Xinhua News Agency Weibo page on August 10, 2017. Xinhua News Agency is the official state press agency of the CPP.</p> <p>2) “<b>Wipe them out completely .... Destroy them root and branch.</b>” As quoted by Wang Yongzh, a top official of Yarkand County, at a rally in a public square. Wang directed this speech to fellow party members attending the rally, urging them to fight against the so-called “terrorists.” Under Wang’s leadership, two detention facilities holding at least 20,000 prisoners were built, and funding for checkpoints</p>	<p>1) <u>Human Rights Watch</u>, Maya Wang, et al., “‘Break Their Lineage, Break Their Roots’: China’s Crimes against Humanity Targeting Uyghurs and Other Turkic Muslims,” Apr. 19, 2021.</p> <p>2) <u>New York Times</u>, Austin Ramzy and Chris Buckley, “‘Absolutely No Mercy’: Leaked Files Expose How China Organized Mass Detentions of Muslims,” Nov. 16, 2019.</p> <p>3) <u>Radio Free Asia</u>, Shohret Hoshur, “Chinese Authorities Jail</p>

<sup>460</sup> *Prosecutor v. Karera*, Trial Judgment, ICTR-01-74-T, ICTR, Dec. 7, 2007.

<sup>461</sup> *Prosecutor v. Muvunyi*, Trial Judgment, para. 507, ICTR-2000-55A-T, ICTR, Sept. 12, 2006.



<p>be viewed in the light of its cultural and linguistic content. Indeed, a particular speech may be perceived as ‘direct’ in one country, and not so in another, depending on the audience. The Chamber further recalls that incitement may be direct, and nonetheless implicit.”<sup>462</sup></p> <p>“Display of intent through public speeches or in meetings may also support an inference as to the requisite specific intent.”<sup>463</sup></p>	<p>and surveillance significantly increased.</p> <p>3) “You can’t uproot all the weeds hidden among the crops in the field one-by-one; <b>you need to spray chemicals to kill them all.</b> [R]e-educating these people is like spraying chemicals on the crops. That is why it is a general re-education, not limited to a few people.” As quoted by a Kashgar security chief in an official meeting with other officials in Kashgar city to explain the policy of mass internment.</p> <p>4) “Freedom is only possible when this ‘<b>virus</b>’ in their thinking is <b>eradicated.</b>” As quoted in the Xinjiang public security bureau directive with guidance on how Chinese officials should explain the disappearances of Uyghurs.</p> <p>5) In his 2016 policy agenda speech, XUAR Party Secretary Chen Quanguo described Uyghur beliefs as “religious extremist thought” and referred to their behavior in XUAR as a “<b>malignant tumor</b>” and a “<b>communicable plague</b>” which would require “more radical and invasive surgery.” Officials were told to “<b>eradicate tumors.</b>”</p> <p>6) The CPP states that the Party</p>	<p>Four Wealthiest Uyghurs in Xinjiang’s Kashgar in New Purge,” Jan. 5, 2018.</p> <p>4) <u>Newsline</u> <u>Institute</u>, Yonah Diamond, et al., “The Uyghur Genocide: An Examination of China’s Breaches of the 1948 Genocide Convention,” p.38, Mar. 8, 2021.</p> <p>5) <u>ChinaFile</u>, Timothy Grose, “Once Their Mental State Is Healthy, They Will Be Able to Live Happily in Society,” Aug. 2, 2019.</p> <p>6) <u>Newsline</u> <u>Institute</u>, Yonah Diamond, et al., “The Uyghur Genocide: An Examination of China’s Breaches of the 1948 Genocide Convention,” p.38, Mar. 8, 2021.</p>
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<sup>462</sup> *Prosecutor v. Akayesu*, Trial Judgment, para. 557, ICTR-96-4-T, ICTR, Sept. 2, 1998.

<sup>463</sup> *Prosecutor v. Karadžić*, Trial Judgment, para. 500, IT-95-5/18-T, ICTY, Mar. 24, 2016.

	<p>must “<b>penetrate like an intravenous needle,</b>” and “<b>cure</b>” or “<b>reform through criticism</b>” in order to wipe out the thoughts and ideals of the Uyghurs.</p> <p>7) Police officers were told to prepare for a “<b>smashing, obliterating offensive.</b>” This was quoted by party official Chen Quanguo when addressing a group of police officers in a town square in Urumqi in 2017. In the following weeks, Internal documents indicated that CPP leadership finalized plans to pursue mass detention against Uyghurs.</p>	<p>7) <u>New York Times</u>, Austin Ramzy and Chris Buckley, “‘Absolutely No Mercy’: Leaked Files Expose How China Organized Mass Detentions of Muslims,” Nov. 16, 2019.</p>
<p>Genocidal <i>dolus specialis</i> may be inferred “from the facts, the concrete circumstances, or “<b>a pattern of purposeful action.</b>””<sup>464</sup></p> <p>“The Appeals Chamber concurs with the Appellant that in order to find a person guilty of genocide, it must be established that such a person was personally possessed of the specific intent to commit the crime at the time he did so. Nonetheless, as stated by the Appeals Chamber in Kayishema and Ruzindana, ‘explicit manifestations of criminal intent are ... often rare in the context of criminal trials’. In the absence of explicit, direct proof, the <i>dolus specialis</i> may therefore be <b>inferred from relevant facts and circumstances.</b> Such an approach prevents perpetrators from escaping convictions simply because such</p>	<p>1) Nurlan Kokteubai, a Kazakh detainee, stated in an interview: “They said they would keep us there up to 50 years, until the whole nation, Kazakhs, Uyghurs, and other Muslim nationalities, would disappear. They said there was a document sent from above, from the administrative center, and that they were acting based on that document. They said no one can change the document since it was sent from the Central Committee. <b>They said that the current system would not change until all Muslim nationalities would be extinct.</b> ‘Only when you, your children and your grandchildren become</p>	<p>1) <u>SupChina</u>, Darren Byler. “‘Only When You, Your Children, And Your Grandchildren Become Chinese’: Life After Xinjiang Detainment,” Jan. 6, 2021.</p> <p>2) <i>See</i> Appendix C for more details on the CPP’s pattern of conduct.</p>

<sup>464</sup> *Prosecutor v. Stakić*, Trial Judgment, para. 526, IT-97-24-T, ICTR, July 31, 2003.

<p>manifestations are absent.”<sup>465</sup></p> <p>“Specifically, relevant facts and circumstances could include ‘the <b>general context, the perpetration of other culpable acts systematically directed against the same group, the scale of atrocities committed, the systematic targeting of victims on account of their membership of a particular group, or the repetition of destructive and discriminatory acts.</b>”<sup>466</sup></p> <p>“Factors relevant to this analysis may include, but are not limited to, the general context, the scale of atrocities, the systematic targeting of victims on account of their membership in a particular group, the repetition of destructive and discriminatory acts, or the <b>existence of a plan or policy.</b>”<sup>467</sup></p> <p>However, “[t]he Appeals Chamber, in a recent decision, indicated that <b>the existence of a plan was not a legal ingredient of the crime of genocide but could be of evidential assistance to prove the intent</b> of the authors of the criminal act(s).”<sup>468</sup></p> <p>“The Chamber considers that it is possible to deduce the genocidal intent inherent in a particular act charged from the general context of the perpetration of other culpable acts systematically directed against that same group, whether these acts were committed by the same offender or by others. Other factors, such as the <b>scale of atrocities committed, their</b></p>	<p>Chinese would the current system change,’ they said.”</p> <p>2) The treatment of the Uyghurs as a whole, including mass detention, forced labor, surveillance, forced sterilization, forced abortions, forced marriage, removal of children, rape, torture, organ “harvesting,” medical experimentation, murder, and cultural erasure is suggestive of a purposeful pattern of conduct aimed at the destruction of a substantial part the Uyghur people.</p>	
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<sup>465</sup> *Prosecutor v. Rutaganda*, Appeal Judgment, para. 525, ICTR-96-3-A, ICTR, May 26, 2003.

<sup>466</sup> *Prosecutor v. Gacumbitsi*, Appeal Judgment, para. 41, ICTR-2001-64-A, July 7, 2006.

<sup>467</sup> *Prosecutor v. Karadžić*, Trial Judgment, para. 500, IT-95-5/18-T, ICTY, Mar. 24, 2016.

<sup>468</sup> *Prosecutor v. Krstić*, Trial Judgment, para. 572, IT-98-33-T, ICTY, Apr. 19, 2004.

<p><b>general nature, in a region or a country, or furthermore, the fact of deliberately and systematically targeting victims on account of their membership of a particular group, while excluding the members of other groups,</b> can enable the Chamber to infer the genocidal intent of a particular act.”<sup>469</sup></p>		
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<sup>469</sup> *Prosecutor v. Akayesu*, Trial Judgment, para. 523, ICTR-96.4.T, ICTR, Sept. 2, 1998.

## COUNTER-NARRATIVE

LEGAL STANDARD	COUNTER-NARRATIVE	SOURCE
<p>Chinese Government officials would likely offer a counter-narrative that the treatment of the Uyghurs is justified as a counter-terrorism program. Such claims could be offset by showing that the crimes being perpetrated against the Uyghurs, <b>as a whole, do not appear to target terrorism.</b></p> <p>“In the absence of direct evidence, the perpetrator's specific intent may be inferred from his overt statements or other circumstantial evidence. The perpetrator <b>need not be solely motivated by a genocidal intent</b> and having a personal motive will not preclude such a specific intent.”<sup>470</sup></p> <p>“[T]he term ‘as such’ clarifies the specific intent requirement. It does not prohibit a conviction for genocide in a case in which the perpetrator was also driven by other motivations that are legally irrelevant in this context. Thus the Trial Chamber was correct in interpreting ‘as such’ to mean that the proscribed acts were committed against the victims because of their membership in the protected group, but not solely because of such membership.”<sup>471</sup></p>	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1) Erkin Tuniyaz, Xinjiang Deputy Governor, explained the CPP’s “preventive counter-terrorism and de-extremism work” in Xinjiang: “Xinjiang’s counter-terrorism and de-extremism efforts have created a new way to solve the symptoms and root cause of the difficult global issue of counter-terrorism, and are worthy of praise. [C]hina will continue to make its due contribution towards the global fight against terrorism.”</li> <li>2) China’s State Council released a white paper on employment and labor rights in Xinjiang in 2020. The white paper stated that “the extreme poverty” of Xinjiang could be attributed to “terrorists, separatists and religious extremists” that have “long preached that ‘the afterlife is fated’” and that “religious teachings are superior to state laws.” The white paper argued that this incited other Uyghurs to “resist learning the standard spoken and written Chinese language, reject modern science, and refuse to improve their vocational skills.”</li> <li>3) A string of terrorist attacks connected to the Uyghurs took</li> </ol>	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1) <u>The Guardian</u>, “China Says ‘Preventive’ Work in Xinjiang Detention Camps Should Be Applauded,” Feb. 24, 2019.</li> <li>2) <u>Medium</u>, William Yang, “China Published New Xinjiang White Paper in an Attempt to Push Back Against Forced Labor Criticisms,” Sept. 18, 2020.</li> <li>3) <u>Securitization</u>, Joanne Smith Finley, “Insecurity and Conflict in Contemporary Xinjiang: Has PRC Counter-Terrorism Evolved into State Terror?” p. 2, Mar. 11, 2019.</li> <li>4) <u>Securitization</u>,</li> </ol>

<sup>470</sup> *Prosecutor v. Karera*, Trial Judgment, para. 534, ICTR-01-74-T, Dec.7, 2007.

<sup>471</sup> *Prosecutor v. Niyitegeke*, Appeal Judgment, para. 53, ICTR-96-14-A, ICTR, 9 Jul. 2004.

	<p>place in the early 2010s. In October 2013, a car with three Uyghurs inside ran into a crowd of tourists in front of Tiananmen Square in Beijing. The attack killed 2 and injured 38. In March 2014, 8 people in Xinjiang launched a knife attack at a railway station, killing 33 and injuring 144. In response, China's Security Chief, Meng Jianzhu, condemned the attacks on "defenseless, innocent people by violent terrorists," and vowed, "'all-out efforts' to punish the perpetrators."</p> <p>4) "Members of the public who have been chosen for re-education have been infected by an ideological illness. They have been infected with religious extremism and violent terrorist ideology, and therefore they must seek treatment from a hospital as an inpatient. [T]he religious extremist ideology is a type of poisonous medicine, which confuses the mind of the people." As quoted from an official CCP audio recording, transmitted to Uyghurs in 2017.</p> <p>5) The People's War on Terror was launched in 2014 and Xi Jinping called for "terrorists to be 'chased down the streets like rats.'"</p> <p>6) "If religious extremist thought is not rooted out, violent terrorist acts will continually multiply like cancer cells."</p> <p>7) "Since the measures have been taken, there's no single terrorist incident in the past</p>	<p>Joanne Smith Finley, "Insecurity And Conflict in Contemporary Xinjiang: Has PRC Counter-Terrorism Evolved into State Terror?," p. 11, Mar. 11, 2019.</p> <p>5) <u>Securitization</u>, Joanne Smith Finley, "Insecurity And Conflict in Contemporary Xinjiang: Has PRC Counter-Terrorism Evolved into State Terror?," p. 14, Mar. 11, 2019.</p> <p>6) <u>Newslines Institute</u>, Yonah Diamond, et al., "The Uyghur Genocide: An Examination of China's Breaches of the 1948 Genocide Convention," p. 38, Mar. 8, 2021.</p> <p>7) <u>International Consortium of Investigative Journalists</u>, Fergus Shiell, "China Cables:</p>
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	<p>three years. The preventative measures have nothing to do with the eradication of religious groups. Religious freedom is fully respected in Xinjiang.” As quoted from a statement issued by the press office of China’s Embassy to the UK.</p>	<p>Who Are the Uighurs and Why Mass Detention?,” Nov. 24, 2019.</p>
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IN WHOLE OR IN PART		
LEGAL STANDARD	RELEVANT INFORMATION	SOURCE
<p>“The notion ‘destruction of the group’ means ‘the material destruction of a group either by physical or by biological means, not the destruction of the national, linguistic, religious, cultural or other identity of a particular group.’ There is no numeric threshold of victims necessary to establish genocide. To establish specific genocidal intent, it is not necessary to prove that the perpetrator intended to achieve the complete annihilation of a group throughout the world, but, at least, to destroy a <b>substantial part</b> thereof.”<sup>472</sup></p> <p>“[I]t is not necessary to consider the global population of the group. The intent to destroy a multitude of persons because of their membership in a particular group constitutes genocide even if these persons constitute only <b>part of a group either within a country or within a region</b> or within a single community.”<sup>473</sup></p>	<p>1) As the detentions rapidly increased between 2017–2018, the CPP reportedly implemented regional quotas for detaining Uyghurs. By 2017, it is reported that officials were ordered to detain <b>nearly 40% of the adult population</b> in parts of southern Xinjiang. The CPP’s policies have <b>targeted millions of Uyghurs in Xinjiang</b>, constituting a substantial part of the group.</p> <p>2) “The United States government has estimated that <b>more than a million Uighurs</b> [sic]—representing nearly 10 percent of the Uighur [sic] population in Xinjiang—have been locked up by Chinese authorities.”</p> <p>3) Chinese Government data stated that arrests in Xinjiang account for 21% of the entirety of China’s arrests, despite Xinjiang only accounting for approximately 1.5% of the country’s population.</p>	<p>1) <u>Newslines Institute</u>, Yonah Diamond, et al., “The Uyghur Genocide: An Examination of China’s Breaches of the 1948 Genocide Convention,” p. 45, Mar. 8, 2021.</p> <p>2) <u>Australian Strategic Policy Institute</u>, Nathan Ruser, “Family De-planning: The Coercive Campaign to Drive Down Indigenous Birth-rates in Xinjiang,” May 12, 2021.</p> <p>3) <u>BBC</u>, Joel Gunter, “Uyghur Imams Targeted in China's Xinjiang Crackdown,” May 13, 2021.</p>
	Due to contradicting reports of the actual population of Uyghurs in Xinjiang, and China overall, it is difficult to say how many and	<u>Justice.gov</u> , Report for U.S. Department of Justice, “Treatment

<sup>472</sup> *Prosecutor v. Seromba*, Appeal Judgment, para. 319, ICTR-2001-66-A, ICTR, Dec. 13, 2006.

<sup>473</sup> *Prosecutor v. Krstić*, Appeal Judgment, para. 582, IT-98-33-A, ICTY, Apr. 19, 2004.



	<p>how substantial a portion of the population have been killed, detained in camps, and forced to work in labor camps.</p> <p><b>2010:</b> “According to the most recent 2010 national population census, Uyghurs comprise the fourth largest ethnic group in China, with an official population of 10.069 million.”</p> <p><b>2016:</b> Dr. Erkin Sidick estimated the Uyghur population to be approximately 18 million.</p> <p><b>2018:</b> Victor Gao, Vice President of a Chinese Government think tank, reported the population of the Uyghurs to be about six to seven million.</p> <p><b>2021–2022:</b> The Uyghur population is reported to be approximately 11–12 million.</p> <p>Assuming Victor Gao is correct, the Uyghur population was cut by either four to five million people from 2010 to 2018. However, if Dr. Sidick’s estimate and Victor Gao’s are both correct, there has been a population reduction of about 11 million Uyghurs in about two years.</p>	<p>of the Uyghur Ethnic Group in the People’s Republic of China,” Mar. 2015; <u>Council on Foreign Relations</u>, Lindsay Maizland, “China’s Repression of Uyghurs in Xinjiang,” Mar. 1, 2021; <u>BBC News</u>, “Who Are the Uyghurs and Why Is China Being Accused of Genocide?,” May 24, 2022.</p>
<p>“In addition to the numeric size of the targeted portion, its prominence within the group can be a useful consideration. If a specific part of the group is emblematic of the overall group, or is <b>essential to its survival</b>, that may support a finding that the part qualifies as substantial within the</p>	<p>1) Government documents from 2019 reveal orchestrated plans to conduct <b>mass female sterilization</b> in rural Uyghur regions, “targeting between 14 and 34 percent of all married women of childbearing age in two Uyghur counties in that year alone, with funding for</p>	<p>1) <u>Newslines Institute</u>, Yonah Diamond, et al., “The Uyghur Genocide: An Examination of China’s Breaches of the 1948 Genocide</p>

<p>meaning of Article [II].”<sup>474</sup></p>	<p>these XUAR programs increasing.”</p> <p>2) <b>Uyghur women’s reproductive abilities</b> are particularly targeted in the camps through aggressive birth control measures. Beginning in 2017, infertility rates increased by 124%, women experiencing menopause increased by 106%, and the rates of women becoming widows increased by 116.5%.</p> <p>3) More than 60% of those detained are between the ages of 20–40 years old. Removing a significant portion of the child-bearing population will have serious negative effects on the ability of the population as a whole to grow or reproduce.</p> <p>4) It is estimated that over a two-year period (mid-2016 to mid-2018), about <b>400,000 children were forcefully displaced</b>.</p>	<p>Convention,” p. 31, Mar. 8, 2021.</p> <p>2) <u>The Jamestown Foundation</u>, Adrian Zenz, “Sterilizations, IUDs, and Mandatory Birth Control,” p. 24, July 21, 2020.</p> <p>3) <u>DW</u>, William Yang, et al., “China’s Systematic Tracking, Arrests of Uighurs Exposed in New Xinjiang Leak,” Feb. 17, 2020.</p> <p>4) <u>The New Yorker</u>, Raffi Khatchadourian, “Surviving the Crackdown in Xinjiang,” Apr. 5, 2021.</p>
<p>“[T]argeting the <b>leadership</b> of a protected group can indicate genocidal intent, irrespective of the process of selection of the targeted leader. [R]ecognising that genocide may be committed through the killings of only certain <b>prominent members of the group</b> ‘selected for the impact that their disappearance would have on the survival of the group as such.’”<sup>475</sup></p>	<p>1) <b>Imams</b> have been singled out as a “problem” to be eliminated, and are given severe prison sentences.</p> <p>2) <b>Imams</b> comprise 13 percent of victims but 29 percent of those with formal prison sentences.</p>	<p>1) <u>Newslines Institute</u>, “The Uyghur Genocide: An Examination of China’s Breaches of the 1948 Genocide Convention,” p. 45, Mar. 8,</p>

<sup>474</sup> *Prosecutor v. Krstić*, Appeal Judgment, para. 12, IT-98-33-A, ICTY, Apr. 19, 2004.

<sup>475</sup> *Prosecutor v. Tolimir*, Appeal Judgment, paras. 260, 263, IT-05-88/2-A, ICTY, Apr. 8, 2015.

	<p>3) <i>See also</i> Appendix C (targeting, including killing, of other leaders—such as university professors, poets, historians, etc.)</p>	<p>2021.</p> <p>2) <u>Uyghur Human Rights Project</u>, “Demolishing Faith: The Destruction and Desecration of Uyghur Mosques and Shrines,” p. 3, Oct. 2019.</p>
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A NATIONAL, ETHNICAL, RACIAL, OR RELIGIOUS GROUP		
LEGAL STANDARD	RELEVANT INFORMATION	SOURCE
<p>Protected groups under Article II of the Genocide Convention are those belonging to a distinct “national, ethnical, racial or religious group.”<sup>476</sup></p> <p>“[T]he Chamber holds that [a]n <b>ethnic group</b> is generally defined as a group whose members share a common language or culture .... The <b>religious group</b> is one whose members share the same religion, denomination or mode of worship.”<sup>477</sup></p>	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1) The Uyghurs are ethnically Turkic, speak a southeastern Turkic <b>language</b>, and largely practice Sunni Islam.</li> <li>2) Uyghurs have their own unique identifiers, such as “<b>cultural heritage</b>, traditional clothing and diet, and language.” Uyghurs often have physical features that differ from the average Han. This is due to the Uyghurs’ more diverse influence from Central Asia.</li> <li>3) “The Uyghur <b>Muslim</b> minority is an <b>ethnically and religiously distinct group</b>. The Chinese government’s census data records the Uyghurs as a distinct ethnic group, and their expressions of ethnic and religious identity unambiguously place them within the groups protected under the Convention.”</li> <li>4) Chinese Government policy calls for its citizens’ <b>ethnic identities</b> to be recorded on identifying documents such as household registration cards and ID cards. The Chinese Government recognizes the registration of Uyghur as an ethnic identity, thus inferring the official recognition of the</li> </ol>	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1) <u>Minority Rights Group</u>, “World Directory of Minorities and Indigenous Peoples – China: Uyghurs,” Nov. 2017.</li> <li>2) <u>U.S. Department of Justice</u>, “Treatment of the Uyghur Ethnic Group in the People’s Republic of China,” Mar. 2015.</li> <li>3) <u>The United States Holocaust Memorial Museum</u>, Simon-Skjodt Center for the Prevention of Genocide, “‘To Make Us Slowly Disappear’: The Chinese Government’s Assault on the Uyghurs,” p. 39, Nov. 2021.</li> </ol>

<sup>476</sup> UN General Assembly, *Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide*, Dec. 9, 1948, United Nations, Treaty Series, vol. 78, p. 277.

<sup>477</sup> *Prosecutor v. Akayesu*, Trial Judgment, paras. 512-15, ICTR-96-4-T, ICTR, Sept. 2, 1998.

	<p>group as a distinct ethnic group.</p> <p>5) An unpublished draft of the Ministry of Public Security’s standard for face recognition was found stating that “face attribute recognition functionalities should include ethnicity recognition: (Uyghur/Non-Uyghur).”</p>	<p>4) <u>U.S. Department of Justice</u>, “Treatment of the Uyghur Ethnic Group in the People’s Republic of China,” p. 3, Mar. 2015.</p> <p>5) “Uyghur Surveillance &amp; Ethnicity Detection Analytics in China Expert Report Presented to the Uyghur Tribunal,” Aug. 20, 2021.</p>
	<p>Because of the use of cyber technology to identify who is a Uyghur and to conduct surveillance, the genocide discussed in this report is a <b>cyber-enabled genocide</b>.</p>	<p><i>See Appendix C, surveillance, for discussion of malware attacks, facial recognition technology and other uses of cyber technology.</i></p>

AS SUCH		
LEGAL STANDARD	RELEVANT INFORMATION	SOURCE
<p>“The group itself is the ultimate target or intended victim of this type of massive criminal conduct .... [T]he intention must be to destroy the group ‘as such,’ meaning as a separate and distinct entity.”<sup>478</sup></p> <p>“[T]he term ‘as such’ clarifies the specific intent requirement. It does not prohibit a conviction for genocide in a case in which the perpetrator was also driven by other motivations that are legally irrelevant in this context. Thus the Trial Chamber was correct in interpreting ‘as such’ to mean that the proscribed acts were committed against the victims because of their membership in the protected group, but not solely because of such membership.”<sup>479</sup></p> <p>“The term ‘as such’ has been interpreted to mean that the prohibited act must be committed against a person based on that person’s membership in a specific group and specifically because the person belonged to this group, such that the real victim is not merely the person but the group itself.”<sup>480</sup></p>	<p>The mass detention of the Uyghur people, forced sterilization campaign, and other crimes as detailed herein indicate the Uyghur as a whole are being targeted, satisfying the “as such” requirement.</p> <p>For example:</p> <p>1) Nurlan Kokteubai, a Kazakh detainee, stated in an interview: “They said they would keep us there up to 50 years, until the whole nation, Kazakhs, Uyghurs, and other Muslim nationalities, would disappear. They said there was a document sent from above, from the administrative center, and that they were acting based on that document. They said no one can change the document since it was sent from the Central Committee. They said that the current system would not change until all Muslim nationalities would be extinct.”</p> <p>2) A woman’s legs and arms were strapped to a high chair and an electroshock helmet was placed on her head. The shocks caused her mouth to foam and continued at least until she lost consciousness. <i>She was told her crime was being Uyghur.</i> This was the</p>	<p>1) <u>SupChina</u>, Darren Byler, “‘Only When You, Your Children, And Your Grandchildren Become Chinese’: Life After Xinjiang Detainment,” Jan. 6, 2021.</p> <p>2) <u>AP News</u>, Maria Danilova, “Woman Describes Torture, Beatings in Chinese Detention Camp,” Nov. 26, 2018.</p>

<sup>478</sup> *Prosecutor v. Krstić*, Appeal Judgment, para. 552, IT-98-33-A, ICTY, Apr. 19, 2004.

<sup>479</sup> *Prosecutor v. Niyitegeke*, Appeal Judgment, para. 53, ICTR-96-14-A, ICTR, 9 July 2004.

<sup>480</sup> *Prosecutor v. Muvunyi*, Trial Judgment, para. 485, ICTR-2000-55A-T, ICTR, Sept. 12, 2006.

	woman's third time in detention.	
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## UNDERLYING CRIMES

### A. Killing members of the group

LEGAL STANDARD	CRIMES	SOURCE
<p>“Murder has consistently been defined by the ICTY and the ICTR as the death of the victim resulting from an act or omission of the accused committed with the intention to kill or to cause serious bodily harm which he/she should reasonably have known might lead to death.”<sup>481</sup></p> <p>“Killing members of the group requires a showing that the principal perpetrator intentionally killed one or more members of the group.”<sup>482</sup></p> <p>“The fact that only a single person was killed on this occasion does not negate the perpetrators’ clear intent, which was to destroy the Tutsi population of Kibuye and of Rwanda, in whole or in part.”<sup>483</sup></p>	<p>Accounts of murders against the Uyghurs are largely reported within the camps, although it is difficult to confirm the deaths. Much of the available information has been reported by former detainees recounting murders and/or deaths they have witnessed. It was common for the Government to report the death after the fact, attribute the death to illness, or to refuse to provide the body to the family. Evidence suggests the Chinese Government is going to extreme lengths to cover up deaths in the camps.</p>	<p>See Appendix C for additional details on murder, disappearances, and fatal organ “harvesting.”</p> <p><u>Byline Times</u>, CJ Werleman, “‘Death Is <i>Everywhere</i>’ Millions More Uyghurs Missing,” Aug. 24, 2020.</p>
	<p>1) One of the only reports of mass murders comes from the “the No. 1 Internment Camp” located in Kuchar County where at least <b>150 people reportedly died from Jun–December 2018</b> while in detention. This figure was confirmed by a police officer at Kuchar County Police Department by Radio Free Asia’s Uyghur Service.</p>	<p>1) <u>Radio Free Asia</u>, Shohret Hoshur, “At Least 150 Detainees Have Died in One Xinjiang Internment Camp: Police Officer,” Oct. 29, 2019.</p> <p>2) <u>Haaretz</u>, David Stavrou,</p>

<sup>481</sup> *Prosecutor v. Krstić*, Appeal Judgment, para. 485, IT-98-33-A, ICTY, Apr. 19, 2004.

<sup>482</sup> *Prosecutor v. Bagosora*, Trial Judgment, para. 2117, ICTR-98-41-T, ICTR, Dec. 18, 2008.

<sup>483</sup> *Prosecutor v. Ndindabahizi*, Trial Judgment, para. 471, ICTR-2001-71-I, ICTR, July 15, 2004.



	2) Activists and researchers report of detainees approximately age 25–35 years regularly being subject to health screenings consistent with those required to assess organ health for <b>organ “harvesting,”</b> allowing for 24 hours to match patients from other cities and countries with live organ donors who have not knowingly consented to have their kidneys, livers, hearts, lungs, cornea, and skin “harvested.”	“China’s ‘XXX Files’: ‘25 Thousand People Disappear Each Year, Their Organs Are Harvested,’” Dec. 4, 2020; <u>Byline Times</u> , CJ Werleman, “‘Death Is Everywhere’ Millions More Uyghurs Missing,” Aug. 24, 2020; <u>The International Coalition to End Transplant Abuse in China</u> , Ethan Gutman, “The Killing of Innocents for Their Organs,” 2021.
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## B. Causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group

LEGAL STANDARD	CRIMES	SOURCE
“The Trial Chamber states that serious harm need not cause permanent and irremediable harm, but it must involve harm that goes beyond temporary unhappiness, embarrassment or humiliation. It must be harmful that results in a grave and long-term disadvantage to a person’s ability to lead a normal and constructive life. In subscribing to the above case-law, the Chamber holds that inhuman treatment, <b>torture, rape, sexual abuse</b> and deportation are among the acts which may cause serious bodily or	Detainees reported suffering from brutal <b>torture</b> while being interrogated as well as throughout their detention period. This included being restrained or forced into uncomfortable positions for long periods of time, beatings, electrocutions, and deprivation of adequate living conditions among much more. Former female detainees reported instances of <b>rape and</b>	<i>See Appendix C for torture, medical experimentation, rape, and other sexual violence that constitutes serious bodily harm.</i>

<p>mental injury.”<sup>484</sup></p> <p>“For purposes of interpreting Article 2 (2)(b) of the Statute, the Chamber takes serious bodily or mental harm, without limiting itself thereto, to mean acts of <b>torture</b>, be they bodily or mental, <b>inhumane or degrading treatment, persecution</b>.”<sup>485</sup></p> <p>“With regard [to] rape and sexual violence, the Chamber wishes to underscore the fact that in its opinion, they constitute genocide in the same way as any other act as long as they were committed with the specific intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a particular group, targeted as such. Indeed, <b>rape and sexual violence</b> certainly <b>constitute infliction of serious bodily and mental harm</b> on the victims and are even, according to the Chamber, one of the worst ways of inflict harm on the victim as he or she suffers both bodily and mental harm.”<sup>486</sup></p> <p>“Causing serious bodily or mental harm” .... is understood to mean, inter alia, acts of torture, inhumane or degrading treatment, sexual violence including rape, interrogations combined with beatings, threats of death, and harm that damages health or causes disfigurement or serious injury to members of the targeted national, ethnical, racial or religious group. The harm inflicted need not be permanent and irremediable but needs to be serious. The harm must be inflicted intentionally.”<sup>487</sup></p>	<p><b>sexual violence</b> by the security guards in the detention facility. Women were taken from their cells, often in groups, and were restrained and raped by individual or multiple guards. The women were beaten and tortured during the act of sexual violence, including biting and taking electric shocks to the genitals. Female detainees’ privacy was regularly violated through surveillance in the showers and lavatories.</p> <p>1) <b>Medical experimentation</b> has occurred on Uyghurs between 18–20 years of age. They were infected with COVID-19 in order to test vaccine effectiveness.</p>	<p>1) <u>Byline Times</u>, CJ Werleman, “‘Death Is Everywhere’ Millions More Uyghurs Missing,” Aug. 24, 2020.</p>
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<sup>484</sup> *Prosecutor v. Krstić*, Appeal Judgment, para. 513, IT-98-33-A, ICTY, Apr. 19, 2004.

<sup>485</sup> *Prosecutor v. Akayesu*, Trial Judgment, para. 504, ICTR-96-4-T, ICTR, Sept. 2, 1998.

<sup>486</sup> *Id.* at para. 731.

<sup>487</sup> *Prosecutor v. Brdanin*, Trial Judgment, para. 690, IT-99-36-T, ICTY, Sept. 1, 2004.

<p>In <i>Blagojević</i>, it was determined that acts that fall short of death may constitute genocide. The perpetrator is not required to choose the most efficient, quickest, or most violent methods in order to cause destruction.<sup>488</sup></p>		
<p>“<b>[S]erious mental harm</b> includes ‘more than minor or temporary impairment of mental faculties such as the infliction of strong fear or terror, intimidation or threat’. Indeed, nearly all convictions for the causing of serious bodily or mental harm involve rapes or killings. To support a conviction for genocide, the bodily harm or the mental harm inflicted on members of a group must be of such a serious nature as to threaten its destruction in whole or in part.”<sup>489</sup></p> <p>“[M]ental harm can be construed as some type of impairment of mental faculties or harm that causes serious injury to the mental state of the victim.”<sup>490</sup></p> <p>“Serious mental harm refers to more than minor or temporary impairment of mental faculties. The serious bodily or mental harm, however, need not be an injury that is permanent or irremediable. This harm can include crimes of sexual violence, including rape.”<sup>491</sup></p>	<p>Tactics were used to inflict mental and emotional harm, such as sleep deprivation and the threat of torture, as well as long periods of pain, isolation, and deprivation of basic necessities. Pervasive and constant surveillance both inside and outside of the detention camps causes severe distress. The surveillance is used to monitor every step each Uyghur takes in order to catch them violating a law outside of the camps, and for torture and confessional purposes inside of the camp.</p>	<p>See Appendix C for more information on mass incarceration, surveillance, cultural erasure, mass sterilization, mass forced abortions, forced marriages, taking away children, and other crimes which cause serious mental harm.</p>
<p>“<b>[F]orced marriage</b> involves a perpetrator compelling a person by force or threat of force, through the words or conduct of the perpetrator or</p>	<p>The CPP made strong efforts to facilitate and press for marriages between Uyghur women and Han men. Uyghur women</p>	<p>See Appendix C on forced marriages.</p>

<sup>488</sup> *Prosecutor v. Blagojević*, Trial Judgment, IT-02-06-T, ICTY, Jan. 17, 2005.

<sup>489</sup> *Prosecutor v. Seromba*, Appeal Judgment, para. 46, ICTR-2001-66-A, ICTR, Mar. 12, 2008.

<sup>490</sup> *Prosecutor v. Muhimana*, Trial Judgment, para. 502, ICTR- 95-1B-T, ITCR, Apr. 28, 2005

<sup>491</sup> *Prosecutor v. Bagosora*, Trial Judgment, para. 217, ICTR-98-41-T, ICTR, Dec. 18, 2008.

<p>those associated with him, into a forced conjugal association with another person resulting in great suffering, or serious physical or mental injury on the part of the victim. Second, unlike sexual slavery, forced marriage implies a relationship of exclusivity between the ‘husband’ and ‘wife,’ which could lead to disciplinary consequences for breach of this exclusive arrangement .... Forced marriage describes a situation in which the perpetrator through his words or conduct, or those of someone for whose actions he is responsible, compels a person by force, threat of force, or coercion to serve as a conjugal partner resulting in <b>severe suffering, or physical, mental or psychological injury</b> to the victim.”<sup>492</sup></p> <p>“The term ‘forcibly’ is not restricted to physical force, but may include threat of force or coercion, such as that caused by fear of violence, duress, detention, psychological oppression or abuse of power, against such person or persons or another person, or by taking advantage of a coercive environment.”<sup>493</sup></p>	<p>reported being coerced into marriage out of fear of detention or punishment, causing serious mental harm.</p>	
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<sup>492</sup> *Prosecutor v. Brima, Kamara, Kanu* (the AFRC accused), Appeal Judgment, paras. 195-202, SCSL-2004-16-A, Special Court for Sierra Leone, Feb. 22, 2008.

<sup>493</sup> International Criminal Court (ICC), *Elements of Crimes*, Art. 6(e), 2011, ISBN No. 92-9227-232-2.

**C. Deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about its physical destruction in whole or in part**

LEGAL STANDARD	CRIMES	SOURCE
<p>“The term ‘conditions of life’ may include, but is not necessarily restricted to, deliberate deprivation of resources indispensable for survival, such as food or medical services, or systematic expulsion from homes.”<sup>494</sup></p> <p>“The Trial Chamber [interpreted] circumstances which will lead to a slow death, for example, lack of proper housing, clothing, hygiene and medical care or excessive work or physical exertion .... It is the view of the Trial Chamber that ‘deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about its physical destruction in whole or in part,’ <b>includes methods of destruction which do not immediately lead to the death of members of the group ....</b> Therefore the conditions of life envisaged include rape, the starving of a group of people, reducing required medical services below a minimum, and withholding sufficient living accommodation for a reasonable period, provided the above would lead to the destruction of the group in whole or in part.”<sup>495</sup></p> <p>“The Chamber holds that the expression deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about its physical destruction</p>	<p>The CPP implemented policies that created conditions intended to make the survival of the Uyghur population difficult. Large portions of Uyghur society have been forcibly detained in internment camps under deplorable living conditions. In detention, the Uyghurs are deprived of essentials such as adequate food, water, and clothing and subjected to murder, organ “harvesting,” torture, rape and other sexual violence. After detention, many are transferred to forced labor camps and allowed little to no contact with the outside world. Uyghurs are constantly surveilled through advanced surveillance technology, both in and outside of detention. The surveillance makes it impossible for Uyghurs to move freely, practice their religion or customs, or maintain an appropriate level of privacy from the Government. Large scale forced sterilization, forced abortion, forced marriage, and removal of children appear designed to ensure there is not a next Uyghur generation.</p>	<p>See Appendix C for additional information on surveillance, detention, cultural erasure, rape, torture, murder, forced sterilization, forced abortion, forced marriages, and transfer of children.</p>

<sup>494</sup> *Id.* Art. 6(c).

<sup>495</sup> *Prosecutor v. Kayishema and Ruzindana*, Trial Judgment, paras. 115-16, ICTR-95-1-T, ICTR, May 21, 1999.

<p>in whole or in part, <b>should be construed as the methods of destruction by which the perpetrator does not immediately kill</b> the members of the group, but which, ultimately, seek their physical destruction.”<sup>496</sup></p> <p>“Examples of the prohibited act as so defined are confining the group members under extremely unhygienic or otherwise inhuman conditions, subjecting them to a subsistence diet, reducing essential medical services available to the group below minimum requirements.”<sup>497</sup></p>		
<p><b>D. Imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group</b></p>		
<b>LEGAL STANDARD</b>	<b>CRIMES</b>	<b>SOURCE</b>
<p>“[The] Chamber holds that the measures intended to prevent births within the group, should be construed as sexual mutilation, the practice of <b>sterilization, forced birth control</b>, separation of the sexes and prohibition of marriages. In patriarchal societies, where membership of a group is determined by the identity of the father, an example of a measure intended to prevent births within a group is the case where, during <b>rape</b>, a woman of the said group is deliberately <b>impregnated by a man of another group, with the intent to have her give birth to a child who will consequently not belong to its mother's group.</b>”<sup>498</sup></p>	<p>As part of the “Strike Hard” Campaign launched by the CPP in 2014, authorities began actively and systematically forcibly preventing the births of Uyghur and Turkic Muslim women. Uyghur women were subjected to <b>forced abortions, forced sterilization, and forced IUD implants</b>. Uyghur women were fined and detained for having excess births. This policy led to a decreased birth rate and a decreased population growth in certain areas of Xinjiang. Uyghur women are being encouraged/forced into marrying Han Chinese men, resulting in children of mixed ethnicity. Uyghur women are also</p>	<p>See Appendix C for additional details on forced sterilization, forced abortions, forced marriages, and rape.</p>

<sup>496</sup> *Prosecutor v. Akayesu*, Trial Judgment, para. 503, ICTR-96-4-T, ICTR, Sept. 2, 1998.

<sup>497</sup> *Id.* at para. 504.

<sup>498</sup> *Prosecutor v. Akayesu*, Trial Judgment, para. 507, ICTR-96-4-T, ICTR, Sept. 2, 1998.

	subjected to rape in detention camps by Han Chinese men.	
<b>E. Forcibly transferring children of the group to another group</b>		
<b>LEGAL STANDARD</b>	<b>CRIMES</b>	<b>SOURCE</b>
<p>“With respect to <b>forcibly transferring children</b> of the group to another group, the Chamber is of the opinion that, as in the case of measures intended to prevent births, the objective is not only to sanction a direct act of forcible physical transfer, but also to sanction acts of threats or trauma which would lead to the forcible transfer of children from one group to another.”<sup>499</sup></p> <p>“The term ‘forcibly’ is not restricted to physical force, but may include threat of force or coercion, such as that caused by fear of violence, duress, detention, psychological oppression or abuse of power, against such person or persons or another person, or by taking advantage of a coercive environment.”<sup>500</sup></p> <p>“Intent to destroy may be inferred from a policy of forcible transfer, along with ‘other culpable acts systematically directed against the same group.’ ... The ICTY Appeal Chamber stated that forcible transfer may constitute ‘an additional means’ in which a regime may bring about the physical destruction of a community, rather than in and of itself constituting genocide.”<sup>501</sup></p>	<p>Uyghur children are taken away from their parents and forcibly taken to Han-run boarding schools or orphanages. The parents often lose total contact with their children. Some parents reported seeing their children later on in Government propaganda videos.</p>	<p>See Appendix C for more information on the forcible transfer of children.</p>

<sup>499</sup> *Prosecutor v. Akayesu*, Trial Judgment, para. 507, ICTR-96-4-T, ICTR, Sept. 2, 1998.

<sup>500</sup> International Criminal Court (ICC), *Elements of Crimes*, Art. 6(e).

<sup>501</sup> *Prosecutor v. Krstić*, Appeal Judgment, paras. 31-33, IT-98-33-A, ICTY, Apr. 19, 2004.